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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit dem Einfluss von Rechtfertigungsdruck 
auf die Suche, Bewertung und Integration von Informationen bei der multiattributiven 
Entscheidungsfindung. Dabei wurden klassische sozialpsychologische und entschei-
dungsanalytische Ansätze miteinander kombiniert. Rechtfertigungsdruck wurde als eine 
motivierende Variable angesehen, die bestimmte Ziele in die Informationsverarbeitung 
des Entscheiders einführt. Welche Ziele das im einzelnen sind, hängt von situativen 
Merkmalen des Rechtfertigungsdrucks ab. Es wurde gezeigt, dass Rechtfertigungsdruck 
im wesentlichen aus zwei Komponenten besteht, (1) dem Gefühl persönlicher Verant-
wortlichkeit für eventuelle negative Konsequenzen des eigenen Verhaltens und (2) der 
Bewertungserwartung des eigenen Verhaltens durch eine „Öffentlichkeit“ (externes 
Publikum). Die zweite Komponente ist jedoch nur dann vorhanden, wenn erwartet wird, 
dass der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung von einer außenstehenden Person beobach-
tet wird bzw. dieser gegenüber gerechtfertigt werden muss (externer Rechtfertigungs-
druck). Bei internem Rechtfertigungsdruck, d.h. einem Verlangen, das eigene Verhalten 
sich selbst gegenüber rechtfertigen zu können, ist Bewertungserwartung minimal, da es 
kein externes Publikum gibt. 
Es wird ein Prozessmodel der Rechtfertigung (process model of accountability, 
PMA) entwickelt. Dessen Hauptannahme ist es, dass unter Rechtfertigungsdruck der 
Entscheidungsprozess sorgfältiger und komplexer, aber gleichzeitig stärker verfälscht 
abläuft. Rechtfertigungsdruck hat deshalb nicht die ausschließlich positive Wirkung, die 
ihm gemeinhin zugesprochen wird. Das Prozessmodel des Rechtfertigung nimmt 
weiterhin an, dass Hinweise auf persönliche Verantwortlichkeit den Wunsch nach 
Genauigkeit erhöhen. Letztere versuchen Entscheider dadurch zu erreichen, dass sie die 
Tiefe ihrer Informationssuche und Komplexität ihrer Informationsverarbeitung erhöhen. 
Dahingegen erzeugt Bewertungserwartung sogenannte Richtungsziele, d.h. Ziele, die 
den Entscheidungsprozess in eine bestimmte Richtung verfälschen, z.B. in Richtung 
einer Anpassung an die Präferenzen eines externen Publikums bzw., im Falle der 
erneuten Entscheidung, in Richtung auf eine Bestätigung der vorherigen Entscheidung. 
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Zur Überprüfung einiger zentraler, aus dem Prozessmodell abgeleiteter Vorher-
sagen wurden zwei Experimente mit folgender Versuchsanordnung durchgeführt. Die 
Versuchsteilnehmer sollten nach einer ersten Suche von Informationen eine vorläufige 
Entscheidung fällen. Bevor eine endgültige Entscheidung getroffen werden musste, 
konnten sie zusätzliche Informationen aus einer zweiten Informationsmenge einholen. 
Die für die zweite Informationssuche bereitgestellten Informationen waren hochgradig 
redundant und erlaubten es somit, zu überprüfen, ob die Informationssuche nach einer 
vorläufigen Entscheidung zugunsten dieser verfälscht wird. Weiterhin wurden mehr-
mals während des Entscheidungsprozesses Bewertungen der Attraktivität einzelner 
Aspekte von Alternativen sowie die Wichtigkeit dieser Aspekte für die Entscheidung 
abgefragt. Dies geschah, um zu überprüfen, ob sie vom Entscheider so verändert 
werden, dass sich der Attraktivitätsvorsprung  der gewählten Alternative gegenüber den 
nicht gewählten Alternativen vergrößert. Letzteres wird von der Differenzierungs- und 
Konsolidierungstheorie (Svenson, 1992, 1996) vorhergesagt, welche Festingers (1957, 
1964) Dissonanztheorie auf multiattributive Entscheidungssituationen übertragen und 
für solche spezifiziert hat. 
Im ersten Experiment wurden die Effekte internen und externen 
Rechtfertigungsdrucks untersucht, der entweder vor oder nach einer ersten Entschei-
dung eingeführt wurde. Dabei wurden keine externen Präferenzen explizit gemacht. Es 
zeigte sich in Übereinstimmung zu den Vorhersagen des Prozessmodells, dass sowohl 
interner als auch externer Rechtfertigungsdruck in der Tendenz zu einer tieferen und 
komplexeren Informationssuche führte. Unter internem Rechtfertigungsdruck, welcher 
bereits vor einer ersten Entscheidung eingeführt wurde, blieb die Informations-
verarbeitung auch nach einer vorläufigen Entscheidung relativ ausgewogen. Wurde 
interner Rechtfertigungsdruck jedoch erst nach einer vorläufigen Entscheidung ein-
geführt, verfälschten Entscheider ihre Informationssuche und Informationsbewertung 
stärker in Richtung der vorher gewählten Alternative als dies bei externem Rechtferti-
gungsdruck der Fall war. Verfälschungstendenzen bei der Informationsbewertung waren 
jedoch generell eher schwach und deuteten darauf hin, dass Personen unter externem 
Rechtfertigungsdruck die Attraktivitätsdifferenz zwischen ihrer gewählten Alternative 
und den nicht gewählten Alternativen reduzierten, wenn ihr Urteil offensichtlich war, 
  v 
z.B. bei einer holistischen Bewertung der Güte von Alternativen, sie jedoch vergrößer-
ten, wenn eine Verfälschungstendenz weniger deutlich war, z.B. wenn die Gesamt-
bewertung von Alternativen mit Hilfe der multiattributiven Nutzentheorie aus ein-
dimensionalen Wert- und Gewichtsurteilen vorhergesagt wurde. Dies deutet darauf hin, 
dass Personen unter externem Rechtfertigungsdruck eine deutliche öffentliche Stellung-
nahme vermeiden wollen, wenn unklar ist, wie ein externes Publikum auf eine solche 
reagieren würde, und ihr Verhalten offensichtlich stark von Überlegungen geprägt ist, 
wie sie sich dem externen Publikum gegenüber positiv darstellen können. 
Letztere Schlussfolgerung wurde auch von den Ergebnissen eines zweiten 
Experiments bestätigt, welches den Einfluss von Rechtfertigung gegenüber verschiede-
nen Interessengruppen auf Entscheidungsprozesse untersuchte. Die Versuchsteilnehmer 
wurden gebeten, für eine Firma eine Kaufentscheidung über ein Computerprogramm zu 
treffen und wurden entweder den späteren Benutzern dieses Programms oder dem 
Management der Firma gegenüber verantwortlich gemacht. Dies geschah entweder vor 
einer ersten Entscheidung oder erst, nachdem schon eine vorläufige Entscheidung 
getroffen worden war. Wie vom Prozessmodell der Rechtfertigung vorhergesagt, konnte 
eine Anpassung der Entscheidung an die Präferenzen der Interessengruppe, der gegen-
über Versuchsteilnehmer verantwortlich gemacht worden waren, nur dann beobachtet 
werden, wenn Rechtfertigungsdruck schon vor einer ersten Entscheidung, nicht aber, 
wenn er erst nach einer ersten Entscheidung induziert worden war. Eine Anpassung an 
die Präferenzen des externen Publikums konnte insbesondere bei offensichtlichen 
Urteilen und weniger bei stärker versteckten Urteilen beobachtet werden. Bestand 
jedoch ein starker Konflikt zwischen den Präferenzen der Entscheider und den Präfe-
renzen ihres externen Publikums, zeigten sowohl offene als auch versteckte Urteile 
Anzeichen einer Unterstützung der eigenen Präferenz. Dabei vergrößerten Entscheider 
die Attraktivitätsdifferenz zwischen ihrer gewählten Alternative und den nicht gewähl-
ten Alternativen und suchten Informationen, welche ihre gewählte Alternative im 
Vergleich zu den nicht gewählten Alternativen begünstigten. Gleichzeitig resultierte 
sowohl Rechtfertigungsdruck vor als auch nach einer ersten Entscheidung in einer 
tieferen und komplexeren Informationsverarbeitung im Vergleich zu einer Kontroll-
gruppe, bei der zu keinem Zeitpunkt Rechtfertigungsdruck erzeugt wurde. Dies 
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bestätigt, dass Rechtfertigungsdruck den Entscheidungsprozess sowohl sorgfältiger und 
komplexer macht als auch stärker verfälscht. Dabei scheint die erhöhte Tiefe der Ver-
arbeitung Personen darin zu unterstützen, Rechtfertigungen für ihre Entscheidungen zu 
konstruieren. 
Insgesamt verweisen beide Experimente auf die wichtige Funktion, die sowohl 
interne als auch externe Präferenzen und Normen als Richtungsziele für den 
Entscheidungsprozess haben. Die Bedeutung dieser Befunde für den Einsatz von 
Rechtfertigungsdruck als Kontrollmittel in Organisationen wird diskutiert. 
  vii 
SUMMARY 
The thesis investigated the effects of accountability on information search, 
evaluation and integration in multiattribute decision making, combining classical social 
psychological with decision-analytical approaches. Accountability was conceptualised 
as a motivating agent, that is, as a variable that introduces particular goals into decision 
makers' information processing. The exact nature of these goals was argued to depend 
on the particular type of accountability that is created. Accountability demands were 
suggested to consist of two core components, (1) a feeling of personal responsibility for 
potentially negative consequences of the individual's behaviour, and (2) evaluation 
apprehension. However, only when the individual is made accountable to an external 
audience, are both components present. Under internal accountability, that is, a need to 
be able to justify one's behaviour to oneself, evaluation apprehension is largely absent, 
due to the absence of an external audience. 
A new process model of accountability (PMA) was introduced whose main 
premise is that accountability can make the decision process both more complex and 
more biased and therefore has not the exclusively beneficial effects that it is commonly 
afforded. The PMA proposes that the personal responsibility cues inherent in 
accountability demands make accuracy goals salient, which the decision maker tries to 
meet by increasing the depth of information search and complexity of information 
integration. Evaluation apprehension cues, on the other hand, are assumed to make 
directional goals salient, that is, goals that drive the decision process towards a 
particular conclusion, for example, towards supporting an alternative that is assumed to 
be preferred by the external audience individuals are accountable to. A directional goal 
may also be introduced by a previous commitment to an alternative; in this case the 
decision process is biased towards the previously chosen alternative.  
Some predictions derived from the PMA were tested in two empirical studies, 
both of which employed a similar paradigm. Participants searched information twice, 
once before they made a preliminary and once before they made a final decision. The 
information contained in the second search set was largely redundant with that of the 
first set, in order to be able to test whether information search after a previous 
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commitment would be biased to support the chosen alternative. Unidimensional value 
and weight judgements were elicited several times during the experiment, in order to 
test whether participants would change them in such a way as to increase the evaluative 
advantage of their chosen alternative over any non-chosen alternatives. The latter is 
predicted by Svenson's (1992, 1996) differentiation and consolidation theory, which has 
applied Festinger’s (1957, 1964) theory of cognitive dissonance to multiattribute 
decisions. 
The first study investigated the effects of pre- and post-decisional internal and 
external accountability on the decision processes observed during a fictitious personnel 
selection decision. No external norms or preferences were made explicit. As predicted, 
both internal and external accountability tended to result in a deeper and more complex 
information search prior to the first decision. Pre-decisional internal accountability was 
found to keep information processing after a preliminary decision relatively balanced. 
However, when internal accountability was only introduced after a previous 
commitment had been made, participants’ information search and evaluation was more 
strongly biased towards supporting the previously chosen alternative than that of 
externally accountable participants. The analysis of the extent of bias in participants' 
information evaluation yielded rather weak effects, which suggested that under external 
accountability, individuals tended to decrease the evaluative difference between their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative whenever their evaluation was obvious to 
others, for example, in holistic suitability ratings of alternatives, but tended to increase 
this difference when their evaluation was less obvious, for example, when 
unidimensional value and weight judgements were combined in a linear additive MAUT 
(Multiattribute Utility Theory) model prediction of the overall evaluation of 
alternatives. This suggested that externally accountable participants tried to avoid a 
strong public commitment to a particular alternative when the reactions of their external 
audience to this commitment could not be anticipated. Hence, impression management 
concerns seem to play an important role in determining the responses of individuals' 
who have been made externally accountable.  
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This latter conclusion was also supported by a second study, which investigated 
pre-and post-decisional accountability to different interest groups. Participants were 
asked to decide which software engineering tool they would acquire for a company, and 
were either made accountable to the future users of the tool or the management of the 
company. As predicted by the PMA, an adjustment to the preferences of the external 
audience was only observed when accountability had already been introduced before, 
but not when it had only been introduced after a preliminary decision. This adjustment 
was primarily observed in overt, and to a lesser extent in covert, judgements. When 
participants' preferences conflicted with those of the audience they had been made 
accountable to, however, both overt and covert judgements showed signs of bolstering, 
where participants increased the evaluative difference between their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative and searched information that supported their chosen alternative 
over their non-chosen alternatives. At the same time, both pre-and post-decisional 
accountability resulted in deeper and more complex information processing compared 
to no accountability, suggesting that accountability will indeed increase both depth and 
directional bias in individuals' information processing. The increased depth of 
processing may help individuals to construct sophisticated justifications for their choice.  
Taken together, both studies demonstrated the special role of internal as well as 
external preferences and norms in directing the individual's decision process. The 
implications of these findings for the use of accountability as a means of control in 
organisations were discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
”Often anticipations of acceptable justifications will control conduct. (‘If I did this, 
what could I say? What would they say?’) Decisions may be, wholly or in part, delimited by 
answers to such queries.” 
 (C. W. Mills, 1940, p. 907) 
 
Decisions are considered to be expressions of a decision maker’s value system, that is, 
to reflect the decision maker’s preferences. These preferences, however, are not stable but 
strongly context-dependent. Decision research has identified a variety of context variables 
which strongly influence both the process of arriving at a decision and the resulting decision 
(Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). These are, for example, variables of the task context, such 
as the complexity of a decision problem or whether or not a decision has to be made under 
time pressure. As the above statement by Mills suggests, variables of the social context in 
which a decision is made must be assumed to be at least equally influential. As Tetlock 
(1992) points out, decisions are not usually made in a social vacuum. Often decisions affect 
not only the person who makes them but also other people, and those others expect that the 
consequences a decision will have for them are taken into account when it is made. Also, 
important decisions are often the product of the decision maker interacting with other people, 
asking them for and listening to their opinions, or they are made by a group altogether. 
Whereas social psychology has recognised the impact of the social environment on individual 
behaviour and has made it the focus of its study, this impact has largely been ignored by 
cognitive and economic approaches to decision-making. It is a goal of this thesis to integrate 
social psychological and cognitive approaches to decision-making, in order to achieve a more 
complete understanding of decision-making in a social environment. 
The work presented here focuses on accountability as an important social context 
variable. The concept of accountability, which deals with the demand to justify one’s 
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behaviour, can be regarded as one of the oldest concepts in science (Schlenker, Weigold & 
Doherty, 1991), yet it has not received much empirical attention until recently. Both the 
extent to which a person’s behaviour is affected by being accountable for it and the nature of 
these effects including their mediating processes has long been unknown. These issues will be 
addressed, with a focus on decisions as important constituents of human behaviour. In 
particular, the aim is to find an answer to the following questions: How does accountability 
affect the process of arriving at a decision and its outcome? How are information search, 
evaluation and integration influenced by the knowledge that a decision has to be justified to 
oneself and/or other people?  
In recent years, accountability has come to be regarded as a remedy against 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness and even as a means to overcome the general crisis of modern 
society (Bayertz, 1996). Proposals for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of social 
services, for example, usually advocate increasing accountability (Newman & Turem, 1974; 
Ross & Joelson, 1986; O’Neill, 1989). This is the case although the effects of accountability 
on behaviour in general and decision-making processes in particular are not yet fully 
understood and there are good reasons to believe that, under certain circumstances, holding 
people accountable may have effects contrary to those intended. Adelberg and Batson (1978), 
for example, were able to show that, in the context of a financial resource allocation, when 
applicants’ needs exceeded available resources, making the decision-maker accountable to 
either the provider or the recipient of resources led to a less effective use of resources than did 
no accountability. It is essential, therefore, to know more about the effects of accountability 
on decision-making and potential moderators of these effects before any such advice can be 
given. It is the aim of this thesis to contribute to the understanding of these processes.  
The approach to decision making taken here is a descriptive one, that is, in contrast to 
normative theories of decision making which assume that context variables do not and should 
not affect the decision process or its outcome, the significance of such variables is recognised 
and the effects of accountability as one of these variables investigated. Descriptive theories of 
decision making often stress the importance of a decision maker’s goals or motives for how 
decisions are made. The notion that motives affect reasoning processes is an old one in social 
psychology (Lewin, 1938; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). General motives that have been 
proposed to influence reasoning processes include avoiding inconsistency in the cognitive 
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system (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1968), protecting or enhancing one’s self-esteem (Steele, 
1988), creating a favourable impression on others (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981; 
Baumeister, 1982) and avoiding stress and anxiety (Janis & Mann, 1977). These motives may 
be made salient by particular features of the situation and create specific processing goals. 
Accountability may be regarded as one such feature.  
Abelson (1963) distinguished between hot and cold cognition. Hot cognition describes 
affect-laden, motivated information processing, whereas cold cognition refers to the normal, 
non-motivated operation of the human information processing system. Although very 
plausible, the idea of motivated, hot cognition has been controversial in the past. In the mid 
1970s and early 1980s many effects previously accounted for in terms of motivation were 
explained in non-motivational, cognitive terms. It was suggested that motivated reasoning 
phenomena could be entirely explained by the nature of human information processing 
mechanisms and that it was not necessary to invoke any motivational explanations (Miller & 
Ross, 1975; Ross, 1977; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This cold cognition approach assumed that 
people draw certain conclusions not because they are motivated to do so, but because these 
conclusions seem more plausible, given certain prior beliefs and expectancies (Kunda, 1990). 
An example for a purely cognitive mechanism that may underlie biased judgements and 
decisions is that people can only process information that is available to them. If, for some 
reason, the available information is insufficient or not representative, a biased conclusion will 
be drawn. 
The hot versus cold cognition debate is an on-going one since it is often very difficult 
to determine whether a certain effect is due to a motivational or a purely cognitive 
mechanism. Abelson and Levi (1985) give the example of a theory-driven, biased information 
search which may reflect a motivational bias in that a decision maker may want to confirm his 
or her initial hypothesis but could also reflect a cognitive bias in that the decision maker’s 
initial hypothesis may direct his or her attention to supporting information. Authors such as 
Tetlock and Levi (1982) have therefore argued that the hot versus cold cognition controversy 
cannot be solved, at least not in certain domains.  
Nevertheless, the evidence that certain motives or goals can influence information 
processing seems to be indisputable. There have been efforts recently to put forward a 
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compromise view, for example by Kruglanski (1996), who suggests to get rid of the 
distinction between motivated and non-motivated cognition altogether and adopt a synergistic 
perspective. According to Kruglanski, "motivation and cognition are inextricably intertwined 
in that nearly all motivation encompasses cognitive aspects and nearly all cognition 
encompasses motivational aspects" (1996, p. 493). He proposes that, instead of asking 
whether motivation exerts any effects on cognition, one should concentrate on answering a 
slightly different question, namely what it is about motivation that helps us understand 
cognition and vice versa. Kunda (1990) proposes that motivation may affect reasoning 
through reliance on a set of cognitive strategies from which the individual chooses the one 
that best suits his or her goals and which provide the mechanisms through which motivation 
can affect reasoning. This is a view of the individual as a motivated tactician, who regulates 
his or her own cognitive processes in order to fulfil certain needs and achieve certain goals 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Showers & Cantor, 1985; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; 
Kruglanski & Meinholdt, 1990; Baumeister & Newman, 1994). Baumeister and Newman’s 
(1994) self-regulation model will serve as a basis for a theoretical framework that describes 
how the individual may direct his or her decision processes as a consequence of 
accountability pressures and will be presented in some detail in Chapter 4.  
Although the work presented here investigates decision processes with a descriptive 
rather than normative focus, the methodology employed is largely based on a normative 
decision theory, multiattribute utility theory (MAUT, Edwards, 1971, 1977; Raiffa, 1969; 
Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). We will therefore continue with 
an outline of what decision making entails and introduce MAUT as both a theory of how 
decisions should be made and a set of methods to guide the individual in making a rational 
decision. We will then continue with a discussion of accountability and its significance in 
various real-world contexts before concluding this chapter with a sketch of the chapters to 
come.  
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Decision processes 
A decision is commonly conceived of as choosing one alternative out of a number of 
available alternatives. This is assumed to be an intentional act, preceded by a period of 
conscious reflection about the different alternatives. There is no general agreement among 
decision researchers about how people actually make decisions (Huber, 1989), but it may be 
argued that there are three fundamental processes involved: Information search, information 
evaluation, and information integration. When making a decision, the individual first has to 
find out about various aspects or consequences of the available alternatives. This is the 
process of information search. The next important step is to evaluate these consequences in 
terms of how well they serve one’s goals, and, finally, to integrate these evaluations to arrive 
at a decision.  
Not all decisions, however, are made in this way. Decisions can vary considerably 
with regard to the extent of conscious cognitive effort that is expended when making them. 
Often we are not even aware of making a decision. This is the case when decisions have 
become largely habitual and automatised, because they have to be made often and are not 
very important. The decision maker simply chooses what he or she has chosen before and 
what turned out to be successful (so-called level 1 decisions, Svenson, 1990). An example for 
this type of decision would be choosing which brand of coffee to buy in a supermarket.  
Only when decisions are perceived to be important and difficult does the decision 
maker carefully consider all available alternatives and make trade-offs between the various 
advantages and disadvantages of alternatives (Borcherding, Schmeer & Weber, 1995). 
Whether a decision is perceived as important, is mainly a function of its consequences 
(Borcherding, 1991). If the consequences are serious, affect many people and will be present 
for a long time or even irreversible, the decision is considered to be important. Decisions are 
perceived to be difficult when the decision maker has multiple conflicting goals and no 
alternative is clearly superior to the others in terms of achieving these goals. This is usually 
the case for multiattribute decisions. Multiattribute decisions are decisions between 
alternatives, each of which has several consequences. These consequences occur in different 
dimensions (attributes) and are called outcomes. An example for a multiattribute decision is a 
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decision about which house to buy. The houses on offer may differ with regard to price, size, 
state of repair, distance to work and distance to shopping facilities; they have different 
outcomes on these attributes. In such a situation, the decision maker usually has multiple 
objectives: He or she wants to buy a house that is at the same time inexpensive, has an 
optimal size, is in a good state of repair, close to work and close to shopping facilities. Most 
likely there will not be an alternative that serves all these goals best. For this reason, 
multiattribute decisions are also called decisions with conflicting objectives (Bell, Keeney, & 
Raiffa, 1977). In order to arrive at a decision, the decision maker has to compare all aspects 
and trade them off against each other. The resulting trade-offs are likely to differ between 
individual decision makers and, therefore, are open to criticism. Hence, multiattribute 
decisions are typically decisions we are accountable for and therefore are the type of decision 
investigated here. People do not normally feel accountable or are made accountable for 
unimportant and easy decisions, unless they lead to unexpected negative consequences.  
Multiattribute utility theory  
Multiattribute utility theory (Edwards, 1971, 1977; Raiffa, 1969; Keeney & Raiffa, 
1976; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) is a prescriptive theory that sets out how 
multiattribute decisions should be made (in contrast to descriptive theories of decision making 
which deal with how decisions are made). MAUT can therefore also serve as a support tool 
for individual or group decision making. As a prescriptive theory MAUT takes into account 
the subjective nature of a decision maker’s goals and attempts to identify the choice that 
serves these subjective goals best, in contrast to normative decision theories which propose 
general rational principles that all decision makers should follow. MAUT recognises that 
multiattribute decision situations typically make heavy demands on the decision maker’s 
information processing capacities (Borcherding, 1983, Hogarth, 1987) and suggests 
simplifying the decision process by decomposing the decision problem into its constituting 
components, evaluating these components separately, and then recomposing them to arrive at 
a decision (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). Instead of having to cope with an n-dimensional decision 
problem, decomposition of the problem allows the decision maker to deal with n one-
dimensional problems separately.  
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The application of MAUT usually involves four major steps whose order, apart from 
the first and the final step, is arbitrary: (1) structuring objectives, (2) eliciting preferences, (3) 
scoring alternatives, and (4) aggregating preferences to arrive at an overall evaluation for each 
alternative. The main goal of structuring objectives is to select dimensions on which the 
alternatives are to be evaluated. The decision maker specifies his or her objectives (e.g., 
buying a house which is inexpensive, of optimal size, in a good state of repair, close to work, 
and close to shopping facilities), which are then build into a value tree, with the overall, 
general objective (e.g., buying a house) at the top and increasingly specific objectives (e.g., 
optimal size) at lower levels of the tree. The objectives at the bottom level of the tree have to 
be measurable and are usually referred to as attributes (see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976, for 
desirable properties of a set of attributes).  
Once a value tree has been created the decision maker’s preferences are measured. 
Preferences include the relative importance of attributes, referred to as attribute weights, and 
the value or utility of certain outcomes on the specified attributes. The term ‘value’ is 
normally used when dealing with decisions which have more or less known consequences 
(e.g., which house to buy), whereas ‘utility’ is reserved for decisions involving uncertainty to 
such an extent that it warrants representation in the decision analysis (e.g., which shares to 
buy). When values or utilities are measured, the decision maker specifies the relationship 
between particular outcomes and the extent to which these outcomes satisfy the objective 
expressed by their corresponding attribute. For example, the decision maker may be asked to 
specify, for a range of sizes, how good (or bad) they are in terms of the wished-for size. The 
resulting value or utility functions allow comparing aspects of alternatives across different 
dimensions, that is, they establish commensurability across different attributes. Values or 
utilities are based on the same scale, unlike measurements made on an attribute level which 
usually differ in the units employed (e.g., size may be expressed in m2 and distance to work in 
km) and therefore make trade-offs between attributes difficult. 
There are a number of different ways in which values and utilities may be measured 
(see von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). The simplest one, direct rating, involves the decision 
maker rating the outcomes of alternatives on an attractiveness scale which is usually anchored 
by the worst and best plausible outcome. In the house-buying example, the decision maker 
may be asked how good he or she perceives a distance to work of 10 km to be, when the best 
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outcome would be living 0.5 km away and receives a score of 100, and the worst outcome 
would be living 50km away and receives a score of 0. Alternatively, the scale may just have 
verbal anchors, for example, ‘very bad’ and ‘very good’.  
Attribute weights describe the importance of each attribute relative to the other 
attributes and the decision maker’s overall objective. The term ‘relative’ is important here; 
attribute weights specify the contribution of each attribute to the overall evaluation of an 
alternative in the given decision situation and not some abstract, general perception of 
importance1. Weights, like values or utilities, can be elicited in different ways. One method, 
the swing method (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) will be described in more detail in 
Chapter 6. For a summary of weight elicitation methods and a discussion of their respective 
merits and disadvantages, see Borcherding, Eppel, and von Winterfeldt (1991) and 
Borcherding, Schmeer, and Weber (1995).  
MAUT's third step, the scoring of alternatives, involves collecting information about 
the outcome of each alternative with respect to each attribute. For example, the decision 
maker who wants to buy a house would have to gather information about the price, size, state 
of repair, distance to work and distance to shopping facilities of each house he or she 
considers. This, together with the elicited value or utility functions, allows determining the 
perceived value or utility of each alternative with regard to each attribute and is an important 
prerequisite for the final step, the aggregation of preferences to arrive at an overall evaluation 
for each alternative.  
Different aggregation (or decision) rules may be applied. By far the most common and 
the simplest aggregation rule is the weighted additive rule, whereby the overall evaluation of 
an alternative is a function of the value or utility of an outcome multiplied by the weight of 
the corresponding attribute, added up over all attributes. Other aggregation rules include the 
multiplicative and the multilinear model (see Borcherding, 1983, for a detailed discussion of 
                                                 
1 This implies that attribute weights should change with the range of outcomes of the considered alternatives. If 
the range of outcomes is small (e.g., the price of houses on offer only varies by DM 500), the price attribute 
should receive a small weight. If the range of outcomes is large, on the other hand (e.g., DM 50,000), the weight 
of the price attribute should increase. Decision makers, however, often show range insensitivity, that is, they do 
not make sufficient adjustments when outcome ranges change. 
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these models). All models have in common that they involve calculating some sort of 
weighted average which reflects the expected value (EV) or subjectively expected utility 
(SEU) of an alternative. A formal representation of the weighted additive rule is shown in 
Equation 1.1: 
 V(Ai) = ∑ wj ⋅ v(xij) (Eq. 1.1) 
 where V(Ai) is the overall evaluation of an alternative i, wj is the weight for the jth 
attribute, xij is the outcome for alternative i on attribute j, and v(xij) is the value or utility 
of alternative i’s outcome on attribute j.  
The aggregation rule is used to calculate an overall evaluation for each considered 
alternative. The alternative that receives the highest overall evaluation maximises EV or SEU 
and should be chosen by a rational decision maker. 
Compensatory vs. non-compensatory decision rules 
Decision rules are typically categorised as compensatory or non-compensatory. A 
compensatory decision rule allows a bad value on one attribute to be compensated for by a 
good value on another attribute, that is, it permits trade-offs. MAUT’s aggregation rules, such 
as the weighted additive rule, are examples of compensatory decision rules. This is not 
surprising, as MAUT explicitly deals with how trade-offs between attributes should be made. 
MAUT, as a prescriptive theory, is concerned with making rational choices, and rational 
choices are assumed to be those (and only those) which maximise expected value or utility. 
Value or utility maximisation, by nature, involves a compensatory approach; all outcomes are 
considered and weighed by the extent to which the decision maker is willing to trade them off 
against each other (in the case of value maximisation, Hogarth, 1987) or by the probability 
with which they are obtained (in the case of utility maximisation).  
Although compensatory decision rules are best from a normative point of view, 
descriptive analyses of decision processes have repeatedly shown that decision makers do not 
use them very often. Decision makers prefer non-compensatory decision rules, especially 
when the decision to be made is complex (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) or not highly 
involving (Kahn & Baron, 1995). As the term suggests, non-compensatory decision rules do 
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not allow compensation or trade-offs between attributes. Examples for non-compensatory 
decision rules are the conjunctive, the lexicographic and the elimination-by-aspects rule (see 
Svenson, 1979, for others). The conjunctive rule involves the setting of cut-off points for each 
attribute; only alternatives whose outcomes exceed the cut-off point for each attribute may be 
chosen. The lexicographic rule prescribes the choice of the alternative with the best outcome 
on the most important attribute. If alternatives have equally attractive outcomes on the most 
important attribute, they will be compared on the attribute that is the next most important until 
only one alternative remains. The elimination-by-aspects rule, suggested by Tversky (1972), 
combines aspects of both the conjunctive and the lexicographic rule. Similarly to the 
lexicographic rule, alternatives are compared on attributes in the order of attribute importance, 
but, similarly to the conjunctive rule, only alternatives whose outcomes exceed certain cut-off 
points survive the elimination process.  
Why are decision makers more likely to use non-compensatory than compensatory 
decision rules? A major reason for the attractiveness of non-compensatory rules is that they 
are usually much less demanding in terms of the cognitive effort they require. Non-
compensatory decision rules involve fewer and less complex comparisons than compensatory 
decision rules. Also, the decision maker does not have to establish commensurability across 
attributes in order to be able to apply them. This advantage becomes particularly important 
when information load is high due a large number of alternatives and/or attributes, and the 
decision maker’s information processing capacities are stretched (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1993). Simon (1955) introduced the concept of bounded rationality which 
recognises the decision maker’s wish to make a rational decision but at the same time keep 
cognitive effort minimal. Simon suggests that a decision maker often engages in a process of 
satisficing rather than maximising or optimising, that is, he or she looks for a satisfactory 
alternative rather than the best one. This process involves the application of a heuristic very 
similar to the conjunctive rule; the first alternative that meets certain criteria or so-called 
aspiration levels is chosen. Satisficing and other non-compensatory decision rules have the 
benefit of reducing computational demands, but they also carry a cost; they may result in the 
rejection of an alternative that is superior to the chosen one. A satisficing decision maker is 
willing to accept this risk in exchange for the benefits of the chosen rule. This idea of Simon’s 
greatly influenced descriptive theories of decision making and resulted in the proposal of 
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various cost-benefit frameworks in the decision literature, such as Beach and Mitchell’s 
(1978) strategy selection model and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson’s (1993) effort-accuracy 
framework. A similar model from the social cognition literature is the cognitive miser model 
(Taylor, 1981, Taylor & Fiske, 1981) which suggests that, because people have limited 
information processing capacities, they take shortcuts whenever possible.  
Hogarth (1987) points out that, apart from allowing the decision maker to avoid the 
cognitive effort of trade-offs, the use of non-compensatory decision rules also allows him or 
her to avoid the emotional conflict that typically accompanies trade-offs. Trade-offs force the 
decision maker to consider questions he or she would like to avoid, for example, how big a 
cut in salary would I be willing to accept for working 10 hours less per week. People show a 
particular aversion to trade-offs that involve human lives, such as decisions about how many 
lives saved are worth a certain investment into road safety campaigns or into safety measures 
for a nuclear waste disposal site (Lichtenstein, Gregory, Slovic, & Wagenaar, 1990). The 
application of non-compensatory decision rules is an attempt to reduce the conflict by 
avoiding trade-offs altogether, whereas the application of compensatory decision rules shows 
a conflict-confronting strategy.  
Unless process tracing methods are applied which allow the researcher to monitor how 
decisions are made, it is difficult to infer which rule a decision maker used to arrive at his or 
her choice. The fact that a certain rule predicts a choice well, however, does not necessarily 
mean that this rule was really applied. Linear models, such as the weighted additive model, 
usually are good predictors of choices, even if the decision rule used was not a compensatory 
one (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, 1979).  
Having outlined general principles of decision theory, we will now return to our 
original interest, namely accountability as a variable that affects decision processes.  
Accountability as a norm enforcement mechanism 
According to Schlenker, Weigold and Doherty (1991), accountability “refers to being 
answerable to audiences, oneself included, for performing up to prescribed standards” (p. 
110). This definition incorporates two important aspects of accountability: (1) accountability 
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comprises a need to explain one’s behaviour either to oneself or to an external audience, and 
(2) the explanations brought forward are oriented at and will be evaluated with respect to 
certain prescribed standards or norms. The latter aspect implies that accountability can be 
understood as a norm enforcement mechanism. It is considered to be crucial for social control 
and self-regulation (Schlenker, Weigold & Doherty, 1991). According to Tetlock (1985a), 
accountability provides the social psychological link between individual decision makers on 
the one hand and the social system to which they belong on the other. For a society it is vital 
to solve the problem of how to control and co-ordinate the actions of individuals who are 
capable of monitoring and controlling their own actions and who have different interests and 
goals (Semin & Manstead, 1983; Tetlock, 1985a; Schlenker, Weigold & Doherty, 1991). 
Accountability causes people to expect that others will judge their behaviour with regard to 
prevalent norms of conduct and that rewards and punishments will be distributed accordingly. 
This puts a certain constraint on individual behaviour and allows people to exert legitimised 
control over each other’s behaviour (Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991). In this context, it 
is also important to note the significance of accountability for maintaining good relationships 
with the social environment (Buttny, 1993). Accounts help to repair ‘fractured’ social 
interaction, that is, interaction which has been disrupted by the fact that social norms have 
been violated or are believed to have been violated (Semin & Manstead, 1983). When 
accounting for their behaviour, individuals may try to convince the other party that they could 
not have foreseen the consequences of their behaviour and therefore are not responsible for 
them or that these consequences are not as negative as they appear to be. Otherwise, people 
may apologise for their behaviour. When the other party accepts the accounts or apologies 
brought forward, normal interaction can be resumed. Accounts also allow individuals to 
negotiate rules and norms (Buttny, 1993). Although the social control function of 
accountability constrains the individual from deviating from societal norms of conduct, the 
question of how and whether these norms apply to the individual can be negotiated in social 
interaction, especially through accounts. 
Accountability not only provides a mechanism for social control, but also for self-
regulation. Even when not explicitly prompted by other people to do so, individuals take into 
account how their behaviour may be evaluated in the light of certain standards and norms. 
They consider how defensible certain actions are and adjust their behaviour accordingly, that 
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is, they organise their behaviour in such a way that it can be accounted for to others (Semin & 
Manstead, 1983). Individuals also monitor their behaviour, evaluate the resulting performance 
and administer self-reward or self-punishment, thereby exerting self-regulation (Bandura, 
1977).  
To illustrate the high significance of accountability for various domains of public life, 
we will now discuss four contexts in which accountability features particularly strongly: the 
law, politics, organisations, and professions. 
Accountability contexts  
Legal accountability  
Given the control function of accountability and its central role for the functioning of a 
society, it is not surprising that it has a particular significance in legal contexts. Very often 
accountability also means legal responsibility. Legal systems rest on the assumption that 
people are autonomous actors who are able to control their actions and account for them. 
When an offence has been committed and a person is brought before a court of law, a first 
step in order to establish whether a defendant is guilty and therefore liable to punishment, is 
to call him or her to account, that is, to demand a more detailed explanation from him or her 
about what happened and to give reasons for his or her behaviour (Ross, 1975). Only when 
responsibility of a person for his or her deed has been established, following certain rules 
specified in the law, the person can be found guilty and sentencing can take place. This 
implies that accountability in a legal context not only entails accountability of the defendant 
to a court of law, but also accountability of the court of law to the defendant. The court of law 
has to give reasons for arriving at a certain verdict. Thereby a reciprocal relation or a contract 
is established between the individual and the legal system: the individual is accountable for 
the consequences of his or her actions, but only if the law is not subject to arbitrary change or 
enforcement (McKeon, 1957). Legal trials can be understood as a social institutionalisation of 
the everyday process of accusation and justification. This form of social institutionalisation 
has in turn exerted considerable influence on the procedure of accounting for oneself in an 
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everyday context. The process of accounting for one’s behaviour often resembles a legal trial 
(Bayertz, 1996).  
Political accountability  
Clearly, accountability is also an integral part of politics. Accountability can be 
regarded as a central feature of a democratic political system. Members of parliament and 
government are accountable to their constituencies and control institutions. The idea of an 
accountable and responsible government has developed and has been applied to an increasing 
extent since the 19th century. A responsible government „operates within a framework of law 
in which official action and control are reasonably predictable“ and „reflects the attitude of its 
people through institutions which provide for the regular election of personnel and regular 
review of policy“ (McKeon, 1957, pp. 23-24).  
Accountability in a political context results from the fact that someone is a 
representative of or agent for the general public and being given a mandate to act in the 
interests of society. Elections provide the means for the individual to administer rewards or 
punishments for politicians’ performance at this task. Politicians who have not been able to 
fulfil their task in an acceptable way will usually not be elected again. They will therefore try 
to convince the public that they have acted or will act to the benefit of the society.  
According to Goldmann (1971), politics to a very large extent consists of justifying 
past and future decisions, and of criticising justifications brought forward by others. That the 
necessity of defending their decisions is a key constraint on how policy-makers choose among 
available alternatives, has been demonstrated in a number of case studies of important foreign 
politics decisions (Anderson, 1981). After Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956, „the 
British government consciously tried to create a situation in which the use of force against 
Egypt would be acceptable in terms of certain international norms“ (Goldmann, 1971, p. 44). 
British leaders tried to hide their collusion with Israel and delayed the invasion of Egypt until 
after the initial Israeli strike. Another example is President Kennedy’s demand that the 1961 
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba should not be traceable to U.S. armed forces, because he had 
publicly pledged not to violate the norm of military non-intervention. This had important 
consequences in that the invading forces had a very inefficient air force and that the whole 
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operation failed (Goldmann, 1971, Janis, 1982, Anderson, 1981, Tetlock, 1985a, 1992). As an 
example from domestic politics, one may cite the attempt of German politicians across all 
parties to justify a law waiting to be passed by the German parliament in June 1995 that 
intended to couple the allowances of members of parliament (MPs) with the income of high 
court judges. As this would have meant a substantial rise in income for MPs at a time when 
the majority of the population suffered losses in their real income, MPs were given 
'justification support' (Argumentationshilfen), a brochure they were supposed to present to 
their home constituencies that presented arguments in favour of the planned pay-rise. Owing 
to continuing public opposition, however, the law did not attract the necessary majority of 
votes.  
Tetlock (1985a, 1992) put forward the idea that all human beings act like politicians 
insofar as they make judgements and decisions depending on whether they are justifiable to 
significant others. In his social contingency model of judgement and choice he uses the 
metaphor of the individual as a „politician whose primary goal is to maintain the positive 
regard of important constituencies to whom he or she feels accountable“ (1992, p. 332). 
Organisational accountability  
Accountability demands in organisations occur on different levels and to different 
extents, depending on the structure of the organisation and the position a person occupies in 
it. The more structured, particularly, the more simply and hierarchically structured an 
organisation is, the more likely is it that accountability demands are salient. In a simply 
structured organisation top level managers have the final say over all important decisions. 
What Mintzberg (1989) calls the ‘operating core’, namely the manual workers and people 
who provide the services, are directly accountable to the top level managers. Here 
accountability arises from the superior-subordinate relationship. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) 
call this kind of accountability bureaucratic accountability. As an organisation gets larger, the 
distance between top level managers and their subordinates increases and makes it more 
difficult to ensure accountability of subordinates to organisational leaders. Rules and 
regulations typically replace direct supervision as a means to hold people accountable (Jos & 
Tompkins, 1994). The more unstructured, diversified, or divisionalised an organisation is, the 
more difficult it becomes for central administrators to exert control. Also, for subordinates it 
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becomes increasingly difficult to identify whom they are accountable to. The fact that 
subordinates may be accountable to many people with perhaps conflicting goals and 
expectations not only makes it difficult for them to decide which expectations to follow, but 
also often makes it more likely that they will be able to protect themselves from 
accountability demands altogether. This is a problem especially prominent in public 
administration. Public administrators often find themselves in a situation where a fundamental 
question is to whom they should be answerable and for what (Jos & Tompkins, 1994). 
Potential constituencies include “the general public, elected officials, agency heads, agency 
clientele, other special interest groups, and future generations” (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, p. 
229). The constituencies in turn may lack the resources and cohesiveness to consistently 
monitor administrative implementation. We encounter here what Eisenhardt (1989) has called 
the fundamental agency problem, „the desires or goals of the principal and the agent conflict 
and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing“ 
(p.58). 
Top level managers not only make accountability demands on their subordinates but 
are in turn accountable to external groups, like share-holders or other providers of resources 
(Staw, 1980). Thus, according to Jos and Tompkins (1994), organisational leaders are in a 
position where they both make others in the organisation accountable and themselves are 
made accountable by others outside the organisation. Pfeffer (1981) also stresses the 
importance of justifiability in managerial decision-making. He sees the primary task of 
managers to „provide explanations, rationalizations and legitimation for the activities 
undertaken in the organization“ (p.4), that is, to make what is going on in the organisation 
meaningful and acceptable to its members and to the world outside. In his view, only a 
manager who is able to convince both internal and external observers that the organisational 
activities are consistent with prevailing social norms and values can be successful. According 
to this view, managers in the same way as politicians search for courses of action that can 
easily be justified to important constituencies. 
The need to justify their actions may also result in organisations developing 
‘justificatory myths’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), that is, justifications that are intended to 
convince a sceptical public. This is particularly likely when the organisation is under high 
pressure from external groups.  
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Professional accountability 
Jos and Tompkins (1994) speak of professional accountability when a member of a 
certain profession is either accountable to a formal professional body that has developed its 
own standards and codes of conduct, or when there exists an internalised set of norms and 
principles that reflect an individual’s ‘professional conscience’ which he or she tries to 
follow. An example that comes readily to mind here is the medical profession. More 
generally, professionals whose judgements or actions may lead to severe negative 
consequences for people other than themselves are usually faced with the prospect of being 
held accountable. Apart from the medical profession, this is true for lawyers, accountants and 
auditors, for example (Messier & Quilliam, 1992). 
Accountability is an important aspect of the auditor’s judgement and decision 
environment (Gibbins & Emby, 1985). This is recognised not only by people outside the 
profession but also by auditors themselves. When practising auditors judged the importance 
of various factors in exercising good professional judgement, the quality viewed most 
important was that the decision could be justified (Gibbins & Emby, 1985, Emby & Gibbins, 
1988). Auditors usually make decisions in the knowledge that their decisions will be reviewed 
by partners in the firm and that explanations for their decisions will be called for (Johnson & 
Kaplan, 1991). The review process is considered to be an integral part of a firm’s quality 
control procedures. Pressure on auditors to justify their judgements and decisions, however, 
might also be exerted by clients (Lord, 1992).  
Professional accountability arises from a person having special expertise. A control 
system that stresses professional accountability is especially appropriate when the task at hand 
is complex and technically difficult (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). Under such circumstances 
organisations must rely on skilled and expert employees who expect to be held fully 
accountable for their actions but in turn expect that they are given sufficient discretion to 
fulfil their duties. This means that a good deal of control over organisational activities is 
placed in the hands of expert employees. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) argue that the 
Challenger accident in 1986, when the space shuttle Challenger exploded shortly after launch 
and seven crew members died, would very likely not have happened had NASA relied on a 
system of professional accountability rather than bureaucratic and political accountability. 
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The decision to launch the shuttle despite adverse weather conditions was made under 
political pressure to achieve planned flight rates. This pressure had been exerted by the White 
House, the Congress, military and private sector customers, and repeated media reports of 
shuttle delays. The management of Morton Thiokol, NASA’s main shuttle program 
contractor, signalled their consent to the decision to launch despite the reservation of their 
engineers, because NASA was their main customer and in the process of reviewing its 
contracts with the firm. At NASA, lower-level supervisors were reluctant to report problems 
voiced by their engineers upward, because they did not want to be perceived as the ones who 
endangered the success of the program. The final decision to launch was made by managers 
who did not have the necessary information and expertise to make a correct decision. If a 
professional accountability system had been given more significance in the decision-making 
process, as would have been appropriate given the technically difficult task NASA faced, the 
recommendation of the engineers not to launch would very likely have been followed and the 
disastrous accident avoided (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).  
Accountability as a motivating agent  
The above discussion of the different societal contexts in which accountability plays 
an important role should have given the reader an idea of its significance for the analysis of 
individual behaviour in a social environment. Accountability is a universal feature of 
behavioural environments (Tetlock, 1985a, 1992) and therefore relevant to a wide range of 
phenomena investigated in the social sciences. In social psychology these phenomena include, 
for example, conformity, social comparison, social exchange, performance in the presence of 
others, attribution, impression management, and identity development. Schlenker, Weigold 
and Doherty (1991) even go so far as to suggest that problems in dealing with accountability 
are at the core of most dysfunctional behaviours and that accountability therefore also bears 
upon the development of psychopathological symptoms. The theoretical analysis of the 
accountability construct, following in Chapter 2, will attempt to clarify the link between 
accountability and some of the aforementioned phenomena.  
This thesis will argue that accountability is a motivating agent which typically makes 
two different needs salient, a need to be accurate and a need to arrive at an easily defensible 
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decision. Whether or to what extent one exceeds the other, depends on the particular situation 
the individual finds him- or herself in. It is therefore important to pay attention to the 
particular demands accountability manipulations create. It will also be suggested that the 
decision maker uses different cognitive mechanisms to try to achieve each of the goals made 
salient by accountability pressures, and that these mechanisms operate at different stages of 
the decision process. In particular, it is suggested that the decision maker will try to maximise 
accuracy by conducting an extensive information search and integrating it in a complex 
manner while he or she will try to arrive at an easily defensible decision by biasing 
information evaluation and integration in such a way that the alternative that the decision 
maker assumes appeals most to the people he or she is accountable to will be supported. 
Finally, while a motivation to be accurate and a motivation to make a decision that can be 
easily justified are often compatible, under certain circumstances they may conflict with each 
other. The ultimate effects of accountability on decision processes will depend on whether 
these goals conflict and if so, which goal will dominate. The investigation of accountability 
effects will combine a descriptive theoretical approach, primarily based on dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957, 1964) and differentiation and consolidation theory (Svenson, 1992, 1996) as 
the application of dissonance ideas to multiattribute decision situations, with a normative 
methodology as specified by MAUT. 
Summary and overview 
In this chapter we discussed the cognitive processes involved in decision making and 
introduced multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) as a theory which both sets out how 
decisions should be made and proposes a methodology to guide individuals in making rational 
decisions. We also discussed the main features of accountability and the important function it 
has for social control as well as self-regulation. Accountability was shown to be a pervasive 
aspect of our every-day with particular significance in the legal and political system and the 
work world. An initial proposal of how accountability exerts its effects on decision processes 
suggested that it is a motivating agent which makes certain information processing goals 
salient which, in turn, determine the cognitive strategies used by the decision maker to arrive 
at his or her decision.  
INTRODUCTION 
 20 
In the next chapter, an analysis of the accountability construct will be presented, which 
discusses the different antecedent conditions of accountability and their link to other concepts 
in social psychology. Chapter 3 will review previous research on the effects of accountability 
on decision processes. In Chapter 4, we will introduce Baumeister and Newman’s (1994) self-
regulation model as a framework for the different mechanisms which underlie biased 
information processing as well as discuss the empirical evidence for these mechanisms, 
especially where multiattribute decisions are concerned. In Chapter 5, a process model of 
accountability will be presented which integrates empirical findings with some theoretical 
considerations from the previous chapters. Hypotheses derived from this model were tested in 
two empirical studies, which will be reported in Chapters 6 and 7. Finally, in Chapter 8 the 
presented findings will be summarised and implications for future research as well as possible 
applications discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ACCOUNTABILITY CONSTRUCT 
In the decision making literature accountability has often been treated as a moderator 
variable, with relatively little interest in the concept itself and, with some notable exceptions, 
little awareness of how differences in the way accountability is manipulated may change the 
nature of the effect it has. The failure to recognise the complexity of the variable has impeded 
attempts to integrate empirical findings, which have suggested different and sometimes 
contrary effects of accountability on decision processes. Accountability, clearly, is not a 
single situational determinant that produces uniform effects on decision processes. Rather, for 
an individual to feel accountable, certain cues or antecedent conditions have to be present and 
each of these will have a certain effect on the way in which information is processed. A full 
understanding of the effects of accountability on decision processes must therefore be 
informed by an analysis of its antecedent conditions.  
Antecedents of accountability 
Semin and Manstead (1983) state that people will be asked to or spontaneously offer 
accounts for their behaviour only if a problematic act occurs, that is, if certain social rules or 
conventions are breached. In order for a situation to be recognised as such, several conditions 
have to be met (p. 36): (1) the rule(s) and conventions in question must belong to the 
repertoire available to the actor, (2) the rules and conventions must be taken seriously, (3) the 
actor must be aware of having broken the rule(s), (4) the rules must be recognised by the actor 
as being applicable to him- or herself, and (5) the actor must have some awareness that the 
breach in question has been witnessed by others. 
Similarly, Schlenker (1986) suggests that accountability plays a major role whenever a 
predicament is encountered. He defines predicaments as “situations in which events have 
undesirable implications for the identity-relevant images actors have claimed or desire to 
claim in front of real or imagined audiences” (p.125). According to Schlenker, there are three 
conditions which normally accompany predicaments: (1) people believe their decisions or 
behaviours are publicly known or will become public knowledge, (2) people believe their 
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performance will be judged by others, and (3) people anticipate having to explain or justify 
their decisions or conduct to others. 
Schlenker and co-workers (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989; Schlenker, Weigold & 
Doherty, 1991; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994) have proposed a 
triangle model of accountability which specifies the conditions under which a perception of 
accountability develops and that determine its strength. According to the model, perceived 
accountability is a function of the combined strength of three elements and the connections or 
linkages between them: prescriptions, an event, and the actor’s identity. These three elements 
are perceived as necessary to carry out the evaluation underlying accountability. Prescriptions 
(which can be either implicit or explicit) include information about what the individual should 
try to achieve (goals), in what way (rules), and what level of performance is satisfactory 
(standards). Perceived accountability is stronger, the more important the prescriptions are. 
Importance is perceived to be a function of both the extent to which the prescriptions are 
valued principles of conduct and any personal consequences of following them. The event is 
the individual’s behaviour and its consequences. The more important the consequences, the 
stronger perceived accountability will be. Finally, the individual’s identity is both a structure 
that contains ideas about what one is like and an active process of presenting oneself to be a 
particular kind of person (Schlenker, 1986). Perceived accountability will be stronger, the 
more strongly the situation bears on protecting or enhancing the individual’s identity.  
As mentioned above, perceived accountability does not only depend on the strength of 
the three elements but also on the strength of the linkages between them. The prescription-
event linkage refers to the extent to which prescriptions for behaviour in the particular 
situation exist and are known. If prescriptions are clear and well-understood, the prescription-
event linkage is strong, if they are “ambiguous, conflicting, obscure, and/or non-existent” 
(Sheer & Weigold, 1995, p. 596), the linkage is weak. The prescription-identity linkage 
describes the extent to which the prescriptions are binding for the actor. If the prescriptions 
clearly apply, for example, because the actor understands the consequences of his or her 
behaviour, occupies a certain role that implies adhering to them, or feels committed to them 
because of certain personal convictions, the prescription-identity linkage is strong. If, 
however, the prescriptions are inapplicable or the actor does not feel committed to them, the 
linkage is weak. Finally, the identity-event linkage refers to the extent to which the actor is 
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perceived to be personally responsible for the consequences of his or her behaviour, which, in 
turn, is a function of the intention to produce them and the control over them (we will discuss 
this last point in more detail below). The link is strong, if it is assumed that the actor had (or 
will have) both the intention to produce and control over the event, and weak otherwise.  
Schlenker et al. (1994) provided support for the assumption that the perceived strength 
of accountability depends on the model’s elements and the strength of their linkages. In a 
hypothetical scenario, actors were perceived to be most accountable when all linkages were 
strong, less accountable when one or two linkages were weak, and least accountable when all 
linkages were weak. When subjects were asked to gather information to determine whether 
the actor in a hypothetical scenario was accountable, 90% of the information requested was 
related to the proposed linkages of the model. Also, Sheer and Weigold (1995) found that 
when participants were asked to choose between accounts, they preferred those which 
weakened the linkages proposed by the triangle model of accountability. 
In terms of factors which underlie perceived accountability, Semin and Manstead 
(1983) and Schlenker and co-workers seem to agree on the following, (1) negative 
consequences of an actor’s behaviour (which may be intangible if they concern the actor’s 
self and/or public image), (2) the actor feeling personally responsible for these consequences 
(or at least expecting to be made personally responsible), and (3) an anticipation of being 
evaluated. With regard to the first, negative consequences of behaviour, it should be noted, 
however, that people may be told explicitly and in advance of any action on their part that 
they will be accountable. Formal accountability procedures may be in place, especially in 
organisations and public administration, which require individuals to provide an account for 
their actions, regardless of the outcome. Antaki (1988) recognises that accounts are not only 
given to protect oneself in the event of a norm violation, but may also be descriptions, 
ordinary explanations, or self-reports of everyday activities. It may therefore be concluded 
that negative consequences are not a necessary condition of accountability. It seems 
reasonable to assume, however, that the consequences of the behaviour in question must be 
potentially negative and that the individual is aware of these potentially negative 
consequences. This implies the following conditions as antecedents of accountability: 
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(1) an actor's personal responsibility for potentially negative consequences of his or her 
behaviour (or an expectation to be held personally responsible), and 
(2) evaluation apprehension. 
We will continue with a discussion of personal responsibility and evaluation 
apprehension, as these variables have been investigated in some depth in other contexts and 
the results of these investigations make a valuable contribution to an understanding of the 
accountability concept. 
Personal Responsibility 
Accountability and responsibility are closely interrelated concepts. This is reflected in 
the fact that the terms ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ are often used interchangeably. In 
languages other than English, for example, German, there is often only one term 
(Verantwortlichkeit) which is used for both. A person who is accountable for something is 
responsible for it. We have just argued, however, for the opposite; a person who is responsible 
for something is accountable for it (see also Greenfield, 1975). Thereby, responsibility is an 
antecedent condition of accountability and not identical with it.  
Semin and Manstead (1983) refer to Ross (1975), who stresses the importance of 
making a clear distinction between the different meanings of responsibility. He suggests that 
responsibility can be (1) responsibility in the sense of being the person who can be “rightfully 
brought to account for” an act (p. 16), and (2) responsibility in the sense of being the person 
who can be “rightfully sentenced” for an act (p.20). The former is responsibility in the sense 
of having caused a particular outcome by one's behaviour and is closely related to 
accountability, the latter is responsibility in terms of legal liability. In some cases, people may 
be answerable not only for their own actions but also for the actions of others, by virtue of 
their role. For example, supervisors may be responsible for the actions of their subordinates 
(Graumann, 1994; Hamilton, 1978).  
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Personal causality and control as necessary antecedents of personal 
responsibility 
Attribution research has investigated the conditions under which personal 
responsibility is ascribed to an actor. We will outline very briefly and selectively the 
conclusions that have been drawn (for a detailed discussion, see Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; 
Semin and Manstead, 1983; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995a, b). The first contribution to an 
understanding of personal responsibility attributions was made by Heider (1958), who 
suggested five levels of responsibility for one’s actions: (1) global association, whereby the 
actor is perceived to be responsible for outcomes he or she is associated with, no matter how 
weak this association is, (2) impersonal causation or commission, whereby the actor is 
perceived to be responsible for outcomes he or she caused by committing an act, even if these 
outcomes were not foreseen and therefore not intended, (3) foreseeability, whereby the actor 
is perceived to be responsible for outcomes which he or she could anticipate, even if they 
were not intended, (4) personal causation, whereby the actor is perceived to be responsible 
for outcomes he or she intended, and (5) justifiability, whereby the actor is perceived to be 
responsible for outcomes which cannot be justified by the situation the actor found him- or 
herself in (such a situation being acting in self-defence, for example). Accountability would 
seem to increase from the first to the fourth level, with the fifth level pointing to mitigating 
circumstances. Hamilton (1978) presented a model which re-interpreted each of Heider’s 
levels in terms of legal responsibility rules. The first level, for example, is equivalent to 
vicarious liability (e.g., when a bar-owner is held responsible for the sale of alcohol to 
individuals under age on his or her premises, regardless of whether he or she is aware of it 
and has agreed to it, Semin & Manstead, 1983), whereas the fourth level represents full 
responsibility in the sense of the law.  
Weiner (1995a, b) suggests that the process of attributing responsibility follows a 
certain sequence. First, an observer determines whether there is human involvement in the 
event, that is, whether there is personal as opposed to impersonal causality. Weiner gives the 
example of a car being damaged either by another car hitting it or by a falling rock. Only if 
the driver of another car was involved, would the observer continue with the responsibility 
inference process; according to Weiner (1995a), “assignment of responsibility requires human 
or personal agency” (p. 6). The next step involves the observer deciding whether the actor 
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was able to control the event. If the driver of the other car was not able to control his or her 
behaviour, for example, because of having fainted, he or she will not be regarded as 
responsible. Finally, the observer checks for any mitigating circumstances, such as other 
morally valued goals which justify the behaviour, or an inability to comprehend the 
‘wrongness’ of an act on the part of the actor. If mitigating circumstances are found to have 
been present, responsibility can be diminished or entirely lifted.  
For a judgement or expectation of personal responsibility as an antecedent to 
accountability it seems unlikely that mitigating circumstances play an important role, because 
mitigating circumstances are typically brought forward after a person has been called to 
account for his or her behaviour. Weiner (1995a, b) recognises that his proposed sequence is 
not invariant, for example, people may arrive at premature conclusions which are revised as 
more information becomes available. Mitigating circumstances appear to be particularly 
likely to be left out of the inference process, since it is difficult to assess them without a 
detailed knowledge of the situation. Also, an actor may recognise that others may not be 
aware of mitigating circumstances and therefore he or she will expect to be held responsible 
even if mitigating circumstances are present. Whereas Heider (1958) explicitly assumes that 
there is no difference in the process of responsibility attribution for an external observer and 
oneself as long as the same information is available, it remains unclear whether Weiner 
proposes attribution of responsibility to oneself to follow the same sequence as the one 
suggested for an external observer. For the purposes of this discussion, however, anticipation 
on part of the individual that others would consider him- or herself personally responsible for 
his or her actions seems sufficient to bring about the intended effects. 
When comparing Heider’s concept of personal causation with Weiner’s concept of 
personal causality, it becomes apparent that, despite their similar name, these two concepts 
are quite different. Heider’s personal causation refers to bringing about intended outcomes, 
whereas Weiner’s personal causality only implies personal involvement, but not necessarily 
control over and/or an intention to bring about a certain outcome. Weiner’s concept of 
personal causality, therefore, resembles Heider’s concept of impersonal causation. Weiner 
(1995a) does discuss intention as a factor that influences perceptions of responsibility, but 
sees it as a determinant of the degree of responsibility (if an act was intended, responsibility is 
higher) rather than a necessary condition of perceptions of responsibility.  
Antecedents of accountability 
 27 
We will go along with Weiner’s suggestion and assume that two factors are crucial for 
a perception of personal responsibility as an antecedent of accountability: personal causality 
(as understood by Weiner) and control over an event. Note that these two factors also are part 
of Schlenker's (Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, 
& Doherty, 1994) triangular model of accountability, as two variables determining the 
identity-event linkage.  
Evaluation apprehension  
Clearly, anticipated evaluation is a central feature of accountability. The individual 
expects to be evaluated by other people and/or, in some cases, carries out a self-evaluation. 
Many definitions of accountability, indeed, only focus on the evaluation aspect and neglect 
the aspect of explanation or justification. Examples are the definitions by Carnevale (1985), 
who describes accountability as the concern about the evaluation of one’s views and 
preferences by others, or Yarnold, Mueser and Lyons’s (1988) view of accountability as a 
public personal evaluation. 
The effects of evaluation apprehension have been empirically investigated in many 
different domains, but have received particular attention in studies on the effects of the 
presence of other people on task performance. These studies have some relevance here, as the 
performance of accountable decision makers is under investigation. 
Evaluation apprehension is a result of the presence of others and can have both 
positive and negative effects on task performance. It enhances performance if the task is easy 
(social facilitation), and debilitates performance if the task is difficult (social impairment, 
'choking under pressure', Baumeister, 1984). Zajonc (1965) proposed that the mere presence 
of others causes an alertness response which is accompanied by a heightened physiological 
arousal. This arousal increases the likelihood of dominant responses (simple, well-learned 
behaviours that are highest in the habit hierarchy) and decreases the likelihood of non-
dominant responses (novel or complex behaviours). If the dominant response is the correct or 
appropriate one, as is the case for an easy task, the presence of others will enhance 
performance. If the dominant response is incorrect or inappropriate, for example, when the 
task is difficult, the presence of others will impair performance. Cottrell (1972), however, 
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suggested that the drive-like effects of the presence of others come about because the 
individual has learned that others are a source of positive or negative evaluation and that the 
presence of others often co-varies with rewards or punishments. The anticipation that other 
people will evaluate the individual’s performance, that is, evaluation apprehension (and not 
their mere presence, as Zajonc suggested), according to Cottrell, increases the individual’s 
level of arousal and causes the effects described above. A study by Markus (1978) designed to 
test between these two approaches suggested that while mere presence seems to be sufficient 
to elicit the typical performance effects, evaluation apprehension has an effect over and above 
the effect of the mere presence of other people. 
Self-presentational accounts, such as impression management theory (Tedeschi & 
Riess, 1981), assume that evaluation apprehension is a fear of not being able to present a 
competent public image. Making a mistake when other people are present leads to 
embarrassment. This embarrassment is assumed to be an impediment to cognitive and motor 
control and impairs performance, especially the performance of those behaviours where a 
failure is likely or has occurred before (Bond, 1982). In this account, task complexity only 
plays a role in so far as it conveys information about the performer’s task competence. 
Success in easy tasks signals to the individual that the desired public image can be 
maintained, whereas failure in difficult tasks signals that the desired image cannot be 
maintained and causes embarrassment. This suggests that performance in the presence of 
other people should not so much depend on the actual difficulty of the task as on the 
individual’s perception of his or her own competence at the task, mediated by the perceived 
difficulty of the task. In line with this hypothesis, Bond (1982) was able to demonstrate that 
the presence of an observer impaired the learning of simple items when those items were 
embedded within a difficult task and did not impair the learning of complex items when they 
were embedded within an easy task.  
These last results underline the importance of self-presentational and identity-related 
considerations for accountability effects, as suggested by Schlenker and colleagues 
(Schlenker & Weigold, 1989; Schlenker, Weigold & Doherty, 1991; Schlenker, Britt, 
Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994) and Semin and Manstead (1983). According to 
Schlenker et al., accountability is assumed to pose a threat to identity and the strategies 
applied to cope with this threat have repercussions on the identity of an individual. Identity is 
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understood as a theory of the self about “how one is and should be perceived, regarded and 
treated in social life” (Schlenker, 1982, p. 194). It is both a structure that contains the ideas 
about what one is like and an active process presenting oneself to be a particular kind of 
person (Schlenker, 1986). This process, Schlenker refers to as ‘self-identification’. The 
process of self-identification links identity with accountability, as the construction and 
evaluation of identity takes place within the context of accountability. Similarly, Semin and 
Manstead (1983) argue that the attribution of motives to an individual's actions means that the 
actor is regarded as possessing an identity which is defined by those actions. When an 
individual's conduct is called into question, the issue of identity management therefore 
becomes salient.  
The implied presence of others and identifiability as necessary antecedents of 
evaluation apprehension.  
One condition that is clearly necessary for the individual to feel evaluation 
apprehension is the implied presence of others. Some authors, for example, Semin and 
Manstead (1983) and Tetlock (1992) have argued that it may be sufficient for this presence to 
be imaginary rather than real, as individuals have internalised the external behavioural rules to 
which they want to adhere and then engage in a process of self-evaluation. An evaluation by 
others can only be carried out, however, if the behaviour that is to be evaluated is identifiable 
(Harkins, 1987; Harkins & Szymanski, 1987). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that in 
order for individuals to feel evaluation apprehension, they must also know that their 
behaviour and its potential consequences are identifiable to others. 
Identifiability has been considered an important explanatory variable in social loafing 
and de-individuation research. Social loafing is the phenomenon of individuals reducing their 
effort when they work in groups compared to when they work alone, because they think that 
the other group members will expend the necessary effort (Latané, Harkins & Williams, 1979; 
see also Kerr and Bruun, 1983, about the ‘free-rider effect’). Similarly, de-individuation is a 
state of lack of self-awareness in which the individual, as a consequence of being submerged 
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in a group, shows more disinhibited, often anti-normative behaviour1 (Festinger, Pepitone, & 
Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969, 1970).  
Both social loafing and de-individuation occur because individual behaviour is not 
identifiable. In the case of social loafing, the anonymity of pooled performance diffuses 
responsibility for performance and protects individuals from any negative effects of not 
exerting the same effort as the other group members. Individuals who loaf can hide in the 
crowd, but at the same time they can also become lost in the crowd; they cannot receive credit 
for their positive contributions. If people’s individual output can be identified, social loafing 
disappears (Jackson & Harkins, 1985; Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981). Similarly, the lack 
of identifiability in de-individuation situations (in experiments often manipulated by giving 
participants the opportunity to hide their identity behind masks, e.g., Zimbardo, 1969) allows 
individuals to escape from any negative effects of anti-social behaviours.2  
Salient norms as a consequence of evaluation apprehension and personal 
responsibility 
In the previous chapter, accountability was described as driving both social control 
and self-regulation by enforcing normative behaviour. In the following, we will describe the 
way in which the two main antecedents of accountability, evaluation apprehension and 
personal responsibility, are linked to this norm-enforcement mechanism.  
Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991) distinguish between descriptive norms and 
injunctive norms. Descriptive norms refer to what is commonly done or what is normal, 
whereas injunctive norms refer to what is either commonly approved of or what is socially 
sanctioned. These two types of norms usually coincide, but not always. For example, a typical 
phenomenon observed in emergency situations is the bystander effect, whereby a person in 
                                                 
1 Reicher (1987), however, has recently argued that de-individuation does not reduce the influence of normative 
constraints on the individual's behaviour, but increases the feelings of shared group membership and the power 
of group norms, thereby increasing whatever behaviour is typical for the group. 
2 Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) have contested this assumption. According to their differential self-
awareness theory, it is an external focus of attention rather than a lack of identifiability that results in de-
individuation.  
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need of help is increasingly less likely to receive help the more bystanders are present (e.g., 
Latané & Darley, 1970). The injunctive norm in this situation would be to step in and help. 
However, because the other bystanders are passive, individuals infer a descriptive norm which 
suggests that intervention would be inappropriate, and do not act, because they do not want to 
embarrass themselves in front of other people. The effect may be strengthened by the 
existence of another, injunctive norm to mind one's own business. If one person offers help, 
on the other hand, he or she will serve as a model, defining help as an appropriate response, 
and others will be quick to follow (Staub, 1978).3 The significance of descriptive norms is 
also reflected in Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) concept of informational social influence, which 
is social influence that occurs because the individual is unsure about what constitutes 
appropriate behaviour and looks to other people to see how they behave.  
Both descriptive and injunctive norms provide external standards of appropriate 
behaviour. As mentioned above, however, external norms often become internalised and turn 
into personal norms. Schwartz (1977) defines personal norms as self-based standards or 
expectations for behaviour which are enforced through processes of self-enhancement or self-
deprecation; hence, not only the standards but also the sanctions for not obeying them are 
located within the self. While many studies have suggested that personal norms are better 
predictors of behaviour than external social norms (see Schwartz, 1977, for a review), there 
has, however, also been evidence that if a social norm is activated, its influence on behaviour 
can override that of personal norms. An example is a study by Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno 
(1991, study 9), which showed that focusing participants' attention on an injunctive social 
anti-littering norm resulted in significant less subsequent littering compared to participants in 
a self-focus condition, irrespective of whether participants' personal anti-littering norm was 
weak or strong. Also, littering was significantly lower than in a condition with a social 
evaluation focus that was unrelated to the relevant normative behaviour, suggesting that the 
possibility of social evaluation per se was not sufficient to affect participants' behaviour. 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, descriptive norms have been found to be asymmetrically effective in that they are more likely to 
influence behaviour in a negative than in a positive way (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). 
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These results, apart from illustrating the potentially powerful influence of social norms on 
behaviour, underline the importance of norm activation for any such influence. Norms only 
influence behaviour if they are activated, that is, if they are made salient or are focused upon. 
Self-attention theories, for example, that by Carver and Scheier (1981a, b; see also 
Duval & Wicklund, 1972) have suggested that the presence of an evaluative audience makes 
behavioural norms salient and instigates a process of 'matching to standard', that is, enhanced 
conformity to such norms (see also Heider, 1958). In their cybernetic theory of self-
regulation, Carver and Scheier propose that the presence of other people (as well as other 
conditions, such as the presence of a mirror or a camera) heightens an individual’s self-
directed attention. This, in turn, causes the individual to engage in a behavioural feedback 
loop, similar to the Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) unit suggested by Miller, Galanter, and 
Pribram (1960), whereby the individual's present behaviour is compared to a salient standard 
of behaviour. If a discrepancy is detected, measures are taken to reduce the discrepancy. If a 
subsequent comparison reveals that the discrepancy still exists, the process is repeated until 
no discrepancy can be detected anymore4. A heightened self-focus thus leads to enhanced 
conformity to a salient standard. The standard is usually inferred from situational cues. 
Depending on the nature of these cues and how the individual interprets them, different 
standards may become salient and different behaviours may result. Grush (1978) could show 
that participants playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in front of an audience described as 
previous winners at the game made more competitive choices than no-audience control 
participants, whereas participants playing the game in front of an audience described as 
‘Human Relations Council’ made fewer competitive choices than control participants. This 
was the case despite all participants having been given a pre-treatment experience with the 
game causing them to favour competitive choices. 
Whereas in Carver and Scheier's (1981a, b) model of audience effects self-directed 
attention is assumed to be the central mechanism that mediates audience effects, other models 
like that of Zajonc (1965) or Cottrell (1972) see physical arousal as the central mediator. In 
                                                 
4 The 'matching to standard' process which reduces the discrepancy between actual and normative behaviour is 
only instigated, however, if the individual's expectancy of being able to reduce the discrepancy is sufficiently 
favourable. If this is not the case, the individual is likely to withdraw, either physically or mentally. 
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the latter case, one would still expect relevant norms to become salient. Easterbrook (1959), 
for example, demonstrated that physical arousal causes a perceptual narrowing, resulting in a 
focus on those cues that appear most relevant. 
It may be argued that not only evaluation apprehension but also personal responsibility 
is likely to increase the individual's self-directed attention and thereby make certain norms 
salient, as it draws attention to the possible consequences of one's behaviour. However, unlike 
evaluation apprehension, personal responsibility is likely to make personal rather than 
external norms salient, as there is no anticipation of being evaluated by others and behaviour 
should therefore flow from one's own values. It is therefore assumed that personal 
responsibility will make the individual focus on his or her personal norms and encourage a 
matching to personal standards, whereas evaluation apprehension will make the individual 
focus on possible audience norms and encourage matching to perceived audience standards.  
Summary and conclusions 
The previous discussion attempted to shed some light on the antecedent conditions of 
accountability. Two processes were identified as being central to generating accountability 
pressures in the individual, a feeling of personal responsibility for performing a behaviour that 
has potentially negative consequences, and the expectation of being evaluated. Drawing on 
attribution research, in particular on models put forward by Heider (1958) and Weiner (1995a, 
b), it was concluded that in order for the individual to feel personally responsible, two 
conditions have to be met, (1) personal causality as defined by Weiner (1995a, b), that is, the 
individual must have brought about an outcome by his or her behaviour, although the 
outcome may not have been intended, and (2) control over the behaviour. The second 
accountability component, evaluation apprehension, was also seen to be based on the 
fulfilment of two conditions, (1) the implied presence of others, and (2) identifiability of the 
actor's behaviour. It was argued that both personal responsibility and evaluation apprehension 
make certain behavioural norms or standards salient that the individual will strive to adhere 
to. In the case of personal responsibility, internal or personal norms will be made salient, 
whereas in the case of evaluation apprehension, external or audience norms will become 
salient.  
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The results of studies addressing evaluation apprehension, although not directly 
bearing on the effects of accountability on behaviour, allow some interesting predictions. 
Firstly, evaluation apprehension research suggests that accountability should be accompanied 
by a heightened physiological arousal that mediates its effects. To our knowledge, no 
accountability study exists where physiological measures have been taken to show that this is 
indeed the case. Secondly, task difficulty should emerge as one of the variables that moderate 
accountability effects. This, again, has not yet been explicitly investigated but one would 
expect that if the task is easy, accountability should enhance performance, whereas if the task 
is difficult, accountability should result in a decreased performance (see also Pelham & Neter, 
1995). For testing the validity of this hypothesis, the particular operational definition of task 
difficulty that is employed seems to be crucial. Evaluation apprehension studies have related 
task difficulty to the appropriateness of dominant and non-dominant responses, but the 
subjective perception of a task as being difficult has also been shown to play an important 
role. The evidence for accountability enhancing dominant responses is mixed at best (see 
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and whether or not easy tasks in this case can be equated with those 
for which dominant (i.e., habitually strong) responses are likely to be correct is questionable. 
It may be argued that accountability is likely to draw attention to the expectations of the 
audience the individual is accountable to, and that task difficulty is at least partly dependent 
on whether the perceived norm against which performance is to be measured can guide the 
individual's behaviour and provide cues as to how a positive evaluation can be achieved. If 
this is not the case, the task is likely to be perceived as difficult and the expectation to be 
evaluated is likely to induce stress and decrease performance (see Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 
1996). This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is important to keep in 
mind, though, that accountability cannot be equated with evaluation apprehension, as the 
latter is just one of the central components that generate accountability pressures. 
Along the same lines, it must be stressed that, despite their superficial similarity, an 
accountability manipulation is not identical with placing participants in a transmission set, 
that is, leading them to expect that they will have to communicate their opinions or 
impressions of an event to others (as opposed to a reception set, where they receive additional 
information from others) (Tetlock, 1992). Whereas placing participants in a transmission set 
focuses their attention on producing an easy-to-understand, logically consistent description, 
Summary and conclusions 
 35 
making participants accountable additionally implies that they will not only have to 
communicate their opinion but also defend it against possible counter-arguments.  
An important question that has not been addressed yet relates to the necessity and/or 
sufficiency of the conditions specified above. In order to answer this question, we must first 
refer to the distinction between external and internal accountability. External accountability is 
a demand to justify one’s behaviour to others, whereas internal accountability is a need to 
justify one’s behaviour to oneself (Simonson, 1989). External accountability can either be 
implicit, when a person feels observed by other people and has a desire to appear competent, 
without actually having been challenged by others to explain his or her behaviour, or it can be 
explicit, when individuals are told that they are accountable to someone else (Simonson, 
1989). Explicit external accountability is present when formal accountability procedures are 
in place, for example, in organisations where employees have to report to their managers and 
are aware of this. Explicit external accountability may also be present in negotiation contexts 
when the leaders of the negotiating parties as agents make a decision about a settlement on 
behalf of other people, their principals (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). The main difference 
between external and internal accountability is the source of behavioural control. In the case 
of external accountability, control is exerted by the person(s) the individual is accountable to, 
whereas internal accountability implies that control lies within the individual him- or herself. 
Internal accountability arises because decision makers tends to internalise the criteria 
employed by others and want to prove to themselves that they have behaved in an appropriate 
manner.  
It is argued here that different combinations of the above-mentioned antecedent 
conditions result in either internal or external accountability (see Figure 2.1). In particular, a 
feeling of internal accountability is hypothesised to occur when the individual has personally 
caused or is about to cause a potentially negative outcome by behaviour that is/was under his 
or her control, resulting in a feeling of personal responsibility for this outcome. Personal 
causation and control are both considered necessary antecedents of personal responsibility 
which, in turn, is both necessary and sufficient to create internal accountability. External 
accountability, on the other hand, will only be induced if the individual, in addition to feeling 
personally responsible, expects to be evaluated by others. The implied presence of others and 
identifiability of the individual's behavioural outcomes to them are necessary conditions for 
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evaluation apprehension (see also Weldon & Gargano, 1988). Evaluation apprehension and 
personal responsibility are both necessary but not sufficient conditions for external 
accountability. 
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Figure 2.1. The antecedent conditions of internal and external accountability. 
Having developed an initial model of the antecedent conditions of both internal and 
external accountability, the following chapter will provide a review of studies that have 
investigated the effects of internal and external accountability, with the ultimate goal of 
further developing the model such that certain antecedent conditions can be linked to certain 
accountability effects.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY ON DECISION PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES 
This chapter will present a review of the existing literature on the effects of internal 
and external accountability on decision processes and outcomes. It will be argued that, 
generally, accountability has two main effects on decision processes, namely, (1) it increases 
the amount of information that is considered and the complexity with which this information 
is processed, and (2) it increases the decision maker's motivation to arrive at a decision that is 
easy to justify. In order to explain the differential effects of accountability, three 
classifications of different types of accountability will be presented, (1) accountability to an 
audience with known vs. unknown views, (2) pre-decisional vs. post-decisional 
accountability, and (3) procedural vs. outcome accountability. Finally, the effects of 
accountability will be linked to its antecedent conditions of personal responsibility and 
evaluation apprehension, as described in the previous chapter.  
The effects of internal accountability 
Research on the effects of accountability on behaviour in general and decisions in 
particular has rarely focused on internal accountability. It may be argued, however, that 
studies intended to test the theory of cognitive dissonance by Festinger (1957) often have 
implicitly tapped into internal accountability processes (Staw, 1980). The antecedent 
conditions of cognitive dissonance are very similar to those of internal accountability, namely 
a feeling of personal responsibility for foreseeable, potentially aversive consequences in a 
situation of free choice (see Cooper & Fazio, 1984, for a review), resulting in a need for self-
justification. Studies investigating the effects of cognitive dissonance in the context of 
decision-making have typically found that after a decision, the chosen alternative is evaluated 
better than before, thereby reducing the dissonance that arises when one has to put up with the 
disadvantages of the chosen alternative and loses the advantages of the non-chosen 
alternatives (e.g., Brehm, 1956). Also, a selective exposure effect may be observed, where 
people prefer to expose themselves to information that supports their chosen alternative and 
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avoid information that contradicts it (e.g., Frey, 1986). Although not anticipated by Festinger 
himself, some studies have shown that biased information processing can already be observed 
after a tentative decision but before a final decision has been made (e.g., Borcherding, 1981; 
Grabitz & Haisch, 1972). 1  
Staw (1976) investigated the effects of personal responsibility on participants' 
tendency to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action. Perceived personal 
responsibility, it has been argued in the previous chapter, is a necessary antecedent condition 
of internal accountability. In this case, however, personal responsibility was not prospective 
but retrospective. Participants were asked to allocate R&D funding to one of two corporate 
divisions of a fictitious company. In the 'high personal responsibility' condition, participants 
were asked to make this decision twice and received either positive or negative feedback on 
the outcome of their initial decision, in the 'low personal responsibility' condition the initial 
(either successful or unsuccessful) decision was said to have been made by someone else. It 
was found that if participants perceived high personal responsibility for the previous decision 
and this decision had resulted in negative consequences, they invested a disproportionately 
high amount of money in their previously chosen alternative, suggesting that they felt a need 
to justify their choice to themselves and defend themselves against the negative consequences 
resulting from it.  
Weldon and Gargano (1985) tested the effect of prospective personal responsibility on 
cognitive effort. Responsibility for the judgement task, an evaluation of a series of part-time 
jobs described on five dimensions, allegedly carried out for a (fictitious) vocational research 
institution, was manipulated by either telling participants that they were the only evaluator of 
their particular set of job descriptions ('individual responsibility' condition), or that they were 
1 of 16 students evaluating that particular set of job descriptions ('shared responsibility' 
condition). These instructions clearly established personal responsibility in the former and an 
absence of personal responsibility in the latter condition, thereby implicitly manipulating 
internal accountability. It was found that participants under individual responsibility produced 
                                                 
1 A more detailed discussion of dissonance theory and the effects of cognitive dissonance on information search 
and evaluation will follow in Chapter 4. 
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more evaluations and used more complex judgement strategies that were better predicted by a 
linear additive model than participants in the shared responsibility condition. 
Another line of research that may be said to have investigated internal accountability, 
albeit not explicitly, is research on information processing under different degrees of personal 
involvement. In Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann's (1983) study, for example, participants 
were asked to report their attitude towards a new brand of disposable razor after having been 
exposed to an advertisement for this product. High involvement was created by telling 
participants that the product would soon be available in their home town and that, as a reward 
for taking part in the study, they would later be allowed to choose among several brands of 
disposable razors. The latter information, it may be argued, made personal consequences of 
their performance salient to the participants and thereby created internal accountability. In the 
'low involvement' condition, participants were told that the product would soon be tested in 
some other towns and that they would be allowed to choose among several brands of 
toothpaste as a reward for taking part in the study. The advertisement contained either strong 
or weak arguments and the product was either endorsed by a famous sports celebrity or by an 
unknown ordinary citizen. It was found that 'high involvement' participants processed the 
message in a more systematic way than 'low involvement' participants, indicated by the fact 
that their attitude toward the advertisement only depended on the strength of the arguments 
presented and not on the famousness of the endorser. Similarly, Borgida and Howard-Pitney 
(1983) found that personal involvement, that is, being personally affected by an issue, 
eliminated the influence of a discussant's visual salience on participants' ratings of her 
influence and causal role and resulted in a more systematic processing of message arguments.  
These findings confirm Cacioppo and Petty's (1981, 1986) elaboration likelihood 
model which suggests that highly involved participants take a central processing route, where 
they carefully think about arguments and therefore are influenced by the quality of the 
presented arguments, whereas low-involvement participants take a peripheral processing 
route, where they rely on heuristics to evaluate a message superficially and therefore are 
influenced by peripheral cues such as communicator likeability, salience, or expertise.  
In Harkness, DeBono, and Borgida’s (1985) study, which tested the effects of personal 
involvement in a different context, participants were asked to perform a co-variation 
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judgement task in which they were presented with 2 x 2 co-variation matrices containing 
information about a person’s dating choices. High involvement was created by telling 
participants that they would date the person later (thereby making personal consequences and 
responsibility for the consequences of their performance salient), in the 'low involvement' 
conditions, participants either believed that they would date a different person or that the 
presented information was fictitious. The co-variation judgements of 'high involvement' 
participants were consistent with the use of more complex strategies and tended to be more 
accurate than those of 'low involvement' participants.  
Lee, Herr, Kardes, and Kim (1999, exp. 2) directly compared the effects of issue 
involvement and external accountability on information search and use in a multiattribute 
decision task. Participants were asked to choose one of nine laptop computers, each described 
by eight attributes on a computerised information board. For half of the participants, high 
issue involvement was induced by telling them that their Business College was planning to 
purchase laptop PCs to lend them to students and that their decision would help to select a 
suitable model for them. The other participants in the 'low involvement' condition were told 
about the same kind of scenario, but it was said to apply to another Business School, not their 
own. External accountability was then manipulated by reminding half of the participants 
about the importance of a correct choice and telling them that they would be required to write 
a justification of their choice afterwards (high accountability), whereas the other half was told 
that the study was not about assessing the correctness of their choice but identifying 
individual preferences (low accountability). Results showed that either high issue 
involvement or high accountability were sufficient to make participants examine more 
information, spend more time examining information and engage in more compensatory 
information processing than participants in the other conditions. Where the effects of the two 
manipulations differed was in terms of their contingency on prior knowledge levels. Whereas 
high accountability always increased the depth and complexity of information processing, no 
matter whether participants' previous knowledge about laptop computers was high or low, 
high issue involvement only increased search effort and compensatory processing if 
participants had little prior knowledge. Lee et al. (1999) explained this effect by assuming that 
high external accountability focuses participants' attention on extrinsic rewards, such as other 
people's approval of their decision, which is unlikely to be gained unless much effort is 
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invested in the task, whereas high issue involvement focuses participants' attention on 
intrinsic rewards, such as a feeling that they have made a good decision. The latter can be 
gained with relatively little effort unless participants lack sufficient experience, which they 
will then attempt to compensate for by increasing effort. Note that this explanation is 
consistent with the point made at the end of the previous chapter, namely, that personal 
responsibility as an antecedent of internal accountability will make personal norms salient, 
whereas evaluation apprehension as an antecedent of external accountability will make 
external norms salient. 
A comparison of the effects of personal responsibility and external accountability was 
also the focus of Rozelle and Baxter's (1981) study. Participants had to rate mock applicants 
to graduate school on a series of self-and experimenter-generated traits. Personal 
responsibility was manipulated by either telling participants that their ratings would be 
considered along with other materials when reaching a decision about whether to accept or 
reject the applicants ('high personal responsibility' condition), or telling them that the 
selection decisions had already been made and their ratings were combined with other 
materials in order to improve the selection process in coming years ('low personal 
responsibility' condition). Participants were also either made externally accountable by being 
led to believe that they would have to discuss their ratings with other judges and that the 
applicants would be able to inspect their ratings ('high accountability' condition), or they were 
not made accountable, in which case no mention was made of any group discussion and 
participants were told that their ratings would be kept in strict confidence and applicants 
would not be able to inspect them. As in Lee et al.'s (1999) study, results suggested that either 
high personal responsibility or high external accountability were sufficient to increase 
between-judge agreement on the same target, decrease between judge-agreement on different 
targets and decrease within-judge agreement on different targets, suggesting that participants' 
ratings under these conditions more reliably reflected real characteristics of the target rather 
than perceptual idiosyncrasies of individual judges. The effect of personal responsibility on 
these measures was not as strong as that of external accountability, however. 
A final study comparing the effects of personal responsibility and external 
accountability to be reported here is that by Weldon and Gargano (1988). The cover story and 
manipulation of personal responsibility was identical to that of their 1985 study described 
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above. Additionally, half of the participants were told that the experimenters may want to 
contact them afterwards, in order for participants to explain what information they used and 
why they made certain judgements ('accountability' condition). In the 'no accountability' 
conditions, no mention was made of these things. Note that the manipulation of external 
accountability contains an implicit suggestion of identifiability. As Weldon and Gargano 
point out, this was intended, as they, in line with the analysis presented in the previous 
chapter, assume that identifiability, despite being distinct from external accountability, is a 
necessary component of it. The results showed a significant interaction effect between 
personal responsibility and accountability on cognitive effort, such that the number of non-
zero beta weights in a linear additive regression model, as indicators of how much 
information had been used, was greater for participants who believed they were the only 
evaluator than for participants who believed they were 1 of 16 evaluators, whereas there was 
no difference when participants had been made accountable. Also, for participants who 
thought they shared responsibility for the judgement task (regardless of whether they had 
been made externally accountable or not), a smaller proportion of judgement variability could 
be explained by a linear regression model, suggesting that their judgement strategies were less 
linear. This latter result may also be interpreted in terms of consistency, as an inconsistent 
application of a linear combination strategy (or random evaluations, in an extreme case) 
would also result in a low proportion of explained variance. Given that this result was 
obtained even when shared responsibility participants were accountable, Weldon and Gargano 
(1988) concluded that accountable participants only expected their performance to be judged 
with regard to the information they had used (as this was explicitly mentioned in the 
instructions), whereas they did not expect their consistency to be judged. This again supports 
the idea that particular norms become salient, when the individual experiences evaluation 
apprehension.  
In conclusion, the findings of the studies reviewed above suggest that internal 
accountability, operationalised in the form of personal responsibility or high personal 
involvement, increases the depth of information search and complexity of information 
integration. Under certain circumstances, however, in particular, after a decision has been 
made, it seems to increase people's tendency to bolster their previous choice by searching for 
information that is consistent with it, by changing their evaluation of their chosen alternative 
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in such a way that its attractiveness is increased, and by continuing to invest in it even though 
it has been proven wrong. 
The effects of external accountability 
Research on how external accountability affects decision processes generally has also 
produced these two kinds of results. On the one hand, it has been found that external 
accountability, compared with no accountability, results in more thorough and multi-
dimensional, that is, more analytical and compensatory information processing. On the other 
hand, it has been found that external accountability leads to a greater defensiveness and to 
decisions which are more prone to a tendency to choose according to the ease of justifiability 
instead of making the best decision.  
Increased effort and complexity of information processing 
A higher vigilance and complexity of information processing when the individual is 
externally accountable compared to when he or she is not accountable, have been indicated by  
• a deeper information search (Billings & Scherer, 1988; Doney & Armstrong, 1996; 
Hattrup & Ford, 1995; Huber & Seiser, 2001) 
• a longer time to arrive at a decision or spent on a task (Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Ford & 
Weldon, 1981; Hattrup & Ford, 1995; Huber & Seiser, 2001; McAllister, Beach & 
Mitchell, 1979, exp. 3; Mc Lean Parks & Conlon, 1990; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; 
Stewart, Billings, & Stasser, 1998; Van Hiel & Schittekatte, 1997; Weldon & Gargano, 
1988) 
• an increased self-reported task motivation (Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Magjuka, 
Baldwin, & Lower, 1994)  
• a higher integrative complexity of thoughts (Gordon & Stuecher, 1993; Koonce, 
Anderson, & Marchant, 1995; Mandel, Axelrod, & Lehman, 1993; Tetlock, 1983a; 
Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989)  
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• the application of more complex, compensatory decision rules (McAllister, Beach & 
Mitchell, 1979, exp. 3; Murphy, 1994) 
Huber and Seiser (2001), for example, asked their participants to role-play a member 
of a social services executive board with the task to choose a manager for a home for criminal 
adolescents. Participants were either only told that they had been delegated by the executive 
board to choose the candidate ('no justification' condition), or were additionally told that, after 
the decision, they would have to write a letter to the executive board in which they would 
either have to explain why the selected candidate was chosen ('accounting' condition) or they 
would have to convince the other members of the executive board to follow their 
recommendation ('convincing' condition). Six candidates, described on 16 attributes, were 
presented on an information board. Apart from standard information board measures, such as 
decision time and percentage of utilised information, think-aloud protocols were analysed. 
The results showed that decision time was longest in the 'convincing' condition and shortest in 
the 'no justification' condition, with the 'accounting' condition in-between. Also, the 
percentage of utilised information was larger in the justification conditions than in the 'no 
justification' conditions. No significant difference was found between the 'accounting' and the 
'convincing' condition, however. The think-aloud protocols, on the other hand, did show a 
significantly larger number of statements in the 'convincing' than in the 'accounting' condition. 
Again, the lowest number of statements was observed in the 'no justification' condition. This 
study therefore demonstrates increased task effort as a consequence of external accountability 
pressures. Increased task effort has also been reported by participants directly, for example, in 
a study by Magjuka, Baldwin, and Loher (1994), in which participants in a business skills 
training programme were either made externally accountable or not made accountable for 
their performance.  
Tetlock and his co-workers (Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & 
Kim, 1987; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) have repeatedly demonstrated a higher 
integrative complexity of thoughts, when individuals are made externally accountable (see 
also Mandel, Axelrod, & Lehman, 1993), particularly when they are made accountable to an 
audience with unknown views. Tetlock (1983a), for example, asked participants to report 
their thoughts and respond to a series of attitude scales on three controversial social issues, 
affirmative action, capital punishment, and increased defence spending. This happened under 
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one of four conditions, (1) no accountability, (2) accountability to someone with liberal views, 
(3) accountability to someone with conservative views, or (4) accountability to someone with 
unknown views. Participants' thoughts were coded for their integrative complexity, that is, the 
extent to which participants focused on multiple dimensions of a problem and the 
development of complex connections among these multiple dimensions. Integrative 
complexity was found to be higher when participants had been made accountable to an 
individual with unknown views than when they had not been made accountable. Interestingly, 
the lowest integrative complexity was obtained when participants had been made accountable 
to an individual with either liberal or conservative views. This suggests that when participants 
know or can anticipate the view of the audience they have been made accountable to, they 
will just adopt this view and only expend minimal cognitive effort.  
Studies which have analysed participants' decision strategies rather than their thoughts 
on a topic have found that external accountability results in the employment of more complex 
decision strategies. Murphy (1994), for example, showed that when participants were told that 
they would have to justify their responses to the experimenter and other participants, they 
used more complex strategies when assessing the co-variation of two cues. McAllister, 
Mitchell, and Beach (1979, exp. 3) asked participants, who had either been made externally 
accountable or had not been made accountable for the particular decision task they were faced 
with, to make a decision on the potential marketability of sports products2. In order to arrive 
at a decision, participants had to choose one of four different prescribed decision strategies 
which differed in the amount of information they used, the difficulty of computations 
involved and their past record for accuracy. Participants who had been made accountable 
were found to select more analytical decision strategies than participants who had not been 
made accountable. In addition, they allocated more time to and actually spent more time on 
completing the task. De Hoog and van der Wittenboer (1986), in a similar study, were not 
able to replicate these results, however. Participants who had been told to justify their 
decision rule to a panel of experts were not more likely to select compensatory decision rules 
(the averaging rule and least objections rule) than participants who had not been made 
                                                 
2 In addition to accountability, perceived task significance and decision reversibility were manipulated. Since no 
interactions of these factors with the accountability factor were observed, the effects of these manipulations are 
not reported.  
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accountable. De Hoog and van der Wittenboer suggest that a possible explanation for their 
failure to find a difference between accountable and non-accountable participants' rule 
selection may have been participants' low familiarity with the particular non-compensatory 
decision rules offered. Generally, the procedure of having participants choose pre-defined 
decision rules is very artificial and may not reflect participants' natural use of decision rules 
anyway.  
The increased cognitive effort that accountability seems to instigate has a number of 
beneficial effects, for example, 
• a greater consistency in the application of judgmental strategies (Ashton, 1992; Hagafors 
& Brehmer, 1983; Ordonez, Benson III, & Beach, 1999) 
• a higher self-awareness of decision makers in terms of how they use information to arrive 
at their decision (Cvetkovich, 1978; Johnson & Kaplan, 1991) 
• a higher consensus among decision makers (Ashton, 1992; Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; 
Johnson & Kaplan, 1991)  
• a greater accuracy of judgements and decisions (Ashton, 1992; Cvetkovich, 1978; Nero & 
Motowidlo, 1995; Rozelle & Baxter, 1981) or, more generally, a better performance 
(Magjuka, Baldwin, & Lower, 1994; Tausky & Chelte, 1983; Yarnold, Mueser, & Lyons, 
1988)  
• a better recall of information (Chaiken, 1980, exp. 1; Tetlock, 1985b)  
• a de-biasing effect, particularly for biases which result from incomplete information 
processing (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Boudreau, Baron, & Oliver, 1992; 
Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; Foschi, 1996; Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985, 
exp. 3; Kassin, Rigby, & Castillo, 1991; Kennedy, 1993; Kirby & Davis, 1998; Kroon, 't 
Hart, & van Kreveld, 1991; Kroon, van Kreveld, & Rabbie, 1992; Kruglanski & Freund, 
1983; Lerner, Goldsmith, & Tetlock, 1998; McKenna & Myers, 1997; McLean Parks & 
Conlon, 1990; Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998; Schadewald & Limberg, 1992; 
Simonson & Nye, 1992; Slugoski, unpublished; Takemura, 1993; Tetlock, 1983b, 
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Tetlock, 1985b; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996; Wells, 
Petty, Harkins, Kagehiro, & Harvey, 1977) 
Studies which have employed a multiple cue prediction (or policy capturing) paradigm 
have repeatedly shown that external accountability improves various aspects of the judgement 
process. Such studies typically present participants with at least two information cues and ask 
them to make a prediction based on these cues. In Hagafors and Brehmer's (1983) study, for 
example, participants had to predict the level of the fictitious disease 'Morbus Brugonit' from 
the amount of 'Raviance' and 'Victine' in patients' bodies. Ashton's (1992) and Johnson and 
Kaplan's (1991) participants, who were professional auditors, had to predict bond ratings from 
three financial ratios and the risk for products in a company's catalogue becoming obsolete 
from five cues, respectively. Both Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) and Ashton (1992) found 
that external accountability increased the consistency with which participants applied their 
judgmental strategy (measured as the multiple correlation between the cues and participants' 
predictions). In Johnson and Kaplan's (1991) study, however, no significant difference 
between accountable and non-accountable participants was observed. Ashton (1992) and 
Johnson and Kaplan (1991) also reported a higher consensus between accountable 
participants than non-accountable participants, as indicated by the increased mean correlation 
between the predictions of pairs of participants. Finally, external accountability has been 
found to result in an increased self-insight of decision makers into their own judgement and 
decision processes. This is indicated by an increased correlation between beta regression 
weights and self-reported cue weights for accountable compared to non-accountable 
participants (Cvetkovich, 1978; Johnson & Kaplan, 1991).  
If objective criteria exist, which allow a comparison of participants' predictions with 
actual values, participants' accuracy of judgement may be assessed. This was the case in 
Ashton's (1992) study, which found that accountable participants made more accurate 
judgements than participants who had not been made accountable. Studies employing other 
paradigms also have reported a higher accuracy of judgements under accountability pressure. 
In a study by Mero and Motowidlo (1995), for example, one group of participants was held 
accountable for their ratings of the performance of four simulated subordinates displayed on 
video, while another group was not held accountable. Accountable participants rated the 
displayed performance more accurately than non-accountable participants, as indicated by 
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Cronbach's (1955) index of differential accuracy, which measures how well raters can 
differentiate between different levels of performance on different dimensions. Although the 
primary focus here are judgement and decision processes, it should be mentioned that 
accountability has been found to improve other types of performance as well. For example, 
when asked to tear as many pages out of a phone book as possible within a certain time 
interval, accountable Type A individuals showed a better performance than non-accountable 
Type A individuals. For Type B individuals, no significant difference between accountable 
and non-accountable participants was observed (Yarnold, Mueser, & Lyons, 1988). This 
result suggests that there are inter-individual differences with regard to susceptibility to 
accountability manipulations. Other personality variables that have been found to increase 
people's response to external accountability include high self-monitoring, high social anxiety, 
a low individuating tendency, and low dogmatism (Chen, Shecter, & Chaiken, 1994; Fandt & 
Ferris, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989).  
External accountability has also been found to enhance people's memory performance. 
Chaiken (1980, exp. 1), for example, observed that participants recalled more arguments of a 
persuasive message if they had been told that they would be interviewed on the same topic at 
a second session than if they had been told that they would be interviewed on a different 
topic.  
Finally, a number of studies have demonstrated that external accountability may have 
a de-biasing effect in those cases where a more thorough information processing results in a 
normatively correct response (Simonson & Nye, 1992, see also Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, for 
an extensive review). Externally accountable participants have repeatedly been shown to be 
less susceptible to a primacy effect in information processing (Freund, Kruglanski, & 
Shpitzajzen, 1985, exp. 3; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983, exp. 1; Tetlock, 1983b; Schadewald & 
Limberg, 1992; Kennedy, 1993; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski; 1996). Wells, Petty, 
Harkins, Kagehiro, and Harvey (1977), Tetlock (1985b), and Lerner, Goldsmith, and Tetlock 
(1998) have demonstrated that accountability eliminates the fundamental attribution error, 
that is, the tendency to attribute behaviour to personal traits rather than situational factors 
(Ross, 1977). External accountability has also been found to reduce overconfidence in a 
personality prediction task (Tetlock & Kim, 1987), when giving eyewitness testimony 
(Kassin, Rigby, & Castillo, 1991), and when judging one's driving skills (McKenna & Myers, 
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1997). In addition, it seems to reduce bias in people's co-variation judgements. Slugoski, in an 
unpublished study, found that external accountability attenuated the illusory correlation effect, 
that is, the tendency to perceive a correlation between two classes of events when no such 
correlation is present in the data (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Under certain circumstances, 
external accountability may decrease people's reliance on stereotypes, for example, when they 
are not under time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983, exp. 2). Participants in Boudreau, 
Baron, and Oliver's (1992) study used fewer trait terms and described more specific 
behaviours when anticipating communication with an expert, and Foschi (1996) found that 
external accountability reduced a typical bias in the evaluation of task competence, namely 
that women are held to a stricter standard of competence than men. External accountability 
can also help to eliminate the tendency of incidental affect to elicit stereotypical information 
processing. Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser (1994), for example, found that participants 
who had been put into a happy mood relied more on stereotypes than participants in a neutral 
mood, unless they had been made externally accountable. Furthermore, a number of biases 
identified by the Kahneman and Tversky research programme have been found to be 
attenuated under external accountability. Kruglanski and Freund (1983, exp. 3) showed a 
diminished anchoring and adjustment bias when participants had been made externally 
accountable, and Takemura (1993) demonstrated that participants who had to justify their 
decision did not show a framing effect but were more likely to choose the risky option in both 
gain and loss frames. A number of authors (e.g., Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; Conlon & 
Wolf, 1980; Kirby & Davis, 1998; McLean Parks & Conlon, 1990; Simonson & Nye, 1992; 
Simonson & Staw, 1992) have provided evidence for the fact that when people are externally 
accountable, they are less likely to show escalation of commitment to a failing course of 
action and more likely to ignore sunk costs. This is in contrast to the effect of internal 
accountability on sunk costs reported earlier and provides further evidence for the suggestion 
that external accountability makes different behavioural standards salient than internal 
accountability. Finally, in the applied context of pilot decision making in cockpits, Mosier, 
Skitka, Heers, and Burdick (1998) could show that external accountability decreases the so-
called automation bias. This term refers to omission and commission errors resulting from 
over-reliance on cues provided by automated aids, for example, not taking appropriate action 
because of not being informed of an imminent problem by the automated aid, or immediately 
acting upon automated information when there is other information in the environment that 
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contradicts or is inconsistent with the automated cue. This finding and the results of the 
studies reported above all strongly suggest that external accountability results in a more 
thorough processing of all available information.  
Interestingly, external accountability has been found to reduce biased judgement and 
decision processes not only in individual but also in group decision making. Kroon and co-
workers (Kroon, 't Hart, & van Kreveld, 1991; Kroon, van Kreveld, & Rabbie, 1991, 1992) 
have provided evidence for the fact that external accountability diminishes people's 
susceptibility to the so-called groupthink phenomenon, where the desire to reach a unanimous 
group decision overrides a motivation to critically analyse decision alternatives, resulting in a 
number of symptoms of defective decision making (Janis, 1982). In particular, external 
accountability inhibited the occurrence of pressure towards unanimity, encouraged all group 
members to participate actively in the discussion (thereby counteracting one of the 
antecedents of groupthink, promotional leadership), and resulted in less risky decisions. These 
effects were stronger when participants were made individually accountable (i.e., when they 
were told that they would each have to account for the group's decision and their own 
contribution to the discussion) than when they were made collectively accountable (i.e., when 
they were told that they would have to account for their group's decision together), although 
collective accountability was still more beneficial than no accountability (Kroon, 't Hart, & 
van Kreveld, 1991). Also, men seemed to be more affected than women (Kroon, van Kreveld, 
& Rabbie, 1992). Fandt (1991) found that making team members both individually and 
collectively accountable resulted in more interdependent behaviour, that is, more 
communication and co-ordination between group members in their effort to accomplish their 
task, which, in turn, lead to higher team satisfaction and higher perceived team success than 
no accountability. Unfortunately, no objective measure of team success was taken in this 
study, so that it cannot be established whether the increased subjective perception of success 
had any objective correlate.  
The previous discussion of studies on judgement and decision biases seems to suggest 
that external accountability invariably reduces or eliminates such biases. This is, however, not 
the case. There are a number of biases that are either not affected or even negatively affected 
by external accountability. Which these are and under what circumstances external 
accountability will have a beneficial, no, or a detrimental effect will be discussed in more 
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detail later in this chapter. One reason for an impairment which is relevant to the discussion 
here, is that in certain situations the induced tendency to consider as much information as 
possible may backfire. A prime example is the dilution effect, the tendency for people to 
inappropriately take non-diagnostic information into account, which dilutes the extremity of 
predictions people would arrive at if they only used diagnostic information (Nisbett, Zukier, 
& Lemley, 1981; Zukier, 1982). Both Tetlock and Boettger (1989) and Tetlock, Lerner, and 
Boettger (1996) have demonstrated that external accountability increases participants' 
tendency to exhibit a dilution effect. Similarly, Stewart, Billings, and Stasser (1998) found 
that external accountability not only failed to enhance participants' tendency to share unique 
information with other members in their discussion group but even decreased it relative to a 
'no accountability' condition, because of an increased focus on irrelevant details. At the same 
time, accountable participants were no more likely than non-accountable ones to identify the 
correct solution. 
Whereas external accountability in many cases seems to have a beneficial effect, by 
inducing a deeper and more effortful information processing, the findings on the dilution 
effect and information sharing in groups suggest that external accountability can also impair 
judgement and decision processes. We will now turn to studies that have provided evidence 
for this impairment by suggesting that external accountability increases the individual's 
defensiveness. 
Increased defensiveness  
Commonly reported negative effects of external accountability point to an increased 
defensiveness on the part of the decision maker and include the following indicators:  
• decisions that are expected to appeal to the evaluator's preferences and/or norms 
(Adelberg & Batson, 1978; Antonioni, 1994; Brief, Dukerich, & Doran, 1991; Brockner, 
Rubin, & Lang, 1981; Chinburapa, Larson, Brucks, Draugalis, Bootman, & Puto, 1993; 
Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Pennington & Schlenker, 1999; Schoenrade, Batson, Brandt, & 
Loud, Jr., 1986; Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) 
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• decisions that are based on more generally accepted reasons that do not depend on 
knowledge of the particular evaluator's preferences (Aaker, 1991; Bowen & Qiu, 1992; 
Curley, Yates & Abrams, 1986; Simonson, 1989; Taylor, 1995)  
• a focus on negative consequences and risk avoidance (Ganzach, 1993, exp. 3; Gibbins, 
1984; Lord, 1992; McLean Parks & Conlon, 1990; Tetlock & Boettger, 1994) 
• a defensive information search (Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Emby & Gibbins, 1988; 
Gibbins & Emby, 1985; Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Sanbonmatsu, Akimoto, & Biggs, 1993) 
• an enhanced competitiveness in negotiators (Bass, 1966; Benton, 1972; Ben-Yoav & 
Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Druckman, 1968; Haccoun & 
Klimoski, 1975; Klimoski & Ash, 1974; Pruitt, Kimmel, Britton, Carnevale, Magenau, 
Peragallo, & Engram, 1978; Roloff & Campion, 1987) 
• decision avoidance (Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 1994; Staw & Boettger, 1990; Tetlock & 
Boettger, 1994) 
• an enhanced tendency to rely on stereotypical information processing (Gordon, Rozelle, & 
Baxter, 1988, 1989; Hattrup & Ford, 1995, exp. 2) 
Several studies have suggested that under external accountability, individuals are more 
strongly driven by a concern to avoid controversy and criticism than they are by the wish to 
reach an optimal conclusion, resulting in decisions that are easy to justify. One feature that 
makes decisions easy to justify is when they match the evaluator's preferences. Adelberg and 
Batson (1978) were among the first to demonstrate that the tendency to choose according to 
the preferences of one's evaluator(s) when having been made externally accountable can have 
considerable negative consequences. In their study, they told their student participants about a 
fictitious agency whose purpose was to provide financial aid for students who were in danger 
of having to drop out of university because of financial problems. Participants were told that 
they took part in a pilot study which tested whether students could function as local 
administrators of this programme. Each participant was given a certain budget and had to 
decide on six applicants with different personal histories and different levels of financial need. 
For each applicant, a minimal survival estimate was provided which was said to be necessary 
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in order to prevent the applicant from having to leave and, therefore, for the financial support 
to be effective. Participants were either not made accountable (i.e., were told that their 
decisions would remain anonymous), were made accountable to the service providers (i.e., 
were told that they would meet with an employee of the agency who would review their 
decisions), or were made accountable to the recipients of the service (i.e., were told that they 
would meet individually with each applicant to inform them about the decision). Also, the 
budget participants were given was either sufficient or insufficient to meet all applicants’ 
needs. The main dependent variable was the amount of wasted resources, that is, the amount 
in dollars awarded below the specified minimum survival estimate. As predicted, Adelberg 
and Batson found that participants in the inadequate-resources conditions wasted more money 
than participants in the adequate-resources conditions, and within the inadequate-resources 
conditions those participants who were accountable to either the providers or the recipients of 
the service wasted more money than participants who were not accountable. This was because 
participants in these conditions were more concerned with pleasing the people they were 
accountable to than with providing effective help, as indicated by an analysis of the strategies 
participants applied to distribute their inadequate budget. Non-accountable participants 
mainly used an ‘all to some’ strategy which involved awarding substantial amounts to some 
applicants and nothing to others. This strategy minimised waste of resources. Participants in 
the 'recipient accountability' conditions, however, mainly applied a ‘some to all’ strategy, that 
is, they awarded all applicants some money. Since the amount awarded frequently was less 
than the minimum survival estimate, waste in this condition was high. Finally, although 
participants in the 'provider accountability' conditions, like those in the 'no accountability' 
conditions, primarily adopted an ‘all to some’ strategy, their waste was highest overall, 
because the amount they gave to their selected applicants often was less than was needed. The 
data therefore suggested that in the 'provider accountability' conditions, the salient norm was 
to spend as little as possible, whereas in the 'recipient accountability' conditions a fairness 
norm was salient, which prescribed to distribute resources equally among applicants. 
Importantly, when resources were insufficient (arguably, a common state of affairs for social 
services) external accountability, no matter whether to providers or recipients, resulted in a 
less effective use of resources than no accountability. 
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Similarly, a study by Pennington and Schlenker (1999) showed that when participants, 
who believed that they were real judges in a cheating case under adjudication by a student 
honour court, expected to discuss their decision with the accused student, they were more 
lenient in the punishment they recommended and wrote justifications that were more 
sympathetic to the student than when they expected to have to explain their decision to the 
professor who had brought forward the accusations, or to an official from the student honour 
court. These effects were still observed, although to a lesser extent, when participants made 
their decisions after being informed that the anticipated meeting had been cancelled, 
suggesting that external accountability not only resulted in normative influence but also 
prompted participants to genuinely change their perspective, consistent with informational 
influence. However, before such a conclusion can be drawn, it is important to rule out that 
participants may have believed that a meeting would take place at a later point.  
Other evidence for the fact that under external accountability, individuals try to match 
their behaviour closely to a salient norm in order to gain the approval of the person(s) they are 
accountable to (or, as Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni, 1998, have put it, show a 
preference for 'should' over 'want' options), includes Schoenrade, Batson, Brandt, and Loud's 
study (1986). This demonstrated that female undergraduates, given a choice between 
benefiting themselves and benefiting another female undergraduate, were more likely to 
benefit the other person when they anticipated accountability to this person. Klimoski and 
Inks (1990) found that participants in the role of supervisors anticipating face-to-face 
feedback sharing with a poorly performing subordinate rated the subordinate's performance 
significantly more positively than participants who either expected to give written feedback or 
not to share any feedback. This effect has also been observed for upward appraisal ratings 
(Antonioni, 1994), where subordinates who were accountable for their ratings of their 
supervisor's performance made significantly more positive judgements than those who gave 
anonymous ratings. Finally, Brockner, Rubin, and Lang (1981) found that participants 
adopted their audience's view on what would be the best investment strategy to win them 
money in a jackpot. When the audience was expected to be cautious, participants made 
conservative investment decisions, when it was expected to be risky, participants made risky 
investment decisions. 
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The previous discussion has suggested that one way of coping with external 
accountability pressures is making a decision that is assumed to please the audience one is 
accountable to. However, a choice may also be perceived as easy to justify, and therefore 
preferred under external accountability, when it is not dependent on knowledge of the 
particular evaluator's preferences but is based on more generally accepted decision principles 
instead. One such principle, according to Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986), may be 
ambiguity avoidance. In their studies, participants showed ambiguity avoidance when 
choosing between two lotteries with identical outcomes, one of which was ambiguous 
because the probability of the outcomes was not known. Curley et al. argued that the 
preference for the unambiguous lottery could be explained by participants' belief that a choice 
that avoided ambiguity was most socially acceptable. This explanation was borne out of the 
fact that the anticipation of being evaluated by others was the only one out of six 
manipulations that systematically affected participants' choice behaviour in this situation. A 
possible reason for why ambiguity avoidance may be perceived as more justifiable, Curley et 
al. suggested, could be that external accountability focuses participants' attention on possible 
negative decision outcomes, and participants choose the non-ambiguous option in order to 
avoid the outcome of losing with an ambiguous option that turns out to have a worse 
probability of success than the unambiguous one. This assumption received some support by 
Bowen and Qiu's (1995) study, which showed that, when faced with a choice between two 
unattractive alternatives, one of which was unattractive because it was ambiguous and the 
other because it had a low probability of success, participants were willing to pay to buy 
information that reduced uncertainty about the ambiguous option, whereas they were not 
willing to do so when the unambiguous alternative was attractive, thereby having a good 
reason already to choose it over the ambiguous option.  
Another example of more justifiable decisions under external accountability is 
Simonson's (1989) demonstration that both the attraction and compromise effect are enhanced 
when participants expect to have to justify their decision. The attraction (or asymmetric 
dominance) effect, first described by Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982), refers to 'the ability of 
an asymmetrically dominated or relatively inferior alternative, when added to a set, to 
increase the attractiveness and choice probability of the dominating alternative' (Simonson, 
1989, p. 158). For example, if participants have to choose between two brands of beer, one 
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cheaper and the other of better quality, when a third brand is added to the choice set which is 
dominated by one of the alternatives (e.g., because of being more expensive and no better 
quality), the choice ratio (i.e., market share) of the dominating alternative goes up compared 
to a situation where the dominated alternative is absent from the set. This effect is enhanced 
when participants anticipate having to justify their decision (see also Aaker, 1991). According 
to Simonson (1989), this is because the asymmetric dominance relationship provides the only 
reason for a choice that does not depend on particular attribute weights or trade-offs and 
therefore is independent of any evaluator's particular preferences. A similar argument may be 
made for the amplification of the compromise effect under external accountability, that is, the 
tendency for an alternative to become more popular when it becomes a compromise or middle 
option in a choice set. If the decision maker is unsure about what the person(s) he or she is 
accountable to prefer, then a compromise alternative seems to be the safest choice with the 
smallest maximum error.  
External accountability seems to focus people's attention particularly on the potential 
negative consequences of their decisions, arguably because the penalties for errors are more 
significant than the rewards for success (Lord, 1992). In Tetlock and Boettger's (1994) 
laboratory simulation of FDA (Food and Drug Administration) decisions about whether to 
allow drugs onto or take already approved drugs off the US pharmaceutical market, 
participants who anticipated to have to justify their decisions to an expert focused their 
thoughts more on negative aspects of the drug than non-accountable participants. Also, 
Ganzach (1993, exp. 3) found that when participants were asked to adopt the role of personnel 
manager in charge of hiring personnel for managerial positions rather than just to evaluate 
two job candidates, they used a conjunctive judgement strategy more often that relied more 
heavily on negative cues. Finally, McLean Parks and Conlon (1990) reported that decision 
makers who were blamed for a previously failed investment decision, thereby having 
accountability concerns made salient to them, focused more on negative cues when asked to 
state how much money they would continue to invest in the option that had failed.  
Presumably as a consequence of focusing on the potential negative aspects of their 
decisions, individuals often show more conservatism and risk avoidance under external 
accountability. In Tetlock and Boettger's (1994) study, for example, accountable participants 
who had to decide on a medium or high-risk drug not yet on the market were particularly 
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reluctant to permit it. Lord (1992) showed that professional auditors who were accountable 
for their decisions to a senior partner of their firm, were less likely to issue an unqualified 
opinion than auditors who had been given a guarantee of anonymity. 
Further indicators of the tendency to become more defensive under external 
accountability are confirmatory and symbolic information search. The latter refers to 
information search that is carried out for the primary purpose of justifying one's actions to 
others (O'Reilly, 1983). In a field survey by Doney and Armstrong (1996), purchasing 
managers indicated that both informal accountability (accountability to subordinates and/or 
peers) and official accountability (accountability to superiors) made them collect more 
information than they really needed, in order to show that they did a good job in case 
something went wrong later on, or for the purpose of making a good impression on others. A 
similar result was obtained by Fandt and Ferris (1990). In their study, customer service 
employees were asked to consider a scenario which, although hypothetical, was very close to 
their daily experience and involved making a decision and documenting this decision by 
writing a brief report and selecting information items from a provided list that would be 
contained in a brief oral report. Participants were either told that they had to stand in as a 
temporary supervisor for a day, with personal responsibility for any decisions made, and that 
their performance would affect their job evaluation and future promotion prospects ('high 
accountability' condition), or they were told that someone else had been made temporary 
supervisor and that they were not responsible for any decisions made nor would their job 
performance evaluation or future career prospects be affected ('low accountability' condition). 
In addition, decisions were either made under high ambiguity, where participants were told 
that a similar incident had occurred the previous week but they were not aware of their 
supervisor's decision then, or under low ambiguity, where participants were told how their 
supervisor had handled a similar incident the previous week. It was found that when 
accountability was high and ambiguity was low, participants used significantly more 
defensive information, that is, information that served to shift responsibility and cover 
mistakes, and mentioned significantly more positive aspects of their decision than in any other 
condition. Also, Sanbonmatsu, Akimoto, and Biggs (1993), in the context of a causal 
judgement task, showed that external accountability increased confirmatory information 
processing, that is, the tendency to mainly consider the likelihood of an outcome in the 
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presence of a target cause and to neglect the likelihood of the outcome in the absence of the 
target cause or in the presence of alternative causes, resulting in strong overestimations of the 
causality of a certain cue.  
Defensiveness-enhancing effects of external accountability have also been observed in 
negotiation contexts. External accountability arises when negotiators act as representatives for 
a party and their constituents have the capacity to monitor their performance and to reward or 
punish them. In laboratory settings, the latter is usually manipulated by the degree to which 
each negotiator’s earnings are determined by his or her team-mates. External accountability to 
their constituents has been found to increase negotiators’ competitive behaviour, which can 
stand in the way of reaching the best possible negotiation outcome. Externally accountable 
negotiators are less likely to reach an integrative agreement which satisfies the needs of both 
parties (Benton, 1972; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981), and the overall profit is lower 
than in negotiations between non-accountable representatives, usually because the profit of 
the less successful negotiator is lower (Pruitt, Kimmel, Britton, Carnevale, Magenau, 
Peragallo, & Engram, 1978; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). In cases where the quality of solution 
is not determined by a quantitative criterion such as overall profit, but where a correct 
solution to a problem exists, such as the NASA moon survival task (Hall, 1971), externally 
accountable negotiators sometimes, but not always, produce solutions of a poorer quality 
(Haccoun & Klimoski, 1975). Externally accountable negotiators make more extreme initial 
offers (Roloff & Campion, 1987), are less willing to concede (Pruitt et al., 1978) and more 
often reject others’ offers. They therefore usually take longer to reach an agreement, 
especially when groups formulate and adopt a position prior to negotiations, and are more 
likely to reach a deadlock (Bass, 1966; Druckman, 1968; Benton, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 
1974, Van Hiel & Schittekatte, 1998). Under external accountability, effective problem-
solving behaviour, such as the exchange of information about values and priorities, is less 
likely to occur. Instead, so-called distributive behaviours can be observed more often, where 
negotiators try to dominate the other party by using threats, positional commitments, 
arguments aimed at the other to concede and attempts to raise one’s status (Pruitt et al., 1978; 
Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). A definition of the 
negotiation situation as highly competitive is reflected in externally accountable negotiators’ 
perceptions of themselves, their constituents and the other party. In Roloff and Campion’s 
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(1987) study, externally accountable negotiators thought they were perceived as less co-
operative and perceived the other party as less co-operative than unaccountable negotiators. 
Benton (1972) reported that externally accountable negotiators perceived their constituency as 
more competitive and more often thought their team-mates expected them to win than 
negotiators who were not accountable. Finally, under external accountability negotiators 
typically report more pressure, frustration and difficulty than without accountability (e.g., 
Klimoski & Ash, 1974). All these findings suggest that in negotiation contexts, accountability 
makes a competitiveness norm salient, where negotiators are meant to try to achieve a 
maximum outcome for their constituents and convey an image of toughness. The typically 
strong concern for negotiators' own and lack of concern for the other party means that both 
the negotiation process and outcome will be sub-optimal and that accountability will have a 
detrimental effect. However, when negotiators believe that they are rewarded for their 
objectivity rather than partisanship, accountable negotiators are better able to perceive 
interests compatible with the other party than non-accountable negotiators (Thompson, 1995).  
The enhanced pressure individuals seem to perceive when they are made accountable 
often results in decision avoidance tactics, as proposed in Janis and Mann's (1977) conflict 
model of decision making. In Tetlock and Boettger's (1994) FDA simulation study, 
participants who anticipated having to justify their decisions to an expert and who were 
confronted by a medium or high-risk drug not yet on the market, were particularly likely to 
show procrastination or buck-passing, that is, were particularly likely to advise deferring the 
decision for another year or passing it on to another decision making body, despite the fact 
that it was extremely unlikely that new evidence would emerge during this time period or that 
the other agency would be able to make a more informed decision. Roberts, Stout, and 
Halpern's (1994) analysis of decision making in a military context also suggested that soldiers 
at lower hierarchy levels typically relieve themselves of unpleasant feelings of responsibility 
by reporting problems to decision makers at the next higher level. This is consistent with Staw 
and Boettger's (1990) finding that external accountability impedes task revision in 
subordinates because they pass responsibility on to a higher level.  
Several authors have suggested that the stress induced by being accountable to others 
may also help to explain why participants who expect having to justify their judgements and 
decisions to others sometimes are more likely to rely on simple heuristics, for example, 
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stereotypes, than those who do not, contradicting research presented earlier that demonstrated 
a reduction of stereotypical information processing under external accountability. In Gordon, 
Rozelle, and Baxter's (1988, 1989) studies, for example, participants who rated simulated 
videotaped employment interviews of female job applicants, rated younger applicants (25 
years old) more positively, older applicants (40 and 55 years old) more negatively, and made 
more dispositional trait attributions when they expected to discuss their impressions of 
applicants with personnel directors compared to when they thought their responses would 
remain confidential. Similarly, Hattrup and Ford (1995, exp. 2) found that when participants 
were asked to search information about several targets prior to judging their suitability for 
membership on a committee, they searched significantly less information for targets with 
occupational labels when they had been made accountable than when they had not been made 
accountable. This supports the notion that external accountability may induce high levels of 
stress, which, in turn, results in more simplistic thinking (Janis & Mann, 1977).  
In conclusion, both internal and external accountability have been shown to affect 
judgement and decision processes in two seemingly contradictory ways. On the one hand, 
they induce deeper and more complex information processing, on the other hand, they make 
the decision maker more defensive and enhance his or her need to make a decision that can be 
easily justified rather than an optimal one. In order to explain why and under what 
circumstances internal and external accountability have these different effects on decision 
processes, three classifications of accountability seem of particular relevance. These are (1) 
accountability to an audience with known vs. unknown views, (2) pre-decisional vs. post-
decisional accountability, and (3) procedural vs. outcome accountability. In the following, 
these classifications will be introduced and the effects of each type on decision processes and 
outcomes discussed. 
Accountability to an audience with known vs. unknown views 
The first classification that allows predicting when external accountability will 
increase the depth and complexity of information processing and when it will increase a 
decision maker's defensiveness instead, is that of accountability to an audience with known 
vs. unknown views. Tetlock (1985a, 1991, 1992), in his social contingency model of 
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judgement and choice, has suggested that external accountability will result in more thorough 
information processing only when decision makers are accountable to an audience with 
unknown views. Otherwise, because people are 'cognitive misers' and prefer to expend 
minimal effort, they will just adopt the position which is most likely to be accepted by those 
to whom they feel accountable. Hence, decision makers' knowledge or assumption about the 
views of the person(s) they have to justify their decisions to moderates the effects of external 
accountability on decision processes. If they know or at least have certain expectations about 
the views of the person(s) they are accountable to, decision makers will make a decision that 
is consistent with these views and will not put increased cognitive effort into the decision 
process. Tetlock calls this an acceptability heuristic. Only when the most socially acceptable 
option is not obvious, does external accountability result in vigilant information processing in 
order to identify the alternative that is most defensible. The latter process Tetlock refers to as 
pre-emptive self-criticism. Individuals, given a situation of normative ambiguity and pressure 
to justify their decisions, will consider a variety of information, in order to anticipate 
arguments that critics could raise against their positions. This, according to Tetlock (1992), 
may be viewed as an adaptive strategy to protect both one's self-image and social image. 
We have already referred to evidence which supports Tetlock's hypothesis, for 
example, Tetlock (1983a), who found that the integrative complexity of participants' thoughts 
was lowest when they had been made accountable to someone with known views (either 
liberal or conservative) and highest when they had been made accountable to someone with 
unknown views, with no accountability in-between. Also, Mero and Motowidlo (1995) 
showed that the accuracy of participants' performance ratings was only improved if they had 
no expectations regarding the desired outcome of their ratings. When they had been told 
beforehand that their previous ratings had been too low, participants systematically 
overestimated the performance of others.  
When individuals are not sure about the standards and norms of the audience they are 
accountable to, they often attempt to guess the views of their audience and behave 
accordingly. Given that individuals are prone to a false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977), where they overestimate the extent to which others agree with their opinion, it 
is not surprising that this guess is often biased towards the individual's own view and/or 
preferences. Weigold and Schlenker (1991, exp. 1), for example, found that low risk takers 
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became more risk-averse when accountable, whereas high risk takers became slightly, 
although not significantly, more risk-taking. A second study confirmed that high risk takers 
admired and thought that also other people admired risk takers more than risk avoiders. It is 
also likely that the reason why participants in Takemura's (1993) study who had to justify 
their choice in a monetary decision task chose the risky option more often than those who 
were not required to justify their choice, was that the former assumed that risk taking was 
more valued. The same seems to have been true in Kirby and Davis's (1998) study. 
Participants whose decisions were monitored allocated smaller funds to risky strategies than 
participants whose actions were not monitored. 
A number of studies have directly investigated the effect of explicitness of audience 
norms on individuals' tendency to adopt these norms. In Brief, Dukerich, and Doran's (1991, 
exp. 2 and 3) study, for example, participants were asked to role-play a member of a board of 
directors of a pharmaceutical company and had to make a decision on how to react to plans to 
ban a dangerous drug marketed by their company. They were made accountable to the 
chairman of the board of directors and either told explicitly how the chairman intended to 
resolve the case, or it was suggested to them that the chairman had either Smithian or 
humanitarian views, by describing his stand on other issues. As expected, participants made 
choices that were more consistent with the chairman's value system when they explicitly 
knew how he would choose compared to when they merely knew about his values. In 
Pennington and Schlenker's (1999, exp. 2) study reported above, only when the preferences of 
the central parties were clearly stated did the nature of the audience with whom participants 
expected to meet and discuss their decisions have a significant impact. Also, Fandt and 
Ferris's (1990) previously reported study suggested that participants only engaged in 
defensive information search when they had been told how the person they had been made 
accountable to had handled a similar incident before.  
Research in the area of conformity (e.g., Hollander, 1960) suggests that individuals 
should be more likely to deviate from the norms they perceive their audience to endorse and 
not adapt their behaviour to these norms, when they themselves have high status. In 
negotiation studies, accountability effects have indeed been found to depend on whether 
negotiators have high status, for example, because of being elected (Klimoski & Ash, 1974) 
or because the nature of their mandate is said to be based on competence rather than liking 
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(Haccoun & Klimoski, 1975). In Haccoun and Klimoski's (1975) study, negotiators perceived 
more flexibility in their roles and deviated to a greater extent from their team's position when 
they had been elected on the basis of their performance in a previous task, particularly when 
they were evaluated by strangers, whereas they were found to be very loyal to their groups 
and did not deviate from their team's position when they had been elected on the basis of 
likeability3. This suggests that individuals are more likely to adhere to their evaluators' norms 
when they care for their affection, and, therefore, knowledge of the particular relationship 
between an agent or spokesperson and his or her constituency is a very important factor for 
correctly predicting accountability effects. Similarly, one would expect that the stronger an 
evaluator's reward or punitive power, the stronger accountability effects should be. The first 
assumption was supported in a study by Cvetkovich (1978), in which participants who were 
accountable to a friend recalled their judgement strategy with greater accuracy than 
participants who were accountable to a stranger or not accountable at all. The second 
hypothesis was supported in a study by Gordon and Stuecher (1992), in which students who 
expected to have to justify their evaluations of a teacher to a faculty member wrote more 
grammatically complex evaluations than students who expected to have to justify their 
evaluations to another student. 
In some cases, the observed effects of external accountability may be inconsistent, 
because the individual feels accountable to more than one party. In a medical task context, 
Chinburapa, Larson, Brucks, Draugalis, Bootman, and Puto (1993) demonstrated that 
physicians who were told that their choice of a hypothetical anti-infective drug would be 
reviewed and evaluated by an infectious disease specialist, paid more attention to the costs of 
the different drugs and more often rated the cost attribute as the most important, but at the 
same time were more likely to choose the drug with the highest cost (but also highest cure 
rate) compared to participants who had not been made accountable4. This suggests that 
accountability can be a dynamic process; during information search, accountability to their 
peers seems to have been salient to the participants, but when it came to choosing a drug, 
                                                 
3 In the latter condition, negotiators also took a longer time to reach agreement when they were evaluated by 
their own team compared to strangers, suggesting that the effects of external accountability to one's own 
constituency are different from pure evaluation apprehension effects. 
4 This effect was only observed in a high complexity condition. 
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accountability to the patient must have been more salient. We have already referred to the 
problem of multiple accountabilities in Chapter 1. When individuals are accountable to 
different people with conflicting goals, it becomes very difficult indeed to be able to correctly 
predict accountability effects. In negotiation contexts, role conflicts based on accountability to 
both negotiators' own constituents and the other party have been found to have a positive 
impact. Pruitt and Carnevale's (1982) dual-concern model of negotiation proposes that 
representatives who are concerned about a satisfactory outcome both for their own group and 
the other group are most likely to adopt a constructive problem solving strategy. Accordingly, 
Carnevale and Mack (reported in Carnevale, 1985) found that participants who had to justify 
their opinions on several issues to two other people with contrasting attitudes wrote more 
complex statements of their opinions than participants who were not told anything about the 
others' attitudes or expected them both to have the same attitude.  
While individuals' concern about maintaining a good relationship to other people 
clearly seems to have an effect on their behaviour, behaviour is obviously also a function of 
individuals' personal goals (Ben Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Hence, the congruency between the 
individuals' own norms and values and those of others they feel accountable to should 
moderate effects of external accountability. When individuals' own norms coincide with those 
of the people they feel accountable to, conformity should be stronger than when they conflict. 
This issue has been given little attention so far in the literature. In a field study conducted at 
two departments of the Dutch Riot Police Academy by Kroon, van Kreveld, and Rabbie 
(1991), incongruence between an anti-violence norm introduced by superiors and the norm 
already existing within the institution (and hence, presumably, the individual members of the 
institution) resulted in reactance, where participants who had been made accountable declined 
the norms introduced by the authorities and showed reluctance to co-operate. This last finding 
underlines the importance of legitimacy of accountability. Accountability to an audience that 
is not perceived as legitimate is likely not to have any beneficial effects and may even 
backfire (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). It also becomes clear that, unless certain norms are 
explicitly made salient to the participant, accountability effects are difficult to predict and 
often involve hindsight guessing about which norms the individual may have tried to conform 
to. 
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The distinction between accountability to an audience with known vs. unknown views 
also sheds some light on the question under what circumstances external accountability may 
have a beneficial, no, or detrimental effect on cognitive biases. Simonson and Nye (1992) 
have suggested that external accountability only has a de-biasing effect, if (1) decision makers 
can anticipate which response will be rational and will be evaluated most favourably, and they 
are less likely to choose this response when not being accountable, or (2) the normatively 
correct decision can be identified by the more thorough and complex information processing 
instigated by accountability to an audience with unknown views. For example, in Simonson 
and Nye's (1992) studies, accountable Business Administration students, who were aware of 
the normative rule that sunk costs should be ignored, were less susceptible to the sunk cost 
effect than non-accountable participants. They were also more likely to produce rational as 
opposed to emotional reasons for their choice. Furthermore, external accountability failed to 
eliminate biases in cases where the normatively correct response was unlikely to be identified 
through more effortful information processing, namely, the tendency to ignore sample size 
and base rates, the conjunction fallacy, choice-matching preference reversals (see also Selart, 
1996) and overconfidence associated with judging the likelihood of events that are causally 
related. In the case of these latter biases, individuals do not seem to be aware of what would 
constitute a rational response nor does a more thorough information processing help them to 
arrive at the normatively correct response. On the contrary, in the case of the dilution effect, 
as described previously, a more thorough information processing makes matters worse, 
because the individual pays too much attention to irrelevant details. That the amplification of 
the dilution effect under external accountability is also partly an effect of the individual's 
enhanced tendency to conform to salient norms, has been shown by Tetlock, Lerner, and 
Boettger (1996). In their study, accountable participants did not exhibit the dilution effect 
when Gricean norms of conversation, such as truthfulness and relevance of the information 
provided, were explicitly deactivated, whereas they did show a dilution effect when 
conversational norms were explicitly primed as well as in a 'no prime' control condition. Non-
accountable participants showed the effect across norm activation conditions and most 
strongly under activation of conversational norms. The tendency to adhere more strongly to 
salient norms when participants expect to have to justify their judgements and/or decisions to 
others, also explains why biases such as the attraction effect, the compromise effect, the status 
quo effect or stereotypes become stronger under external accountability. These biases are 
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expression of the individual's need to make decisions that are easy to justify, because they are 
expected to appeal to the evaluator. 
Pre-decisional vs. post-decisional accountability 
A second important distinction that allows explaining the differential effects of 
accountability is that of pre-decisional vs. post-decisional accountability. As the term 
suggests, pre-decisional accountability is present if decision makers know before they embark 
upon a decision that they will be called to account for it afterwards. Post-decisional 
accountability occurs when decision makers are asked to account for their decision after it has 
been made, and often also only after its outcome has become known. Typically, pre-
decisional accountability results in pre-emptive self-criticism, indicated by a thorough, 
complex information processing, where the individual tries to anticipate the objections of 
potential critics, whereas post-decisional accountability results in defensive bolstering of the 
decision, where people try to generate as many reasons as they can for why they are right, 
accompanied by less complex, rigid, and evaluatively more consistent thought processes 
(Tetlock, 1983, 1985a, 1992). 
Supportive evidence for this hypothesis was obtained in a study by Tetlock, Skitka, 
and Boettger (1989). Participants were asked to list their thoughts about each of four 
controversial issues, under conditions of either no expectation of having to justify their 
attitude, an expectation of having to justify their attitude before they were indicating it, or an 
expectation of having to justify their attitude only after they had been indicating it. In 
addition, participants in the accountability conditions expected to have to justify their decision 
to either a person with unknown, with liberal, or with conservative views. As predicted, the 
integrative complexity of participants' thoughts was highest when they had been made 
accountable to an audience with unknown views before they had committed themselves to a 
particular stand. It was also higher in the pre- compared to the post-commitment conditions. 
This was not true, however, when participants had not been made accountable, suggesting that 
the timing of the accountability manipulation alone was not sufficient to produce 
simplification of thought. Also, in line with predictions, it was found that participants shifted 
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their view to that of their prospective audience only when they knew the views of the 
audience, and when they had not committed themselves previously.  
Further extensive support for the assumption that post-decisional accountability 
enhances defensiveness comes from the numerous studies on the effects of cognitive 
dissonance mentioned earlier, which have demonstrated that once participants have 
committed themselves, for example, by choosing an alternative, they search information and 
evaluate it in such a way that their previous choice is supported. This was also true in the 
studies of escalation of commitment reported earlier, where retrospective personal 
responsibility for a failed course of action resulted in more resources being allocated to this 
course of action. Interestingly, Kirby and Davis (1998) were able to show that making 
participants believe that their principal would monitor their decisions, could offset the 
negative effects of retrospective personal responsibility to some extent. They found 
significant main effects for both personal responsibility and external monitoring. Whereas 
personally responsible participants allocated more funds to a failing strategy than non-
responsible participants, participants whose actions were monitored made smaller allocations 
than participants whose decisions were not monitored. This is a nice illustration of the fact 
that internal and external accountability can have very different effects, depending on the 
norm that becomes salient. In this study, personal responsibility for a previous failure seems 
to have strengthened the individual's wish to enhance their self-esteem and prove to 
themselves that their previous decision was a good one, resulting in even more funds 
allocated, whereas external monitoring seems to have made the principal's interests salient, 
thereby diminishing the tendency to escalate commitment.  
Procedural vs. outcome accountability 
A final important distinction between different types of accountability has been 
suggested by Simonson and Staw (1992, see also Peecher & Kleinmuntz, 1991, and Siegel-
Jacobs & Yates, 1996). They contrast process or procedural accountability with outcome 
accountability. Procedural accountability is accountability for the procedure the decision 
maker uses to arrive at his or her decision. An evaluation of the decision is based exclusively 
on the quality of the procedure used. An example may be a situation in which an auditor has 
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to justify an audit procedure to a senior partner of his or her firm. Outcome accountability, on 
the other hand, means that the decision maker is accountable for the outcome of his or her 
decision and is evaluated on the basis of this outcome. For example, a manager may be 
accountable for the results of his or her investment decisions. It should be noted, however, 
that in practice this difference may often be blurred, since accountability often only becomes 
salient when an unexpected negative outcome occurs. This negative outcome is likely to 
enhance outcome accountability, even though the individual may be subject to procedural 
accountability only. For example, a medical doctor may feel accountable for adverse effects 
of a treatment he or she has recommended (outcome accountability), although he or she 
would normally only be accountable for how a particular course of treatment is chosen 
(procedural accountability). Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996) have pointed out two important 
differences between procedural and outcome accountability, in terms of (1) guidance they 
offer the decision maker of how to achieve a positive evaluation, and (2) perceived ease of 
improving performance. Outcome accountability puts pressure on the decision maker to 
produce a successful outcome, but does not suggest how this may be achieved. Procedural 
accountability, on the other hand, signals to the decision maker that extra effort put into the 
decision process will protect him or her from a negative evaluation. A decision maker under 
procedural accountability therefore will find it relatively easy to improve his or her 
performance, since, as long as sufficient effort is expended or a certain previously specified 
procedure is followed, the decision maker will be exonerated from any blame for a negative 
outcome. Outcome accountability, however, induces a high level of stress, because a negative 
outcome can occur despite following a correct procedure or expending a lot of effort. These 
differences between outcome and procedural accountability are reflected in the differential 
effects they have on decision processes. Generally, procedural accountability has found to be 
beneficial, whereas studies employing outcome accountability have often shown detrimental 
effects.  
For example, in Simonson and Staw's (1992) investigation of escalation of 
commitment, outcome accountability was manipulated by telling participants that if they 
made particularly effective or ineffective decisions, their data would be shared with other 
students and lecturers and their evaluation as a decision maker would be based on whether the 
course of action they initially recommended turned out to be most beneficial to their 
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company. Procedural accountability was manipulated by telling participants that if they used 
particularly effective or ineffective decision strategies, their data would be shared with other 
students and lecturers and their evaluation as a decision maker would be based on their use of 
strategies rather than the outcome of those strategies. As predicted, procedural accountability 
resulted in significantly lower subsequent allocations to a failed course of action than both a 
baseline condition which established personal responsibility for participants' initial decision 
and outcome accountability, thereby preventing escalation of commitment. Allocation of 
funds to the failing course of action under outcome accountability, although larger than in the 
baseline condition, was not significantly different from it. These results clearly suggest that 
procedural accountability reduces escalation of commitment, whereas outcome accountability 
does not.  
In Siegel-Jacob and Yates's (1996) studies, participants had to predict the likelihood 
that each of a set of individuals held a particular attitude from a number of different cues. 
Participants were either not made accountable, were made accountable for their decision 
process (by being informed that there would be a post-experimental interview on why and 
how they used the information they did to arrive at their judgement), or were made 
accountable for their decision outcomes (by being told that they would receive feedback on 
their accuracy relative to the other participants in the study and that there would be a cash 
prize for the people with the top five scores). Procedural accountability improved calibration 
relative to no and outcome accountability and also resulted in more information being taken 
into account. Whether or not this had a beneficial effect on participants' performance 
depended on whether the set of cues the participants were provided with contained only valid 
predictors or a mixture of both valid and invalid predictors. When the set contained valid cues 
only, participants under procedural accountability showed improved discrimination (i.e., 
assigned high probabilities when the target event did indeed occur and low probabilities when 
it did not occur). When it contained both valid and invalid cues, however, discrimination was 
not enhanced, because irrelevant information was taken into account, that is, participants 
showed a dilution effect. Procedural accountability was also found to counteract the negative 
effects of outcome feedback on scatter, that is, significantly reduced the amount of variability 
or inconsistency in participants' judgements. Outcome accountability, on the other hand, 
CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY ON DECISION PROCESSES 
 70 
significantly increased the amount of scatter compared to no or procedural accountability and 
therefore resulted in lower accuracy overall. 
In line with Siegel-Jacobs and Yates's (1996) results, Doney and Armstrong (1996) 
found that procedural but not outcome accountability had a positive effect on participants' 
information analysis, making them spend more time and effort on collecting and analysing 
information prior to a decision. Finally, Ordonez, Benson III, and Beach (1999) showed that 
making participants accountable for the strategy they used for screening a set of jobs resulted 
in more consistency with which the screening strategy was applied. Procedural accountability 
also magnified the difference between threshold values in a 'reject' condition, in which 
participants were told to eliminate any jobs they did not want to apply for, and an 'apply' 
condition, in which participants were asked to select any jobs they wanted to apply for. 
Participants' tendency to have a lower rejection threshold, that is, retain fewer jobs in the 
choice set if they were asked to select the jobs they did not want to apply for than if they were 
asked to select the jobs they did want to apply for, was stronger in the procedural 
accountability condition than in a 'no accountability' condition, once again suggesting that 
accountability intensifies individuals' adherence to salient norms.  
This last point draws attention to an important qualification that has to be made when 
talking about the effects of procedural accountability. Although there is convincing evidence 
for the fact that the effects of procedural accountability are generally beneficial, it has to be 
kept in mind that whether or not this will be the case depends on whether the individual 
knows the correct or rational procedure for arriving at a judgement or decision. Siegel-Jacobs 
and Yates's (1996) results already suggested that individuals who expect to have to justify 
their judgement strategy may be prone to a dilution effect if the information set contains 
invalid predictors, because of their tendency to try to take all information into account. Also, 
some negotiation studies have suggested that when constituents are able to monitor the 
negotiation process rather than just being informed about the negotiation outcome, negotiators 
have a greater desire to appear strong, produce more competitive and contentious behaviour, 
and are less likely to reach an integrative agreement (e.g., Pruitt et al., 1978), presumably 
because they think that this is the kind of behaviour that would impress their constituents. 
Therefore, despite accountability for the negotiation process and not its outcome, a negative 
effect was obtained.  
Summary and conclusions 
 71 
Summary and conclusions 
This review of studies investigating the effects of internal and external accountability 
on judgement and decision making has identified two major, seemingly contradictory, trends. 
Both internal and external accountability, under some circumstances, increase the decision 
maker's depth of information search and complexity of information processing, resulting in 
less biased judgements and decisions. At the same time, however, internal and external 
accountability also seem to increase the decision maker's defensiveness and his or her need to 
make decisions that are easy to justify rather than optimal, indicated by an enhanced tendency 
to make decisions that appeal to the evaluator's preferences and rationalise previously made 
decisions. Three classifications of different types of accountability help to explain why 
sometimes one effect is more prominent and sometimes the other. These are accountability to 
an audience with known vs. unknown views, pre- vs. post-decisional accountability, and 
procedural vs. outcome accountability. Tetlock (1985a, 1991, 1992), in his social contingency 
model of judgement and choice, has proposed that when the decision maker is accountable to 
someone with unknown views and has not previously made a commitment, he or she will 
show pre-emptive self-criticism, that is, effortful, thorough, and complex information 
processing which attempts to anticipate the objections of potential critics. On the other hand, 
when the decision maker is accountable to someone with known (or anticipated) views and 
has not made any previous commitment, instead of engaging in more complex information 
processing, he or she will employ an acceptability heuristic that prescribes choosing the 
socially most acceptable option, without investing the additional effort of carefully analysing 
the other options. Finally, once the decision maker has committed him- or herself to a 
particular position and is made accountable only after this commitment, he or she will engage 
in defensive bolstering, a process of rationalising his or her previous choice. Another type of 
accountability that promotes defensiveness is outcome accountability, accountability that 
focuses the decision maker's attention on the outcome of his or her choice and may create 
high levels of stress, because the decision maker often does not have control over the decision 
outcome, even when the choice is carefully contemplated. Procedural accountability, on the 
other hand, where the decision maker is accountable for how he or she arrived at a decision 
rather than its outcome, is likely to enhance pre-emptive self-criticism and therefore to 
improve the decision process, unless the decision maker follows a sup-optimal procedure.  
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Based on the findings reported in this chapter, it is argued here that accountability is as 
a motivating agent which typically makes two different needs salient, a need to be accurate 
and a need to arrive at an easily defensible decision. Accountability is proposed to enhance 
the salience of both these needs. Whether or to what extent one need will dominate the other, 
will depend on the particular situation the individual finds him- or herself in. Accountability 
to someone with unknown views, pre-decisional accountability and procedural accountability 
all seem to enhance the individual's motivation to make an accurate decision, whereas 
accountability to someone with known views, post-decisional accountability, and outcome 
accountability all seem to enhance the individual's motivation to make a decision that will be 
readily accepted by his or her audience. Any observed accountability effects will therefore 
depend on the particular combination of these factors in the accountability manipulation.  
Another distinction that seems to be important when trying to understand 
accountability effects is that between effects on the decision process and effects on the 
decision itself. Accountability clearly influences both how people think, that is, their decision 
process, and what they think, that is, the decision outcome or the particular preferences they 
express (Simonson & Nye, 1992). Whereas the beneficial effects of accountability seem to be 
mostly related to an improvement of the decision process, particularly a deeper information 
search and a more complex information integration, its detrimental effects, namely the 
tendency to become more defensive and make decisions that are easy to justify rather than 
optimal, are mainly observed in the particular decision outcome and are the result of a biased 
information evaluation. It may therefore be argued that an increase in the complexity of 
information processing and an increase in defensiveness are not really contradictory effects, 
but effects of accountability on different stages of the judgement and decision process, with 
the former mainly affecting information search and the latter mainly affecting information 
evaluation.  
This suggests that decision makers engage in a process of self-regulation, using 
different cognitive mechanisms to try to achieve each of the different needs made salient by 
accountability pressures. In particular, decision makers are assumed to react to the enhanced 
need to be accurate by conducting a deeper information search and more complex information 
integration, whereas they react to the need to arrive at an easily justifiable decision with a 
biased information evaluation and integration. How exactly the decision maker may use these 
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different mechanisms to achieve their goals will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter.  
A question that stills remains to be answered is whether, and if so, how the observed 
effects of accountability are related to its antecedent conditions, personal responsibility and 
evaluation apprehension. From the review of accountability studies above, it seems that 
personal responsibility as a precondition of internal accountability enhances the individual's 
motivation to make an accurate decision and thereby affects depth of information search and 
complexity of information integration, as there is no evidence to suggest that individuals 
become more defensive when they are held personally responsible for their judgements and 
decisions, unless this personal responsibility is retrospective. Evaluation apprehension, on the 
other hand, seems to enhance the individual's motivation to make a decision that can be easily 
justified, as it focuses the individual's attention on decision outcomes by making external 
norms salient, and thereby affects the extent of bias in information evaluation and integration. 
As mentioned above, the next chapter will analyse these processes in more detail and present 
a self-regulation model by Baumeister and Newman (1994) which provides a theoretical 
framework for them. 
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CHAPTER 4: MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING 
In this chapter we will take a closer look at the processes of information search, 
evaluation and integration, and their susceptibility to different motivational goals of the 
decision maker. First, a general theoretical framework for motivated inference and decision 
processes proposed by Baumeister and Newman (1994) will be presented, which focuses on 
the effects of the need to reach an optimal conclusion (i.e., satisfy an accuracy goal) vs. the 
need to reach a particular conclusion (i.e., satisfy a directional goal). It will be followed by a 
review of the literature on various forms of confirmatory bias as the decision maker's 
preferred means to reach a desired conclusion. The discussion of evidence for confirmatory 
information search will largely focus on research conducted within the framework of 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964), whereas that for confirmatory evaluation and 
integration processes will refer to a theory that has spelt out in some detail where such biases 
may occur when multiattribute decisions are made, namely Svenson’s (1992, 1996) 
differentiation and consolidation theory. This review of the motivated reasoning literature will 
provide a basis for the following chapter, in which a process model of accountability will be 
developed that aims to predict how accountability affects processes of information search, 
evaluation and integration in decision making. 
Baumeister and Newman’s (1994) framework of  
self-regulated inference and decision processes 
A number of different authors, for example, Kruglanski (1980, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski 
& Ajzen, 1983), Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987), Kunda (1990, 1999) and Baumeister and 
Newman (1994) have proposed models of the human inference process and how it may be 
susceptible to bias. Baumeister and Newman’s (1994) approach will be described in some 
detail to serve as a framework for a discussion of empirical evidence bearing on biased 
information search, evaluation and integration processes. Baumeister and Newman’s (1994) 
model outlines the various mechanisms (and the time at which they operate during the 
decision process) by which individuals regulate their own inference or decision process. 
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According to Baumeister and Newman, individuals engage in self-regulation when their 
decision process is motivated. Motivation, in their view, is not just a biasing factor but more 
generally a “source of efforts to guide the inference or decision process in any way - even to 
make it less biased and more accurate” (p. 3). The latter refers to the case where a lack of 
motivation or effort might result in a biased conclusion and the individual tries to avoid this 
happening.  
The model proposes that making an inference or a decision involves four stages (see 
Table 4.1): (1) gathering evidence (evidence is assumed to exist as information in long-term 
memory or the immediate environment), (2) assessing the implications of the evidence (this is 
assumed to be an automatic process), (3) re-assessment of the implications (e.g., evaluating 
their validity, clarity, or strength, or the degree of their relevance; this may result in the 
rejection of some of the implications arrived at during the second stage), and (4) integration 
of the results of the third stage (e.g., by resolving inconsistencies or assigning relative weights 
to different factors). This sequence is not to be regarded as rigid; operations associated with a 
particular stage can begin before the operations of the previous stage have been completed 
and a completed stage can be re-initiated, for example, if the conclusion that was reached was 
unsatisfactory. The second stage, the assessment of implications of the available evidence, is 
assumed to automatic and, therefore, immune to self-regulation, but the subsequent stage 
during which implications may be re-assessed allows results of this automatic process to be 
overridden by a controlled process. Baumeister and Newman point out, however, that the 
automatic assessment of implications puts an important constraint on the self-regulation of 
inference and decision processes, since it prevents the individual from drawing any 
conclusion they like from whatever evidence available. 
Baumeister and Newman distinguish between two basic motives underlying self-
regulation, a need to reach an optimal conclusion (the correct or ideal one) and a need to reach 
a particular conclusion (see also Kruglanski, 1980, 1989, 1990; Kunda, 1990, 1999). Kunda 
(1990) calls the former accuracy goal and the latter directional goal. Empirical evidence 
suggests that these two motivational patterns underlie most inference and decision processes 
(e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987, Larrick, 1993). As 
described in the previous chapter, they have also been found to explain accountability effects, 
with accountable decision makers wanting to be more accurate but also wanting to make a 
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decision that is easy to justify to their audience. According to Baumeister and Newman, the 
individual who wants to be accurate acts like an ‘intuitive scientist’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), 
whereas the individual who wants to reach a particular conclusion acts like an ‘intuitive 
lawyer’. If one wants to arrive at a particular conclusion, for example, that one’s cousin 
should get the position one has to fill, it is readily apparent why self-regulation of the decision 
process is necessary; it has to be guided towards the preferred conclusion. Like a lawyer who 
will try to build the best possible case for a client, irrespective of whether the client is 
innocent or not, the individual must try to assemble the best available evidence for his or her 
preferred conclusion or against an unwanted conclusion. Therefore, the desired outcome 
guides the self-regulation process. If the individual wants to maximise accuracy, on the other 
hand, self-regulation will focus on the objectivity of the decision process rather than its 
outcome, for example, by trying to make sure that all relevant evidence is considered in an 
unbiased manner. Baumeister and Newman state that “to the extent that the preferred 
conclusion is not the same as the accurate or optimal conclusion, self-regulation may serve 
ends of self-deception” (1994, p. 5). However, they also point out that self-deception fails, if 
it is acknowledged too openly. Therefore, self-regulation must be subtle or covert.  
Not all decisions are assumed to be subject to self-regulation. Since self-regulation 
requires a fair amount of cognitive effort, only when decisions are complex and when the 
decision maker's personal involvement or the perceived importance of the decision is high 
enough to justify this effort, will the decision maker engage in self-regulation. A number of 
self-regulation mechanisms related to the different stages of the inference or decision process 
are available to the intuitive scientist and intuitive lawyer to achieve their respective 
processing goals. An overview is shown in Table 4.1. 
When assembling evidence, the decision maker can control the amount, range, type, 
and valence of information that enters the decision process. Whereas the intuitive scientist 
will try to ensure that all relevant information will be searched and receive equal attention, the 
intuitive lawyer will search for information that favours his or her preferred conclusion and/or 
show selective inattention to contrary information, that is, will show a confirmation bias. 
Empirical evidence for such processes will be discussed later in this chapter. Attention can 
also be manipulated by changing the viewpoint one adopts and the time one spends on 
processing each piece of information. In addition, since the information search process often 
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does not have a natural endpoint, deciding when to stop searching for further information may 
be used to regulate the decision process (a so-called process of freezing, Kruglanski & Ajzen, 
1983; Kruglanski, 1980, 1989, 1990). It is important to recognise, though, that a thorough 
information search does not guarantee that bias will be eliminated and that a person in the 
mindset of an intuitive lawyer does not necessarily search less information than someone in 
the mindset of an intuitive scientist. 
Table 4.1. Mechanisms for self-regulation of inference (based on Baumeister & Newman, 
1994, p. 6) 
Decision Stage Intuitive Scientist Intuitive Lawyer 
1. Gathering evidence Thorough search, considering 
the opposite 
Confirmation bias, selective 
inattention 
2. Assessing implications 
 (Automatic) (Automatic) 
3. Re-assessment  Search for possible bias, 
adjustment, re-computation 
Controlled override of 
unacceptable conclusions, 
selective criticism of 
unwelcome evidence 
4. Integration Rules and criteria set in 
advance 
Rules and criteria set to 
emphasise favourable 
evidence 
 
Assessing the implications of evidence that has been collected, as mentioned above, is 
an automatic process and therefore is not open to self-regulation, but the decision maker can 
exert some control over the results of this process by carrying out a re-assessment. Baumeister 
and Newman suggest that, at this stage, the intuitive scientist who wants to make an accurate 
decision will try to correct for any biases and distortions in the available evidence, provided 
they have been identified1. According to Strack (1992), a correction of bias may be achieved 
by either adding on an adjustment or by repeating the decision process with revised evidence. 
Making an adjustment is less effortful, but requires some knowledge about the size and the 
direction of the distortion. Since people often lack this knowledge, an over-adjustment (e.g., 
Hatvany & Strack, 1980) or under-adjustment (e.g., Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975) is likely. 
                                                 
1 It has been shown repeatedly, however, that people are often not very good at recognising flaws in the evidence 
they have assembled (e.g., Fischhoff, 1982). 
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Baumeister and Newman suggest that the amount of processing that occurs between 
encountering a biased piece of evidence and becoming aware of the fact that it is biased is 
critical for how adequate an adjustment will be. The more information is processed, the more 
difficult it is to reverse the biasing effect. The intuitive lawyer, in contrast, uses the re-
assessment stage for introducing a directional bias into his or her information processing, by, 
for example, selectively doubting the validity, clarity, strength or relevance of opposing 
evidence. He or she may also make inappropriate adjustments for information which is 
discredited or perceived to be biased. Again, the evidence for such confirmatory bias in 
information evaluation will be discussed in some detail later.  
Baumeister and Newman argue that, while it may be difficult for the intuitive lawyer 
to search information in a confirmatory manner (since it is often not immediately obvious 
whether information is supporting or not before looking at it), the re-assessment of 
implications is easy to regulate, because the evidence is there and can be worked upon. In 
contrast, for the intuitive scientist, his or her accuracy goal is more difficult to achieve in the 
re-assessment stage than in the information search stage, because it is difficult to determine 
which flaws in the evidence, if any, are most problematical. As a result, the intuitive scientist 
is likely to concentrate on regulating information search, whereas the intuitive lawyer is likely 
to concentrate on the re-assessment of implications. 
The final step of the decision process requires the combination and integration of 
evidence to arrive at an overall decision or conclusion. This may be difficult, because in many 
cases the assembled evidence may not be unequivocal but will support different decisions or 
conclusions (see the discussion of multiattribute decisions in Chapter 1). Procedures for 
resolving conflicting implications may involve weighting pieces of evidence differently and 
following certain decision rules. Baumeister and Newman state that an important difference 
between the intuitive scientist and the intuitive lawyer in this respect is the time at which such 
rules will normally be set. The intuitive scientist will set weights and the decision rule, 
including any cut-off points it requires (e.g., when the decision maker uses a conjunctive, 
disjunctive, or elimination-by-aspects rule), before collecting the evidence. The intuitive 
lawyer, on the other hand, will prefer to have evidence collected before applying rules that 
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guarantee the desired outcome2. Svenson’s (1992, 1996) differentiation and consolidation 
theory, which will be discussed later in this chapter, spells out the different ways of 
supporting one’s preferred conclusion in more detail.  
Baumeister and Newman stress that the proposed sequence of information processing 
steps in their model is theoretical, in reality human inference is likely to be an on-line process; 
people will reach preliminary conclusions or make tentative decisions before having 
completed the information search and information evaluation stage. These preliminary 
decisions have also been referred to as hypotheses by other authors (e.g., Kruglanski & Ajzen, 
1983; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987). Intuitive scientists and intuitive lawyers differ in 
that the latter have a hypothesis before even starting to process information, whereas the 
former develop a hypothesis only during processing. The preliminary conclusion or 
hypothesis is updated with each new piece of information encountered. The updating process 
is another source of bias, since people typically do not make normative adjustments (e.g., 
Borcherding, 1981). Not only are the different processing operations performed almost 
simultaneously, but they must also be thought of as iterative, in that their result, that is, the 
decision or conclusion arrived at, may prompt the decision maker to return to previous steps. 
If the intuitive lawyer is unable to reach his or her preferred conclusion, he or she may search 
for more, preferably supporting information, and process it in such a way that the preferred 
conclusion is supported, or he or she may return to the re-assessment stage and change the 
assessment of unfavourable implications. 
In conclusion, Baumeister and Newman's (1994) model of self-regulated inference 
provides an interesting theoretical framework for the analysis of the effects of different 
processing goals on information processing, in that it proposes that different processing goals 
affect different stages of the judgement and decision process. In particular, the model suggests 
that a decision maker with an accuracy goal who, according to Baumeister and Newman, will 
adopt the mindset of an intuitive scientist, will focus on regulating his or her information 
acquisition process by conducting a particularly thorough information search, while a decision 
                                                 
2 This is unless the individual has prior expectations of how the evidence will turn out. In this case, rules can be 
set in advance and an impression of fairness and objectivity created. Baumeister and Newman give the example 
of voting laws which required people to pass a means or literacy test to be allowed to vote, in the expectation 
that unwelcome, disadvantaged groups of the population would be less likely to pass them. 
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maker with a directional goal, who will adopt the mindset of an intuitive lawyer, will focus on 
the evaluation and integration stage and try to achieve the desired conclusion by assessing 
information in a biased manner as well as employing decision rules that favour the desired 
outcome. The individual acting as an intuitive lawyer may also show a biased information 
search process if it is obvious to him or her which information supports the desired outcome. 
The processes of biased information search, evaluation and integration by which the 
individual attempts to reach a desired conclusion are of particular interest when trying to 
understand how accountable decision makers arrive at a decision that they consider acceptable 
to the people they are accountable to. We will therefore continue with a review of the 
literature on confirmation bias at these different stages of the judgement and decision process, 
starting with confirmation bias in information search.  
Confirmation bias in information search 
Confirmation bias, that is, the tendency to look for evidence that confirms a hypothesis 
or decision rather than to look for falsifying evidence, has been widely documented in 
different sub-disciplines of psychology (see Oswald, 1993, and Klayman & Ha, 1987, for a 
review). There are, however, at least two different ways in which the term has been 
understood by researchers in the past (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Klayman & Ha, 
1987; Skov & Sherman, 1985). Firstly, it has been used to refer to a tendency to search 
information that has a high likelihood of supporting one's hypothesis or preferred conclusion. 
This type of confirmation bias, which may be regarded as a hypothesis preservation or 
protection bias (Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990), has been demonstrated, for example, in 
studies conducted within the framework of dissonance theory (Festinger, 1959, 1964), where 
participants' post-decisional information search has been found to be biased towards 
information they expect to support their previously made decision (see Frey, 1986, for a 
review). Such effects will be discussed in more detail below. Secondly, the term 'confirmation 
bias' has been used to describe a tendency to test cases that are expected (or known) to be true 
under the working hypothesis, that is, to ask questions in which a 'yes' or positive answer 
would confirm one's hypothesis. Klayman and Ha (1987) have re-named this phenomenon the 
positive test strategy.  
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Hypothesis preservation bias 
Festinger’s (1957, 1964) theory of cognitive dissonance 
Festinger’s (1957, 1964) theory of cognitive dissonance has provided one of the major 
social psychological frameworks for systematically exploring biased information search in the 
form of a hypothesis preservation bias. Dissonance theory is based on the assumption that 
individuals strive for consistency in their cognitive system. Cognitions as the building blocks 
of the cognitive system can either be irrelevant to each other when there is no logical 
connection between them (e.g., "I smoke" and "Rome is a nice city"), or they can be relevant 
to each other (e.g., "I smoke" and "Smoking is bad for my health") when one has implications 
for the other. Only relevant cognitions are of interest for the theory. Relevant cognitions are 
said to be consonant when they are consistent with each other, for example, "I haven’t got 
much money" and "I won’t go on holiday this summer". A state of dissonance arises 
whenever two relevant cognitions are inconsistent with each other, that is, when considered 
by themselves, one of them follows from the opposite of the other. The above-mentioned 
cognitions "I smoke" and "Smoking is bad for my health" may serve as an example. 
Dissonance, according to Festinger’s theory, is accompanied by negative arousal, which 
motivates the individual to reduce dissonance. This motivation increases with dissonance 
strength. Dissonance strength is defined as the ratio of the number of dissonant to the total 
number of relevant (i.e., consonant plus dissonant) cognitions, with each cognition weighted 
for its importance to the person. This implies that dissonance reduction can be achieved in a 
number of ways, such as increasing the number and/or importance of consonant cognitions or 
reducing the number and/or importance of dissonant cognitions. Generally, how exactly 
dissonance is reduced depends on the resistance to change of the various cognitions involved, 
with less resistant cognitions being more likely to be changed.  
Festinger’s theory generated a large amount of research, from which it soon became 
apparent that certain aspects of the theory had to be clarified and/or to be revised. The first 
revision was suggested by Brehm and Cohen (1962), who concluded that two conditions 
which Festinger had not mentioned were crucial for the occurrence of dissonance: freedom of 
choice and commitment to the decision. Only when the individual has been given a choice to 
perform a certain behaviour and committed him/herself to this behaviour, can dissonance 
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arise and dissonance reduction be observed. Cooper and Fazio (1984), in their new-look 
theory, pointed out that in order for dissonance to occur, apart from a situation of free choice, 
the individual also has to feel personally responsible for foreseeable, potentially aversive 
consequences. 
Selective exposure research  
Dissonance theory has been applied to a wide range of phenomena, first and foremost 
to attitudinal change after attitude-inconsistent behaviour (forced compliance). The 
applications that are particularly relevant to the work presented here, however, are post-
decisional preference changes and selective exposure to information. The latter involves the 
search of supportive information after a decision or a tentative decision has been made. 
According to dissonance theory, whenever a decision is made, dissonance occurs because the 
decision maker anticipates being stuck with the negative aspects of the chosen alternative 
while losing the positive aspects of the non-chosen alternative. The ‘selective exposure’ 
hypothesis (Festinger, 1957) predicts that the individual will try to reduce this dissonance by 
looking for information that is consistent with his or her decision and avoid information that 
is inconsistent with this decision. Experimental studies on mainly post- and occasionally pre-
decisional information search conducted within the framework of dissonance theory typically 
present participants with a number of article or essay titles to choose from. The titles strongly 
suggest whether the information provided is supportive or non-supportive of a certain 
decision. Participants indicate the articles (usually a fixed number) they would like to read 
and/or they would not like to read. While this allows testing the selective exposure 
hypothesis, it does not allow a detailed analysis of the decision process.  
Although there has been some empirical support for the selective exposure hypothesis, 
overall the evidence for it is mixed at best (see Frey, 1986, for a detailed review). Over the 
years it has emerged that the original selective exposure hypothesis was far too simplistic and 
that a number of different variables moderate the expected effect. Early studies often not only 
failed to find a preference for consonant information, but even demonstrated a preference for 
dissonant information (e.g., Freedman, 1965a; Sears, 1965). These and the results of other 
experiments led Freedman and Sears (1965) to conclude that dissonance theory did not apply 
to post-decisional information search.  
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The initial lack of empirical support for the selective exposure hypothesis induced 
Festinger (1964) to revise it and specify three conditions under which people adopt a so-called 
approach-avoid strategy, that is, attempt to reduce dissonance by counter-arguing dissonant 
information rather than looking for consonant information, exposing themselves to dissonant 
information in the process: (1) when dissonant information is perceived as easily refutable, (2) 
when avoiding dissonant information will cause even greater dissonance in the future, and (3) 
under high dissonance, when a revision of the decision is possible.  
The ease of refutability of information may be argued to depend on three factors (Frey, 
1986), the strength of the argument, the competence or credibility of the source, and the 
stability of the decision maker’s cognitive system. Accordingly, a preference for dissonant 
information can be observed when dissonant arguments are weak (Lowin, 1967; 
Kleinhesselink & Edwards, 1975), when they are attributed to a source of low competence 
and/or low credibility (Lowin, 1969; Frey, 1981a), and when the decision maker has 
previously been exposed to consonant information (Schwarz, Frey, & Kumpf, 1980; Frey, 
1981a).  
The second central factor in Festinger’s (1964) re-formulated theory, the long-term 
avoidance of dissonance, also received empirical support. Dissonant information is preferred 
over consonant information if it is perceived as useful for avoiding dissonance in the long run. 
This is, for example, the case if similar decisions are anticipated or when a revision of the 
original decision is imminent (Frey, 1981b). Dissonant information can also be perceived as 
useful if participants anticipate having to justify their decision in a debate, as Canon (reported 
in Festinger, 1964) demonstrated. In his experiment, participants were either told that they 
would have to defend their decision in a debate or that they would have to write an essay 
defending their decision. After the decision and before the justification, they could choose to 
read up to three articles out of a set of five (2 consonant, 2 dissonant, 1 neutral). Canon 
predicted that participants in the ‘debate’ condition would prefer dissonant information in 
order to give a favourable self-presentation, whereas participants in the ‘essay’ condition 
would prefer consonant information in order to present a coherent argument. These 
predictions were confirmed. Another study that investigated the effect of utility of 
information as a consequence of having to justify a decision was one by Freedman (1965b). 
He employed three different utility conditions: a condition where consonant information was 
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assumed to be more useful than dissonant information (in which participants had to justify 
their decision in an essay), a condition where dissonant information was assumed to be more 
useful than consonant information (in which participants expected to be presented with 
opposing arguments which they had to refute in writing), and a condition where consonant 
and dissonant information were assumed to be equally useful (in which participants had to 
evaluate decisions made by others). Consistent with predictions, it was found that the type of 
information preferred by participants reflected the utility of information. These studies 
obviously have important implications for any predictions of the effects of accountability on 
information search and will be returned to later. 
Festinger’s (1964) final point of revision of his original theory relates to dissonance 
strength affecting selective exposure. The tendency to look for consonant information should 
increase with dissonance strength up to the point when dissonance becomes so strong that the 
individual contemplates a change of his or her decision and therefore starts searching for 
information that supports a different decision. This implies a curvilinear relationship between 
dissonance strength and selectivity, with dissonance reduction peaking at a moderate level of 
dissonance. An important qualification, however, is that the decision must be reversible. If the 
decision is irreversible, a linear increase of consonant information search can be expected 
(Frey, 1981b). In a study by Frey (1982), participants had to choose the role of player A or B 
in a 30-trial card game for money. They were told that they could change their decision after 
the twelfth trial, but had to pay a small amount of money for it. After twelve trials, 
participants were asked to select from twelve short essays allegedly written by previous 
players (6 of which supported the A choice and 6 of which supported the B choice) the three 
essays they would most like to read and the three essays they would not like to read. As 
expected, preference for consonant information and avoidance of dissonant information was 
largest when participants had neither won nor lost a large amount of money. As gains and 
losses increased the preference for consonant information decreased. Also, participants’ 
ratings of the probability of changing their position for the next 18 trials revealed that the 
higher the probability of revision, the less consonant information was chosen and the less 
dissonant information was avoided. Frey proposes that, in this situation, two processes 
operate in parallel: a tendency to seek consonant information, in order to reduce dissonance, 
and a tendency to seek dissonant information, in order to make the right decision about 
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whether to change role. As losses increase, the latter is assumed to override the former, 
leading to a net decrease in preference for consonant information. Note that Frey’s 
assumption points to the basic motivational conflict underlying much of human information 
processing, the conflict between a need to confirm one’s actions and a need for accuracy (see 
Baumeister & Newman’s model above).  
Another situation where dissonant information is preferred to consonant information is 
when a norm of fairness and/or impartiality is salient (Canon, 1964; Freedman, 1965a; Frey, 
1991). This may be a particularly appropriate explanation for Freedman’s (1965a) and Sears’s 
(1965) findings which failed to support the selective exposure hypothesis and which were 
obtained in a job selection and jury context, respectively. It may be argued that in such 
situations, possibly because of the implied severity of the consequences of their decision, 
participants have a particularly strong need for accuracy, hence, they search not only 
consonant but also dissonant information. Finally, Canon (1964) named curiosity as a factor 
that can obscure selective exposure effects.3 
In contrast, a selective exposure effect is likely to be obtained, when there are 
implications for participants' self-esteem. Frey (1981c) and Frey and Stahlberg (1986), for 
example, found that participants who had been given false negative feedback about their 
performance in an intelligence test, showed a preference for information that argued against 
the validity of intelligence tests over information that argued for their validity. In Frey and 
Stahlberg's (1986) second study, this effect was largely diminished, however, when there was 
an opportunity for an external attribution for failure, when participants had been told that their 
test may have been scored incorrectly. Holton and Pyszczynski (1986) showed that 
                                                 
3 There are a large number of other variables which have been found to affect selective exposure. These will not 
be discussed in detail, however, as such a discussion would go beyond the scope of this work. They include 
variables such as participants' confidence in their decision (low confidence results in stronger selective 
exposure, Canon, 1964), public commitment (a public commitment to a certain opinion results in stronger 
selective exposure, Schwarz, Frey, and Kumpf, 1980; Sweeney & Gruber, 1984, Frey & Stahlberg, 1986), the 
amount of each type of information from which to choose (if there is more than one item of dissonant 
information, participants prefer consonant over dissonant information, Frey, 1985), whether information incurs a 
cost or not (if it does, selective exposure is stronger, Frey, 1981c), perception of dissonant information as valid 
or reliable (this increases the tendency to expose oneself to consonant information, Frey and Stahlberg, 1986), 
and, finally, personality variables, for example, dogmatism (high dogmatism results in stronger selective 
exposure, Clarke & James, 1967) and repression (repressors search more consonant information than sensitizers, 
Olson & Zanna, 1979). 
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participants who had been evaluated favourably by a confederate searched for more 
information when they expected it to suggest that the confederate was a competent evaluator, 
whereas participants who had received an unfavourable evaluation searched for more 
information when they expected it to suggest that the confederate was an incompetent 
evaluator. Participants, however, who had merely observed the confederate's evaluation of 
another participant, did not show such bias. Indeed, Steele (1988; Steele & Liu, 1981, 1983) 
has argued that individuals engage in dissonance reduction to re-affirm that they have 
behaved in accordance with positive values. Note that the motive underlying dissonance here 
is assumed to be self-integrity (i.e., a desire to maintain a positive view of the self) rather than 
self-consistency.  
The discussion so far has only covered post-decisional information search. Pre-
decisional information search has rarely been investigated within the framework of 
dissonance theory. This may be because Festinger himself stated that "The person .. continues 
to seek new information ... This continued information seeking and information evaluation 
remains, however, objective and impartial" (1964, p. 152). An experiment by Jecker (reported 
in Festinger, 1964) indeed seemed to suggest that pre-decisional information search was 
unbiased, since the time participants spent reading supporting information before they chose a 
partner for a game did not differ significantly from the time they spent reading non-supporting 
information. Participants who were given the opportunity to read information only after they 
had already made their choice, on the other hand, spend more time reading supporting 
information than they did reading non-supporting information. It may be argued, however, 
that time spent reading information is not a good indicator of dissonance reduction. A longer 
time spent reading information is usually interpreted as a stronger desire on the part of the 
individual to expose him- or herself to this information. An argument could also be made for 
the exact opposite, however. As Festinger (1964) himself has suggested, if the individual 
knows that there is information which is dissonant with his or her decision, the best way of 
reducing dissonance is to re-interpret this information. In order to be able to do so, however, 
the individual must expose him- or herself to the dissonant information and may be expected 
to spend a longer time on the cognitively effortful process of re-interpretation than in a case of 
simple information avoidance (Grabitz & Grabitz-Gniech, 1973). Another major difficulty 
one faces when analysing pre-decisional information search, is to identify the point at which 
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the decision maker commits him- or herself to an alternative, and thereby, it may be argued, 
switches from pre- to post-decisional information search. Some authors (e.g., Janis, 1959) 
have dealt with this problem by defining a decision as an explicit overt action which signals a 
commitment to carrying out a specific task or adhering to a particular course of action. This 
allows a clear distinction between the pre- and post-decisional phase. As Grabitz and Grabitz-
Gniech (1973) point out, however, it is questionable whether the point at which a decision is 
made public accurately reflects the timing of significant psychological change in the 
accompanying cognitive process. Rather, it is likely that any explicit decision is preceded by 
an implicit, tentative one. Given that it lies in the very nature of tentative decisions that they 
can be changed, the goal of information search may change at any time and may mask 
confirmation bias.  
From the discussion above it should have become evident that the processes governing 
pre- and post-decisional information search are far from being straightforward. A large 
number of moderating variables have to be taken into account when trying to predict whether 
consonant or dissonant information will be preferred. Wicklund and Brehm (1976, see also 
Frey & Wicklund, 1978; Frey, 1986) suggested that the reason for this may be the fact that 
selective exposure requires new behaviour, namely actively attending to previously 
unexplored information, evaluating it and perhaps even learning it. This is more complex 
than, for example, a change in one's evaluation of information, which only requires changing 
something which is already part of one’s cognitive system and where dissonance reduction 
can be generated from within. Given that selective exposure requires additional behaviour, it 
is likely that factors other than the existence of dissonance have an impact on it as well. 
Whereas the tendency to search for consonant information has received empirical 
support under certain specified conditions, Frey (1986) concludes that the evidence for the 
other part, relating to the avoidance of dissonant information, is even weaker. Among the 
exceptions is a study by Baumeister and Cairns (1992), who showed that participants coped 
with an unfavourable personality evaluation by reducing the amount of time they spent 
reading it and subsequently showed impaired memory for it. Also, Sweeney and Gruber 
(1984) showed that participants who supported President Nixon tended to avoid news on the 
Watergate affair, whereas participants who opposed Nixon followed the Watergate news 
closely. Information avoidance, if it is observed at all, often does not vary as a function of the 
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previously discussed variables, however. Frey suggests that this may be, because the 
avoidance of dissonant information does not reduce dissonance, it just does not increase it. 
Also, a general avoidance of dissonant information may not be effective in terms of long-term 
avoidance of dissonance. A methodological explanation for the failure to observe dissonance 
avoidance has been proposed by Götz-Marchand, Götz, and Irle (1974). Usually, selective 
information seeking is measured before selective information avoidance. It may be that by the 
time selective avoidance is measured, dissonance has already been reduced sufficiently and 
that there is therefore no need for the individual to attempt further reduction by selectively 
avoiding dissonant information. This assumption was supported by Götz-Marchand et al.’s 
finding that the opportunity to reduce dissonance by negatively evaluating an intelligence test 
in which participants had allegedly performed badly, was used more often when it was the 
first dependent measure compared to when it appeared in fifth position in the post-test. 
Other hypothesis preservation paradigms and their link to accountability 
research 
The discussion of evidence in support of confirmatory information search so far has 
heavily relied on research within the framework of dissonance theory, but this is by no means 
the only research programme that has provided such evidence. A hypothesis preservation bias 
can not only be observed for externally available information but also for information that is 
searched in memory. Kunda and her co-workers (see Kunda, 1990, 1999, for a review) have 
repeatedly demonstrated a biased memory search. For example, participants motivated to 
believe that they possess desirable intellectual or personality traits search for and report 
autobiographical memories that are consistent with those traits (Kunda, 1987; Sanitioso, 
Kunda, & Fong, 1990). Among the many other approaches to hypothesis preservation bias, 
the comprehensive reporting of which is beyond the focus of this work, Kruglanski's (1980, 
Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983, Kruglanski & Klar, 1987) theory of lay epistemology deserves 
special mention, as it is consistent with Baumeister and Newman's model of self-regulated 
decision processes and can be related to information search behaviour observed in selective 
exposure studies. Kruglanski postulates three personal motives that affect information 
processing. Firstly, a fear of invalidity, which means that the individual is afraid of making 
incorrect judgements and therefore hesitates to stop information search. This is similar to the 
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mindset of the intuitive scientist with an enhanced need of accuracy who searches a lot of 
information, and may explain the search of dissonant information after consonant information 
has been exhausted. Secondly, a need for structure, which results in a tendency to stop 
information search, in order to establish a structured and predictable world, and thirdly, a 
need for specific conclusions, which results in a discontinuation of information processing as 
soon as the desired conclusion is reached. The latter two factors both closely resemble the 
motives of the intuitive lawyer and may explain a preference for consonant information that 
increases cognitive consistency and supports the individual's preferences. According to 
Kruglanski, information search should not be biased when fear of invalidity is high (i.e., 
accuracy goals are strong), whereas the tendency to look for supporting more than non-
supporting information should be observed with a high need for structure or a strong 
preference for specific conclusions (i.e., strong directional goals). This has indeed been 
observed (e.g., Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). In studies carried out 
to test Kruglanski’s model, a typical way of inducing high fear of invalidity has been to tell 
participants that they have to justify their judgements to others or that their judgements will 
be publicly compared to the 'correct' answer. This is virtually identical with common 
accountability manipulations and supports the suggestion that accountability results in strong 
accuracy goals that deepen information search. Although a need for structure and  a 
preference for specific conclusions have not been explicitly investigated within the context of 
accountability, it may be argued that making people accountable to an external audience with 
known views or making them accountable after they have already committed themselves to a 
particular option, will heighten their need for a confirmatory information search that supports 
the conclusion expected to be preferred by the external audience or arrived at earlier.  
Positive test strategy 
Demonstrations of the positive test strategy as the second type of confirmation bias 
have been, for example, provided by Wason (1960) and others employing variations of his 
rule discovery paradigm. In the 2-4-6-paradigm, participants are presented with a triple of 
numbers (2, 4, and 6) which is said to comply with a rule that participants are meant to 
discover. In order to discover the rule, participants have to generate new triples on which they 
receive feedback from the experimenter as to whether these triples conform or do not conform 
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to the rule. Participants typically quickly form an initial hypothesis, such as 'three consecutive 
even numbers', and generate triples which fit this hypothesis, such as 6, 8, 10, but fail to test 
triples that would falsify their hypothesis. If the hypothesised rule is embedded within the 
correct rule (e.g., 'any sequence of three increasing numbers'), participants employing the 
positive test strategy receive continuous positive feedback which increases confidence in their 
hypothesis but prevents them from discovering the correct rule. This effect is very robust and 
has been replicated many times (e.g., Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Doherty, Mynatt, 
Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979; Klayman & Ha, 1985). Another example of a positive test strategy 
may be seen in people's tendency to weight instances in which a cue is present more heavily 
than instances in which a cue is absent when making judgements about the contingency 
between a cue and an outcome (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Arkes & Harkness, 1983; Lipe, 
1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Schustack & Sternberg, 1981). A positive test strategy differs 
from hypothesis preservation bias in that, although participants search for information which, 
if found, confirms their hypothesis, they have no underlying motivation to preserve or protect 
this hypothesis. 
A clear distinction between the two types of confirmation bias is not always possible, 
however (Oswald, 1993; Skov & Sherman, 1986). Snyder and co-workers (Snyder & Swann, 
1978a, b; Snyder & Uranowitz , 1978; Snyder & Cantor, 1979; Snyder & Campbell, 1980; see 
Snyder, 1981 for a review) investigated how individuals tested trait hypotheses about people 
with whom they anticipated social interaction. Participants were, for example, told that they 
had to judge the extent to which a target person's behaviour was either introvert or extravert. 
In order to do so, they were asked to select 12 questions from a pool of 26, these were either 
directed at introversion (e.g., "What do you dislike about loud parties?"), extraversion (e.g., 
"What would you do if you wanted to liven things up at a party?") or were neutral ("What do 
you think the good and bad points of acting open and friendly are?"). Snyder and colleagues 
found evidence for a confirmation bias, in that participants mostly selected questions which 
matched the hypothesis they were testing, that is, preferred questions that assumed the person 
was introvert when they had to judge the extent of introversion, and questions that assumed 
the person was extravert when they had to judge the extent of extraversion (see also Evans, 
1989). This may be interpreted as evidence for a positive test strategy, but could also be 
regarded as a hypothesis preservation bias, in that the selected questions had a higher á priori 
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likelihood of confirming participants' hypothesis than those not selected. The nature of the 
questions participants had to choose from, however, does not allow to distinguish between a 
positive test strategy and a hypothesis preservation bias, as the questions were always low in 
diagnosticity (the probability of getting a positive answer from someone possessing the trait 
in question was very similar to the probability of getting a positive answer from someone not 
possessing the trait), and any answer could have been taken as supporting the hypothesis. For 
example, no matter whether it is introverts or extraverts who answer the question about what 
they dislike about loud parties, they will always list dislikes and therefore appear introvert 
(Skov & Sherman, 1986). A stringent test between a positive test strategy and a hypothesis 
preservation bias requires manipulation of diagnosticity, since a true hypothesis preservation 
bias can only be said to be present if participants prefer questions that are low in diagnostic 
value but high in likelihood of confirming their hypothesis over questions that are high in 
diagnostic value but low in likelihood of confirming their hypothesis. This point was made by 
Trope & Bassok (1982, 1983; Bassok & Trope, 1984) who, using a similar paradigm as 
Snyder and Swann, found that participants showed a preference for questions that were high 
in diagnostic value regardless of whether they were hypothesis-confirming or not. This 
finding seems to imply that Snyder and Swann's results were based on a methodological 
artefact and that confirmatory information search is not nearly as pervasive as they claimed. 
Both Skov and Sherman (1986) and Devine, Hirt, and Gehrke (1990), however, were able to 
show that among questions with equally high diagnostic value, participants prefer those that 
are hypothesis-confirming. Also, Hodgins and Zuckerman (1991) found that when 
participants had to generate questions themselves rather than select them from a list of pre-
formulated ones, they tended to ask about features that were consistent with their hypothesis. 
Participants' inferences drawn from hypothetical answers to their self-generated questions also 
showed a greater tendency to confirm the hypothesis they were testing than the alternative 
hypothesis and a greater tendency to confirm the hypothesis following hypothesis-consistent 
compared to hypothesis-inconsistent questions. This tendency for hypothesis preservation 
seems to be very robust and does not disappear when people are made accountable. In a study 
by Strohmer and Shivy (1994), in which counsellors were asked to select the ten most 
important facts from a client narrative, in order to test whether the client lacked self-control, 
and were either told or not told that they would have to explain their information selection to 
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another counsellor, they selected more confirmatory than disconfirmatory information, 
regardless of whether they had been made accountable or not. 
It should be pointed out here that a confirmation bias in form of a positive test strategy 
can be functional and does not necessarily carry negative consequences (Klayman & Ha, 
1987). Important for whether or not a positive test strategy is functional is (1) whether the 
context in which a decision is made carries more concern for false positives or for false 
negatives, and (2) which strategy will result in more conclusive falsifications. In a personnel 
selection context, for example, it is more important to avoid selecting someone who is not 
suitable for the job (i.e., to avoid false positives) than to avoid missing out on someone who 
would have been suitable (i.e., to avoid false negatives). In such a situation, a positive test 
strategy (testing applicants who are assumed to be suitable) is beneficial, because it helps to 
identify false positives. In contrast, in a situation where one has to identify people with an 
infectious disease, for example, it would presumably be more important to avoid undiagnosed 
cases which can contribute to the spread of the disease than to avoid treating someone 
unnecessarily. In this case, a negative test strategy would be better. Also, if the number of 
potentially positive instances is small, a positive test strategy may help to keep the number of 
tests down (e.g., one only has to search information for the small number of potentially 
successful job applicants instead of the large number of potentially unsuccessful ones) and 
therefore minimises the cognitive effort individuals have to expend. Finally, it can be shown 
that in such a situation, the probability of receiving conclusive falsifications is higher for a 
positive than for a negative test strategy and a positive test strategy would therefore be more 
effective (Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
Summary  
The review of the literature investigating confirmation bias in information search has 
suggested that there are two different manifestations of such bias, a tendency to search 
information that has a high likelihood of supporting one's hypothesis or preferred conclusion 
and a tendency to test cases that are expected (or known) to be true under the working 
hypothesis. The former has been named hypothesis preservation bias, the latter positive test 
strategy. Whereas there seems to be strong evidence supporting the widespread use of a 
positive test strategy, evidence for a hypothesis preservation bias, especially when it has been 
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collected in studies employing a selective exposure paradigm, is much more inconclusive and 
suggests that there are also various factors that encourage a less biased information search, 
including the ease of refutability of non-confirming information, the possibility of long-term 
avoidance of dissonance, the possibility of eliminating high dissonance by reversing one's 
decision, and a norm of fairness and/or impartiality. All these factors are consistent with the 
idea that strong accuracy goals (or a high fear of invalidity, in Kruglanski's terms), as they are 
typically encountered in individuals with the mindset of an intuitive scientist, encourage a 
more exhaustive and therefore less biased information search. On the other hand, hypothesis 
preservation bias is likely to be observed when information search has strong emotional 
consequences (Pyszscynski & Greenberg, 1987), for example, because the individual's self-
esteem is threatened and the desire to arrive at a particular conclusion is stronger than the one 
to arrive at an accurate conclusion. Both the tendency for non-confirmatory and confirmatory 
information search may be linked to accountability. A non-confirmatory information search 
may be expected if the individual is made accountable to an audience with unknown views, a 
confirmatory information search, on the other hand, if the individual is made accountable to 
an audience with known views or after he or she has already expressed a preference for a 
particular option.
Confirmation bias in information evaluation and integration 
Confirmation biases may not only be observed in information search but also in 
information evaluation and integration, for example, when individuals reinterpret information 
in such a way that it supports their preferred conclusion and selectively doubt the validity of 
negative evidence (stage 3 of Baumeister & Newman's model) or place disproportionately 
high weight on information that supports the preferred conclusion (stage 4 of Baumeister & 
Newman's model). Again, dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964) has provided one but not 
the only theoretical framework that explains such biases. Dissonance theory assumes that, 
after they have made a decision, individuals attempt to reduce the dissonance that arises from 
the disadvantages of the chosen alternative and the advantages of the non-chosen alternative 
by increasing their evaluation of the chosen alternative and/or decreasing their evaluation of 
the non-chosen alternative(s). Brehm (1956) was one of the first researchers to demonstrate 
this effect. In his study, he asked female college students, who thought that they took part in a 
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market research study, to indicate how much they liked each of eight electrical household 
appliances. Later, they were told that, as a reward for their participation, they could choose 
one of two products to take home. For some participants, the products they could choose 
between differed in rated attractiveness by ½ to 1½ points ('high dissonance' condition), for 
others they differed by 3 points ('low dissonance' condition). A control group was given one 
of the products as a gift without any choice. After having made a choice, participants were 
asked to re-evaluate the products. As expected, participants in the experimental conditions 
increased their liking for the chosen product and decreased their liking for the non-chosen 
product (spreading apart effect), whereas in the control condition no significant change of 
evaluation could be observed. Also, the effect was stronger in the 'high dissonance' than in the 
'low dissonance' condition. While this study is one of many that demonstrate post-decisional 
confirmatory information evaluation, this effect can also be observed before a decision is 
made (Boiney, Kennedy, & Nye, 1997; Russo, Medvec, & Maloy, 1996).  
A large number of studies have investigated individuals' cognitive reactions to 
information they are motivated to evaluate negatively. In Frey's (1978), Wyer and Frey's 
(1983) and Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Holt's (1985) studies, for example, participants who 
had been given false positive feedback on their performance in a test rated a study that 
concluded that the test was highly valid as more convincing and better conducted than a study 
that suggested low validity of the test, whereas the opposite was true for participants who 
were led to believe that they had done poorly in the test. Similarly, Lord, Ross, and Lepper 
(1979) found that participants who either supported or opposed capital punishment rated a 
study that confirmed their belief as more convincing and better conducted than another that 
did not, irrespective of whether the study was cross-sectional or longitudinal. In Sherman and 
Kunda's (1989) investigation, participants motivated to disbelieve a study about the 
relationship between high caffeine intake and fibrocystic disease were less persuaded by it. 
This effect was shown to be mediated by a biased evaluation of the methods employed in the 
study. Participants who felt threatened because they drank at least two cups of coffee per day 
listed fewer strengths of the employed methodology than non-threatened participants, and 
rated various methodological aspects as less sound (see also Kunda, 1987; Liberman and 
Chaiken, 1992).  
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In line with the aforementioned results, there is also evidence that preference-
inconsistent information leads to more cognitive activity than preference-consistent 
information. Gilovich (1983), for example, demonstrated that gamblers spend more time 
thinking about their losses than about their wins, because of trying to explain away their 
losses. Schaller (1992) found that participants, who had been randomly assigned to one of two 
groups which took an intelligence test, readily inferred that their own group was more 
intelligent when it performed better than the other group. When the other group did better, 
however, participants took the difficulty of the test items into account to arrive at a 
judgement. Similarly, Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, and Lockhart (1998) 
demonstrated in a series of studies that participants' inferences drawn from favourable 
interpersonal feedback showed a correspondence bias, that is, failed to take situational 
constraints into account, whereas inferences drawn from unfavourable interpersonal feedback 
were sensitive to situational constraints. This sensitivity, however, disappeared under 
cognitive load. Finally, the tendency to apply different levels of stringency when evaluating 
preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent information can also be observed in 
people's use of stereotypes. Devine (1989), for example, suggested that both prejudiced and 
non-prejudiced individuals have racial stereotypes and that these stereotypes are activated 
with equal ease and speed. Unlike non-prejudiced individuals, however, prejudiced 
individuals do not engage in a re-assessment of the implications suggested by the activation of 
racial stereotypes and therefore express stereotypical views. 
The fact that the validity of preference-consistent information is rather uncritically 
accepted, whereas preference-inconsistent information elicits cognitive activity in order to 
explain it away also implies that less preference-consistent than preference-inconsistent 
information is required to reach a conclusion. This 'quantity of processing' approach was 
supported in a series of studies by Ditto and Lopez (1992), who found that participants who 
were presented with information suggesting that a dislikeable student was less intelligent than 
a likable student requested less information to conclude that he was less intelligent than 
participants presented with information suggesting that the dislikeable student was more 
intelligent needed to conclude that he was more intelligent. Participants presented with 
preference-inconsistent information did not require more information to make their decision 
than participants without a particular preference, suggesting that it was the ready acceptance 
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of preference-consistent information (also referred to as self-enhancement bias, Miller & 
Ross, 1975) rather than an overly critical processing of preference-inconsistent information 
which caused the effect in this instance. A reluctance to accept preference-inconsistent 
information (self-protection bias) was observed in two further studies, where participants 
were found to take longer to decide that an unfavourable medical test result was complete, re-
tested themselves more often, were more likely to state factors that could have affected test 
accuracy and rated test accuracy as lower than did participants who had obtained a favourable 
result. Ditto and Lopez's (1992) findings illustrate well how the processes of biased 
information search and biased information evaluation and integration interact with and 
mutually reinforce each other. 
It should be mentioned again at this point that many of the above results may be 
explained in non-motivational terms. For example, the finding that favourable intelligence test 
performance feedback is accepted uncritically, whereas unfavourable feedback is attributed to 
a lack of validity of the test, may be explained by assuming that students, who typically serve 
as participants in such studies, usually have a history of successful academic performance. 
Unfavourable feedback therefore violates their expectations and needs an explanation, 
whereas favourable feedback confirms their expectations and does not call for an explanation. 
Hence, it is not necessary to assume that participants are motivated to enhance their self-
image; an outsider who has no vested interest in the issue would be expected to arrive at the 
same conclusion. Indeed, many studies have demonstrated that biased evaluations can not 
only be observed when individuals have a self-related motivation to reach a particular 
conclusion but also when they just have certain prior expectations not related to personal 
goals. In a study by Darley and Gross (1983), for example, participants watched a videotape 
of a child whose academic ability they were asked to evaluate. The first section of the tape 
implicitly suggested that the child either came from a high or a low socio-economic 
background. Participants then either saw or did not see an inconclusive second section that 
showed the child taking an academic test. A fifth group just watched the second section of the 
tape. Participants who did not see the second part of the tape rated the child's ability level as 
about average for her age, regardless of whether they believed the child to come from a high 
or low socio-economic background. However, those participants who had seen the ability test 
and believed that the child came from a high socio-economic background rated the child's 
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ability well above average, whereas those who had seen the identical clip but believed her to 
come from a low socio-economic background rated her ability below average. Both groups 
referred to the ability test in order to support their respective views; they rated the difficulty of 
the test, the number of problems the child had answered correctly and the number of test 
behaviours that reflected either positively or negatively on the child's achievement level in 
such a way that their expectancy was confirmed. This suggests, consistent with cold cognition 
accounts, that a hypothesis confirmation bias also occurs when the individual has no personal 
motivation to arrive at a certain conclusion. 
The biases discussed so far have largely focused on the re-evaluation of information. 
As suggested by Baumeister and Newman (1994), bias may also be introduced through the 
way in which information is integrated. One such mechanism described in the literature is the 
differential weighting of preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent information. In 
Boiney, Kennedy and Nye's (1997) study, for example, participants who were motivated to 
approve a new product implicitly weighted an expert forecast of sales that was considerably 
higher than those of three other experts more strongly than participants who were not 
particularly motivated to favour the introduction of the product, and, as a consequence, were 
more likely to advocate the introduction of the product. Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg 
(1989) found that when asked to rate themselves compared to their fellow students on various 
ambiguous traits, in order to achieve a desirable self-image, participants placed the greatest 
weight on a dimension on which they looked best. Similarly, in Dunning, Perie, and Story's 
(1991) study, when asked which traits were more important for a good leader, people-oriented 
participants rated interpersonal skills higher than goal-oriented participants, whereas goal-
oriented participants rated ambition and persistence higher than people-oriented participants. 
Ginossar and Trope (1987) found that participants assigned to play the role of a lawyer failed 
to show the usual base rate fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) and took base rate 
information into account if it supported the conclusion they were arguing for. Finally, studies 
conducted within the framework of Svenson's (1992, 1996) differentiation and consolidation 
theory (presented below) have demonstrated confirmative information integration in 
multiattribute decision making. 
It is important to stress again at this point that individuals are not free to reach any 
conclusion they wish but are subject to reasonableness constraints. A compromise has to be 
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reached between the wish to reach a particular conclusion and the plausibility of this 
conclusion given the available evidence (Kunda, 1990, 1999, Boiney, Kennedy, & Nye, 
1997). Given that individuals strive to uphold an illusion of objectivity (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987), that is, pretend that they arrived at an accurate and objective conclusion, 
self-deception will only work if this illusion can indeed be upheld (Baumeister & Newman, 
1994). Many studies have provided empirical support for this assumption. For example, in the 
study by Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg (1989) reported earlier, the tendency for 
participants to interpret ambiguous traits in such a way that their self-image was maximised 
was reduced when they were given particular evaluation criteria beforehand. Also, in Boiney, 
Kennedy, & Nye's (1997) study, participants only weighted the supportive forecast more 
strongly when this was necessary to arrive at the desired conclusion. A classical study by 
Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer (1979) also demonstrates individuals' awareness of 
justification constraints. Participants were asked to decide which of two rooms to wait in for 
their participation in an alleged experiment. In one of the rooms, a supposedly handicapped 
person (a confederate of the experimenter) was already waiting; the other room was occupied 
by a non-handicapped person. Also, in both waiting rooms either the same or two different 
TV programs were being shown. Snyder et al. (1979) found that when different TV programs 
were being shown in the two rooms, participants tended to choose the room that enabled them 
to avoid the handicapped person and justified their choice in terms of program preference. 
However, when the same TV program was being shown in both rooms and it was therefore 
not possible to use this fact as a justification for discriminatory behaviour, participants chose 
to wait with the handicapped person more often. Hsee (1995, 1996) has formalised the idea of 
justification constraints on confirmatory biases in multiattribute decision making in his theory 
of elastic justification. His concept of elasticity refers to uncertainty or ambiguity in attribute 
outcomes, for example, when only a range of possible outcomes instead of fixed outcomes is 
known. Given the choice between two options, one of which is superior on an attribute 
directly related to the task (justifiable factor) and the other of which is superior on a factor 
that is not central to the task but tempting to the decision maker (unjustifiable factor), the 
decision maker is assumed to first look to the justifiable factor to see whether there is a 
justification for making the desired decision and if that is not the case, take the unjustifiable 
factor into account only when there is elasticity in the justifiable factors. Hsee (1995) gives 
the example of a businessman who has to choose between two cities to go to for a business 
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trip to find as many buyers as possible for a product. In the first city, he expects to find more 
buyers than in the second city (justifiable factor), but the second city is more enjoyable 
(unjustifiable factor). According to the theory of elastic justification, the businessman will 
only choose the second city if the exact number of buyers he expects to find in either city is 
not exactly known and may be constructed to be higher for the second than for the first city. 
These predictions were confirmed in two series of experiments using different choice contexts 
(Hsee, 1995, 1996). Participants were found to be more likely to choose the alternative that 
was superior on the unjustifiable factor when there was uncertainty in the justifiable factor 
than when there was no such uncertainty, no matter whether the uncertainty was found in just 
one or in both alternatives. Another theory that specifies how individuals may use uncertainty 
in attribute outcomes to bolster their decision is Svenson's (1992, 1996) differentiation and 
consolidation theory, which will be outlined next.  
Svenson’s (1992, 1996) differentiation and consolidation theory 
A theoretical framework that throws more light upon processes of confirmatory 
information evaluation and integration in a multiattribute decision context has been provided 
by Svenson (1992, 1996). His differentiation and consolidation (Diff Con) theory takes up 
and extends ideas from Festinger’s (1957) dissonance theory and applies them to 
multiattribute decision situations. The theory states that during the process of making 
decision, alternatives are differentiated from each other. This is done in order to let one 
alternative appear sufficiently superior so that the decision for it can withstand future 
challenges, like unwanted negative consequences or changes in the decision maker’s 
preference system. After the decision, consolidation processes follow to maintain or increase 
the achieved degree of differentiation. Differentiation and consolidation involve the same 
basic processes, the main difference between them is the time at which they operate; 
differentiation happens before and consolidation after a decision has been made.  
In the pre-decision phase, the decision maker is assumed to eliminate alternatives until 
only two or three remain for further consideration and a tentative choice will be made. 
Differentiation processes are assumed to focus on the tentatively chosen alternative and its 
closest competitor. The aim is to increase the perceived difference in overall attractiveness to 
such an extent that the decision maker feels confident enough to make a final decision. This 
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aim can be achieved by either increasing the perceived attractiveness of the tentatively chosen 
alternative or by decreasing the perceived attractiveness of the competing alternative. Diff 
Con theory does not explicitly state the conditions under which one or the other is more likely 
to occur, however. Once a decision has been made, consolidation processes set in, in order to 
defend one’s decision against anything that reflects unfavourably upon the chosen alternative 
and may lead to regret. Consolidation is assumed to happen regardless of how great the 
evaluative advantage of the chosen alternative already is. The theory thus makes an 
interesting prediction that deviates from predictions derived by similar theories, such as 
dominance structuring theory (Montgomery, 1983, 1989); differentiation and consolidation 
processes will also be observed when one alternative dominates the others, that is, its attribute 
outcomes are as good as or superior to those of the other alternatives.  
Svenson (1992) lists a number of differentiation4 processes, of which the so-called 
structural differentiation processes have received the most empirical attention, because they 
allow the clearest predictions. Structural differentiation is differentiation by means of 
changing the mental representation of decision alternatives and can be achieved by four 
different processes: (1) attractiveness restructuring, (2) importance differentiation, (3) fact 
restructuring, and (4) problem restructuring. Attractiveness restructuring involves changes in 
how attribute outcomes are evaluated. A negative outcome on an important attribute may be 
evaluated less negatively than before and/or a positive outcome may be evaluated better, 
thereby increasing this alternative’s evaluative advantage over other alternatives. For 
example, imagine a decision maker wants to buy a house and out of the houses she can choose 
between, she prefers one that is close to her work place but quite expensive. If she engages in 
attractiveness restructuring, she may evaluate the high price as less negative and the fact that 
the house is close to her work place as more positive than initially. Importance differentiation 
means that the importance of attributes, as, for example, expressed in attribute weights is 
changed. The weight of an attribute on which an alternative has a negative outcome may be 
decreased and/or the weight of an attribute on which the alternative has a positive outcome 
may be increased. In the case of the house-buying decision, the decision maker may find price 
                                                 
4 Note that Svenson’s terminology is inconsistent. He uses the term ‘differentiation’ both specifically for pre-
decisional processes and in a more general sense for all processes which increase the evaluative advantage of one 
alternative over the others. It is the latter meaning we refer to here.  
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less important and distance to work more important than before. Importance differentiation 
may be regarded as a particularly effective means of differentiation, because it allows 
enhancement of the preferred and devaluation of the non-preferred alternatives at the same 
time (Wernicke, 1993). When facts restructuring occurs, the individual changes his or her 
representation of known and/or newly emerging facts, often exploiting uncertainty associated 
with attribute outcomes. For example, the individual may start to doubt the validity of 
negative information about the preferred alternative or positive information about non-
preferred alternatives. Also, attribute outcomes may be remembered in a biased way. After a 
while the decision maker may remember the price of the house she bought as lower than it 
actually was or the distance to her work place of the houses she did not buy as greater. Unless 
a decision is made over a long time period, memory biases would seem to be restricted to the 
consolidation phase, however. Finally, problem restructuring refers to changes in the 
representation of the decision problem, either by creating new attributes or by creating new 
alternatives. An example for the fact that the introduction of a new alternative which is 
dominated by one of the original alternatives increases the attractiveness and choice 
probability of the dominating alternative is the attraction effect (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982), 
as previously described in Chapter 3. Similarly, the introduction of a third alternative that 
dominates one of the initial two alternatives increases the attractiveness of the non-dominated 
alternative (Tyszka, 1983; Payne, 1982). Adding attributes on which the preferred alternative 
has good outcomes and the non-preferred alternatives have bad outcomes may be another way 
of increasing differentiation. If the decision maker, for example, brought to mind that her 
preferred house, apart from its other advantages, was also most likely to achieve the highest 
re-sell price, it would gain an additional advantage over the other alternatives. All these 
structural differentiation processes are assumed to operate in parallel and in conjunction with 
other differentiation processes, such as changes in criterion levels and the application of 
certain decision rules which favour the preferred alternative. For example, if a lexicographic 
decision rule is used, which prescribes choosing the alternative with the best outcome on the 
most important attribute, the most effective way for the decision maker to increase 
differentiation would be to concentrate any differentiation efforts on the most important 
attribute.  
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The structural differentiation processes suggested by Svenson can be related to the 
components of the MAUT equation (see Chapter 1), a fact that he fails to point out himself, 
however. Attractiveness restructuring is equivalent to changing v(xij), the evaluation of 
outcome i on attribute j, while facts restructuring means changing xij, the outcome for 
alternative i on an attribute j itself. Importance differentiation involves a change of wj, the 
weight for an attribute j, and, finally, problem restructuring may change the number of 
attributes entered into the equation. This mapping of structural differentiation processes onto 
the MAUT linear model components allows one to estimate the extent of differentiation and 
consolidation that the decision maker exhibits by measuring MAUT components during and 
after the decision process. This strategy was used in the empirical work reported in Chapters 6 
and 7.  
Research conducted within the framework of Diff Con theory so far has mostly 
concentrated on post-decisional structural consolidation. Typically, participants are presented 
with two alternatives described on a number of attributes by means of ticks on attractiveness 
scales which are anchored with ‘very bad’ and ‘very good’. Before participants make a 
decision between the alternatives, they usually rate the importance of each attribute by placing 
a crossing line on a visual analogue scale. After a time interval which may last five minutes 
(Svenson & Benthorn, 1992) up to several months (Svenson & Shamoun, 1997), participants 
have to reproduce the attractiveness descriptions and their importance ratings. Results have 
supported the assumption that post-decisional consolidation occurs and usually focuses on the 
most and/or the second-most important attribute (e.g., Svenson & Benthorn, 1992; Svenson & 
Malmsten, 1991, 1996; Benthorn, 1994). Also, attractiveness restructuring is said to be more 
pronounced than importance differentiation (Malmsten, 1996). This claim should be viewed 
with caution, however. It may be expected that the type of consolidation that is preferred 
depends on the ease with which it can be performed and its effectiveness. Such variables have 
not been systematically manipulated in investigations so far. Also, importance differentiation 
seems to have always been measured after attractiveness restructuring. Participants may take 
the first opportunity which presents itself (i.e., attractiveness restructuring) to achieve a 
satisfactory level of consolidation, and therefore not show much importance differentiation 
(see Götz-Marchand, Götz, & Irle’s similar criticism of the selective exposure paradigm 
above).  
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Another criticism concerns the measurement procedure for attractiveness 
restructuring. Describing the attractiveness of alternatives rather than directly describing the 
alternatives’ outcomes on these attributes means that an important step, namely the mapping 
of utilities onto outcomes, is taken by the researcher rather than the participant him- or 
herself. Participants are then asked to reproduce the attractiveness descriptions from memory. 
Any changes in attractiveness representations, therefore, strictly speaking, do not reflect 
attractiveness restructuring but facts restructuring and, at best, a mixture between the two. It 
may be argued that describing attribute outcomes and asking participants to (re-)assess the 
attractiveness of these outcomes provides a stronger test for changes in the decision maker’s 
value system (Wernicke, 1993). With the procedure described above, it is likely that by the 
time post-decisional consolidation is measured, individuals are not able to remember much 
about the alternatives except the choice they made. They may then use their choice as a clue 
for reconstructing attractiveness descriptions (or their own importance judgements) in a way 
that favours this alternative. A similar reconstructive process has been suggested to contribute 
to hindsight bias (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Pohl, 1993). Consistent with this 
assumption, significant consolidation is usually only observed after some time has passed 
(Svenson & Benthorn, 1992). Also, instructing participants to memorise their decision (not 
the description of the alternatives) results in a higher level of consolidation (Svenson, Ortega 
Rayo, Andersen, Sandberg, & Svahlin, 1994). The visual description of alternatives by ticks 
on a line, which may be more difficult to memorise than numbers, favours the expected 
consolidation effect. Benson III & Svenson (1992) indeed reported that consolidation was not 
observed when participants had to rate the attractiveness difference between the chosen and 
non-chosen alternative on a numerical scale, but was observed when participants had to make 
judgements on visual analogue scales. Also, Wernicke (1993) failed to find attractiveness and 
fact restructuring as well as importance differentiation when describing attribute outcomes in 
numerical terms.  
A pre-condition for consolidation seems to be the decision maker’s sufficient 
involvement in the decision (Svenson, Ortega Rayo, Andersen, Sandberg, & Svahlin, 1994). 
Involvement is assumed to increase with the relevance of a decision and the decision maker’s 
feeling of personal responsibility for its consequences. Svenson and Malmsten (1991, 1996) 
asked participants to make a consequential choice between tickets for two different lotteries in 
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which one of two portable cassette players could be won. Whether participants received the 
lottery ticket of their choice was determined by throwing a die. Immediate outcome feedback 
resulted in more and quicker consolidation for consequential than for non-consequential 
decisions; participants who won a ticket for their preferred lottery increased their perception 
of their prior chances of winning a ticket, whereas participants who did not win a ticket 
decreased their perception of their prior chances. Also, a successful outcome resulted in a 
higher degree of facts consolidation than an unsuccessful outcome. Svenson and Hill (1996) 
and Svenson and Shamoun (1997) investigated students' real decisions about which area of 
specialisation to choose for their final year of study. Participants’ preferences and values were 
elicited at different stages of the decision process: prior to the decision, after the decision but 
before the implementation, and several months after the implementation. Svenson and 
Shamoun found that participants with a strong value conflict (i.e., those whose chosen 
alternative was worse than another on an important attribute) showed differentiation and 
consolidation that was strongly focused on the conflict attribute and was stronger than for 
participants without such a conflict. 
Contrary to expectations, Svenson, Ortega Rayo, Andersen, Sandberg and Svahlin 
(1994) repeatedly found no facts restructuring consolidation, when participants were told that 
they would have to justify their decision afterwards. A possible reason for this may be the fact 
that participants were made accountable before they made a decision. As reported earlier, 
Tetlock and his co-workers (1985a, 1992; Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, 1989) have shown 
many times that pre-decisional accountability leads to a deeper, more effortful information 
processing compared to no accountability. As a result of this deeper processing, participants 
in Svenson et al.’s (1994) experiment may have developed a better memory for the 
alternatives’ descriptions and, hence, were less likely to show consolidation. In line with this 
explanation, the hindsight bias, which seems to be very similar to post-decisional 
consolidation in terms of its underlying processes, has been found to decrease as the amount 
of cognitive effort expended increases (Creyer & Ross, 1982).  
The ideas expressed in Diff Con theory are not really new, its value lies in the fact that 
it has successfully managed to combine ideas from the social psychology and decision 
making literature, in particular dissonance theory and MAUT. The assumption of a 
multiattribute representation of decision alternatives allows one to test predictions of the 
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different ways in which the evaluative advantage of the chosen alternative may be increased 
more easily than the holistic representation suggested by dissonance theory. Also, unlike 
dissonance theory, Diff Con theory recognises that already pre-decisional information 
processing may be biased to support a tentatively chosen alternative. However, very few 
studies conducted within the framework of Diff Con theory have addressed this issue at all 
(Benson III, 1993, Svenson & Hill, 1996). Both dissonance theory (in its revised version) and 
Diff Con theory stress the importance of a certain commitment or involvement of the decision 
maker as a pre-condition for the occurrence of their postulated effects. This poses the danger 
for both theories to become impossible to falsify, since a failure to find the expected effects 
can always be explained by a lack of commitment or involvement on behalf of the decision 
maker. Diff Con theory also shares with dissonance theory the problem of being quite loose, 
especially in terms of predicting which particular way of increasing the evaluative advantage 
of the chosen alternative will be adopted. Dissonance theory has attempted to solve this 
problem by introducing the rather circular concept of resistance to change (the cognition with 
the smallest resistance to change will be altered; if a cognition has been changed, it must have 
had the smallest resistance to change). Svenson's outline of Diff Con theory so far has 
addressed the issue of strength of differentiation and consolidation (e.g., it is less strong, if the 
chosen alternative initially already appears much more attractive than its contenders than if 
the perceived attractiveness difference is small, because in this case part of the necessary 
differentiation has already been achieved), but does not say anything about what determines 
which particular differentiation and/or consolidation process will be chosen and clearly needs 
more specification in this respect. Finally, whereas dissonance theory is clearly a hot 
cognition, motivational theory, through postulating a drive to reduce dissonance, the 
'temperature' of Diff Con theory (Arkes, 1996) is not readily apparent. Diff Con theory 
assumes that the decision maker wants to protect him- or herself against the threats of post-
decisional preference changes, but does not go into much detail about the exact nature of this 
motivation. At the same time, it specifies processes that may be regarded as "by-products of a 
fully functional information processing system" (Arkes, 1996, p. 270). It seems therefore that 
Diff Con theory may best be regarded as a hybrid model, like Baumeister & Newman's (1994) 
theory of self-regulated inference or other such models, for example, by Kruglanski (1980, 
1989, 1990; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983), Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987) and Kunda 
(1990, 1999).
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Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we presented both theoretical and empirical work relating to motivated 
information processing, in particular, processes of confirmatory information search, 
evaluation and integration. We first outlined Baumeister and Newman's (1994) theory of self-
regulated inference and decision processes, which describes how a decision maker with either 
the goal of reaching an accurate conclusion (referred to as an intuitive scientist), or the goal of 
reaching a particular conclusion (referred to as an intuitive lawyer), may regulate his or her 
information search, evaluation and integration in order to achieve these respective goals. This 
was followed by a review of the empirical literature on various types of confirmation bias. In 
the domain of information search, confirmation bias was found to manifest itself either in the 
form of a hypothesis preservation bias, that is, the tendency to search for information that has 
a high likelihood of supporting one's hypothesis or preferred conclusion, or in the form of a 
positive test strategy, the tendency to test cases that are expected (or known) to be true under 
the working hypothesis, that is, to ask questions in which a 'yes' or positive answer would 
confirm one's hypothesis. The former has mainly been explored within the framework of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957, 1964), the latter within Wason's (1960) rule discovery 
paradigm and variations thereof. In line with Baumeister and Newman's (1994) assumption 
that it may be difficult for an individual with the mindset of an intuitive lawyer to search 
information in a confirmatory manner (given that it is often difficult to know whether 
information will be supportive or not before looking at it), empirical results in this area of 
investigation are inconclusive. Where it comes to confirmatory information evaluation and 
integration, however, results are more clear-cut; there is abundant evidence that individuals 
bias their evaluation of information and integrate it in such a way that their preferred 
conclusion is supported. This may be done in several ways. Svenson's differentiation and 
consolidation theory specifies the processes that may be observed in multiattribute decision 
making, including re-assessing the attractiveness of attribute outcomes (attractiveness 
restructuring), falsely remembering the outcomes themselves (facts restructuring), changing 
attribute weights (importance differentiation) and changing the representation of the decision 
problem, either by creating new attributes or by creating new alternatives (problem 
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restructuring). Also, the decision maker may choose to apply certain decision rules which 
favour the preferred alternative.  
In conclusion, the application of particular processing strategies appears highly 
adaptive and situation-specific in order to keep cognitive effort minimal, an observation that 
has been made many times in various research contexts, and has resulted in the proposal of 
various cost-benefit frameworks in the decision literature, such as Simon's (1955) concept of 
bounded rationality, Beach and Mitchell’s (1978) cost-benefit strategy selection model, 
extended by Christensen-Szalanski (1978), and Payne, Bettman and Johnson's (1993) effort-
accuracy framework. 
All of the aforementioned effects may occur not only when there is a personal 
motivation to arrive at a certain conclusion but also when the individual just starts off with a 
certain expectation or hypothesis, rendering the distinction between so-called 'hot' (motivated) 
and 'cold' (non-motivated) cognition (Abelson, 1963) obsolete. In addition, although 
Baumeister and Newman's theory distinguishes between accuracy and directional goals, it 
would be wrong to assume that the individual will only ever pursue one or the other, and 
therefore either show thorough and objective or biased and selective information processing. 
Rather, any attempt at self-regulation of cognitive processes is always subject to 
reasonableness constraints (Kunda, 1990) and individuals attempt to maintain an illusion of 
accuracy and objectivity (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). This means that they are not free 
to arrive at any conclusion they want, but need to observe the constraints of the evidence 
available to them. Furthermore, directional goals will usually be paired with accuracy goals, 
and the individual has to deal with potential conflicts between the two. Accuracy goals have 
commonly been found to induce a deeper information processing, particularly a more 
extensive information search. Ironically, this more extensive processing caused by accuracy 
goals may enhance rather than reduce bias, by facilitating the construction of justifications for 
the desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990). This contradicts the belief expressed by many authors 
that strong accuracy goals will minimise the impact of any directional goals (e.g., Pyszczynski 
& Greenberg, 1987). One situation identified by Kunda (1990) as arousing both accuracy and 
directional goals is outcome dependency, that is, a situation in which individuals expect their 
own outcomes to depend in some way on another person, for example, because this person 
will be their partner in a later task and rewards will be determined by joint performance. From 
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what has been said about accountability so far, it should be obvious that any accountability 
manipulation which involves external accountability contains a strong element of outcome 
dependency, in that the individual expects to be evaluated by the people he or she is 
accountable to. It may therefore be expected that external accountability will make both 
accuracy and directional goals salient and will be associated with the cognitive effects 
characteristic of both. In the next chapter, we will propose a process model of accountability 
which will integrate these and earlier conclusions.
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CHAPTER 5: A PROCESS MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
This chapter will summarise the conclusions of previous chapters and integrate them 
into a process model of accountability (PMA in the following), which specifies how 
accountability demands may affect the processes of information search, evaluation and 
integration under various conditions of accountability. This model provides the basis for the 
empirical work undertaken, which will be outlined at the end.  
A process model of accountability: Integration of previous conclusions 
The discussion of motivational reasoning processes in the previous chapter implied that 
decision processes may be affected by two conflicting motives of the decision maker, 
accuracy goals, that is, a need to make an objective or normatively correct decision, and 
directional goals, that is, a need to arrive at a particular decision. Accuracy goals make the 
decision maker act like an intuitive scientist who conducts a thorough and unbiased 
information search, attempts to evaluate information objectively and integrates information 
according to rules and criteria set in advance, whereas directional goals prompt the decision 
maker to act like an intuitive lawyer who searches information selectively and biases 
information evaluation and integration in such a way that the preferred conclusion is favoured 
(Baumeister & Newman, 1994). In order to link accountability to these motives, we need to 
specify how accountability manipulations affect the salience of accuracy or directional goals.  
The analysis of the accountability concept in Chapter 2 suggested that a context in 
which the decision maker is made externally accountable for his or her decisions will contain 
two types of cues, (1) responsibility cues that establish a causal link between the decision 
maker's choice and its consequences and suggest that the decision maker has control over the 
decision and thereby, at least partly, its associated consequences, and (2) evaluation cues that 
suggest that others are present who will evaluate the decision maker's choice with regard to 
certain norms or standards and imply that the decision maker's performance and /or 
conclusion is identifiable to them. Responsibility cues create a feeling of personal 
responsibility and focus the decision maker's attention on internal norms and values. The 
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PMA assumes that personal responsibility strengthens the decision maker's need to make a 
correct decision, that is, increases the salience of accuracy goals. Evaluation cues, on the other 
hand, create evaluation apprehension and increase the decision maker's focus on external 
norms and standards. Evaluation apprehension is assumed to make directional goals salient; it 
increases the decision maker's need to make a particular decision, namely one that is 
consistent with salient standards of evaluation and therefore can be easily justified to the 
people the decision maker is accountable to. The direction the decision process takes is 
suggested by the perceived norms and standards for evaluation. In some cases, the 
accountability manipulation itself may either explicitly provide or implicitly suggest such 
norms or standards, for example, by giving information about the preferences of the audience 
the decision maker has been made accountable to. In other cases, the decision maker may not 
be aware of either audience preferences or other external norms and will then rely on his or 
her personal norms and values which have been made salient by the responsibility cues 
inherent in the accountability manipulation.  
The need to be accurate, as discussed in the previous chapter, is predicted to result in 
more complex information processing, in particular, a more extensive information search, 
because this part of the decision process can be most easily regulated towards objectivity. 
Directional goals, on the other hand, are assumed to primarily affect information evaluation, 
in such a way that the alternative which appears to be most justifiable or the alternative the 
person has already made a commitment to is favoured. This regulation is aimed at the 
resulting decision rather than the process by which the decision is arrived at. Information 
search and information evaluation are therefore seen as primary means to achieving different 
goals, namely accuracy on the one hand and being able to justify the preferred decision on the 
other. Information integration occupies an intermediate position in this respect. It can support 
accuracy goals by the application of complex decision rules that take into account all the 
information searched before, but it can also support directional goals by the application of 
decision rules that favour the preferred alternative. A graphical representation of the PMA 
predictions is shown in Figure 5.1. 
A central assumption of the PMA is that accountability does not normally increase the 
salience of either accuracy or directional goals, but that the cues inherent in the accountability 
context will increase the strength of both these motives and, hence, an effect of accountability 
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on depth of information search and complexity of integration as well as degree of bias in 
information evaluation and integration will be observed. The seemingly contradictory results 
of previous research on the effects of accountability on decision processes, which suggest that 
accountability may both result in more complex and more biased information processing 
compared to a situation where no accountability pressures are present, are therefore well 
predicted by this model.  
Accountability
manipulation
Responsibility cues
personal causality 
+ control
Extensive information search
and complex integration
Salience of audience preferences,
previous commitment,
focus on process vs. outcome
Evaluation cues
implied presence of 
others + identifiability
Biased information 
evaluation and integration
Directional goal:
need to make a  
particular decision
Accuracy goal :
need to make a  
correct decision
Evaluation 
apprehension
Personal 
responsibility
Perceived norms
for evaluation
Focus  on
internal norms
Focus  on
external norms
 
Figure 5.1. The process model of accountability (PMA) 
The model also takes into account that the processes of information search, evaluation 
and integration do not operate independently of each other, but that they mutually reinforce 
each other (depicted by the double arrow in Figure 5.1), as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Information that has been searched by the decision maker in a first step may be used to bias 
the decision process at the evaluation stage. Likewise, a biased information evaluation may 
affect the type of information that is searched when the decision maker returns to the 
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information gathering stage, for example, because the previous information does not seem to 
be strong enough to support the desired decision.  
Having introduced the basic assumptions of the PMA, the next step will be to outline 
how the effects of the different sub-types of accountability discussed in Chapter 3, namely, 
accountability to an audience with known vs. unknown views, pre- vs. post-decisional 
accountability and procedural vs. outcome accountability may be explained by the PMA.  
According to Tetlock's social contingency model (1985a, 1991, 1992), pre-decisional 
accountability results in complex, compensatory information processing if the preferences of 
the audience the decision maker is accountable to are not known, whereas post-decisional 
accountability to an audience with unknown views, that is, being made accountable after one 
has already made a commitment to one of the alternatives, results in biased, defensive 
information processing. The PMA can explain these effects by assuming that the 
responsibility cues inherent in pre-decisional accountability to an audience with unknown 
views will particularly make accuracy goals salient, while the salience of any directional goals 
will be relatively low, due to the absence of perceived audience preferences or other external 
norms or standards which could drive the decision in a particular direction. This 
accountability manipulation will therefore make information processing more complex, and 
the decision maker is expected to make a decision that closely matches his or her personal 
preferences, as these are the only standards available to him or her. Having previously made a 
commitment to a particular alternative, however, will provide the decision maker with a 
strong directional goal, namely to defend the appropriateness of his or her previous decision. 
At the same time, the responsibility cues still inherent in this manipulation are predicted to 
induce a more extensive information search, compared to a situation of no accountability. It is 
expected, however, that the higher depth of processing serves the directional goal of 
defending the decision maker's past decision. Note that the prediction of a more extensive 
information search whenever responsibility cues are present, no matter whether accountability 
is pre- or post-decisional, departs from Tetlock's predictions and, hence, provides a suitable 
way of testing the two models against each other. In fact, the results of Tetlock's own research 
point to the correctness of this PMA hypothesis. Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger (1989), for 
example, found that introducing post-decisional accountability demands was not sufficient to 
produce simplification of thoughts compared to pre-decisional accountability. 
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Tetlock (1985a, 1991, 1992) furthermore states that decision makers apply a low-
effort acceptability heuristic and match their decision to the preferences of the audience they 
are accountable to if those are known or assumed, but not if they have already committed 
themselves to a different decision. The PMA arrives at the same prediction, assuming that 
while both the knowledge of or assumptions about audience preferences and the decision 
maker's past commitment make certain directional goals salient, past commitments do so 
more powerfully, either owing to implications for the decision maker's self-image or owing to 
the greater cognitive availability of previously processed information. It may also be expected 
that the decision maker is more likely to adjust his or her expressed preferences to those of the 
audience if his or her own preferences are similar to the presumed audience preferences, 
because in such a situation there is little conflict between different directional goals. 
Finally, the fact that procedural accountability typically results in more complex 
information processing, whereas outcome accountability results in more biased information 
processing can be explained by the PMA in the following way. Procedural accountability 
signals to the decision maker that the standards against which his or her decision will be 
measured relate to the decision process rather than the decision outcome. This suggests that a 
thorough processing of all available information is a suitable way of meeting these standards 
and avoiding blame (see Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996, for a similar argument), and, hence, 
information search will be deep and information integration complex. Outcome 
accountability, on the other hand, signals to the decision maker that his or her decision will be 
considered acceptable if it results in a successful outcome. Given that in such a situation it is 
impossible for the decision maker to totally safeguard him- or herself from failure by 
processing information very carefully, he or she will try to adopt strategies that maximise the 
likelihood of a successful outcome, for example, by attending to information about what the 
evaluators would do in a similar situation. It is therefore expected that under outcome 
accountability, the decision maker will not invest particular effort into the decision process 
but will simply make a decision that is consistent with the preferences of the audience he or 
she is accountable to, if these preferences can be inferred or have been made salient in any 
way. 
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Summary and research plan 
The PMA, in departure from previous models of accountability effects on judgement 
and decision processes, suggests that any accountability manipulation will usually create both 
accuracy and directional goals in the decision maker, and as a consequence, will induce 
information processing that is both more complex and more biased compared to a situation 
without accountability pressures. The exact nature of the accountability manipulation, 
however, will determine the relative strength of these two effects. A manipulation that 
primarily contains personal responsibility cues but minimises evaluation cues, as it is typical 
when trying to create internal accountability, is expected to mainly result in deeper and more 
complex information processing while any biasing effects will be weak. On the other hand, a 
manipulation that makes evaluation cues particularly salient, including audience preferences 
or previous commitments that may serve as standards of evaluation, is expected to result in 
both complex and strongly biased information processing, as long as the available evidence 
permits a biased conclusion. A test of the validity of the PMA should therefore involve 
manipulating personal responsibility and evaluation cues as well as perceived norms for 
evaluation and observing the effects of these manipulations on the complexity and degree of 
bias in information search, evaluation and integration.  
The first study to be reported here investigated all three of these factors in an 
experiment testing the effects of internal vs. external accountability and pre- vs. post-
decisional accountability on the decision process. Internal accountability was manipulated by 
creating a scenario in which participants were made aware of their personal responsibility for 
the consequences of their decision, while the decision itself was said to be kept anonymous to 
others, thereby lowering evaluation concerns. External accountability was manipulated in a 
similar way, except that participants were explicitly told that others would be aware of their 
decision, thereby strengthening evaluation apprehension. There was no explicit manipulation 
of audience preferences. Instead, the assumed influence of perceived norms of evaluation was 
tested by comparing the effects of pre-and post-decisional accountability, predicting that post-
decisional accountability would bias the decision process towards supporting a previous 
decision.  
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The second study that tested the PMA focused on the effects of external accountability 
to different interest groups whose preferences could be easily inferred by the participants and 
were therefore expected to direct the decision process towards a particular conclusion. The 
data were also analysed with respect to the absence or presence of conflict of audience 
preferences with the decision maker's own preferences. Again, the timing of the 
accountability manipulation was varied, in order to test the relative strength of bias induced 
by audience preferences vs. bias induced by a previous commitment. The results of these 
studies will be reported in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Introduction 
The first experiment to test the validity of the process model of accountability (PMA) 
presented in Chapter 5 addressed effects of internal and external accountability on 
information search, evaluation and integration. Although a distinction between these two 
types of accountability has commonly been made in the literature, studies directly 
investigating the differential effects of these two types of accountability have not been 
reported in the literature so far. According to the PMA, internal accountability is assumed to 
arise when individuals feel personally responsible for their decision, that is, when they feel 
that the decision rests on them and they are therefore responsible for its consequences, while 
there is no opportunity for external evaluation of their decision, because their contribution is 
not identifiable. This means that impression management concerns and evaluation 
apprehension are minimal and the biasing effects of accountability should therefore not be as 
strong as in a situation of external accountability, where decision makers perceive a personal 
responsibility for their decision and, more importantly, their performance can be evaluated by 
other people, because it is identifiable.  
According to the PMA, there will be no difference between these two types of 
accountability in terms of depth of information search and complexity of information 
integration when making an initial decision. This is, because in both cases responsibility cues 
are predicted to make accuracy goals salient which, in turn, will result in an extensive 
information search and complex, compensatory information integration. There will, however, 
be a difference between internal and external accountability with regard to the degree of bias 
evident in information evaluation and integration. Externally accountable individuals, because 
of the fact that they anticipate their performance to be evaluated by other people, will look for 
an alternative that they can easily justify to those to whom they are accountable. If a norm has 
been made salient against which the decision maker's performance will be evaluated, for 
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example, through suggesting that the person or group the decision maker is accountable to has 
a preference for a certain alternative, adjustment to this norm can be expected (Tetlock, 1990, 
1992, Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). If a norm has not been made salient, there are two 
possible reactions. Firstly, the decision maker may try to infer the norm and then adjust his or 
her information evaluation and integration to the inferred norm. Secondly, the decision maker 
may be led by internal norms and opt for the alternative with the best outcome on the 
attribute(s) which appear(s) most important to him or her in the given decision context, that is, 
make a choice that is consistent with a lexicographic decision rule. 
Another way of enhancing the justifiability of an alternative, which has been 
suggested by Diff Con theory (Svenson, 1992, 1996), is to increase the evaluative difference 
between the chosen alternative and the non-chosen alternatives. This may be achieved by 
structural differentiation processes, such as attractiveness restructuring or importance 
differentiation. Attractiveness restructuring refers to a better evaluation of attribute outcomes 
for the chosen alternative and/or a worse evaluation of attribute outcomes for the non-chosen 
alternatives. Importance differentiation refers to increasing the perceived importance of 
attributes on which the chosen alternative performs well and/or decreasing the perceived 
importance of attributes on which it performs badly. These processes should also find their 
expression in the holistic evaluation of alternatives, that is, the difference in judgements of 
overall attractiveness between the chosen alternative and the non-chosen alternatives should 
be enlarged. Such differentiation processes should be stronger when participants are made 
externally accountable than when they are made internally accountable.  
The difference between the effects of internal and external accountability should be 
diminished, however, when individuals are only made accountable once they have already 
committed themselves to an alternative. In this case, both internally and externally 
accountable individuals are expected to bias their information search as well as their 
information evaluation and integration so as to bolster their previously chosen alternative. To 
what extent this tendency will be stronger for participants under internal or external 
accountability may be expected to depend on whether participants who are made externally 
accountable perceive their choice to be in conflict with the preferences of the audience they 
are made accountable to. Although they will feel obliged to search information about the 
alternative their audience seems to prefer, resulting in a less biased information search 
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compared to that of internally accountable participants, externally accountable participants 
will bias their information evaluation and integration more strongly than internally 
accountable participants, because of an increased need to be able to justify that their 
previously made decision was a good one. If there is no conflict between externally 
accountable participants’ choice and the perceived preferences of their audience, on the other 
hand, both internally and externally accountable participants may be expected to show a 
similar degrees of bias towards supporting their chosen alternative, once they have been made 
accountable.  
The experiment conducted to test the predictions of the PMA therefore manipulated 
the following two factors: type of accountability (internal vs. external) and time when 
accountability was introduced (before a first decision vs. after a first and before a final 
decision). Participants were made internally or externally accountable either already before 
they made a preliminary or only before they made a final decision about which one of four 
job applicants to select. Information search was assessed by presenting participants with an 
information board (Payne, 1976), which they used to search information about the four 
different applicants who had been described on five attributes. Participants had to search 
information twice, once before they made their first decision, and a second time before they 
made their final decision. A particular feature of the two information sets used was that the 
attributes and attribute outcomes for the second search were largely redundant with those of 
the first search. For example, if an attribute in the first set was whether or not the applicant 
had had an educational stay in a foreign country, a redundant attribute in the second set would 
be the applicant's knowledge of foreign languages. This was to enable participants to foresee 
the value of the information they searched and so make it possible to test whether information 
search after a commitment was biased to support the previously chosen alternative. 
Information evaluation and integration was measured by participants' choices, their overall 
judgements of the suitability of each candidate for the job, and their evaluations of attribute 
outcomes and attribute weights, which were elicited before participants made their first 
decision and after they made their final decision. 
For the first decision, it was expected that information search would be more 
extensive, less variable across alternatives and attributes, more compensatory and less 
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strongly concentrated on the chosen alternative in conditions with either internal or external 
accountability compared to conditions with no accountability.  
The effects of the manipulated variables on the first information evaluation and 
integration were expected to be the following. It was predicted that, compared to participants 
who were not or were internally accountable, participants who were externally accountable 
would be more likely to choose the alternative with the best outcome on what they regarded 
the most important attribute. This was, because no particular audience preferences were made 
salient and a choice consistent with such a lexicographic decision rule is easy to justify (see 
Slovic, 1975). It was also predicted that externally accountable participants would show a 
larger difference between their suitability judgement for the chosen alternative and their 
suitability judgement for the average non-chosen alternative than participants who were not 
accountable or internally accountable. Since unidimensional values and weights were only 
elicited before the first and after the final decision, attractiveness restructuring and importance 
differentiation could not be tested at this point. 
For the final decision, the PMA predicted that the information search of participants 
who had been made either internally or externally accountable immediately beforehand would 
display characteristics of depth and compensation more strongly than that of participants who 
had already been made accountable before the first information search. This is, because for 
participants who had been made accountable immediately prior to this information search, the 
invoked accuracy goals should have been more salient than for participants who had already 
been made accountable before the first decision.  
For participants for whom accountability was introduced only after they had already 
made a first decision, it was furthermore expected that, although their information search 
would be more extensive in order to meet salient accuracy goals, it would also be more biased 
to support the previously chosen alternative, compared to that of participants who had been 
made accountable from the start.  
The final information evaluation and integration was expected to be generally biased 
in the direction of favouring the previously chosen alternative, because all participants would 
be motivated to confirm their previously made decision. However, this motivation should be 
strongest for participants who had been made externally accountable immediately prior to the 
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final decision and weakest for participants who had been made internally accountable before 
the first decision, with the other two conditions in-between. As an expression of biased 
information evaluation, participants were expected to increase the evaluative difference 
between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative. This was predicted to become 
apparent not only in participants' overall evaluations of the job applicants but also in a change 
of unidimensional values and weights, as suggested by Diff Con theory (Svenson, 1992). 
Specifically, it was expected that negative attribute outcomes of the chosen alternative would 
be evaluated less negatively and/or positive attribute outcomes would be evaluated more 
positively than before a decision had been made. It was also expected that the weights of 
attributes on which the chosen alternative had positive outcomes were increased, and/or the 
weights on which the chosen alternative had negative outcomes were decreased.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two psychology students at the Technical University of Darmstadt 
participated in the experiment, 66 women and 6 men. Their age ranged from 20 to 33 years 
(M = 25.5), the number of semesters they had been studying psychology varied between 2 and 
14 (M = 4.8). Participation was voluntary. Instead of a fixed reward, participants received a 
lottery ticket with which they could win up to DM 500. After completion of the data 
collection, 13 winners were drawn. 
Design 
The design was a 2 x 2 factorial design, manipulating type of accountability (internal 
vs. external) and time of introducing accountability (before a first decision vs. before the final 
decision). Both factors were varied between subjects, resulting in four experimental groups 
with 18 participants each. 
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Materials 
The decision task presented to the participants was one of personnel selection. In order 
to create a realistic scenario student participants could relate to and would be involved in, the 
decision situation chosen was the selection of a junior lecturer (the post of Wissenschaftlicher 
Mitarbeiter at German universities). In order to be able to test the extent to which information 
search was biased after a commitment to an alternative had been made, two sets of highly 
redundant information had to be constructed. To find the attributes for these information sets, 
a pilot study was conducted. Sixty psychology students at the Technical University of 
Darmstadt (none of which participated in the main experiment) rated 14 qualification criteria 
for the job of junior lecturer in Organisational Psychology. These criteria had to be rated with 
regard to their importance for selecting an applicant (on a scale from 1 ‘not at all important’ to 
5 ‘very important’) and all possible pairs of these criteria1 with regard to their similarity (on a 
scale from 1 ‘very dissimilar’ to 5 ‘very similar’). Ten of the 14 rated criteria were then 
selected to be used as attributes in the main experiment, five for each information set. The 
information sets were created in such a way that the five attributes in each set were judged 
maximally dissimilar from each other (i.e., were perceived to describe clearly different 
aspects of the qualification for the job), while at the same time each attribute from the first 
information set was judged as highly similar to one (and only one) attribute from the second 
information set. Pairs of highly similar attributes will in the following be referred to as 
parallel attributes. The resulting information sets, with mean similarity and importance ratings 
for their attributes, are shown in Table 6.1. 
For each of the five attributes in information set 1, four different outcomes were 
specified, which were spread equally across a realistic range of outcomes. The attribute 
outcomes were used to construct four alternatives, that is, job candidates. To make the 
decision between them difficult, the overall quality of the alternatives had to be similar. This 
was achieved by assigning outcomes to the alternatives in such a way that their overall 
                                                 
1 91 different pairs of criteria were rated in total. Each person rated a selection of 49 pairs, 7 pairs for which high 
similarity was expected (resulting in 60 ratings per pair) and a selection of 42 of the remaining 84 pairs (resulting 
in 30 ratings per pair).  
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evaluation, predicted by an additive MAUT model (see Equation 1.1), was as similar as 
possible. 
Table 6.1. Information sets used in the main experiment, with mean similarity and 
importance ratings. 
 
Information Set 1 
  
Information Set 2 
 
Attribute Labels 
 
Importance 
 
Similarity 
 
Importance 
 
Attribute Labels 
educational stay in a 
foreign country 
 
2.47 
 
4.64 
 
3.50 
knowledge of foreign 
languages 
activities as a student 
member of a professional 
association 
 
2.72 
 
4.03 
 
2.53 
activities as a student 
representative on 
university committees 
 
diploma thesis grade 
 
3.55 
 
3.95 
 
3.25 
reference from thesis 
supervisor 
number of placements in 
the area of Organisational 
Psychology 
 
3.78 
 
3.78 
 
3.25 
relevance of thesis topic 
to Organisational 
Psychology 
 
job as a student research 
assistant 
 
3.22 
 
3.18 
 
3.87 
 
computing skills 
Note: Importance ratings were given on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important), 
 similarity ratings were given on a scale from 1 (very dissimilar) to 5 (very similar). 
 
The mean importance judgements obtained in the pilot study were normalised and 
served as attribute weights in the model equation. Unidimensional values for the model 
equation were estimated by assuming a value of 0 for the worst of the four outcomes for each 
attribute, a value of 100 for the best outcome, and values at equal distances in-between for the 
other two outcomes (i.e., 33.33 and 66.67). Outcomes for the attributes of information set 2 
were specified in such a way that there was a perfect correspondence between parallel 
attributes. This meant that the alternative with the best, second-best, etc. outcome on an 
attribute of information set 1 also had the best, second-best, etc. outcome on the parallel 
attribute of information set 2.  
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Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual sessions. They received written instructions, 
which were handed to them by an experimenter who was present throughout the experiment 
and gave additional explanations if necessary. A schematic representation of the sequence of 
events during the experiment is shown in Table 6.2. In the following, each event will be 
described in detail: 
Table 6.2. Procedure. 
intro V1 S1 D1 pref S2 D2 JUST V2 PEQ 
 
 manipulation 
 of 
 accountability 
 
intro V1 S1 D1 pref S2 D2 JUST V2 PEQ 
Note: Capital letters indicate elicitation parts, lower-case letters indicate instruction parts. 
 intro: introduction to the decision problem 
 V1, V2: first and second elicitation of unidimensional values and weights 
 S1, S2: first and second information search  
 D1, D2: first and second decision 
 pref: information about preferences of other committee members  
 JUST: justification of the decision 
 PEQ: post-experimental questionnaire 
 
Intro: Introduction to the decision problem 
Participants were told that their task would be to make a personnel decision. They were informed about 
the normal selection procedure at their department, namely that personnel decisions were made by a selection 
committee and that one of the committee members was always a student. Participants were asked to imagine 
being the student member of a such a committee, with the task to select a junior lecturer in Organisational 
Psychology. The committee was said to have five members; apart from the participant him- or herself, there were 
said to be two professors and two other junior lecturers on the committee. Participants were told about the duties 
the advertised job involved, and that four candidates had been short-listed and interviewed. For each of the four 
candidates, information was said to be available with regard to five different qualification criteria. The attributes 
of information set 1 were listed. 
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V1: First elicitation of unidimensional values and weights 
In order to elicit unidimensional value functions, the attributes of information set 1 were presented, each 
with the four outcomes that had been previously specified. Each outcome had to be rated on a scale from 0 (very 
bad) to 100 (very good). The order of presentation of attributes as well as the order of presentation of attribute 
outcomes was randomised for each participant. 
Weights for the attributes of information set 1 were elicited with the swing method (von Winterfeldt & 
Edwards, 1986). Participants were presented with those outcomes of each attribute they had rated worst and best. 
If a participant had rated all attribute outcomes identically, the objectively worst and best outcomes were used. 
Participants were asked to imagine a candidate with worst outcomes on all attributes and indicate the attribute 
whose ‘swing’ from the worst to the best outcome would result in the largest, second-largest, etc., improvement 
of this candidate’s qualification, thereby effectively rank-ordering the attributes from most to least important. 
The swing resulting in the largest improvement was arbitrarily set to 100 and all other improvements had to be 
specified as percentages thereof. Final weights were obtained by normalising these percentages such that the 
weights added up to 1. 
Manipulations of accountability 
For half of the participants accountability was introduced at this point, the other participants did not 
receive any instructions and continued directly with the information search procedure. Half of the participants 
who received accountability instructions were made internally accountable, the other half were made externally 
accountable.  
Internal accountability. Participants were informed that, in order to arrive at a committee decision, there 
would be a vote by ballot. The votes of single committee members would be kept secret (no identifiability). 
Participants were furthermore told that conversations with other committee members had suggested that a 
stalemate might be expected between their choices, so that their own vote would be decisive (personal 
responsibility). 
External accountability. Participants received the information that, in order to reach a committee 
decision, there would be a public vote and everybody on the committee would know how each committee 
member had voted (identifiability). As in the ‘internal accountability’ conditions, participants were informed 
about the expected stalemate between the other committee members and that their own vote would be decisive 
(personal responsibility). 
S1: Information search set 1 
In order to make a decision, participants were asked to search information about the four short-listed 
candidates. Information search was monitored by employing the information board technique (Payne, 1976). 
Information about the candidates, named A,B,C, and D, was presented on cards arranged in an attribute-by-
alternative matrix. On each card information was given about a particular candidate’s (i.e., alternative’s) 
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outcome on a particular attribute. At the beginning only attribute and alternative labels were visible, all other 
cards were turned over so that the information on them was not visible. Participants had to search information by 
turning over one card, reading the information provided on it, and then putting it back again so that the 
information was not visible anymore, before turning over the next card. This procedure was continued until 
participants were ready to make a decision. Participants were free to search as many items of information as they 
wanted to and were allowed to look at the same item as often as they liked. The sequence in which cards were 
turned over was recorded. Appendix 1 shows a schematic representation of the information board used for the 
first information search. 
D1: First decision and suitability judgements 
Participants indicated their chosen candidate and rated each candidate in terms of suitability for the job. 
This was done on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely unsuited) to 100 (extremely suited). Additionally, 
participants rated on 5-point scales how difficult the decision had been (1 = 'not at all difficult', 5 = 'very 
difficult') and how sure they were about having made a good decision (1 = 'not all sure', 5 = 'very sure'). 
Manipulations of accountability 
Participants who had not been made accountable before now received either internal or external 
accountability instructions as described above. The remaining half of participants did not receive any instructions 
at this point. 
pref: Preference of other committee members 
All participants were told that a stalemate had arisen between the other committee members. Two 
committee members were said to have voted for the candidate the participant had chosen, whereas the remaining 
two committee members allegedly had voted for a different candidate. This other candidate was randomly 
chosen from the remaining candidates, with the constraint that the number of particular pairs of candidates 
presented to participants was balanced as much as possible across conditions. Participants were also told that, 
because the decision proved difficult, the committee had decided to draw upon additional information and that 
before they were expected to make a final decision about which candidate they preferred, they were going to be 
given the opportunity to search additional information about the candidates.  
S2 Information search set 2 
Participants were presented with an information board whose upper half contained the information 
items of information set 1 and whose lower half the information items of set 2. Those information items of set 1 
that participants had looked at during their first search were permanently visible now, the others were not 
accessible anymore. Information items from set 2 could be searched like before. The preferred candidates were 
marked on the board. Appendix 2 shows the items of information set 2, in the way they were arranged in the 
lower half of the second information board. 
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D2: Final decision and suitability judgements 
When they felt ready, participants again indicated their chosen candidate and rated each candidate in 
terms of suitability for the job, like before. They also responded again to the questions about how difficult the 
decision had been and how sure they were about having made a good decision. 
JUST: Justification 
Participants had to justify their choice in writing. Participants in the ‘internal accountability’ conditions 
were only asked to write down the reasons for their choice. Participants in the ‘external accountability’ 
conditions were told that the other committee members wanted them to give the reasons for their choice and that 
they should therefore write them down for them. 
V2: Second elicitation of unidimensional values and weights 
The elicitation procedure of V1 was repeated. Participants rated the outcomes of and specified weights 
for the attributes of information set 1.  
PEQ: Post-experimental questionnaire  
Participants were asked how much they had expected to have to justify their decision, how strongly they 
had had the wish to make a good decision, and how strongly they had felt a need to be able to justify their 
decision to themselves and to the other committee members at the first as well as the final decision. Ratings were 
made on 5-point scales, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’. Additionally, participants had to rate the 
attributes of set 2 with regard how important they were for the decision, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
important) to 5 (very important) and they were asked to give similarity ratings for all 25 possible pairs 
comparing one attribute of set 1 with one attribute of set 2. Similarity ratings were given on scales ranging from 
1 (very dissimilar) to 5 (very similar).  
At the end of the experiment, participants were thanked for their participation, received their lottery 
ticket, and were asked not to talk about the experiment with other students.  
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Results 
First decision 
Information search 
The records of the first information search were used to derive the following 
measures: 
• Depth of search  
 Measures of depth of search included both the percentage of total number of items 
searched and the percentage of different cells searched. The former may exceed 100% if 
participants search cells repeatedly. 
• Variability of search across alternatives and attributes 
 Variability of search is defined as the standard deviation of the number of items 
searched across alternatives or across attributes. Variability of search across alternatives 
is 0, if the same number of items is searched for each alternative, and is > 0, if a different 
number of items are searched for each alternative. Variability of search across attributes 
indicates the extent to which different attributes receive different amounts of search. It is 
0, if the same number of alternatives is searched for each attribute, and is > 0, if a 
different number of alternatives are searched for each attribute. Although the two 
measures are obviously not completely independent of each other, they are not completely 
redundant either, as Klayman (1983) has pointed out. The two indices may be used to 
determine where a high variability of search comes from, that is, from not looking at all 
attributes or not looking at all alternatives.  
 Variability of search across alternatives, in particular, has been linked to the type of 
decision strategy employed. A low variability of search across alternatives is consistent 
with a compensatory strategy, where the decision maker trades off attributes against each 
other and therefore searches a similar number of attributes for each alternative. If 
variability of search across alternatives is high, on the other hand, the decision maker is 
assumed to have employed a non-compensatory strategy, where alternatives may be 
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excluded from further consideration once they are found not to meet certain criteria, and 
therefore the number of attributes searched for each alternative varies. A similar argument 
may be made for variability of search across attributes, with a high variability of search 
across attributes indicating that certain alternatives have been eliminated from the set of 
possible choices. 
 Variability of search across alternatives and across attributes was computed both for 
the total number of items searched and for the number of different cells searched. 
Variability of search for the total number of items searched takes repeated searches of the 
same cell into account.  
• Compensatory processing 
 Koele and Westenberg (1995) argue that, in addition to variability of search across 
alternatives, depth of search should be considered when trying to infer the kind of 
decision strategy used. If all attributes are relevant for making a decision, compensatory 
decision strategies require the processing of a large proportion of the available 
information (high depth of search) as well as the processing of a relatively constant 
proportion of information per alternative (low variability of search across alternatives). 
Following this line of reasoning, Koele and Westenberg’s index combines depth of search 
with variability of search across alternatives in a multiplicatory function to arrive at a 
measure of compensatory information processing. The index is defined as  
 
C N
N
TS
Max Max
= ⋅ −( )1 var
var
 (Eq. 6.1) 
NTS: total number of information items searched 
NMax:  maximum number of information items that can be searched  
var:  variability of search across alternatives 
varMax:  maximum variability of search across alternatives.  
 When there is an even number of alternatives, as it was the case here, and variability 
of search across alternatives is computed for the proportion of information searched per 
alternative, it can be shown that the maximum variability of search equals 0.5. Equation 
6.1 can then be written as 
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 The resulting values lie between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate more compensatory 
information processing. 
• Pattern of search 
 Pattern of search refers to the sequence in which information is searched. It can be 
either alternative-wise or attribute-wise. An alternative-wise search means that individuals 
search information within a particular alternative, that is, across different attributes, and 
then move on to do the same for the next alternative. It is usually associated with 
compensatory information processing, since it is consistent with trading off attributes 
within each alternative. An attribute-wise search is a search within attributes and across 
different alternatives. It is usually associated with non-compensatory information 
processing, since it is consistent with a strategy where alternatives are only considered 
further if their attribute outcomes fulfil certain criteria.  
 In order to determine the search pattern, the number of alternative-wise and attribute-
wise search transitions has to be established. This is done comparing the nth item of 
information searched with the nth + 1 item of information searched. An alternative-wise 
transition is observed, if the nth + 1 item of information searched is within the same 
alternative but a for a different attribute than the nth item. An attribute-wise transition is 
observed, on the other hand, if the nth + 1 item of information searched is within the same 
attribute but for a different alternative. Shifts occur if the nth + 1 item of information 
searched is neither for the same alternative nor the same attribute. They are, however, not 
considered in the search pattern index developed by Payne (1976). The Payne Index is 
defined as 
 
PI N N
N N
TAlt TAtt
TAlt TAtt
=
−
+
 (Eq. 6.3) 
NTAlt:  Number of alternative-wise transitions 
NTAtt:  Number of attribute-wise transitions 
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 A value of -1 indicates a strictly attribute-wise search, a value of +1 indicates a strictly 
alternative-wise search. As Stokmans (1991) points out, the expected value is only 0, if 
the information board matrix contains an equal number of alternatives and attributes. In 
the case of an information board with four alternatives and five attributes, as it was used 
here, it can be shown that the expected value is 0.05. This means that in order to check 
whether information search followed a pattern that differed significantly from a chance 
pattern, the empirically found Payne Index had to be tested against a value of 0.05. 
• Concentration of search  
 The concentration of search (CS) measure (Johnson, Meyer & Ghose, 1989) indicates 
the extent to which search is concentrated on the chosen alternative. It is defined as 
 
CS
N N
N
CAlt Alt
TS
=
⋅
−( ) 1 (Eq. 6.4) 
NCAlt: number of information items searched for the chosen alternative 
NAlt:  number of available alternatives 
NTS:  total number of information items searched 
 A value of 0 indicates that, on average, the same number of items was searched for all 
alternatives, that is, that there was no concentration of search on the chosen alternative. A 
value > 0 results if search was concentrated on the chosen alternative and a value < 0 
results if search was concentrated on the non-chosen alternatives. Concentration of search 
was calculated both for the total number of items searched and different cells searched. 
At the time of the first information search, two groups of participants had not received 
any accountability instructions yet. Since independent sample t-tests revealed no significant 
differences between them, they were pooled and constituted the ‘no accountability’ condition. 
Table 6.3 shows a summary of the results.  
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Table 6.3. Process measures for the first information search, as a function of type of 
accountability. 
  Type of Accountability  
  No1 Internal2 External2 F (2, 69), p 
1. Depth of search (in %)     
 total # of items  191 206 176 < 1, ns 
 different cells 91 93 90 < 1, ns 
2. Variability of search      
across alternatives     
 total # of items 2.10 2.01 1.56 < 1, ns 
 different cells 0.38 0.30 0.23 < 1, ns 
across attributes      
 total # of items 2.70 2.42 2.27 < 1, ns 
 different cells 0.40 0.33 0.42 < 1, ns 
3. Compensatory processing 0.79 0.84 0.83 < 1, ns 
4. Pattern of search (Payne Index) 0.20 0.08 0.08 < 1, ns 
5. Concentration of search     
 total # of items  0.11 -0.02 0.04 1.89, .159 
 different cells 0.09 0.03 0.08 < 1, ns 
1 n=36 
2 n=18 
 
1. Depth of search 
Information search was generally very extensive. The mean percentage of total 
number of information items searched across all conditions was 191%, that is, on average 
almost twice as many items were searched as there were different items available. The mean 
percentage of different cells searched (M = 91%) showed that, on average, almost all of the 
available items (namely 18.28 out of 20) were searched at least once. Participants obviously 
took the task seriously and carefully looked and looked again at information before making a 
decision.  
It had been expected that accountability, compared to no accountability, would lead to 
a more extensive information search. Independent sample t-tests comparing these two 
conditions were employed to test this hypothesis. Both for the percentage of total number of 
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items searched and different cells searched, no significant difference was revealed, the 
obtained values were virtually identical (total number of items searched: accountability: M = 
191%, no accountability: M = 191%, different cells searched: accountability: M = 92%, no 
accountability: M = 91%). 
In addition, univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were carried out in order to 
test the effect of type of accountability (no vs. internal vs. external) on the percentage of total 
number of items searched and different cells searched. No significant effects were obtained.  
2. Variability of search 
The overall mean variability of search across alternatives and attributes, calculated for 
search of different cells, was relatively low (M = 0.32 across alternatives, M = 0.39 across 
attributes). This was not surprising, given that 58% of the participants searched all cells and 
therefore received a value of 0 for both indices. A more informative measure of variability of 
search when information search is exhaustive, is variability of search computed for the total 
number of items searched, because it also takes into account repeated searches of the same 
cells. The overall mean variability of search across alternatives computed for the total number 
of items searched was relatively high (M = 1.94), and the overall mean variability of search 
across attributes even higher (M = 2.52). For a random search of an asymmetrical matrix with 
more attributes than alternatives, the opposite would be expected. This pattern of results 
shows that certain information items received more attention compared to others when the 
same information was searched more than once, and that attributes were attended to more 
unevenly than alternatives. 
It had been predicted that accountable participants would show a lower variability of 
search across alternatives and attributes than participants who had not been made accountable. 
The independent t-tests performed to test these hypotheses did not yield any significant 
effects, although the obtained differences were in the right direction (variability of search 
across alternatives: accountability: M = 1.78, no accountability: M = 2.10 for the total number 
of items searched, accountability: M = 0.26, no accountability: M = 0.38 for different cells 
searched; variability of search across attributes: accountability: M = 2.34, no accountability: 
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M = 2.70 for the total number of items searched, accountability: M = 0.37, no accountability: 
M = 0.40 for different cells searched). 
The one-factorial ANOVAs carried out to test the effect of type of accountability also 
showed no significant effects. 
3. Compensatory processing 
Consistent with the results for depth of search and variability of search across 
alternatives for different cells, the overall mean of Koele and Westenberg’s Index of 
Compensatory Processing, which combines these two measures, was high (M = 0.82), 
suggesting that information processing was highly compensatory.  
The predicted significant difference in the extent of compensatory processing between 
accountable and non-accountable participants was not found, although, as expected, 
information search tended to be more compensatory for accountable than for non-accountable 
participants (M = 0.84 vs. M = 0.79). 
There was also no significant main effect of type of accountability on the index of 
compensatory processing. 
4. Pattern of search (Payne Index) 
The mean Payne Index across all conditions was 0.14, suggesting that search was 
slightly more alternative-wise than attribute-wise, although the difference to the expected 
value of 0.05 for a balanced search was not significant (t(71) = 1.50, p = 0.138). 
It had been expected that accountable participants would be significantly less likely to 
show an alternative-wise search than non-accountable participants, suggesting that they had 
processed information in a compensatory manner. The observed difference between these two 
conditions pointed to such an effect, in that accountable participants tended to show a less 
alternative-wise search than non-accountable participants (M = 0.08 vs. M = 0.20); this effect 
was not significant, however. 
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The one-factorial ANOVA testing the effect of type of accountability on the pattern of 
search was also not significant. 
5. Concentration of search 
The fact that the overall amount of information searched for each alternative was quite 
similar, already suggested by the low variability of search across alternatives, was also 
indicated by the concentration of search measures. Mean concentration of search across all 
conditions was 0.06 for the total number of items searched and 0.07 for different cells 
searched. The fact that these values are positive shows that the chosen alternative received 
more attention than the non-chosen alternatives. The difference to 0, the value for a 
completely balanced search, was significant both for concentration of search for the total 
number of items searched and for different cells searched (total number of items searched: 
t(71) = 2.15, p = .035, two-sided, different cells searched: t(71) = 3.85, p = .000) 
In line with expectations, participants who had been made accountable tended to show 
a lower concentration of search for the total number of items searched than participants who 
had not been made accountable (M = 0.01 vs. M = 0.11, t(70) = 1.81, p = .075, two-sided). 
The difference for concentration of search for different cells searched was in the same 
direction, but not significant (M = 0.05 vs. M = 0.09).  
The one-factorial ANOVAs employed to test the effect of type of accountability on the 
concentration of search measures suggested a very weak tendency of such an effect on the 
concentration of search for the total number of items searched (F(2,69) = 1.89, p = .159). 
Post-hoc simple contrasts showed that participants who had not been made accountable 
tended to concentrate their search more on the chosen alternative than participants who had 
been made internally accountable (M = 0.11 vs. M = -0.02, p = .062). No significant effects 
were obtained in the analysis performed on the concentration of search for different cells 
searched. 
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6. Search content 
Given that one of the common effects of external accountability is to enforce salient 
norms, one may expect external accountability not only to have an effect on the decision 
process but also on the type of information searched. This may become evident as an 
increased attention to attributes which are considered to be particularly relevant for a 
justification in the given decision situation. 
In order to test this assumption, one-factorial ANOVAs testing the effect of type of 
accountability on the percentage of items searched for the individually most important, 
second-most important, etc. attribute (relative to the total number of items searched) were 
performed. They revealed a very weak, non-significant effect of type of accountability on the 
search for the individually most important attribute (F(2,69) = 1.66, p = .198). Post-hoc 
simple contrasts showed that participants who had not been made accountable tended to 
search a relatively higher percentage of information for the attribute they considered most 
important than participants who had been made internally accountable (M = 28% vs. M = 
24%, p = .09, two-sided). The difference between the 'external accountability' condition (M = 
28%) and the other conditions was not significant.  
In addition, in order to identify attributes that received different amounts of attention 
depending on the type of accountability participants experienced, one-factorial Analyses of 
Covariance (ANCOVAs) were performed on the percentage of items searched for each 
attribute (relative to the total number of items searched), holding the initial normalised weight 
for the particular attribute constant. These only revealed a marginally significant effect of type 
of accountability on the attribute ‘educational stay in a foreign country’ (F(2,68) = 2.83, p = 
.066). Post-hoc simple contrasts showed a significant difference between the ‘no 
accountability’ condition and the 'internal accountability' condition. Participants who had 
been made internally accountable searched a significantly higher percentage of items for 
‘educational stay in a foreign country’ than participants who had not been made accountable 
(adjusted means: M = 23% vs. M = 18%, p = .021). The difference to the 'external 
accountability' condition was not significant (adjusted means: M = 23% vs. M = 19%). The 
covariate had a significant effect (F(1,68) = 5.66, p = .020).  
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Summary of the results for the first information search 
Overall, the analysis of the processes observed when participants were making their 
first decision did not consistently support the predictions of the PMA. Although the effects of 
type of accountability on the various information search measures typically showed the 
expected pattern, namely a tendency for a deeper and less variable information search that 
was not concentrated on the eventually chosen alternative for participants who had been made 
accountable, compared to participants who had not been made accountable, these effects often 
failed to reach significance. This is likely to have been the consequence of a ceiling effect, 
induced by the demands of the task. Information search was generally exhaustive and 
therefore not very variable. Therefore, accountability could not lead to a more exhaustive 
search over and above the already exhaustive search induced by the task itself, especially not 
where the search of different cells was concerned. The ceiling effect could be the result of 
telling participants not only to choose one candidate but also to judge each candidate with 
respect to suitability for the job. Process tracing studies have shown that the required response 
mode can strongly influence information processing and that having to judge each alternative, 
compared to choosing one alternative, results in a deeper and more compensatory search 
(Billings & Scherer, 1988; Westenberg & Koele, 1992). 
It is interesting to note that, although in the ‘external accountability’ condition, depth 
of search with respect to the total number of items searched was lowest, this group also 
showed the least variable search across alternatives and across attributes, where the total 
number of items searched was concerned. Trying to prepare for a justification and discussion 
with other people may have resulted in a better memory for information, making repeated 
searches less necessary and thereby keeping the total number of information items searched 
comparatively low. This assumption is supported by the fact that the mean percentage of 
repeatedly searched information was lowest in the external accountability group (M = 38%, 
no accountability: M = 43%, internal accountability: M = 43%), although the difference to the 
other conditions was not significant. 
Pre-decisional external accountability, compared to no and internal accountability, 
also did not significantly enhance the attention to attributes that were considered most 
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important in the given decision situation. Instead, it was no accountability which resulted in 
the highest observed percentage of information searched for the most important attribute. 
Information evaluation and integration 
The following indicators of how participants evaluated and integrated the information 
presented to them were analysed:  
• Choices  
 Apart from testing whether the chosen alternative differed as a function of type of 
accountability, it was analysed whether there were any differences in the likelihood of a 
lexicographic choice between conditions, that is, a choice of the alternative with the best 
outcome on the most important attribute. 
• Ratings of alternatives  
 In addition to participants' suitability ratings for each alternative, the difference 
between their suitability rating for their chosen alternative and their mean rating for their 
non-chosen alternatives was analysed. This served as an indicator of the amount of 
differentiation at the first decision.  
• Actual vs. predicted ratings of alternatives 
 For each participant, the difference between the actual suitability rating for their 
chosen alternative and the MAUT predicted suitability rating for their chosen alternative 
was calculated. The same was done for the average non-chosen alternative. The latter 
value was then subtracted from the former, in order to arrive at a measure of the extent to 
which participants inflated the holistic evaluation of their chosen alternative more strongly 
than the holistic evaluation of their average non-chosen alternatives, indicating the extent 
to which they differentiated these alternatives from each other. The expected value of this 
measure is 0 if participants inflate the holistic evaluation of their chosen and average non-
chosen alternative to the same extent, is > 0 if participants inflate the holistic evaluation of 
their chosen alternative relatively more than the holistic evaluation of their average non-
chosen alternative, and is < 0 if they increase the holistic evaluation of their average non-
chosen alternative relatively more than the holistic evaluation of their chosen alternative. 
 The additive linear MAUT model specified in Chapter 1, Equation 6.1 was adapted to 
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allow for the case that participants did not search all available information in the 
following way:  
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∑   (Eq. 6.5) 
S(xij): search of the outcome of alternative i on attribute j, 0 = yes, 1 = no 
wj: weight for attribute j 
v(xij): unidimensional value of the outcome of alternative i on attribute j 
1. Choices  
Table 6.4 presents the frequency of choice for each alternative, depending on type of 
accountability. 
Table 6.4. Choice frequencies at the first decision (percentages in brackets). 
 Type of Accountability  
Alternative No Internal External Σ 
A 16 (44) 10 (55) 8 (44) 34 (47) 
B 4 (11) 3 (17) 1 (6) 8 (11) 
C 5 (14) 3 (17) 2 (11) 10 (14) 
D 11 (31) 2 (11) 7 (39) 20 (28) 
Σ 36 (100) 18 (100) 18 (100) 72 (100) 
 
A Chi-squared analysis performed on the overall choice frequencies revealed that 
some alternatives were chosen significantly more often than others ( χ 2 (3) = 23.56, p = .000). 
In particular, candidates A and D were clearly preferred to candidates B and C. Candidate A 
was chosen by 47% of the participants (34/72), candidate B by 11% of the participants (8/72), 
candidate C by 14% of the participants (10/72) and candidate D by 28% of the participants 
(20/72). Since the alternatives had been constructed in such a way that their overall 
attractiveness should have been similar if participants had applied a compensatory decision 
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rule, a non-compensatory decision rule seems to have been used by many participants. 
Consistent with this assumption, the two most popular candidates A and D were the 
alternatives with the best outcomes on the two attributes generally considered most important 
(number of placements in the area of Organisational Psychology, mean normalised weight    
M = 0.28, and job as a student research assistant, mean normalised weight M = 0.24). 
It had been expected that participants who had been made externally accountable 
would be more likely to choose the alternative with the best outcome on what they considered 
to be the most important attribute, compared to internally accountable participants or 
participants who had not been made accountable. The frequency of lexicographic choices in 
each ‘type of accountability’ condition is shown in Table 6.5. As can be seen from this table, 
participants in the 'external accountability' condition were no more likely to make a 
lexicographic choice than participants in the other two conditions. Indeed, both a Chi-squared 
analysis comparing the three experimental conditions to each other and a Chi-squared analysis 
testing the 'external accountability' condition against a pooled condition of 'no accountability' 
and 'internal accountability' did not show any significant effects. If anything, the frequency of 
lexicographic choice was higher in the 'internal' compared to the 'external accountability' 
condition (M = 67% vs. M = 56%). 
Table 6.5. Lexicographic choice frequencies at the first decision (percentages in brackets).   
Type of Accountability   Lexicographic 
Choice No Internal External Σ 
No 15 (42) 6 (33) 8 (44) 29 (40) 
Yes 21 (58) 12 (67) 10 (56) 43 (60) 
Σ 36 (100) 18 (100) 18 (100) 72 (100) 
 
2. Ratings of alternatives  
The observed mean ratings of the suitability of each alternative reflected participants’ 
choices. The highest overall mean rating was observed for candidate A (M = 78.72), followed 
by candidate D (M = 72.17), candidate C (M = 61.28) and candidate B (M = 60.97).  
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One-factorial ANOVAs testing the effect of type of accountability that were 
performed on the mean suitability ratings for each alternative, showed a significant effect on 
the rating of candidate D (F(2,67) = 4.88, p = .010). A simple post-hoc Bonferroni contrast 
indicated a significant difference between the ‘no accountability’ and the ‘internal 
accountability’ condition. Participants in the ‘no accountability’ condition rated candidate D 
as significantly more suitable than participants in the ‘internal accountability’ condition (M = 
76.94 vs. M = 60.28, p = .003). This effect may partly be explained by different initial 
preferences. When the MAUT predicted overall evaluation of candidate D (based on the 
unidimensional values and weights elicited before the experimental manipulations) was 
introduced as a covariate, the effect of type of accountability was diminished (F(2,68) = 2.87, 
p = .064), but still marginally significant. 
The overall mean rating for the chosen alternative was 89.44, the overall mean rating 
for the average non-chosen alternative was 62.62. As expected, the mean difference between 
these two ratings (M = 13.69) was highly significant (t(71) = 16.33, p = .000).  
It had been expected that externally accountable participants would show a larger 
judgmental difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than both 
internally accountable participants and participants who had not been made accountable. 
Figure 6.1 shows the obtained means in each condition. A one-factorial ANOVA testing the 
effect of type of accountability did not reveal any significant effect. Rather than being the 
highest, the mean obtained for the 'external accountability' condition was the lowest, 
suggesting that external accountability tended to result in a decreased rather than increased 
differentiation.  
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Figure 6.1. Mean difference in overall suitability between the chosen and the average non-
chosen alternative after the first decision, as a function of type of accountability.  
3. Actual vs. predicted ratings of alternatives 
The overall difference between participants' actual and predicted rating for their 
chosen alternative and the actual and predicted rating for their average non-chosen alternative, 
which was calculated using the adapted MAUT model specified in Equation 6.5 above, was 
13.56. This positive difference suggests that, overall, participants inflated the actual rating of 
the overall quality of their chosen alternative more strongly than their rating of the overall 
quality of their average non-chosen alternative.  
It had been expected that for participants in the 'external accountability' condition, the 
obtained mean difference would be higher than for participants in the 'internal accountability' 
condition and the 'no accountability' condition. The results are presented in Figure 6.2. 
Contrary to expectations, the 'type of accountability' effect in the one-factorial ANOVA 
testing this assumption did not reach standard significance levels (F(2,69) = 2.07, p = .134). 
Also, the difference obtained in the 'external accountability' condition was the lowest. A 
planned contrast testing the 'external accountability' condition against the pooled other two 
conditions was marginally significant (t(69) = 1.69, p =.096, two-sided). This lends further 
support to the idea that participants in the 'external accountability' condition kept the 
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evaluative difference between their chosen alternative and their average non-chosen 
alternative smaller than participants in the 'internal accountability' condition and the 'no 
accountability' condition. 
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Figure 6.2. Mean difference between the actually observed and the MAUT predicted rating 
of overall suitability for the chosen vs. the average non-chosen alternative after 
the first decision, as a function of type of accountability. 
Summary of the results for information evaluation and integration at the first 
decision 
The expected effects of different types of accountability on the degree of bias in 
information and integration were not observed. It had been expected that externally 
accountable participants would show a stronger differentiation of their chosen alternative 
from their average non-chosen alternative and would be more likely make a lexicographic 
choice than internally accountable participants or participants who had not been made 
accountable. However, it was internally accountable participants who chose the alternative 
with the best outcome on the most important attribute most often, and evaluated information 
in such a way that the difference between their chosen alternative and average non-chosen 
alternative was greatest, while the tendency for externally accountable participants to show 
this behaviour was smallest. Even though the effects of type of accountability were not 
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significant for any of these measures, the consistency in the data suggests that it was indeed 
internal accountability that resulted in the relatively strongest bias. A more detailed discussion 
of the possible reasons for why this may have been the case will follow at the end of this 
chapter. 
Final decision 
Information search 
The same measures as for the first information search were analysed. The results are 
shown in Table 6.6. In addition, since the attributes contained in information set 2 were 
largely redundant to those in information set 1, it was possible to test whether information 
search was selective to support the chosen alternative and, thereby, to consolidate the existing 
preference. If information search was biased in this way, it would be expected that for their 
chosen alternative, participants would search more information items for which they could 
anticipate a positive outcome than items for which they could anticipate a negative outcome. 
For their non-chosen alternatives, the opposite should be true. This selective information 
search should occur especially for information about important attributes, since important 
attributes would allow to discriminate between alternatives most effectively. A measure for 
biased search was developed that takes into account both the expected value of searched 
information and its importance, by comparing the mean product of unidimensional values and 
their corresponding weights for the information items searched for a particular alternative to 
the mean product that would be expected if information search was completely balanced. The 
biased search index (BSI) for an alternative Ai is defined as  
 
 BSI A
FS x w v x FS x
w v x m
i
ij pj p ij ij
jj
pj p ij
j
( )
( ) ( ) / ( )
( ( )) /
=
⋅ ⋅
⋅
∑∑
∑  (Eq. 6.6) 
FS(xij):  frequency of search of the outcome of alternative i on attribute j,  
  i = 1, n; j = 1, m  
wpj: weight for the parallel attribute of attribute j 
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vp(xij): unidimensional value of the outcome of alternative i on the parallel  
  attribute of attribute j 
Σ wpj·v(xij): MAUT prediction for the overall evaluation of alternative i,  
  based on the attributes of information set1 
m:  number of attributes (=5)  
For an unbiased information search, a value of 1 is expected. A value > 1 indicates that 
information search was biased to support the searched alternative and a value < 1 indicates 
that it was biased to devalue the searched alternative. An overall measure of confirmation bias 
for the chosen alternative compared to either the competing alternative (the other stalemate 
alternative) or the non-chosen alternatives can be computed by dividing the BSI for the 
chosen alternative by the BSI for the competing alternative or the BSI for the average non-
chosen alternative. A value > 1 is expected if there is a bias to support the chosen alternative 
over the competing or average non-chosen alternative, a value of < 1 if there is a bias to 
support the competing or average non-chosen alternative over the chosen alternative. 
1. Depth of search 
 Information search was again quite extensive, but significantly less so than the first 
search (total number of information items searched: M = 109% vs. M = 191%, t(71) = 6.96, p 
= .000, different cells searched: M = 75% vs. M = 91%, t(71) = 5.83, p = .000). This may be 
explained by a tendency to concentrate the final information search mainly on the two 
alternatives between which a stalemate was said to have arisen.  
In order to test this assumption, the percentage of information searched for these two 
alternatives was calculated, both for the total number of item searched and different cells 
searched. The overall means obtained were 69% and 68%, respectively. The fact that these 
values differed significantly from 50%, the expected value for a balanced search of all 
alternatives (total number of items searched: t(71) = 7.55, p = .000, different cells searched: 
t(71) = 7.04, p = .000), supported the hypothesis that information search was concentrated on 
the two stalemate alternatives. 
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Table 6.6. Process measures for the final information search. 
 Time of Accountability  
 Before First 
Decision 
Before Final 
Decision Significance of Effects 
Type of Accountability Internal External Internal External Type Time Type x Time 
1. Depth of search  
    (in %) 
       
          total # of items 141 95 89 112   (*) 
          different cells 83 73 67 78   (*) 
2. Variability of search         
across alternatives        
          total # of items 1.75 1.53 2.10 2.15  (*)  
          different cells 0.59 0.96 1.47 0.96  (*) (*) 
across attributes        
          total # of items 0.95 1.31 0.89 1.02    
          different cells 0.28 0.64 0.23 0.29 (*) (*)  
3. Compensatory 
    processing 0.70 0.51 0.37 0.56   (*) 
4. Pattern of search 
    (Payne Index) -0.41 -0.45 -0.32 -0.21 
   
5. Concentration  
    of search 
       
          total # of items 0.16 0.32 0.65 0.37  (*) (*) 
          different cells 0.18 0.34 0.60 0.33  * * 
6. Confirmation bias  
  (BSI) 
       
 chosen alternative 0.94 1.06 0.98 1.08 *   
 competing alternative 1.06 0.97 0.93 1.01   (*) 
 aver. non-chosen alt. 1.01 0.94 0.98 1.05   * 
 chosen/competing alt. 0.92 1.12 1.03 1.06 *   
 chosen/av. non-chosen 1.10 1.37 1.20 1.21    
Note: (*) p ≤ .10 
         *   p ≤ .05 
 
It had been expected that accountability before the final decision would result in a 
deeper final search than accountability before the first decision, yielding a main effect of time 
of accountability. In order to test the effects of type of accountability and time of 
accountability on depth of search, 2 (internal vs. external accountability) by 2 (accountability 
before the first decision vs. accountability before the final decision) ANOVAs were 
performed. The expected main effect of time of accountability could neither be observed for 
the percentage of total number of items searched nor for the percentage of different cells 
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searched. However, a marginally significant interaction was found between type of 
accountability and time of accountability for both measures (total number of items searched: 
F(1,68) = 3.88, p = .053, different cells searched: F(1,68) = 3.32, p = .073). Simple main 
effects analyses suggested that there was only a significant 'time of accountability' effect for 
participants who had been made internally accountable (total number of items searched: 
F(1,68) = 4.42, p = .039, different cells searched: F(1,68) = 3.77, p = .056). This effect was 
not in line with expectations, however. Internal accountability resulted in a significantly 
higher percentage of information searched, when it had already been introduced before the 
first decision than when it had been introduced before the final decision (total number of 
items searched: M = 141% vs. M = 89%, different cells searched: M = 83% vs. M = 67%). 
For external accountability, the opposite trend could be observed, but was not significant 
(total number of items searched: M = 95% vs. M = 112%, different cells searched: M = 73% 
vs. M = 78%).  
Figure 6.3 shows the percentage of total number of items searched, as a function of 
type and time of accountability.  
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Figure 6.3. Mean percentage of items searched during the final information search (based on 
the total number of items searched), as a function of type of accountability and 
time of accountability.  
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Two-factorial ANOVAs were also performed on the percentage of information 
searched for the two stalemate alternatives only. The analyses yielded a marginally significant 
main effect of time of accountability for both the total number of items searched and different 
cells searched (total number of items searched: F(1,68) = 3.78, p = .056, different cells 
searched: F(1,68) = 2.74, p = .100). As expected, participants with accountability introduced 
before the final decision tended to pay more attention to the two stalemate alternatives than 
participants with accountability introduced before the first decision (total number of items 
searched: M = 74% vs. M = 64%, different cells searched: M = 72% vs. M = 64%). Simple 
main effects analyses suggested, however, that both for the total number of items searched 
and different cells searched, the significant effect of time of accountability was confined to 
the 'internal accountability' conditions (total number of items searched: F (1,68) = 5.56, p = 
.021, different cells searched: F (1,68) = 5.87, p = .018). Participants who had been made 
internally accountable before the final decision searched a higher percentage of information 
for the stalemate alternatives than participants who had been made internally accountable 
before the first decision (total number of items searched: M = 78% vs. M = 61%, different 
cells searched: M = 78% vs. M = 61%). For externally accountable participants, there was no 
significant difference (total number of items searched: M = 70% vs. M = 67%, different cells 
searched: M = 67% vs. M = 67%). This pattern of data suggests that under external 
accountability, more alternatives were considered, no matter whether accountability had been 
introduced before the first or before the final decision. 
2. Variability of search 
The overall mean variability of search across alternatives did not change significantly 
from the first to the final search where variability across alternatives for the total number of 
items searched was concerned (M = 1.94 vs. M = 1.88, t(71) = 0.30, ns), but was significantly 
larger during the final information search for different cells searched (M = 0.32 vs. M = 1.00, 
t(71) = 5.22, p = .000). For the overall mean variability of search across attributes, the 
opposite was true; there was no significant difference between the first and the final search for 
different cells searched (M = 0.39 vs. M = 0.36, t(71) = 5.22, ns), but variability of search 
across attributes calculated for the total number of items searched was significantly smaller 
for the final compared to the first information search (M = 2.52 vs. M = 1.04, t(71) = 5.97, p 
Results 
 151 
= .000). Unlike for the first search, for the final search variability of search across alternatives 
was higher than variability across attributes (total number of items searched: M = 1.88 vs. M = 
1.04, t(71) = 5.41, p = .000, different cells searched: M = 1.00 vs. M = 0.36, t(71) = 4.85, p = 
.000). This pattern of results is again consistent with a search behaviour that concentrates on 
only a subset of the available alternatives, for which information is searched on a similar 
number of attributes.  
It had been expected that variability of search across alternatives and attributes would 
be smaller for participants who had been made accountable before the final compared to the 
first decision. Two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of type of accountability and time of 
accountability on the variability of search measures revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of time of accountability for variability of search across alternatives. However, contrary 
to predictions, participants who had been made accountable before the final decision showed 
a higher variability of search across alternatives than participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision (total number of items searched: M = 2.12 vs. M = 1.64, 
F(1,68) = 3.69, p = .059), different cells searched: M = 1.22 vs. M = 0.77, F(1,68) = 3.72, p = 
.058). For variability across alternatives for different cells searched, this main effect was 
qualified by a marginally significant interaction between type of accountability and time of 
accountability (F(1,68) = 3.71, p = .058). Simple main effects analyses indicated that the 'time 
of accountability' effect was only significant for internally accountable participants (F(1,68) = 
7.43, p = .008). They showed a significantly lower variability of search across alternatives 
when accountability had already been introduced before the first decision, compared to when 
accountability had been introduced before the final decision (M = 0.59 vs. M = 1.47). For 
externally accountable participants, there was no difference (M = 0.96 vs. M = 0.96). This 
was consistent with the results observed for depth of search, but, again, contradicted the 
original predictions. This pattern of results would be expected, however, if participants who 
had been made accountable immediately prior to the final information search mainly focused 
on the two stalemate alternatives, as this would have created a high variability of search 
across alternatives which, in turn, would have prevented the expected main effect of time of 
accountability from occurring. 
For variability of search across attributes for different cells searched, marginally 
significant main effects of type of accountability (F(1,68) = 3.40, p = .070) and of time of 
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accountability (F(1,68) = 3.14, p = .081) were observed. Participants who had been made 
internally accountable tended to show a lower variability of search across attributes than 
participants who had been made externally accountable (M = 0.26 vs. M = 0.46), and 
participants with accountability introduced before the first decision tended to show a higher 
variability of search across attributes than participants with accountability introduced before 
the final decision (M = 0.46 vs. M = 0.26). The latter result was consistent with predictions. 
Although the interaction between the two factors did not reach standard significance levels 
(F(1,68) = 1.86, p = .178), simple main effects analyses showed that there was a significant 
effect of time of accountability for participants who had been made externally accountable 
only (F(1,68) = 4.91, p = .030). These participants showed a lower variability of search when 
they had been made accountable before the final decision than when they had been made 
accountable before the first decision (M = 0.29 vs. M = 0.64). For participants in the 'internal 
accountability' conditions, the difference was not significant (M = 0.23 vs. M = 0.28). For 
variability of search across attributes for the total number of items searched, no significant 
effects were obtained. 
The results for variability of search across attributes for different cells searched were 
consistent with predictions and supported one of the earlier conclusions, based on the results 
observed for depth of search for the two stalemate alternatives; external accountability in 
particular seemed to have had the effect of making participants consider more alternatives.  
3. Compensatory processing 
The overall mean value for the Index of Compensatory Processing suggested that, in 
general, information processing was less compensatory for the final than for the first search 
(M = 0.82 vs. M = 0.54, t(71) = 5.67, p = .000). This may again be attributed to the fact that 
participants' attention was focused on their chosen and the competing stalemate alternative. 
Consistent with the results for depth of search and variability of search across 
alternatives for different cells searched, the two-factorial ANOVA carried out on the index of 
compensatory processing yielded a marginally significant interaction between type of 
accountability and time of accountability (F(1,68) = 3.88, p = .053). Simple main effects 
analyses indicated that the effect of time of accountability was only significant for internally 
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accountable participants (F(1,68) = 6.05, p = .016). Their information processing was 
significantly more compensatory when accountability had been introduced before the first 
decision than when it had been introduced before the final decision (M = 0.70 vs. M = 0.37). 
For external accountability, there was no significant difference (M = 0.51 vs. M = 0.56). 
Again, this pattern of results would be expected if participants who had been made internally 
accountable before the final decision concentrated their search on the two stalemate 
alternatives.  
4. Pattern of search (Payne Index) 
The Payne Index suggested that the final information search was generally more non-
compensatory than the first search, given that it was significantly more attribute-wise than the 
first search (M = -0.35 vs. M = 0.14, t (71) = 6.69, p = .000). This time the difference to 0.05, 
the expected value for a balanced search, was significant (t(71) = 5.82, p = .000).  
It had been expected that participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision would show a less attribute-wise search than participants who had already been made 
accountable before the first decision. Although the observed means followed this direction (M 
= -0.26 vs. M = -0.43), the main effect of time of accountability in the two-factorial ANOVA 
carried out on the data was not significant. The main effect of type of accountability and the 
interaction between time of accountability and type of accountability were also not 
significant.  
5. Concentration of search 
The concentration of search on the chosen alternative was higher during the final than 
during the first search (total number of information items searched: M = 0.38 vs. M = 0.06, 
t(71) = 5.22, p = .000, different cells searched: M = 0.36 vs. M = 0.07, t(71) = 5.22, p = .000). 
This finding was once more consistent with the assumption that only a subset of alternatives 
that included the chosen alternative had been searched. This is, because the concentration of 
search measure relates the number of searched items that would be expected if all alternatives 
were searched to the same extent as the chosen alternative to the actual number of items 
searched. If only some of the available alternatives are searched, a high value is obtained. 
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It had been expected that concentration of search would be lower for participants who 
had been made accountable before the final decision than for participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision, indicated by a significant main effect of time of 
accountability. For concentration of search for the total number of items searched, the 
predicted main effect of time of accountability was found (F(1,68) = 6.04, p = .017). 
However, unlike expected, participants with accountability introduced before the final 
decision showed a significantly higher concentration of search than participants with 
accountability introduced before the first decision (M = 0.51 vs. M = 0.24). No significant 
main effect emerged for the 'type of accountability' factor. There was, however, a marginally 
significant interaction between type of accountability and time of accountability (F(1,68) = 
3.84, p = .054). Simple main effect analyses showed that the effect of time of accountability 
was only significant in the 'internal accountability' conditions (F(1,68) = 9.76, p = .003). 
Internally accountable participants showed a significantly higher concentration of search on 
the chosen alternative for the total number of items searched when they had been made 
accountable before the final compared to the first decision (M = 0.65 vs. M = 0.16), whereas 
for externally accountable participants this difference was not significant (M = 0.37 vs. M = 
0.32).  
The results for concentration of search for different cells mirrored those for the total 
number of items searched; there was a significant main effect for time of accountability 
(F(1,68) = 4.62, p = .035) such that participants with accountability introduced before the 
final decision showed a significantly higher concentration of search on the chosen alternative 
than participants with accountability introduced before the first decision (M = 0.47 vs. M = 
0.26), and a significant interaction between type of accountability and time of accountability 
(F (1,68) = 4.71, p = .033). Simple main effect analyses showed that time of accountability 
only had a significant effect on internally accountable participants (F(1,68) = 9.33, p = .003). 
Concentration of search for different cells was significantly higher when internal 
accountability had been introduced before the final compared to when it had been introduced 
before the first decision (M = 0.60 vs. M = 0.18). There was no significant difference for 
externally accountable participants (M = 0.33 vs. M = 0.34). A marginally significant 
difference was found between internally and externally accountable participants when 
accountability had been introduced before the final decision (M = 0.60 vs. M = 0.33, F(1,68) 
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= 3.71, p = .058), but not when it had been introduced before the first decision (M = 0.18 vs. 
M = 0.34). 
6. Search content 
Like for the first search, it was checked whether the accountability manipulations had 
affected the attention to particular attributes. For this purpose, two-factorial ANOVAs were 
performed on the percentage of items searched for the individually most important, second-
most important, etc., attribute in information set 2 (related to the total number of items 
searched). They revealed a marginally significant effect of type of accountability for the 
individually least important attribute (F(1,68) = 3.04, p = .086). Externally accountable 
participants showed a tendency to search a lower percentage of items for the attribute they 
considered least important than internally accountable participants (M = 16% vs. M = 19%). 
These results are consistent with the assumption that external accountability makes people 
focus more on what they assume to be the important aspects in a given decision situation, at 
the cost of less important aspects.  
In order to identify attributes that had received different amounts of attention from 
participants in the different experimental conditions, two-factorial ANCOVAs, testing the 
effects of type of accountability and time of accountability, were performed on the percentage 
of information searched for each attribute, holding the normalised weight for the analysed 
attribute constant. These did not reveal any significant effects. 
When the percentage of different cells instead of the total number of items searched 
was examined for each attribute, a marginally significant effect of type of accountability was 
found for the attribute ‘student representative on university committees’ (F(1,67) = 3.09, p = 
.084). Participants experiencing internal accountability tended to search a higher percentage 
of cells for this attribute than participants with external accountability (M = 20% vs. M = 
17%). The covariate also had a significant effect (F(1,67) = 6.46, p = .013).  
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7. Confirmation bias 
Contrary to expectations, the final information search was not generally biased to 
support the chosen alternative or devalue the competing or the average non-chosen 
alternative. One-sample t-tests, testing the observed overall means of the Biased Search Index 
(BSI) for the chosen alternative (M = 1.01, t(71) = 0.57, ns), the competing alternative (M = 
0.99, t(71) = -0.39, ns) and the average non-chosen alternative (M = 1.00, t(71) = -0.23, ns ) 
against a value of 1, which would be expected if information search was unbiased, revealed 
no significant effects.  
The mean ratio of the BSI for the chosen alternative to the BSI for the average non-
chosen alternative (M = 1.22), however, was significantly different from 1 (t(71) = 4.54, p = 
.000), suggesting that information search was biased to support the chosen alternative over the 
average non-chosen alternative. The mean ratio of the BSI for the chosen alternative to the 
BSI for the direct competitor (M = 1.03), on the other hand, was not significantly different 
from 1. This may be explained by the fact that the final information search seemed to have 
been strongly focused on the two stalemate alternatives. If those two alternatives had been 
searched equally, a ratio near 1 would have been obtained, indicating an unbiased search. 
In order to test the effect of type of accountability and time of accountability on the 
tendency to exhibit a confirmation bias, two-factorial ANOVAs were performed on the biased 
search index (BSI) for the chosen alternative, the competing alternative and the average non-
chosen alternative. It had been expected that the information search of participants who had 
been made accountable before the final decision would be more biased to support the chosen 
and to devalue the competing or average non-chosen alternative than that of participants who 
had been made accountable before the first decision. For the chosen alternative, the expected 
significant effect of time of accountability was not found, but the main effect of type of 
accountability was significant. For externally accountable participants, a significantly higher 
mean value was observed than for internally accountable participants (M = 1.07 vs. M = 0.96, 
F(1,68) = 5.03, p = .028). One-sample t-tests testing the observed means against a value of 1 
showed that the BSI for externally accountable participants was significantly greater than 1, 
indicating that their information search was biased to support the chosen alternative (t(35) = 
1.68, p = .050, one-sided). For internally accountable participants, a marginally significant 
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difference was observed, indicating a tendency of their information search to be biased to 
devalue the chosen alternative (t(35) = -1.58, p = .061, one-sided). These findings are 
illustrated in Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.4. Mean Biased Search Index for the chosen alternative (a value >1 indicates a bias 
to support the chosen alternative, a value <1 indicates a bias to devalue the 
chosen alternative). 
The ANOVA analysis for the competing alternative revealed a marginally significant 
interaction between time and type of accountability (F (1,68) = 3.63, p = .061). Simple main 
effects analyses suggested that the effect of time of accountability was only significant for 
participants in the ‘internal accountability' conditions (F(1,68) = 4.25, p = .043). Internal 
accountability before the final decision resulted in a significantly stronger bias to devalue the 
competing alternative than internal accountability before the first decision (M = 0.93 vs. M = 
1.06). This was consistent with expectations. For external accountability, the opposite pattern, 
although not significant, could be observed (M = 1.01 vs. M = 0.97). For the average non-
chosen alternative there was also a significant interaction effect between time of 
accountability and type of accountability (F(1,68) = 4.11, p = .047). This time, however, 
simple main effects analyses suggested that the effect of time of accountability was only 
significant for externally accountable participants (F(1,68) = 5.20, p = .026). Participants who 
had been made externally accountable before the first decision showed a significantly stronger 
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bias to devalue the average non-chosen alternative than participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision (M = 0.94 vs. M = 1.05, see Figure 6.5).  
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Figure 6.5. Mean Biased Search Index for the average non-chosen alternative (a value >1 
indicates a bias to support the average non-chosen alternative, a value <1 
indicates a bias to devalue the average non-chosen alternative). 
The ANOVA performed on the ratio of the BSI for the chosen to the BSI for the 
competing alternative yielded a significant effect of type of accountability (F (1,68) = 4.68, p 
= .034). The information search of externally accountable participants showed a stronger 
overall bias to support the chosen compared to the competing alternative than the information 
search of internally accountable participants (M = 1.09 vs. M = 0.97). The analysis on the 
ratio of the BSI for the chosen to the BSI for the average non-chosen alternative did not yield 
any significant effects. 
The above results were obtained for the whole sample of participants. It may be 
argued that the confirmation bias can be expected to be stronger in participants who did not 
change their initial choice when making their final decision. Analyses that only included data 
from participants who kept their previously chosen alternative supported this assumption. The 
overall pattern of results remained unchanged, however. The only difference observed was 
that the marginally significant interaction between type of accountability and time of 
accountability in the analysis of the BSI for the competing alternative became significant. 
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Summary of the results for the final information search 
Generally, the results for the measures of information search observed during the final 
decision were not consistent with the predictions at the outset. In cases where the expected 
pattern was found, a large individual response variability meant that the effects often failed to 
reach statistical significance. It may also be argued, however, that particular features of the 
task meant that the hypothesised effects were not observed.  
For example, it had been expected that the information search of participants who had 
been made accountable immediately prior to the final decision would be deeper, less variable 
and more compensatory than that of participants who had already been made accountable 
before the first decision. This effect was not generally observed, except in the variability of 
search across attributes for different cells searched, where participants who had been made 
accountable before the final decision showed the expected smaller variability of search across 
attributes, suggesting that their information processing was indeed more compensatory 
compared to that of participants who had been made accountable before the first decision. 
Other measures, however, for example, the variability of search across alternatives and the 
concentration of search on the chosen alternative, seemed to contradict this finding and 
seemed to indicate that the information search of participants who had only been made 
accountable before the final decision was less compensatory compared to that of participants 
who had been made accountable before the first decision. Also, significant interaction effects 
between time of accountability and type of accountability on these measures suggested that 
this was particularly the case for participants who had been made internally accountable 
before the final decision. The apparent contradiction in results can be resolved when one 
considers that, before their final information search, participants were told that a stalemate 
had arisen between two job candidates. One may therefore assume that participants 
particularly concentrated their search on these two candidates. This assumption was supported 
by the fact that the final information search was generally less extensive than the first and that 
about 70% of the searched information was for the two stalemate alternatives (69% for total 
number of items searched and 68% for different cells searched). Also, participants who had 
been made accountable before the final decision tended to focus more on the two stalemate 
alternatives than participants made accountable before the first decision, especially when they 
were internally accountable. This concentration on the stalemate alternatives would have 
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made information search less extensive and more variable, especially where variability of 
search across alternatives was concerned. The pattern of results for the final information 
search may therefore be explained by a tendency of participants who had been made 
accountable immediately prior to this search to concentrate on the two stalemate alternatives. 
This is consistent with the PMA model, in that accountability intensified information search 
for the alternatives that had been brought to the special attention of participants. A reason for 
the fact that this effect was stronger in the 'internal accountability' compared to the 'external 
accountability' condition may be that externally accountable participants anticipated a 
justification of their decision to their fellow committee members and therefore may have also 
looked for comparison information about other alternatives, in order to be well-prepared for a 
discussion.  
Analyses of the content of the searched information indicated that externally 
accountable participants showed a tendency to search a lower percentage of items for the 
attribute they individually found least important than internally accountable participants. 
Also, externally accountable participants tended to search information about the ‘student 
representative on university committees’ attribute less frequently than participants with 
internal accountability. This attribute had received the lowest mean importance rating of all 
attributes in information set 2 (M = 0.16). Both findings are consistent with the prediction that 
external accountability will make external norms salient and will focus the individual's 
attention on what they perceive to be important in the situation, to the detriment of less 
important attributes. Also, the 'student representative' attribute may have been tempting for 
student participants to take into account, as it was the attribute that told most about a 
candidate’s interest in and commitment to students’ issues, but may not have been perceived 
as relevant to the professors and junior lecturers who were also said to be part of the selection 
committee. The PMA predicts that, as this external norm should be particularly salient to 
externally accountable participants, they should not consider this type of information as 
strongly as internally accountable participants. This is what was observed. 
The PMA had also predicted that participants' final information search would show 
signs of a confirmation bias, in that participants would predominantly search information that 
they could expect to support their previous choice. While the Biased Search Index (BSI) that 
was calculated to measure this tendency did not suggest a significantly biased information 
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search for the chosen alternative overall, the tendency to search more information that 
supported rather than did not support the chosen alternative was significant in externally 
accountable participants’ information search, and significantly stronger for externally than 
internally accountable participants. The expected main effect of time of accountability was 
not obtained. This was also true for the ratio of the BSI for the chosen to the competing 
alternative which indicates the extent to which participants searched more supporting 
information for their chosen compared to their competing alternative. The significant main 
effects of type of accountability may be explained by assuming that for externally accountable 
participants, the conflict between their own choice and that favoured by some other members 
of the committee was more salient, as they anticipated having to publicly justify their choice 
later on and therefore may have felt a need to bolster their chosen alternative more than 
internally accountable participants, while at the same time also looking for the advantages of 
the other alternatives. Indeed, the analysis of the BSI for the average non-chosen alternative 
suggested that participants who had been made externally accountable before the final 
decision showed a significantly less strong bias to search information that devalued the 
average non-chosen alternative than participants who had been made externally accountable 
before the first decision. Participants who had been made internally accountable before the 
final decision were found to search significantly more information that devalued the 
competing alternative compared to participants who had been made internally accountable 
already before the first decision. 
Information evaluation and integration 
The following main types of dependent variables were analysed:  
• Choices  
 Changes of preferences as a function of time of accountability and type of 
accountability were analysed.  
• Attribute weights 
 For each participant, the difference between the normalised weights obtained for each 
attribute in information set 1 after the final and before the first decision was calculated, in 
order to test whether importance differentiation had occurred. For this to be the case, the 
weights of important attributes on which the chosen alternative was likely to have a 
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positive outcome would have to be increased, and the weights of less important attributes 
on which the chosen alternative was likely to have a negative outcome would have to be 
decreased, resulting in a positive difference for important attributes and a negative 
difference for less important attributes. 
• Ratings of alternatives  
 Apart from the difference between participants' suitability rating for their chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative, the difference between participants' suitability ratings for 
their chosen alternative and the competing alternative (the other stalemate alternative) was 
analysed. Also, the change in these measures from the first to the second elicitation was 
analysed.  
• MAUT predictions 
 MAUT predictions of the overall evaluation of alternatives were used to test further 
hypotheses regarding differentiation and consolidation processes. Since MAUT 
predictions take into account both the importance of attributes and the evaluation of 
attribute outcomes, they allow to assess the joint effects of importance differentiation and 
attractiveness differentiation. It is assumed that both differentiation processes are 
synchronised, because, in order to enhance the overall evaluation of one’s chosen 
alternative compared to the competing alternative or, more generally, the average non-
chosen alternative, it is most effective to change one’s perception of the attractiveness of 
outcomes for attributes with a high compared to a low importance. MAUT predictions 
were calculated using the adapted additive linear model specified in Equation 6.5. Only 
the attributes of information set 1 were considered, since only for them unidimensional 
values and weights had been elicited before the first and after the final decision.  
 The dependent variables analysed were the difference between the MAUT predicted 
overall evaluation of the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative and the difference 
between the MAUT predicted overall evaluation of the chosen and the competing 
alternative as well as the change in these two difference values from the first to the second 
elicitation. The first two values are indicators of the amount of consolidation that has 
taken place, the latter two represent the sum of both differentiation and consolidation 
effects.  
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1. Choices 
Table 6.7 presents the choice frequencies for each alternative at the first and final 
decision. If participants' second choice had been the same as their first choice, all values 
except in the diagonal should have been 0. This, however, was not the case. Candidate A was 
chosen less frequently than at the first decision (36% instead of 47%), whereas the choice 
frequencies for the other candidates increased slightly, especially for candidate D (B: 12% vs. 
11%, C: 17% vs. 14%, D: 35% vs. 28%).  
Although, in order to allow participants to keep their choice, the stalemate had been 
said to involve each participant's preferred alternative, a considerable number of participants 
(14/72 = 19%) changed their previously chosen alternative (see Table 6.8). Thirty-four 
participants (47%) changed their second-best alternative, 13 of those (18%) changed both 
their chosen and their second-best alternative. Eleven participants (15%) made the competing 
alternative their first choice, whereas 15 participants (21%) made it their second-best 
alternative. 
Table 6.7. Choice frequencies for each alternative at the first and final decision 
(percentages in brackets). 
 Chosen Alternative, Final Decision  
Chosen Alternative, 
First Decision A B C D Σ 
A 24 3 1 6 34 (47) 
B - 6 1 1 8 (11) 
C - - 10 - 10 (14) 
D 2 - - 18 20 (28) 
Σ 26 (36) 9 (12) 12 (17) 25 (35) 72 (100) 
 
There were neither any significant differences between conditions in terms of whether 
participants had changed their preferred alternative or not (see Table 6.8), nor which 
alternative had been preferred at the final decision. 
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Table 6.8. Frequency of change of the chosen alternative, as a function of type of 
accountability and time of accountability. 
 Time of Accountability  
 Before First Decision Before Final Decision  
Type of Acc. 
Change 
Of Choice 
Internal External Internal External Σ 
No 16 14 14 14 58 (81) 
Yes 2 4 4 4 14 (19) 
Σ 18 18 18 18 72 (100) 
 
2. Attribute weights 
Table 6.9 presents the mean normalised weights for the individually most important, 
second-most important, etc. attribute (based on the first importance ratings) after the final 
decision, before the first decision, and the difference between the two. Since importance 
differentiation and consolidation would have been difficult for participants who had changed 
their chosen alternative, because alternatives had been constructed in such a way that each 
alternative had their best outcome on a different attribute, only the data of those participants 
who had not done so were included in the following analyses.  
Overall, the results did not point to importance differentiation and consolidation 
having taken place. Instead, the difference between the first and second weight elicitation 
indicated a mere regression effect; the more important weights were decreased, resulting in 
negative differences between the second and first elicitation, and the less important weights 
were increased, resulting in positive differences between the second and first elicitation.  
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Table 6.9. Mean normalised weights before the first and after the final decision, as a 
function of type of accountability and time of accountability. 
  
Time of Accountability 
 
 
 Before First 
Decision 
Before Final 
Decision Significance of Effects 
Type of Accountability 
Rank of Importance 
Internal 
(n=16) 
External 
(n=14) 
Internal 
(n=14) 
External 
(n=14) Type Time 
Type x 
Time 
1        
after final decision 0.295 0.276 0.281 0.302    
before first decision 0.322 0.326 0.291 0.337    
difference -0.027 -0.050 -0.010 -0.035 (*)   
2        
after final decision 0.244 0.248 0.251 0.259    
before first decision 0.265 0.264 0.255 0.278    
difference -0.021 -0.017 -0.004 -0.018    
3        
after final decision 0.207 0.232 0.211 0.193   (*) 
before first decision 0.217 0.197 0.219 0.196 *   
difference -0.010 0.036 -0.008 -0.003 *  (*) 
4        
after final decision 0.167 0.153 0.171 0.154    
before first decision 0.136 0.147 0.167 0.131    
difference 0.031 0.006 0.004 0.024    
5        
after final decision 0.087 0.091 0.087 0.091    
before first decision 0.060 0.066 0.068 0.063    
difference 0.027 0.026 0.018 0.029    
        
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and 
the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
(*) p ≤ .10 
 *   p ≤ .05 
 
Two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of type of accountability and time of 
accountability on the difference values revealed a marginally significant main effect of type of 
accountability for the individually most important attribute (F(1,54) = 3.65, p = .061). 
Participants under internal accountability tended to reduce their most important weight to a 
lesser extent than participants under external accountability (M = -0.012 vs. M = -0.043). This 
effect was largely reduced, however, and not significant anymore, if the weight for the most 
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important attribute at the first elicitation was introduced as a covariate, thereby holding any 
differences between conditions before the experimental manipulations constant (F(1,53) = 
1.77, p = .189). The covariate was highly significant (F(1,53) = 9.50, p = .003). The expected 
main effect of time of accountability was not obtained. 
In addition, a significant main effect of type of accountability was obtained in the 
analysis of the individually third-most important attribute (F(1,54) = 5.41, p = .024). Whereas 
participants in the 'internal accountability' conditions reduced the weight for the third-most 
important attribute slightly from the first to the second elicitation, participants in the 'external 
accountability' conditions increased it, indicating importance differentiation and consolidation 
(M = -0.009 vs. M = 0.017). Although a significant difference between internally accountable 
and externally accountable participants existed before the first decision (the third-most 
important weight was significantly higher for internally accountable participants than for 
externally accountable participants, M = 0.22 vs. M = 0.20), when the value obtained at the 
first elicitation was introduced as a covariate in an ANCOVA, the covariate effect of the 
initial third-most important weight was not significant. The main effect of type of 
accountability was reduced, but remained marginally significant (F(1,53) = 3.21, p = .079). In 
addition to the main effect of type of accountability, there was a marginally significant 
interaction between type of accountability and time of accountability (F(1,54) = 3.34, p = 
.073). This remained almost unchanged in the ANCOVA (F(1,53) = 3.21, p = .071). Simple 
main effects analyses showed that there was only a significant effect of time of accountability 
when participants were externally accountable (F(1,54) = 5.73, p = .020). For participants 
who had been made externally accountable before the final decision the difference in their 
third-most important weight between the second and the first elicitation was significantly 
smaller than for participants who had been made externally accountable before the first 
decision (M = -0.003 vs. M = 0.036). This was opposite to what had been expected. Also, the 
effect of type of accountability was only significant for participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision (F(1,54) = 8.91, p = .004). Participants who had been 
made externally accountable before the first decision showed a larger difference than 
participants who had been made internally accountable before the first decision (M = 0.036 
vs. M = -0.01). 
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Two-factorial ANOVAs employed to test the effects of type of accountability and time 
of accountability on the differences between the second and first weight judgement for the 
specific attributes presented in information set 1 (rather than individually ranked weights) 
revealed no significant effects. 
3. Overall evaluation of alternatives 
Table 6.10 presents the results for the evaluation measures taken to assess the joint 
effects of importance and attractiveness differentiation. As before, only the data of 
participants who had not changed their choice were included in the analysis. 
3a. Ratings of the chosen vs. the average non-chosen alternative  
The results showed that, with the exception of participants who had been made 
externally accountable before the final decision, participants did not show a tendency to 
consolidate the judgmental difference between their chosen alternative and their average non-
chosen alternative, but decreased this difference slightly instead. The overall mean difference 
after the first decision was 27.86, and 26.05 after the final decision, resulting in a negative 
overall mean difference of -1.81 between the first decision and the final decision. This value 
was not significantly different from 0. 
Two (type of accountability: internal vs. external) by two (time of accountability: 
before the first vs. before the final decision) ANOVAs performed on the judgmental 
difference between the chosen alternative and the average non-chosen alternative at the first 
decision and at the final decision did not reveal any significant effects. 
The ANOVA performed on the difference between the first and the second elicitation 
revealed a weak tendency for a 'time of accountability' main effect (F(1,54) = 2.49, p =.121). 
Participants who had been made accountable before the final decision tended to decrease the 
difference between their chosen alternative and their average non-chosen alternative to a 
smaller extent than participants who had been made accountable before the first decision (M 
= 0.38 vs. M = -3.86). No other effect was significant.  
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Table 6.10. Measures of the evaluative difference between alternatives after the final 
decision. 
 Time of Accountability  
 Before First 
Decision 
Before Final 
Decision Significance of Effects 
Type of Accountability Internal 
(n=16) 
External 
(n=14) 
Internal 
(n=14) 
External 
(n=14) Type Time 
Type x 
Time 
1. Rating chosen - av. 
non-chosen alternative 
       
after final decision 25.94 22.38 25.21 30.67    
after first decision 31.46 24.33 25.48 29.64    
difference -5.52 -1.95 -0.26 1.02    
2. MAUT chosen - av. 
non-chosen alternative 
       
after final decision 10.26 10.40 15.84 17.46  (*)  
before first decision 11.54 11.08 12.17 11.33    
difference -1.28 -0.69 3.66 6.13    
3. Rating chosen - 
competing alternative 
       
after final decision 21.56 15.00 22.57 23.14    
after first decision 34.06 23.43 29.79 34.64    
difference -12.50 -8.43 -7.21 -11.50    
4. MAUT chosen - 
competing alternative 
       
after final decision 8.43 11.23 16.20 17.26    
before first decision 11.87 7.99 13.54 11.72    
difference -3.44 3.24 2.66 5.53    
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and 
the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
(*) p ≤ .10 
 *   p ≤ .05 
 
3b. MAUT predictions for the chosen vs. average non-chosen alternative  
The overall mean difference in MAUT predictions between participants' chosen 
alternative and their average non-chosen alternative indicated that a small degree of 
differentiation and consolidation had occurred. The overall mean difference before the first 
decision was 11.53, after the final decision it was 13.38. The obtained overall mean difference 
of 1.85 between the difference in MAUT predictions before the first and after the final 
decision was not significantly different from 0, however. 
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The two-factorial ANOVA performed on the difference in MAUT predictions for the 
chosen alternative compared to the average non-chosen alternative at the first elicitation 
(before the experimental manipulations), as expected, revealed no significant differences 
between conditions. For the difference at the second elicitation after the final decision, 
however, a marginally significant main effect of time of accountability (F(1,54) = 3.86, p = 
.055) was found. Consistent with expectations, participants who had been made accountable 
before the final decision tended to show a larger difference between the MAUT predictions 
for their chosen and for their average non-chosen alternative than participants who had been 
made accountable before the first decision (M = 16.65 vs. M = 10.32). This suggests that they 
made unidimensional value and weight judgements which supported their chosen over their 
average non-chosen alternative more strongly than participants who had already been made 
accountable before the first decision. The mean difference in MAUT predictions for the 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative after the final decision is shown in Figure 6.6. 
The analysis on the difference between the first and the second elicitation revealed no 
effects which reached standard significance levels, but, again, there was a weak tendency for a 
significant main effect of time of accountability (F(1,54) = 2.48, p = .121), with participants 
who had been made accountable before the final decision showing a larger and, more 
importantly, positive difference compared to participants who had been made accountable 
before the first decision (M = 4.90 vs. M = -1.00). The mean value obtained for participants 
who had been made accountable before the final decision was significantly different from 0 
(t(27) = 2.30, p = .029, two-sided).  
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Figure 6.6. Mean MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative after the final decision.  
Since participants were encouraged to particularly differentiate between their chosen 
alternative and another, more or less randomly selected alternative (by telling them about a 
stalemate between these two alternatives, which their own decision would break), 
differentiation and consolidation processes were also analysed in terms of the difference 
between the chosen alternative and the competing alternative. In addition to the factors of 
time of accountability and type of accountability, the analyses included the preference rank of 
the competing alternative as a factor, that is, whether the competing alternative had been the 
second-best, third-best or fourth-best alternative at the first decision, based on the suitability 
ratings participants had provided then. Again, only participants who had not changed their 
choice after the first decision were included in the analysis. 
3c. Ratings of the chosen alternative vs. the competing alternative 
The overall mean difference between the rating for the chosen alternative and the 
rating for the competing alternative was 30.60 after the first decision and 20.60 after the final 
decision. This showed that, instead of increasing the judgmental difference between the 
chosen and the competing alternative, participants decreased it. The overall mean change 
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from the first to the final decision (M = -10.00) was significantly different from 0 (t(57) = 
4.59, p = .000, two-sided).  
Three-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of time of accountability, type of 
accountability and preference rank on the judgmental difference between the chosen and the 
competing alternative after the first decision revealed the expected highly significant main 
effect of preference rank (F(2,46) = 15.86, p = .000). The higher the preference rank of the 
competing alternative, the smaller the difference between the chosen and the competing 
alternative (2nd rank: M = 15.54, 3rd rank: M = 32.49, 4th rank: M = 48.18). Post-hoc tests 
showed that this linear trend was highly significant (p = .000). No other effects were 
significant. 
The ANOVA on the judgmental difference between the chosen alternative and the 
competing alternative after the final decision again showed a highly significant main effect of 
preference rank (F(2,46) = 8.09, p = .001). As before, the lowest difference was obtained for 
the competing alternative that had been rated second-best after the first decision and highest 
for the competing alternative that had been rated fourth-best, with the third-best competing 
alternative in-between (2nd rank: M = 11.08, 3rd rank: M = 24.71, 4th rank: M = 29.94). The 
linear trend was again highly significant (p = .000). In addition, although the triple interaction 
between time of accountability, type of accountability and preference rank only showed a 
very weak tendency to be significant (F(2,46) = 1.69, p = .196), simple main effect analyses 
showed that there was a significant interaction between time of accountability and type of 
accountability for participants whose competing alternative had been the least preferred at the 
first decision (F(1,46) = 4.03, p = .050). In this case, when participants had been made 
accountable before the final decision, the obtained difference between the chosen and 
competing alternative was larger for externally accountable participants than for internally 
accountable participants (M = 38.75 vs. M = 23.33), whereas if participants had been made 
accountable before the first decision, the opposite was true (M = 37.50 vs. M = 22.33). 
The main effect of preference rank was the only significant effect in the analysis on 
the change in judgmental difference between the chosen and the competing alternative from 
the first to the final decision (F(2,46) = 3.94, p = .026). Again, the smallest difference 
between the second and first elicitation was obtained for participants whose competing 
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alternative had been their second-best at the first decision, and the highest difference was 
obtained for participants whose competing alternative had been their least preferred, with the 
third-best alternative in-between (2nd rank: M = -4.46, 3rd rank: M = -9.58, 4th rank: M =-
18.24). The linear trend was highly significant (p = .007). 
3d. MAUT predictions for the chosen alternative vs. the competing alternative.  
The overall mean difference in MAUT predictions for the chosen alternative and the 
competing alternative at the first elicitation was 11.30, the overall mean difference at the 
second elicitation was 13.11. This meant that participants showed some differentiation and 
consolidation by slightly increasing this difference from the first to the second elicitation 
(overall mean: 1.81). This increase was not significant, however. 
The ANOVAs performed on the difference in MAUT predictions between the chosen 
alternative and the competing alternative both at the first elicitation and at the second 
elicitation only revealed significant main effects of preference rank (1st elicitation: F(2,46) = 
10.05, p = .000, 2nd elicitation: F(2,46) = 8.23, p = .001). As before, the difference between 
the chosen alternative and the competing alternative was smallest when the competing 
alternative had been the second-best at the first decision and largest when it had been the least 
preferred, with the third-best alternative in-between (1st elicitation: 2nd rank: M = 2.66, 3rd 
rank: M = 8.60, 4th rank: M = 26.21, 2nd elicitation: 2nd rank: M = 4.77, 3rd rank: M = 12.27, 
4th rank: M = 25.73). In both cases, the linear trend was highly significant (p = .000). 
The analysis of the change in these difference values from the first to the second 
elicitation did not reveal any significant effects. It had been expected that participants who 
had been made accountable before the final decision would show a larger, positive difference 
than participants who had been made accountable before the first decision, indicating stronger 
consolidation. Such a directional trend was apparent in the data. A positive difference was 
obtained for participants who had been made accountable before the final decision (M = 
4.10), whereas for participants who had been made accountable before the first decision the 
obtained difference was negligible and slightly negative (M = -0.32). Because of considerable 
unsystematic variance in the data, this difference between conditions was not significant, 
however. Similarly, externally accountable participants tended to show a larger difference 
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between the second and first elicitation than internally accountable participants (M = 4.39 vs. 
M = -0.39), but, again, the difference between conditions was not significant. 
Summary of the results for information evaluation and integration at the final 
decision 
The results for the degree of bias in information evaluation and integration during the 
final decision proved largely inconclusive. It had been expected that participants who had 
been made accountable before the final decision and externally accountable participants 
would show more evidence of differentiation and consolidation processes compared to 
participants who had been made accountable before the first decision and internally 
accountable participants, respectively. Hardly any of the measures of differentiation and 
consolidation showed significant effects of either time or type of accountability, however. 
Participants' changes of attribute weights from the first elicitation, before any manipulation of 
accountability had occurred, to the second elicitation after the final decision failed to show the 
expected increase of weights for attributes on which the chosen alternative performed well 
and/or weights on which the non-chosen alternatives performed badly, but pointed to a 
regression effect instead; high weights were reduced, whereas low weights were increased. 
After controlling for any initial differences in weight judgements between conditions, no 
significant accountability effects were obtained. There was a marginally significant tendency 
for participants who had been made externally accountable before the first decision to 
increase the weight for their individually most and third-most important attribute, whereas 
participants who had been made externally accountable before the final decision decreased it. 
This was opposite to what had been expected. Possible explanations for the failure to obtain 
the expected effects will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
The analyses performed on actual and MAUT predicted overall ratings of alternatives 
also did not consistently support the hypotheses. Apart from a marginally significant effect of 
time of accountability on the difference between the MAUT predicted rating of the chosen 
and the average non-chosen alternative after the final decision, no significant effects of the 
manipulated variables were observed. The marginally significant effect of time of 
accountability suggested that participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision, as expected, tended to show a larger evaluative difference between their chosen and 
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average non-chosen alternative than participants who had been made accountable before the 
first decision. Other data patterns also showed the expected trend. For example, participants 
who had been made externally accountable before the final decision showed signs of 
differentiation and consolidation by an increased difference in overall ratings between their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative, whereas in all other conditions no change or even 
a decrease was observed.  
Interestingly, whereas the actual ratings for the chosen compared to the competing 
alternative did not show any differentiation and consolidation effects (on the contrary, the 
evaluative difference between them was reduced in all conditions), the MAUT predictions of 
these ratings did; as expected, the largest increase in the difference between the chosen and 
competing alternative was found in the condition with external accountability introduced 
before the final decision and, more generally, when accountability had been introduced before 
the final decision compared to before the first decision. A possible reason for this dissociation 
may be that the fact that the competing alternative had been said to be part of a stalemate, 
prevented participants from openly devaluing it. However, when devaluation was less obvious 
and more subtle, participants took the chance to engage in it. Consistent with this explanation 
is the fact that 26% of the participants whose data was included in the analysis adopted the 
competing alternative as their second-best alternative when making their final decision, 
thereby expressing some conformity with and acknowledgement of the preferences of the 
other committee members. This behaviour also meant that there was little scope to increase 
the difference between the chosen and the competing alternative further, unless participants 
had chosen to rate all alternatives other than the one they preferred rather badly. Furthermore, 
the observation that participants who had been made externally accountable before the final 
decision showed the largest tendency to minimise the difference between the overall rating for 
their chosen and the competing alternative supports the PMA prediction that their motivation 
to attend to external preferences should have been most salient.  
Justifications 
Participants’ written justifications were content-analysed. The unit of analysis was an 
argument, defined as the smallest unit that provided some meaning in the experimental 
context. Two independent judges sorted the arguments with respect to the categories listed 
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below. Inter-judge correlations were moderate to high (range: r = .64 to r = .91, mean: 
r = .87). Differences in categorisation were resolved by discussion. The results are presented 
in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11. Justification results (percentages in brackets). 
  
Time of Accountability 
 
 
 Before First 
Decision 
Before Final Decision Significance of Effects 
Type of 
Accountability Internal External Internal External Type Time 
Type x 
Time 
1. Type of argument         
direct  2.17 (46) 3.22 (59) 3.50 (70) 4.05 (69)  *  
elaboration 2.83 (49) 2.00 (33) 1.33 (27) 1.78 (28)  (*)  
false reproduction 0.33 (5) 0.39 (8) 0.17 (3) 0.17 (2)  (*)  
total  5.33 (100) 5.61 (100) 5.00 (100) 6.00 (100)    
2a. Consonant  
arguments 
       
positive aspects of 
the chosen alternative 4.56 (79) 5.06 (90) 4.22 (86) 4.72 (84) 
   
negative aspects of 
the non-chosen alt. 0.28 (9) 0.05 (1) 0.11 (2) 0.56 (7) 
  * 
total  4.84 (88) 5.11 (91) 4.33 (88) 5.28 (91)    
2b. Dissonant 
arguments 
       
positive aspects of 
the non-chosen alt. 0.00 (0) 0.28 (5) 0.11 (2) 0.44 (5) (*) 
  
negative aspects of 
the chosen alt. 0.50 (12) 0.22 (4) 0.56 (10) 0.28 (4) * 
  
total 0.50 (12) 0.50 (90) 0.67 (12) 0.72 (9)    
3. Complexity  0.15 0.14 0.10 0.11    
Note: Discrepancies are due to rounding errors. 
 (*) p ≤ .10 
  *   p ≤ .05 
 
The following types of dependent variables were analysed: 
• Total number of arguments 
 This number included three subtypes of arguments: (1) direct arguments, which were 
directly related to information presented during the experiment, (2) elaborations, that is, 
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arguments in which participants had elaborated on information presented during the 
experiment and which could not be directly inferred from this information2 , and (3) false 
reproductions of information, where participants' arguments contained incorrect 
information. 
• Consonant vs. dissonant arguments 
 Consonant arguments were arguments which mentioned a positive aspect of the 
chosen alternative or a negative aspect of a non-chosen alternative, whereas dissonant 
arguments were arguments which mentioned a positive aspect of a non-chosen alternative 
or a negative aspect of the chosen alternative.  
• Complexity of argumentation 
 The complexity of argumentation was measured by the ratio of the number of two-
sided arguments to the sum of one-sided and two-sided arguments. Two-sided arguments 
were defined as arguments which mentioned two alternatives, comparing them in some 
way, whereas one-sided arguments were arguments that only mentioned one alternative. 
The complexity index ranged between 0 and 1, where 0 indicated that only one-sided 
arguments had been presented and the complexity of argumentation was low, and 1 
indicated that only two-sided arguments had been presented and the complexity of 
argumentation was high. It was expected that participants who had only been made 
accountable after they had already made a decision, that is, participants who had been 
made accountable before the final decision, would show a higher complexity of 
argumentation than participants who had already been made accountable before the first 
decision.  
1. Type of arguments  
The mean total number of arguments listed by participants was 5.49. Of these, 3.24 
were arguments directly related to information presented during the experiment, 1.99 were 
elaborations and 0.26 were false reproductions. 
                                                 
2 For example, a participant may have inferred from the information that the job candidate's thesis topic had not 
been related to the research interests of his or her future PhD supervisor that this would broaden the focus of the 
team. 
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Two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of type of accountability and time of 
accountability were performed on these variables. For the total number of arguments, no 
significant effects of the experimental variables were obtained. Nevertheless, in order to 
eliminate the effect of the total number of arguments mentioned, the different types of 
arguments were transformed into percentages and these percentages were analysed. For direct 
arguments, a significant main effect of time of accountability was observed (F(1,68) = 6.36, p 
= .014). Participants who had been made accountable before the final decision mentioned a 
higher percentage of direct arguments than participants who had been made accountable 
before the first decision (M = 70% vs. M = 53%). In the ANOVA performed on the 
percentage of elaborations, the main effect of time of accountability was marginally 
significant (F(1,68) = 3.88, p = .053). Participants who had been made accountable before the 
final decision tended to present a smaller percentage of elaborated arguments than participants 
who had been made accountable before the first decision (M = 28% vs. M = 41%). Finally, a 
marginally significant main effect of time of accountability was also obtained for the number 
of false reproductions (F(1,68) = 3.39, p = .070). The percentage of false reproductions 
tended to be larger for participants who had been made accountable before the first decision 
than participants who had been made accountable before the final decision (M = 7% vs. M = 
3%).  
2a. Consonant arguments  
The overall mean total number of consonant arguments was 4.89, of which 4.64 
mentioned positive aspects of the chosen alternative and 0.25 mentioned negative aspects of 
the non-chosen alternatives. The difference between the latter two values was highly 
significant (t(71) = 13.80, p = .000), which suggests that when they presented consonant 
arguments, participants showed a significantly stronger overall tendency to focus on the 
advantages of the chosen alternative than the disadvantages of the non-chosen alternative.  
Two-factorial ANOVAs were conducted to test the effects of type of accountability 
and time of accountability on the percentages of the two different subtypes of consonant 
arguments as well as the percentage of consonant arguments overall, relative to the total 
number of arguments. The analysis for the percentage of consonant arguments overall did not 
reveal any significant effects nor did the analysis for the percentage of positive aspects 
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mentioned for the chosen alternative. However, a significant interaction between time of 
accountability and type of accountability was observed in the analysis of the percentage of 
negative aspects mentioned for the non-chosen alternatives (F(1,68) = 4.91, p = .030). Simple 
main effects analyses indicated that there was a significant 'type of accountability' effect for 
participants who had been made accountable before the first decision only (F(1,68) = 4.03, p 
= .049). Internally accountable participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision produced a higher percentage of arguments that stressed the negative aspects of the 
non-chosen alternatives than participants who had been made externally accountable before 
the first decision (M = 9% vs. M = 1%). An opposite tendency was observed for participants 
who had been made accountable before the final decision (M = 2% vs. M = 7%), this was not 
significant, however.  
2b. Dissonant arguments  
The overall mean total number of dissonant arguments was 0.60, of which 0.21 
mentioned positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives and 0.39 mentioned negative 
aspects of the chosen alternative. The difference between the latter two values was not 
significant. Dissonant arguments were given significantly less frequently than consonant 
arguments, however (M = 0.60 vs. M = 4.64, t(71) = 13.47, p =.000).  
Again, two-factorial ANOVAs were employed to test the effects of type of 
accountability and time of accountability on the dependent measures. For the percentage of 
dissonant arguments overall, no significant effects were obtained. However, both the 
percentage of arguments mentioning positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives and the 
percentage of arguments mentioning negative aspects of the chosen alternative were affected 
by type of accountability. Externally accountable participants tended to mention a higher 
percentage of arguments focusing on the positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives 
(F(1,68) = 3.74, p = .057, M = 5% vs. M = 1%) and mentioned a significantly lower 
percentage of arguments focusing on the negative aspects of the chosen alternative (F(1,68) = 
5.91, p = .018, M = 4% vs. M = 11%) than internally accountable participants. These effects 
are shown in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.7. Mean percentage of arguments mentioning positive aspects of the non-chosen 
alternatives, as a function of type of accountability and time of accountability. 
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Figure 6.8. Mean percentage of arguments mentioning negative aspects of the chosen 
alternative, as a function of type of accountability and time of accountability. 
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3. Complexity of argumentation  
The overall mean complexity index was 0.12 (maximum value 1), suggesting a 
generally very low complexity of argumentation. 
Unlike expected, the complexity index was lower for participants who had been made 
accountable before the final decision than participants who had been made accountable before 
the first decision (M = 0.10 vs. M = 0.14). This difference was not significant, however. The 
main effect of type of accountability and the interaction between time of accountability and 
type of accountability were also not significant.   
Summary of the justification results 
Although expected, the analyses of participants' justifications did not reveal any 
significant effects of time of accountability on depth and complexity of argumentation. 
Participants who had been made accountable immediately before the final decision did not 
produce more arguments overall than those who had been made accountable before the first 
decision, nor were the justifications of participants who had been made accountable before the 
final decision more complex than those of participants who had been made accountable before 
the first decision. With regard to complexity, if anything, a trend in the opposite direction 
could be observed. 
Time of accountability did, however, affect the relative frequency of particular types 
of arguments. Notable is the higher percentage of elaborations and lower percentage of direct 
arguments produced by participants who had been made accountable before the first rather 
than the final decision. This is likely to be due to the fact that these participants had had a 
longer time span between first hearing that they were going to be accountable and giving their 
justifications than participants who only got to know before the final decision that they would 
have to justify their decision. Somewhat surprising therefore is the higher percentage of false 
reproductions for participants who had been made accountable before the first rather than the 
final decision, because they should have been less likely to forget arguments, given that they 
knew from the start that they would have to justify their decision. Hence, it is likely that false 
reproductions were used in a strategic manner to support the chosen alternative. Indeed, a 
closer inspection of the particular type of false reproductions created shows that a significant 
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effect of time of accountability is only obtained for false reproductions that favour the chosen 
alternative (F(1,68) = 4.31, p = .042, accountability before the first decision: M = 6% vs. M = 
2%). Also, it is interesting to note that false reproductions favouring the non-chosen 
alternatives or devaluing the chosen alternative did not occur at all. 
Type of accountability seemed to particularly affect the number of dissonant 
arguments presented. Externally accountable participants produced relatively more arguments 
mentioning positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than internally accountable 
participants. Interestingly, when it came to mentioning negative aspects of the chosen 
alternative, internally accountable participants did so significantly more often than externally 
accountable participants. This pattern of results is consistent with external accountability 
inducing concerns about external evaluation. Externally accountable participants, particularly 
those who had been made accountable before the final decision, presumably were acutely 
aware of the fact that some of the people they had to justify their choice to would be opposed 
to it and, as part of their strategy, seem to have mentioned positive aspects of their non-chosen 
alternatives, showing that they had given some thought to them, but then to have refuted these 
positive aspects. The latter assumption receives some support by the significant interaction 
effect between time and type of accountability observed for the percentage of negative aspects 
of the non-chosen alternatives. Although the interaction effect was caused by the large 
difference between internal and external accountability before the first decision, as expected, 
participants who had been made externally accountable before the final decision mentioned a 
higher percentage of negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than participants who 
had been internally accountable. However, given that the number of arguments mentioning 
the non-chosen alternatives was generally very small, these results must be viewed with some 
caution.  
Ancillary measures 
1. Difficulty of the first decision 
After their first decision, participants had been asked to rate the difficulty of this 
decision on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult). No significant differences emerged 
between conditions (no accountability: M = 3.14, internal accountability: M = 3.06, external 
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accountability: M = 3.28). As expected, however, the highest rating was observed for 
participants who had been made externally accountable. 
2. Certainty about having made a good first decision  
Participants’ responses to the question about how certain they were to have made a 
good first decision, given on a scale from 1 (very uncertain) to 5 (very certain), showed a 
significant difference between conditions in the expected direction. Participants who had been 
made accountable before making this decision (no matter whether internally or externally) felt 
significantly less sure to have made a good decision than participants who had not been made 
accountable (M = 2.50 vs. M = 2.94, t(70) = 2.35, p = .021). There was no significant 
difference between the ‘internal accountability’ and the ‘external accountability’ conditions 
(M = 2.44 vs. M = 2.56).  
3. Difficulty of the justification 
After the written justification of their final decision, participants had rated how 
difficult this justification had been. A 2 (type of accountability: internal vs. external) by 2 
(time of accountability: before the first decision vs. before the final decision) ANOVA 
yielded a marginally significant main effect of type of accountability (F(1,68) = 3.00, p = 
.088). As expected, participants in the 'external accountability' conditions tended to find it 
more difficult to justify their decision than participants in the 'internal accountability' 
conditions (M = 2.89 vs. M = 2.56). No other significant differences emerged. 
4. Expectation of having to justify one's decision 
At the end of the experiment, participants had rated the extent to which they had 
expected to have to justify their decision on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). A 
two-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of type of accountability and time of accountability 
on participants' responses yielded a significant main effect of time of accountability (F(1,68) 
= 4.73, p = .033). Participants who had been made accountable before the final decision 
expected to have to justify their decision more strongly than participants who had been made 
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accountable before the first decision (M = 3.11 vs. M = 2.53). No other effects were 
significant. 
5. Need to make a good decision 
For the reported need to make a good decision, rated on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 
5 (very strong), the ANOVA analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of time of 
accountability (F(1,68) = 2.97, p = .089). As expected, participants who had been made 
accountable before the final decision tended to report a greater need to make a good decision 
than participants who had been made accountable before the first decision (M = 2.08 vs. M = 
1.83). There were no other significant effects. 
6. Need to be able to justify the first and final decision 
The analyses of the responses to the questions about how strong participants' 
perceived need was to be able to justify their decision to themselves and to others at the first 
and at the final decision did not reveal the expected pattern. It had been expected that 
participants in the ‘external accountability before the first decision’ condition would report a 
greater need of being able to justify their decision to others at the first decision than 
participants in the ‘internal accountability before the first decision’ condition. No difference 
had been expected between the responses of these participants to the question about their need 
to be able to justify their decision to themselves at that time. Also, it had been expected that 
participants with accountability introduced before the first decision would generally report a 
greater need to justify their first decision and participants with accountability introduced 
before the final decision a greater need to justify their final decision.  
The two-factorial ANOVAs performed on these measures revealed no significant 
effects, except for a main effect of time of accountability on participants' need to justify their 
final decision to themselves (F(1,68) = 4.86, p =.031). Participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision reported a greater need to justify their final decision to 
themselves than participants who had been made accountable before the final decision (M = 
4.22 vs. M = 3.81).  
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A repeated measures ANOVA was also conducted which, apart from the two between-
subjects factors of type of accountability and time of accountability, included two within-
participants factors, type of rating (need to justify to self vs. to others) and decision (need to 
justify the first decision vs. the final decision). The analysis revealed a highly significant main 
effect of type of rating (F(1,68) = 8.41, p = .005). Participants reported a stronger need to be 
able to justify their decisions to themselves than to others (M = 4.01 vs. M = 3.65). There was 
also a marginally significant interaction between type of rating and decision (F(1,68) = 3.08, 
p = .084). Whereas there was no difference between the reported need to be able to justify the 
first and the final decision where justification to the self was concerned (M = 4.01 vs. M = 
4.01), participants tended to report a stronger need to be able to justify their final decision to 
others than their first decision (M = 3.75 vs. M = 3.54). This effect was further qualified by a 
marginally significant triple interaction between type of rating, decision and type of 
accountability (F(1,68) = 3.95, p = .051). The previously described interaction pattern 
between type of rating and decision could be observed for participants who had been made 
internally accountable, participants who had been made externally accountable, however, did 
not show this effect.  
A correlational analysis indicated that the correlation between the perceived need to 
justify the first and the final decision to others was higher for participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision than for participants who had been made accountable 
before the final decision (r (36)= .72, p = .000 vs. r (36) = .58, p = .000). This is consistent 
with expectations, assuming that participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision had a strong need to justify the first decision, which remained high for the final 
decision, whereas participants who had been made accountable before the final decision 
would only perceive a strong need to justify the final but not the first decision. The same 
result was not obtained, however, for the correlation between the perceived need to justify the 
first and the final decision to themselves; contrary to what would have been predicted, this 
was higher for participants who had been made accountable before the final compared to the 
first decision (r (36)= .53, p = .000 vs. r (36) = .35, p = .037).  
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Summary of the results for the ancillary measures 
The analyses of the ancillary measures supported some assumptions about the effects 
of the experimental manipulations, but failed to support others. As expected, participants who 
had been made accountable prior to their first decision were less sure that they had made a 
good first decision than participants who had not. There were no significant differences in 
terms of the perceived difficulty of this decision, but, consistent with expectations, 
participants who had been made externally accountable expressed the greatest difficulty. As 
expected, they also found it more difficult to justify their decision than participants who had 
been made internally accountable. When asked about their need to make a good decision at 
the end of the experiment, participants who had only been made accountable before the final 
decision tended to report a greater need than participants who had already been made 
accountable before the first decision, suggesting, not surprisingly, that the most recent 
manipulation of accountability was still strongest in participants' minds. This was also borne 
out by responses to the question of how strongly participants had expected to justify their 
decision. Although there should not have been any differences once all participants had been 
made accountable in some way, participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision reported a stronger expectation of having to justify their decision than participants 
who had been made accountable before the first decision. 
The results that departed most strongly from the original predictions were the results 
relating to the need to be able to justify the first and the final decision to the self and others. It 
was not the case that participants who had been made externally accountable before the first 
decision reported a greater need to justify their first decision to others than participants who 
had been made internally accountable at that time, nor did participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision generally report a greater need to justify their first 
decision, and participants who had been made accountable before the final decision a greater 
need to justify the final decision. Instead, participants generally expressed a stronger need to 
justify their decision to themselves than to others, and this tendency was stronger for 
participants who had been made accountable before the first compared to the final decision. 
These effects may have been a consequence of the external accountability manipulation not 
being strong enough, particularly not after some time had passed, and/or impression 
management concerns on the part of the participants, who may have wanted to signal to the 
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experimenter that they were taking the task seriously. The fact that participants tended to 
report a stronger need to justify their final rather than their first decision to others supports 
this claim. Also, asking participants to make these kinds of judgements retrospectively, may 
have biased them towards the most recent and therefore most salient instruction. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of the present study was to validate the PMA by investigating the effects of 
internal and external accountability demands and the time when these demands were 
introduced (before making a first vs. after making a first and before making a final decision). 
The central assumption of the PMA is that accountability both enhances the accuracy of and 
the degree of bias in information processing when arriving at a decision, but that the relative 
strength of these effects depends on the extent to which the manipulation makes salient the 
decision maker's personal responsibility for the consequences of his or her decision and the 
expectation of being evaluated by an external audience. The PMA predicts that becoming 
aware of being personally responsible for one's actions will enhance the motivation to be 
accurate, which, in turn, will increase the depth of information search and complexity of 
information integration. Evaluation apprehension, on the other hand, will enhance the 
motivation to make a decision that can be easily justified to one's evaluators, which, in turn, 
will increase a bias in information evaluation and integration towards the perceived norms of 
the external audience - if those are salient - or towards letting the preferred alternative appear 
maximally superior to the others. Since internal accountability only makes personal 
responsibility salient, without drawing the decision maker's attention to any external norms, 
whereas the introduction of external accountability demands usually involves both personal 
responsibility and evaluation cues, a comparison of the effects of the two should show a 
deeper and more complex information processing both in conditions of internal and external 
accountability, compared to a control group without accountability demands, but a more 
biased information processing for externally accountable participants compared to 
participants in the control group and 'internal accountability' condition. However, this 
difference between the effects of internal and external accountability with respect to the 
degree of bias in information evaluation and integration, according to the PMA, should be 
diminished if individuals are only made accountable once they have already committed 
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themselves to an alternative, because then both internally and externally accountable 
individuals are assumed to have a motivation to bias their information processing towards 
supporting the alternative they have previously chosen. In the case of externally accountable 
participants, this tendency may be particularly strong if they perceive a conflict between their 
own choice and the choice preferred by their external audience.  
The present study therefore manipulated internal and external accountability either 
before a first decision or before a final decision and monitored participants' information 
search, evaluation and integration of information during the decision making process. Internal 
accountability was induced by making personal responsibility for the decision salient while 
keeping the decision anonymous at the same time, thereby minimising external evaluation 
apprehension. This was achieved through a committee scenario. The external accountability 
manipulation made both personal responsibility and external evaluation salient. The findings 
lent some support to the PMA predictions, but also highlighted methodological problems. In 
particular, features of the experimental task seemed to have occasionally prevented expected 
effects from occurring. 
Information search before the first decision 
Unlike expected, participants who had been made accountable before the first decision 
did not differ significantly from non-accountable participants in terms of depth and variability 
of their information search, although the observed trends were usually in the right direction; 
the information search of participants who had been made accountable tended to be deeper, 
less variable and more compensatory than that of participants who had not been made 
accountable. Apart from the fact that there was a large individual variability in information 
search which may have prevented some effects from becoming statistically significant, the 
generally very exhaustive information search may have masked any differences between 
conditions. This exhaustive search, even for participants who were not accountable, may have 
been caused by telling participants before they made their decision that they additionally 
would have to judge the quality of all alternatives. As Billings and Scherer (1988) and Koele 
and Westenberg (1992) have previously pointed out, the response mode of judgement 
typically results in a deeper and more compensatory information processing than that of 
choice. Surprisingly, pre-decisional external accountability (and not the absence of 
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accountability) resulted in the lowest total number of items searched. It may be speculated 
that the prospect of having to justify one's decision to others enhances memory for the 
searched information and therefore results in fewer repeated searches. Consistent with this 
assumption, the percentage of repeatedly searched information was indeed lowest in the 
'external accountability' group, although not significantly so. Finally, participants under pre-
decisional external accountability did not show a significantly higher percentage of 
information searched for the individually most important attribute than participants in the 
other conditions.  
Information evaluation and integration at the first decision 
The findings concerning information evaluation and integration during the first 
decision, like the findings for the first information search, were largely inconclusive, due to 
the absence of any significant effects. However, not only were there no significant effects, but 
there were also some trends in the data that were inconsistent with the pattern predicted by the 
PMA. It had been expected that externally accountable participants would be particularly 
likely to choose the alternative with the best outcome on the individually most important 
attribute, and that they would show the largest evaluative differentiation between their chosen 
and the other alternatives, compared to conditions of no and internal accountability. 
Generally, the frequency with which the alternative with the best outcome on the individually 
most important attribute was chosen was quite high (60%), but externally accountable 
participants were no more likely to do so than participants in the other conditions. The general 
popularity of such a lexicographic decision rule may be explained by the relatively high 
complexity of the decision situation (4 alternatives that differed on 5 attributes), which 
typically results in the employment of non-compensatory decision strategies (see Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993, for a review). Also, instead of resulting in the largest, external 
accountability resulted in the smallest observed difference between the rating of the overall 
quality of the chosen alternative and the average rating for the non-chosen alternatives. This 
difference was largest for participants under internal accountability. The main effect of type 
of accountability was not significant, but the same trend was observed for the actually 
observed difference between these ratings and the difference predicted by a linear MAUT 
model, suggesting that external accountability resulted in a decreased rather than increased 
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differentiation. This may reflect participants' uncertainty in terms of which alternative would 
be preferred by the other committee members to which they had been made accountable. As a 
result of this normative uncertainty, they may have resorted to a strategy of 'sitting on the 
fence', whereby they kept the difference between their preferred and the other alternatives 
small in order to be able to endorse a different alternative that appeared more justifiable, 
should it be necessary.  
Information search before the final decision 
Analysis of information processing exhibited during the final decision again only 
provided partial support for the PMA. It had been expected that participants who had been 
made accountable immediately before the final information search would exhibit a deeper, 
less variable and more compensatory search than participants who had already been made 
accountable before the first decision. This was not generally observed (except in the lower 
variability of search across attributes for different cells searched, which was shown by 
participants who had been made accountable before the final compared to the first decision), 
but, again, features of the task participants were asked to perform may help to explain why. 
Before they engaged in the process of arriving at a final decision, all participants were told 
that a stalemate had arisen between the other committee members regarding which alternative 
they supported. One of these stalemate alternatives was said to be the one participants had 
expressed an initial preference for, the other was allocated in such a way that the number of 
particular combinations of alternatives presented did not differ largely between conditions. 
The results for the final information search suggested that participants did not consider all 
alternatives anymore, but confined their search to a subset of the available information 
instead, namely particularly information about those alternatives between which the stalemate 
had been said to have arisen. This effect tended to be stronger when accountability had been 
introduced before the final decision than when it had been introduced before the first decision, 
and particularly strong in the ‘internal accountability before the final decision' condition, 
especially in terms of the concentration of search on the chosen alternative. Since participants 
in this condition did not expect to have to justify their decision to the other committee 
members, they were free to concentrate on the two alternatives that were presented to them 
and check whether the alternative which they had previously chosen was still better than the 
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one allegedly preferred by two of the other committee members. Participants who had been 
made externally accountable before the final decision, on the other hand, expected that they 
would have to justify their decision to the other committee members and therefore, in addition 
to searching the two presented alternatives intensely, seem to have looked for comparison 
information about other alternatives, in order to be well-prepared for a discussion. The finding 
that internal accountability introduced before the first decision led to a particularly thorough 
and compensatory search of all alternatives cannot be easily explained. It may be that, since 
participants in this condition were only accountable to themselves and their accountability 
was not immediately salient, there was less motivation for them to attend to the alleged 
opinions of other committee members and it was more important to make sure that of all 
available alternatives the one they had chosen before was really the best one.  
With hindsight, it appears that the procedure of presenting participants with a 
stalemate between two alternatives (which had been adopted in order to have a good cover 
story for a final decision) was problematical, because it focused participants' attention on the 
two stalemate alternatives and thereby made external norms salient, not only for participants 
who had been made externally accountable but also for those who had been made internally 
accountable. This may explain why the responses to the questions about how strongly 
participants had felt a need to justify their first and final decision to themselves and others did 
not show the expected pattern, but expressed a generally stronger need to justify the final 
decision to others, regardless of condition.  
The analyses on the type of information searched before making a final decision 
revealed a tendency for externally accountable participants to search a lower percentage of 
information for the attribute they individually found least important than internally 
accountable participants. This indirectly supports the idea that individuals who have been 
made externally accountable pay more attention to information they consider important in a 
given decision situation, to the detriment of less important attributes. When looking at 
attributes as such rather than their importance rank, it emerged that externally accountable 
participants also tended to search a lower percentage of information for the 'student 
representative on university committees' attribute than participants in the 'internal 
accountability' conditions. Given that this attribute had received the lowest mean importance 
rating of all attributes in information set 2, this finding is consistent with the earlier 
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observation for the individually least important attribute. However, another effect may have 
been at work here as well. Participants were informed that the other committee members were 
junior lecturers and professors. Anticipating having to justify their decision to them may have 
made participants reluctant to consider information that was clearly related to student issues 
and as such may not have been regarded as convincing by the other committee members. This 
explanation would be consistent with Hsee's (1995, 1996) model of elastic justification, which 
suggests that tempting attributes are only taken into account when individuals perceive the 
freedom to do so without negative repercussions. 
An important feature of the second information set was that its information was 
largely redundant with the information contained in information set 1, in order to give 
participants the opportunity to anticipate the outcomes of their search when they accessed the 
cells of the information board. This made it possible to test the extent of confirmation bias in 
participants' information search, that is, a bias to support the chosen and/or devalue the non-
chosen alternatives. Although the measure developed to capture confirmation bias, the Biased 
Search Index (BSI), surprisingly did neither indicate a significant overall bias to support the 
chosen nor a bias to devalue the other stalemate (competing) and average non-chosen 
alternative, the overall mean BSI ratio for the chosen to the average non-chosen alternative 
did suggest that participants' information search was biased to support the chosen over the 
average non-chosen alternative. This was not true, however, for the chosen compared to the 
competing alternative, probably because the final information search was strongly and equally 
focused on the two stalemate alternatives. Whereas the expected stronger bias in the post-
decisional compared to the pre-decisional accountability conditions could not be observed, 
there were a number of significant effects of type of accountability and significant interactions 
between time and type of accountability on the amount of bias displayed. Externally 
accountable participants showed a significant tendency to search more information that they 
expected to support the chosen compared to the average non-chosen alternative, and they did 
significantly more so than internally accountable participants. They also showed a 
significantly stronger bias to support the chosen over the competing alternative than 
participants in the 'internal accountability' conditions. The cause of these effects may be found 
in the fact that externally accountable participants experienced the conflict between their own 
choice and that favoured by some other members of the committee more strongly, given they 
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anticipated a public justification of their choice, and therefore may have felt a need to bolster 
their chosen alternative more than internally accountable participants. At the same time, they 
also seem to have looked for the advantages of the other alternatives, in case they would be 
challenged about them. The latter is suggested by the fact that participants who had been 
made externally accountable before the final decision showed a significantly weaker bias to 
search information that devalued the average non-chosen alternative and even a slight bias 
towards searching information that supported the average non-chosen alternative compared to 
participants who had been made externally accountable before the first decision. The problem 
that was mentioned earlier, namely that informing participants about a stalemate between two 
alternatives before they made their final decision made external norms salient, not only for 
externally accountable but also for internally accountable participants, is underlined by the 
fact that participants who had been made internally accountable before the final decision 
searched more information that devalued the competing alternative compared to participants 
who had been made internally accountable already before the first decision, and showed the 
strongest such bias of all conditions.  
Although the analyses that tested confirmation bias revealed some significant and 
interesting effects, it must be mentioned here that the concept of selective exposure or 
confirmation bias in information search and its measurement is fraught with problems, as 
already discussed in Chapter 4. Support for its existence has been scarce, despite a large 
number of studies within the tradition of dissonance theory. Canon's (1964) and Freedman's 
(1965b) studies, in particular, indicated that external accountability (operationalised by telling 
participants that they would have to engage in a debate or would be presented with opposing 
arguments) resulted in a preference for dissonant over consonant information, as the former 
was perceived to be more useful for the task. Similarly, in the present study, participants who 
had been made externally accountable before the final decision displayed the strongest 
tendency to search information that supported the average non-chosen alternative.  
Also, a particular problem of selective exposure paradigms has been the interpretation 
of attention to particular information. While increased attention to dissonant information may 
signal a preference for it, it may also signal the opposite, namely an attempt to refute the 
unwanted information and as such can be seen as an attempt to reduce dissonance in the long 
term and bolster the chosen alternative (Grabitz & Grabitz-Gniech, 1973; Wyer & Frey, 
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1983). Ditto and Lopez (1992) have indeed demonstrated that information inconsistent with a 
preferred conclusion is examined more critically than information consistent with a preferred 
conclusion and as a consequence, more information is required to reach a preference-
inconsistent conclusion than to reach a preference-consistent one. The present results, 
although encouraging, must therefore be interpreted with caution; the fact that in some 
conditions less consonant and more dissonant information was searched, does not necessarily 
mean that there was no attempt to support the chosen alternative.  
Finally, although an attempt was made to create information for the second 
information set that could be inferred from the information contained in the first set, the 
redundancy was not perfect. Some of the parallel attributes used were only judged as 
moderately similar on average, for example, the attributes 'job as a student research assistant' 
and 'computing skills'. While it is relatively safe to assume that a person who has been a 
student research assistant has good computing skills, otherwise they would not have got the 
job, it does not necessarily mean that someone who has not been a student research assistant 
before will not have good computing skills. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that some 
outcomes had been anticipated by participants differently than intended and came as a 
surprise to them. In a future experiment employing the same procedure, it would be desirable 
to try to achieve real redundancy by using the same information, just expressed in a slightly 
different way. 
Information evaluation and integration at the final decision 
Analysis of participants' information evaluation during and after the final decision 
mainly focused on whether any differentiation and consolidation effects could be observed 
and whether they differed as a function of time and type of accountability. Despite the fact 
that participants were encouraged to adhere to their initial choice, by implying that two other 
committee members also preferred the candidate they preferred, a substantial number of them 
(19%) changed their decision. The likelihood of change did not differ as a function of type or 
time of accountability, however. It cannot be ruled out that some participants misunderstood 
the instructions and thought that all other committee members preferred a different 
alternative. Because any differentiation and consolidation processes would only be evident if 
participants had not changed their choice from the first to the final decision, the data for 
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participants for whom this was not the case were excluded from the analysis. This reduced the 
number of participants to 14 to 16 per condition and resulted in a loss of power. Hence, it may 
not be seen as surprising that many of the observed effects failed to reach standard 
significance levels. 
Importance differentiation was assessed by calculating the difference between 
participants' normalised weights for the attributes of information set1 elicited before any of 
the experimental manipulations and after the final decision. It had been expected that 
participants would increase the weights for attributes they had initially considered important 
and on which their chosen alternative had good outcomes, and /or decrease the weight for 
attributes they had initially considered less important and on which their chosen alternative 
had bad outcomes. It had also been expected that this tendency would be stronger for 
participants who had been made accountable before the final rather than the first decision. The 
results did not provide any evidence for this; on the contrary, they indicated a regression 
effect, where the weight of important attributes was decreased and that of unimportant ones 
increased, resulting in a more equal weight distribution. However, accountability has been 
previously found to increase the dilution effect (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock, Lerner, & 
Boettger, 1996), where individuals inappropriately take into account, that is, assign a too high 
weight to non-diagnostic information, and it is possible that the participants in this study here 
also displayed this tendency, especially in the situation of normative ambiguity they were 
faced with. Once any differences between conditions with regard to the first weight 
judgements were kept constant, there were no significant effects of the experimental 
manipulations on the calculated measures, except for a marginally significant tendency for 
participants who had been made externally accountable before the first decision to increase 
the weight for their individually third-most important attribute, whereas participants who had 
been made externally accountable before the final decision decreased it. This was not in line 
with expectations, but could be interpreted as supporting the dilution argument made earlier. 
Participants made externally accountable before the final decision may be seen as particularly 
prone to showing such a tendency in their responses, as their motivation to be seen to take all 
information into account should be particularly strong.  
Differentiation and consolidation effects had also been expected for actual and MAUT 
predicted overall ratings of alternatives. The only effect that approached significance was a 
Discussion and conclusions 
 195 
tendency for participants who had been made accountable before the final decision to show 
the expected larger MAUT predicted evaluative difference between their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative compared to participants who had been made accountable before the 
first decision. However, also the fact that only participants who had been made externally 
accountable before the final decision showed signs of differentiation and consolidation, by 
increasing the difference between their overall rating for the chosen and their average non-
chosen alternative, whereas in all other conditions no change or a decrease was observed, was 
consistent with predictions.  
In addition, a very interesting dissociation between the results for the actually 
observed and the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the overall ratings of the 
chosen and competing alternative was found. MAUT predictions were based on participants' 
unidimensional value and weight judgements before the experimental manipulations and after 
the final decision, and were calculated to test any joint effects of attractiveness restructuring 
and importance differentiation. The rationale behind this was that the MAUT prediction of the 
overall value of an alternative combines unidimensional values and weights in a 
multiplicatory fashion and thereby embodies the principle that attractiveness restructuring is 
most effective for attributes that are given a high weight. If significant attractiveness 
restructuring and importance differentiation occurred, the MAUT prediction based on 
unidimensional values and weights elicited after the final decision should be significantly 
larger than the MAUT prediction based on the first elicitation of unidimensional values and 
weights. It was found that, whereas the actual ratings for the chosen compared to the 
competing alternative did not show any differentiation and consolidation effects (on the 
contrary, the evaluative difference between these two alternatives was reduced over time in all 
conditions), the MAUT predictions of these ratings did; as expected, the largest (albeit not 
significant) increase in the difference between the chosen and competing alternative was 
found in the condition with external accountability introduced before the final decision and, 
more generally, when accountability had been introduced before the final rather than the first 
decision. It may be speculated that only when the opportunity to bolster the chosen alternative 
was subtle and covert, as in the case of unidimensional value and weights judgements, would 
participants engage in this process. When it was obvious, on the other hand, as in the case of 
having to rate the overall quality of their chosen and competing alternative, participants may 
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have felt reluctant to openly devalue the competing alternative, especially when they had been 
made externally accountable before the final decision. Another factor that may have meant 
that it was difficult to obtain the predicted differentiation and consolidation effects was the 
fact that a considerable number of participants (26% of those whose data had been entered in 
to the analysis) made the competing alternative their new second-best alternative, thereby 
acknowledging the alleged preferences of the other committee members. There were no 
significant systematic differences between conditions as to the likelihood of this happening, 
but it nevertheless meant that there was little scope for an increase in the difference between 
the chosen and the competing alternative; rather, the opposite was likely, given that the 
competing alternative had been judged worse before. These problems could have been 
avoided if the stalemate had always been said to involve participants’ preferred and second-
best alternative, as this would have eliminated the possibility for participants to keep their 
initial choice but change their second-best alternative. This would have forced them to decide 
between the two and would have made differentiation and consolidation processes more 
pronounced. It would not, however, have solved the problem of making different external 
norms salient to different participants. 
Although studies conducted within the framework of Diff Con theory (Svenson, 1992, 
1996) have provided evidence for the existence of various forms of differentiation and 
consolidation processes, attempts to demonstrate that accountability determines the strength 
of such effects have been unsuccessful so far. As reported in Chapter 4, Svenson, Ortega 
Rayo, Andersen, Sandberg and Svahlin (1994) did not find any facts restructuring 
consolidation when participants were made accountable before making a decision. A possible 
reason for this failure to find the predicted stronger consolidation in this case may have been 
the more thorough information processing instigated by pre-decisional accountability, which 
may be assumed to have improved participants' memory for attribute outcomes and prevented 
facts restructuring from occurring. Although participants in the present study were urged to 
report their perception of the value of information at the time when they made their 
judgements, similar memory effects and/or the wish to appear consistent in their ratings 
cannot be ruled out and would have interfered with any differentiation and consolidation 
effects. Also, the prediction derived from Diff Con theory that accountable participants will 
bolster their chosen alternative more strongly than non-accountable participants may be too 
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simplistic, as it does not take into account any impression management concerns of 
accountable individuals, especially those who are externally accountable. The findings of the 
present study seem to consistently suggest that such concerns were important, especially to 
individuals who had been made externally accountable before the final decision. When the 
preferences of the external audience are salient and the decision maker is sufficiently 
motivated to show some regard for them, external accountability may indeed, as suggested 
earlier, result in a 'sitting on the fence' strategy, that is, a decreased projected evaluative 
difference between the alternative preferred by the decision maker and the alternative thought 
to be preferred by the external audience, in an attempt to appear less extreme. However, as 
discussed above, a different picture may emerge, when there is an opportunity for hidden 
bolstering of the own and devaluation of the audience's preferred alternative. It seems that 
individuals are willing to engage in such processes, provided they remain covert. 
Unfortunately, the present experiment, due to the absence of any significant effects, does not 
allow any firm conclusions in this matter, but the observed data pattern certainly points in this 
direction.  
Justifications 
Finally, analysis of participants' written justifications also revealed impression 
management strategies, which, as expected, were stronger, for participants who had been 
made externally accountable. Generally, participants presented consonant arguments much 
more often than they did dissonant arguments, with a ratio of almost 9:1 on average. The 
overall number of consonant arguments that were presented did not differ significantly 
between experimental conditions, but there was a significant interaction effect between time 
and type of accountability for a particular type of consonant argument, namely negative 
aspects of the non-chosen alternatives. When participants had been made accountable before 
the first decision, internally accountable participants mentioned relatively more such 
arguments than externally accountable participants. When participants had been made 
accountable before the final decision, on the other hand, the opposite tended to be true, 
although not significantly so. The number of arguments mentioning the chosen alternative in a 
positive way was not significantly affected by the experimental variables.  
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Externally accountable participants were found to generate relatively more arguments 
mentioning positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than internally accountable 
participants. Yet, where negative aspects of the chosen alternative were concerned (the other 
type of dissonant argument that could be produced), internally accountable participants did so 
significantly more often than externally accountable participants. These findings are 
consistent with the previously discussed idea of externally accountable participants being 
concerned about making a good impression; they avoided letting their own choice appear 
vulnerable, but showed that they were aware of the advantages of other alternatives preferred 
by their external audience. They may have also adopted a strategy of then refuting the alleged 
advantages of the non-chosen alternatives. Lending support to this assumption was the fact 
that participants who had been made externally accountable before the final decision tended to 
mention a relatively larger number of negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than 
participants under internal accountability. However, given that the number of arguments 
mentioning the non-chosen alternatives was generally very small, these results should be 
viewed with caution.  
The other effect that could be observed was that participants under post-decisional 
rather than pre-decisional accountability generated a relatively smaller number of elaborations 
and of false reproductions supporting the chosen alternative. The most likely explanation for 
these effects is that these participants had not as much time to think about in depth and 
elaborate on as well as prepare strategic misrepresentations of information after having been 
made accountable, compared to participants who had already been made accountable before 
the first decision. 
Finally, unlike expected, the justifications of participants who had been made 
accountable before the final decision were not significantly more complex than those of 
participants who had been made accountable before the first decision. Rather, a (non-
significant) trend in the opposite direction emerged. Generally, the complexity of 
argumentation was very low, as participants did not engage in comparisons between 
alternatives very much, but mostly used one-sided arguments that only mentioned one 
alternative. This may have been partly due to the format of the justification, which asked 
participants to summarise their justification in keywords rather than give a verbal defence of 
their decision.  
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Conclusions 
Although the experiment on the whole did not support the predictions of the PMA 
directly and consistently, it provided some valuable insights into the constraints that operate 
on the effects of internal and external accountability on decision processes, most notably the 
importance of individuals' attention to external norms and impression management concerns. 
As stated by the PMA, the implied presence of others and the knowledge of one's 
performance being identifiable, which is inherent in external accountability demands, creates 
evaluation apprehension and induces a motivation to make a decision that can be easily 
justified to the external audience and make a favourable impression on others. This will bias 
the decision maker's information processing towards supporting the alternative that is 
perceived to be most justifiable, or, when accountability is only introduced after the decision 
maker has already committed him- or herself to an alternative, towards defending this choice 
to the external audience. However, impression management concerns mean that the decision 
maker does not want to be seen doing this too openly. A similar suggestion has been made 
previously by authors like Kunda (1990), Baumeister and Newman (1994) and Hsee (1995, 
1996). This fact has important implications for the measurement of information processing 
biases; they are most likely to be noticeable in covert measures, and not in measures where 
decision makers have to directly judge the quality of their preferred option compared to 
others. In the latter case, decision makers will keep the evaluative difference between their 
preferred alternative and other alternatives that may be preferred by their external audience 
small, in order to be able to change their choice in the face of external pressure without losing 
face should it be necessary, but also in order to signal that they take seriously any different 
opinion someone might have. This should be of particular importance to decision makers 
when there is normative ambiguity and decision makers cannot be sure about what reaction to 
expect from their audience, or when they anticipate dissent. This hypothesis can help to 
explain the failure of previous studies to find significant differentiation and consolidation 
effects as a consequence of accountability and provide a way forward of locating such effects 
in the future. 
Because of the problem of covert differentiation and consolidation, the present study 
did not manage to highlight the differences between the effects of pre-decisional internal and 
external accountability sufficiently, as unidimensional values and weights were not elicited 
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after the first decision, and there was therefore no opportunity for externally accountable 
participants to engage in such processes. As to the difference between these two forms of 
accountability after an initial commitment had been made, the PMA predicted that it would be 
reduced, because both externally and internally accountable participants would have a 
directional goal of supporting their previously chosen alternative. The introduction of a 
stalemate between their preferred and another alternative, however, meant that external norms 
were made implicitly salient not only to externally but also to internally accountable 
participants. The present findings suggest, however, that for internally accountable 
participants this effect was not as strong as for externally accountable participants, and this 
meant that internally accountable participants tended to be more inward-looking and less 
balanced in their information processing if they had been made accountable before the final 
decision. This was evident in a number of information search measures, such as the lowest 
observed depth of search, highest observed variability of search across alternatives, lowest 
observed degree of compensatory search and strongest concentration of search on the chosen 
alternative. Internal accountability before the first decision, conversely, resulted in exactly the 
opposite effects, namely the highest observed depth of search, lowest observed variability of 
search across alternatives, highest observed degree of compensatory search and least strong 
concentration of search on the chosen alternative. Also, whereas participants who had been 
made internally accountable before the final decision showed the strongest bias in their final 
information search against the competing alternative, participants who had been made 
internally accountable before the first decision displayed the weakest such bias. This tendency 
for a balanced information processing for participants who had been made internally 
accountable before the first decision was also evident in some of the information evaluation 
measures. These participants, for example, displayed the smallest degree of differentiation 
between the chosen and the average non-chosen as well as competing alternative, both in 
actual and MAUT predicted ratings. Hence, in this particular situation, internal accountability 
before the first decision seems to have had the most beneficial effects. Despite the fact that 
participants had already been made accountable some time before their final decision, their 
accuracy goals still seemed to be strongly salient and their motivation to support their 
previously chosen alternative relatively low. Participants who had been made internally 
accountable before the final decision, on the other hand, would have had a stronger 
motivation to protect their initial choice and at the same time lack the motivation to prepare 
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for a public defence induced by external accountability, therefore having the freedom to show 
the strongest bias in their information processing. 
Given the apparent significance of impression management and normative concerns, 
the second study, reported in the next chapter, focused on the effects of external 
accountability and adaptation to external audience preferences, depending on the extent of 
conflict between participants' own preferences and those of their audience. In a departure 
from the present study, external norms were made explicit and it was investigated how these 
norms influenced the decision maker's attention to and evaluation of particular attributes and 
alternatives. The paradigm used was similar to that adopted for the present study. In order to 
forego some of the problems encountered in the present study, however, some changes were 
made to the procedure. In order to allow participants to display covert differentiation and 
consolidation both after an initial and a final decision, unidimensional values and weights 
were elicited three times, before the first decision, after the first decision and after the final 
decision. These judgements were elicited not only for the attributes contained in the 
information set searched before the initial decision but also for their parallel attributes in the 
information set searched before the final decision, in order to see whether there would be any 
differentiation and consolidation for the latter as well. In addition, distracter attributes were 
introduced, in order to increase the number of judgements that had to be made to such an 
extent that it would be very difficult for participants to just remember their previous responses 
instead of reporting their preferences at the time when judgements were elicited. To eliminate 
the problem of any ceiling effects in the initial information search, the complexity of the task 
was reduced and participants were not told beforehand that they would have to judge each 
alternative as well. Also, the information presented in the second information set was highly 
redundant with that in the first, by expressing the information contained in the first set in a 
different format. Finally, in order to be able to compare the behaviour of participants who had 
been made accountable either before a first or before a final decision to that of non-
accountable participants, a control group was introduced that did not receive any 
accountability instructions at any time. 
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CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTABILITY TO REPRESENTATIVES  
OF DIFFERENT INTEREST GROUPS 
Introduction 
The aim of the following experiment was to study the norm-enforcement aspect of 
accountability, with respect to the mechanisms outlined in the PMA in Chapter 5. The model 
proposes that when the accountability manipulation suggests to individuals that their decision 
will be evaluated - by making them identifiable and providing certain norms or standards 
against which their performance can be measured - directional goals will become salient. As a 
consequence, individuals will bias their information evaluation and integration in such a way 
that the alternative that can be justified most easily will be favoured. Norms of evaluation may 
become salient through suggesting that the person or group to which individuals are 
accountable supports a particular view. For example, if individuals are told that they will have 
to justify their opinion or decision to a person with liberal views, they can anticipate that what 
they say will be evaluated in terms of how much it complies with liberal values. If the 
individual is made accountable to a conservative, on the other hand, the standard of evaluation 
is likely to be the extent to which expressed views are conservative. Tetlock's (1992) 
accountability model predicts that, in this case, individuals will employ an acceptability 
heuristic, whereby they adjust their view to that of their audience, that is, express liberal views 
when being made accountable to a liberal, and conservative views when being made 
accountable to a conservative (see Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Similarly, the PMA 
assumes that individuals will evaluate information they have searched to help them make a 
decision in such a way that the alternative which would be supported by the person or group 
they are accountable to will come out best. This, however, will only be the case if they have 
not already got a strong view as to which alternative they prefer. If they have already 
committed themselves to a different alternative in a previous decision, individuals are 
assumed to bias the information evaluation process in such a way that their previously chosen 
alternative will fare best, rather than the alternative which would be preferred by the group 
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they are accountable to. This may be both for impression management reasons (individuals 
may not want to admit that their previous decision was wrong or appear opportunistic) and for 
cognitive economy reasons (it may be less laborious to create more reasons for why one's 
previous decision was the right one than to undo it and go through the whole decision process 
again). The tendency to adjust to the preferences of the external audience may be expected to 
be moderated by a number of factors, for example, the nature of the individual's own 
preferences and their strength, and the pressure perceived to be or actually exerted by the 
external audience. Also, as we have seen in the previous chapter, individuals are likely to 
avoid any open expression of bias when they experience normative ambiguity or anticipate 
pressure from the external audience. 
Unlike in Tetlock's model, which predicts that individuals will not expend much 
cognitive effort when the views of the audience they are accountable to can be anticipated, the 
PMA proposes that feeling responsible for a decision will enhance the individual's wish to 
make an accurate decision and that information search will therefore become more extensive, 
especially with regard to information that may be regarded as important by the person or 
group the individual is accountable to. Again, this will only be the case if the individual has 
not already committed him- or herself to a decision. If a decision has already been made, the 
information search process is likely to become biased to support the previous decision.  
In the experiment devised to test these hypotheses, the decision scenario presented to 
the participants came from the domain of Computer Science. The participants, who were all 
students of Computer Science, were asked to decide which of four CASE (Computer Aided 
Software Engineering) tools to buy for an insurance company. CASE tools are meta-programs, 
that is, programs that support the software development process, particularly the requirements 
analysis and design specification stage of this process. 
In order to create a situation in which it was plausible for participants to be 
accountable to different interest groups, the following scenario was devised. Participants were 
asked to imagine being head of the information technology division of a company that wanted 
to acquire a CASE tool. The decision was said to be made by a committee which consisted of 
the participants themselves, a representative of the prospective users of the program, that is, 
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the company’s programmers, and a representative of the company’s management. Participants 
were told that, after having made a decision on their own, they would meet with the other 
committee members and discuss the alternatives in order to arrive at a joint decision. 
Participants were either made accountable to the users of the program or to the management 
of the company, by telling them that it would be particularly important to convince either the 
user representative (because the users would have to work with the program) or the 
management representative (because the management would have to make the necessary 
financial resources available) of their decision. This was expected to make either user benefits 
or cost concerns salient and constituted the 'type of accountability' manipulation. 
The second factor manipulated was the time when the accountability manipulation was 
introduced, either before participants made a first decision or before they made a final 
decision. The two factors were fully crossed, resulting in four experimental groups. There was 
also a control group, members of which were not made accountable at any time.  
Information search was measured by asking participants to search an information 
board on which information about four alternatives with regard to four attributes (two user 
attributes and two cost attributes) was presented, and recording their search process. 
Participants had to search information twice, once before they made a first decision and a 
second time before they made a final decision. The attributes and attribute outcomes for the 
second search were largely redundant with those of the first search; either the same fact was 
expressed slightly differently, for example, the user interface design was either described in 
words or expressed as a value on a satisfaction scale, or there was a natural correlation 
between the attributes, for example, the extent of training required and training costs. This 
was done so that participants would be able to anticipate the value of the information they 
searched, and so that it would be possible to test whether information search after a 
commitment was biased to support the previous conclusion. Information evaluation and 
integration was measured by participants' choices, their overall judgements of the suitability of 
each alternative and their judgements of attribute outcomes and attribute weights, which were 
elicited before participants made their first decision, after they had made their first decision 
and after they had made their final decision.  
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With regard to choices, it was predicted that participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision would adjust their first decision to the group they had 
been made accountable to, that is, participants who had been made accountable to the users of 
the program would be more likely to choose alternatives with good outcomes on attributes 
which would be important to users of the CASE tool, whereas participants who had been 
made accountable to the management of the company would be more likely to choose 
alternatives with good outcomes on cost attributes. Participants who had not been made 
accountable were expected to make a decision that followed their own preferences, as 
indicated by their initial evaluation of unidimensional attribute outcomes and weight 
judgements. For the final decision, participants who had only been made accountable 
immediately before this decision were not expected to change their first decision and adjust to 
the preferences of the group they had been made accountable to, but were instead expected to 
stick to their initial decision. A choice in accordance with the preference of the group they had 
been made accountable to was therefore only expected for participants who had already been 
made accountable before the first decision, and for participants who had been made 
accountable before the final decision and whose own preferences coincided with those of the 
group they had been made accountable to.  
A similar pattern was expected for participants' weight judgements. In line with 
Svenson's (1992, 1996) Diff Con theory, it was predicted that, after the first decision, 
participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program would report higher 
weights for user attributes than participants who had been made accountable to the 
management. The latter, on the other hand, would report higher cost attribute weights than 
participants who had been made accountable to the users. This importance differentiation 
would happen in order to adjust to the values of the group participants had been made 
accountable to and maximise the evaluative difference between their chosen and the other 
alternatives. In contrast, it was expected that non-accountable participants would only report 
high user attribute weights if their own preferences were user-oriented and high cost attribute 
weights if their own preferences were cost-oriented. After the final decision, participants who 
had been made accountable before the first decision were expected to further increase either 
their user attribute weights or their cost attribute weights, depending on which group they had 
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been made accountable to, whereas participants who had only been made accountable before 
the final decision would not show any adjustment to the preferences of the group they had 
been made accountable to. Instead, they were expected to increase the weights for attributes 
which supported their own preferences, especially if they were in a position of strong conflict, 
because their own preferences contradicted the preferences of the group they had been made 
accountable to. 
Diff Con theory predicts that, as well as weights, participants will change their 
unidimensional value judgements in order to maximise the evaluative difference between their 
chosen alternative and their non-chosen alternatives. This tendency can be captured in the 
difference between the MAUT prediction for the chosen alternative and the average non-
chosen alternative, since MAUT models combine unidimensional value and weight 
judgements when predicting the overall value of an alternative. Because this is a covert way of 
achieving differentiation and consolidation, since participants judge a multitude of single 
components that have to be combined by the experimenter in order to derive a model 
prediction, it was expected that, when given the opportunity, participants would engage in it. 
The MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative was expected to be larger for participants who had been made accountable than 
participants who had not been made accountable, and larger for participants who experienced 
conflict because their own preferences contradicted those of the group they had been made 
accountable to than for participants who did not experience this conflict.  
Conditions were also expected to differ in terms of the difference between MAUT 
predictions for alternatives complying with user preferences and MAUT predictions for 
alternatives complying with management preferences. The pattern of results was expected to 
follow the predictions for attribute weights. The differences should be larger for participants 
who had been made accountable to the users of the program than participants who had been 
made accountable to the management of the company, but only if they had been made 
accountable before the first decision. Non-accountable participants and participants who had 
been made accountable before the final decision were expected to show a larger difference if 
their own preferences were user-oriented rather than management-oriented, and particularly 
large differences if they were under additional pressure because they had been made 
CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTABILITY TO DIFFERENT INTEREST GROUPS  
 208 
accountable to the management and therefore their own preferences clashed with those of the 
group they had been made accountable to. 
Because participants' actual suitability judgements for the alternatives they had to 
choose between, including their ratings of user- and management-oriented alternatives, would 
make any differentiation and consolidation obvious to the external audience, they were not 
expected to show this bias unless they had complied with the preferences of the external 
audience. This was predicted to be more likely when participants' own attitude and that of 
their audience were the same. Hence, whereas the MAUT predictions were expected to show 
stronger evidence of differentiation and consolidation for participants who experienced a 
conflict between their own attitude and that of their external audience than participants who 
did not, the opposite was predicted to be evident in actual suitability ratings. 
With regard to information search, it was expected that during both searches, 
accountable participants would search more information than participants who had not been 
made accountable. Accountable participants were also expected to show a lower variability of 
search across alternatives and attributes, to display more compensatory information processing 
in their search, to display a pattern of search that suggested less attribute-based processing and 
to show a lower concentration of search on the chosen alternative than non-accountable 
participants. For the final information search, those participants who had been made 
accountable only before this search were expected to display these tendencies to a stronger 
extent than participants who had already been made accountable before the first search.  
In addition, if participants had been made accountable before the first search, those 
who had been made accountable to the users of the program were expected to search more 
user information, whereas participants who had been made accountable to the management of 
the company were expected to search more cost information. For non-accountable 
participants, on the other hand, the type of information they searched was expected to vary as 
a function of their own preferences. During the final information search, again only 
participants who had been made accountable before the first decision were expected to adjust 
the type of information they searched to the group they had been made accountable to.  
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Finally, it was expected that after a first decision had been made, information search 
would be biased to bolster the previously chosen alternative, that is, participants would search 
information which they could expect to support their chosen alternative and devalue their non-
chosen alternatives. This tendency was expected to be stronger for accountable than for non-
accountable participants and particularly strong if participants experienced a conflict because 
their own preferences opposed those of the group they had been made accountable to. Since it 
was expected that participants who had been made accountable before they made a 
commitment would have adjusted their preferences to those of the group they had been made 
accountable to, their information search was expected to be less biased than that of 
participants who had only been made accountable after they had made a previous 
commitment, especially if their own attitude coincided with that of the group they had been 
made accountable to.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 80 students of Computer Science at the Technical University of 
Darmstadt, 73 males and 7 females. The number of semesters they had studied Computer 
Science ranged from 1 to 21 semesters, with a mean of 7.79. For 66 participants, Computer 
Science was their main subject, for 14 participants it was a minor subject. The participants’ 
age ranged from 20 to 35 years, the mean age was 24.28 years. Participants received DM 10 as 
remuneration for their participation, or a lottery ticket with which they could win between DM 
20 and DM 500. After completion of the data collection, 13 winners were drawn. 
Design 
Two factors were manipulated, type of accountability (to the company’s users of a 
software program vs. the management of the company) and time of introducing accountability 
(before a first decision vs. after a first and before a final decision). Both factors were varied 
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between subjects, resulting in four experimental groups with 16 participants per group. A 
control group with 16 participants who were not made accountable at any time was also 
employed. In addition, participants' attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) was included as a 
between-subjects factor in the analyses. 
Materials 
The decision problem put to the participants involved selecting one out of four CASE 
(Computer Aided Software Engineering) tools. The description of the decision scenario, 
attributes and attribute outcomes was developed with the help of two experts, one information 
technology consultant and one member of staff at the Computer Science department at the 
Technical University of Darmstadt. The decision scenario was closely modelled on a typical 
decision problem encountered by the consultant in her daily practice.  
Like in the previous experiment, in order to be able to assess the extent of bias in 
information search after a previous commitment, it was necessary to construct two sets of 
redundant information. These sets had to fulfil certain criteria. Firstly, the information 
contained in the second set had to be redundant with the information contained in the first set, 
in such a way that participants would be able to predict the value of the outcome of a 
particular alternative on a particular attribute from their knowledge of the alternative’s 
outcome on the parallel attribute. Secondly, in order to be able to test whether participants 
would utilise different information, depending on the group they had been made accountable 
to, the information sets had to contain an equal number of attributes that would be regarded as 
important either by the users of a CASE tool or by the management of the company buying the 
tool. Thirdly, in order to control for effects of format of description of attribute values (Huber, 
1980; Stone & Schkade, 1991), attributes had to meet the condition that their outcomes could 
be expressed both in a verbal and in a numerical format1.  
                                                 
1 Stone & Schkade (1991), in an information board study, found that verbal descriptions of attribute outcomes 
resulted in a less attribute-based and more alternative-based information search, and less compensatory 
processing compared to numerical descriptions. This can be explained by comparisons within attributes being 
more difficult and effortful for words than for numbers. This is supported by a study by Huber (1980), who found 
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Four alternatives, defined by their outcomes on two sets of four parallel attributes, 
were constructed. Two of the four attributes in the first set were user attributes (user interface 
design and method support), the other two attributes were cost attributes (hardware costs and 
training requirements). The parallel attributes in the second set were satisfaction with the user 
interface design, satisfaction with the method support, hardware requirements, and training 
costs, respectively. Each alternative had a positive outcome on two attributes and a negative 
outcome on the two other attributes (see Table 7.1)2. This was done in order to make the 
overall attractiveness of the different alternatives as similar as possible to each other if an 
equal weighting of attributes was applied, while at the same time creating alternatives that 
would be differently attractive to participants if they reacted to being made accountable to a 
particular group by weighting the attributes assumed to be important to that group more 
heavily than the other attributes. 
Table 7.1. The valence of attribute outcomes for each alternative in information set 1*. 
Alternative A B C D 
user attribute 1  
(verbal description) 
- + - + 
user attribute 2 
(numerical description) 
+ + - - 
cost attribute 1 
(verbal description) 
- - + + 
cost attribute 2 
(numerical description) 
+ - + - 
Note: * This was the same for information set 2, except that attribute outcomes expressed in a numerical format 
in information set 1 were now expressed in verbal terms and vice versa. 
+ stands for a positive outcome, - for a negative outcome.  
For reasons of counterbalancing, information set 1 contained information about the 
user interface design (verbal), satisfaction with the method support (numerical), training 
requirements (verbal), and hardware costs (numerical), while information set 2 contained 
                                                                                                                                                        
that in participants’ verbal protocols, direct comparisons were more frequent with numerical data, while 
evaluative statements were more frequent with verbal descriptions.  
2 Negativity in this context refers to a less positive outcome. To support the cover story, which stated that the 
alternatives to be considered by the participants had been pre-selected from a larger pool of alternatives, none of 
them had clearly negative features. 
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information about the satisfaction with the user interface design (numerical), method support 
(verbal), training costs (numerical) and hardware requirements (verbal) (see Appendices 4 and 
5 for a full description of the alternatives). 
Procedure 
Table 7.2 shows a representation of the sequence of events during the experiment. 
They are explained in more detail below.  
Table 7.2. Procedure.  
intro V1 S1 D1 V2 S2 D2 JUST V3 PEQ 
  
 manipulation 
 of 
 accountability 
  
intro V1 S1 D1 V2 S2 D2 JUST V3 PEQ 
Note: Capital letters indicate elicitation parts, lower-case letters indicate instruction parts. 
 intro: introduction to the decision problem 
  V1, V2, V3: elicitation of unidimensional values and weights 
 S1, S2: information search  
 D1, D2: decision 
 JUST: justification 
 PEQ: post-experimental questionnaire 
 
Participants took part in the experiment in individual sessions. Written instructions and response sheets 
were handed out to them by the experimenter, who was present throughout the experiment and gave additional 
explanations if necessary. Participants were first introduced to the decision problem: 
Intro: Introduction to the decision problem  
Participants were asked to imagine being head of the information technology division of a large German 
insurance company. They were told that the company had suffered economic losses through stiff competition 
from foreign insurance companies. As a result, internal organisational procedures were to be revised to make 
them more efficient; this revision required new software developments. In order to support software 
development, it had been decided to acquire a CASE tool. Following some additional information about the 
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current programming environment and the software development method the department planned to use, 
participants were told that four tools had been pre-selected by a team of testers. The decision about which CASE 
tool to buy would be made by a committee consisting of themselves, a representative of the prospective users of 
the program, that is, the company’s programmers, and a representative of the company’s management. Given that 
the other two committee members represented different interests, it was expected that participants would feel that 
their own preference would be decisive and therefore feel responsible for the decision they made. 
First, participants’ preferences, that is, unidimensional values and weights, were elicited for 12 
attributes, 6 user and 6 cost attributes. Two attributes in each set, that is, 4 of the 12 attributes, were distracters, 
two of them user-oriented (vendor support and documentation of results) and two management-oriented (tool 
price and vendor's reputation). They were not used in the later description of alternatives.  
V1: First elicitation of unidimensional values and weights  
After going through an example that illustrated how value judgements had to be made, in order to 
familiarise participants with the procedure, four outcomes were presented for each of the 12 attributes, which had 
to be rated on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 100 (very good). Participants were not aware of the fact that some of 
these were the outcomes which would later be used to describe the alternatives. The order of presentation of 
attributes as well as the order of presentation of attribute outcomes within each attribute was randomised for each 
participant. 
Weights for the 12 attributes were elicited with the swing method developed by von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards (1986, see Chapter 6 for a detailed description). To avoid making the redundancy of some of the 
attributes salient to participants, weights were elicited in two separate sets, one consisting of 6 and the other of 7 
attributes. Each set contained the attributes of one of the information sets plus two or three distracters. One 
distracter attribute included in the first weight elicitation set, namely ‘vendor support’, was added to the attributes 
of the second set, in order to be able to relate the weights obtained in the first set to the weights obtained in the 
second set. The order of presentation of attributes within each weight elicitation set was randomised for each 
participant. 
Following the elicitation of unidimensional values and weights, accountability was manipulated in the 
two groups for which accountability was to be introduced before a first decision would be made.  
Manipulations of accountability 
Participants were reminded that they had been asked to assume the role of head of the information 
technology division, and that the final decision about which CASE tool to buy would be made by the project 
committee, consisting of themselves and two other members. They were told that each committee member was 
meant to first arrive at a decision on their own, before the committee members would meet, discuss the 
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alternatives and agree on which CASE tool to acquire for the project. It was made explicit that, after the first part 
of the experiment, participants would meet with two other participants who had been asked to assume the roles of 
the other committee members and that, following a group discussion, they were expected to arrive at a joint 
decision. 
Accountability to users. Participants in these conditions were told that in the later group discussion, it 
would be particularly important to convince the representative of the users of the correctness of their own 
decision, since the users would be the people who had to work with the tool. 
Accountability to management. Participants in these conditions were told that in the later group 
discussion, it would be particularly important to convince the representative of the management of the 
correctness of their decision, since the management would have to make the necessary financial resources 
available. 
In order to make the accountability manipulation more credible and more powerful, participants were 
asked to sign a form declaring their consent that the group discussion was tape-recorded3. The tape-recorder was 
visible all the time, lying on the table at which the participants filled in their response sheets, at a distance of ca. 
50 cm.  
No accountability. Participants in the control group and in the two conditions in which accountability 
was only manipulated after a first decision had been made received none of the above information and they were 
not asked to sign a consent form. Also, no tape-recorder was visible to them. 
After the accountability manipulation, participants were provided with instructions about how to search 
information about the four available alternatives and asked to make a decision for one of them.  
S1: Information search set1 
In order to monitor information search, the information board technique (Payne, 1976; see Chapter 6 for 
a more detailed description) was used. Information about four tools, named A, B, C, and D, was presented in an 
attribute-by-alternative matrix, with the alternatives constituting the columns and the attributes constituting the 
rows of the matrix. The information items were printed on cards and initially not visible. Participants had to turn 
over a card in order to be able to see the information given on it, and put it back again so that the information was 
not visible anymore before turning over the next card. Participants were free to search as many items of 
information as they wanted, and were allowed to look at the same item as often as they liked. The sequence in 
which cards were turned over was recorded by the experimenter.  
                                                 
3 This is a manipulation that has first been suggested and employed by Tetlock (1983a, b). 
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D1:  First decision and suitability judgements  
Participants indicated which tool they would choose and also rated each tool in terms of how suitable it 
was for the company. This was done on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely unsuitable) to 100 (extremely 
suitable). Participants had not been told in advance about these ratings, in order to avoid an effect on the decision 
process, which has been shown to be more compensatory when ratings of alternatives are called for compared to 
making a choice (see Westenberg, 1991, for a review). In addition, participants rated how difficult the decision 
had been (on a scale ranging from 1 ‘very easy’ to 7 ‘very difficult’), how confident they were about having made 
a good decision (on a scale ranging from 1 ‘very unsure’ to 7 ‘very confident’) and how strong their need had 
been to make a good decision (on a scale ranging from 1 ‘very weak’ to 7 ‘very strong’). 
After participants had made their decision and provided their ratings, unidimensional values and weights 
were elicited for a second time. 
V2: Second elicitation of unidimensional values and weights  
Participants rated the outcomes of all attributes including the distracter attributes as they had done at the 
beginning of the experiment. Weights were also elicited in the same way as before. 
This was followed by the manipulation of accountability for participants in the ‘accountability before the 
final decision’ conditions.  
Manipulation of accountability 
Accountability either to the users of the tool or the management of the company was manipulated in the 
same way as described above. Participants in the control group and in the ‘accountability before the first 
decision’ conditions did not receive any information at this point.  
Subsequently, participants were given the opportunity to search additional information about the tools 
and told to make a final decision. 
S2: Information search set2 
As before, the information that could be searched was presented in form of a matrix on an information 
board. In the upper half of the board the information items participants had looked at during their first search 
were still present and permanently visible; the information items they had not searched were removed from the 
board, so that they were not accessible anymore. Participants searched information in the same way as before; the 
sequence of search was again recorded by the experimenter.  
D2:  Final decision and suitability judgements 
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Participants announced their final decision, rated the suitability of each alternative again and responded 
to questions requiring them to rate the difficulty of the decision, their certainty about having made a good 
decision and the strength of their need to make a good decision. 
This was followed by a written justification of their choice. 
JUST: Justification 
Participants had to justify their choice in writing. Participants in the control group were asked to state 
the reasons for their choice, participants in the experimental groups were asked to write down the reasons they 
would give in their discussion with the other committee members.  
The justification was followed by the third and last elicitation of unidimensional values and weights. 
V3: Third elicitation of unidimensional values and weights 
The third elicitation of unidimensional values and weights followed the procedure described above. 
PEQ: Post-experimental questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to provide a number of ratings, which partly 
served as manipulation checks. First, they rated the similarity between pairs of attributes on a 5-point scale, 
ranging from 1 ‘very dissimilar’ to 5 ‘very similar’. The pairs consisted of all possible combinations of the 8 
attributes contained in information sets 1 and 2, altogether 28 of them. The order of presentation of the 28 pairs 
of attributes was randomised for each participant. 
Finally, participants rated 
• how much they had expected to have to justify their decision (on a scale from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very much’) 
• how strongly they had felt a need to be able to justify their first decision (on a scale from 1 ‘very weak’ to 7 
‘very strong’) 
• how strongly they had felt a need to be able to justify their final decision (on a scale from 1 ‘very weak’ to 7 
‘very strong’) 
• how useful they had found the information that could be accessed during the final information search (on a 
scale from 1 ‘not all useful’ to 7 ‘very useful’). 
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Results 
Similarity between attributes 
Analysis of the similarity ratings participants provided at the end of the experiment 
showed that the attempt to create information sets with redundant attributes had been 
successful. The mean similarity ratings of pairs of redundant attributes all exceeded a value of 
4, suggesting that these attributes had been perceived by the participants as highly similar on 
average. None of the other attribute pairings showed mean ratings that came close to those for 
the parallel attributes (see Appendix 3 for a complete list of results). Table 7.3 shows mean 
normalised weights and similarity ratings for the attributes that were used. 
Table 7.3. Mean normalised weights and similarity ratings for the attributes used in both 
information sets. 
 
Information Set 1 
  
Information Set 2 
 
Attribute Labels 
 
Weight 
 
Similarity 
 
Weight 
 
Attribute Labels 
 
user interface design 
 
0.37 
 
4.82 
 
0.33 
satisfaction with user 
interface design 
 
hardware costs 
 
0.12 
 
4.76 
 
0.15 
hardware 
requirements 
satisfaction with 
method support 
 
0.33 
 
4.70 
 
0.34 
 
method support 
 
training requirements 
 
0.17 
 
4.35 
 
0.17 
 
training costs 
Note: Similarity ratings were given on a scale from 1 (very dissimilar) to 5 (very similar). 
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Attitude 
Since many of the following analyses include participants' attitude as an explanatory 
variable, it will first be explained how attitude was measured and on what basis participants 
were classified as having either an attitude that supported user values (a pro-user attitude) or 
an attitude that supported management values (a pro-management attitude). The attitude 
measure was derived from participants’ initial unidimensional value and weight judgements, 
which had been elicited before any experimental manipulation. More specifically, for each 
participant the MAUT prediction of the overall value of the alternative with exclusively 
positive outcomes on the user attributes and exclusively negative outcomes on the cost 
attributes (alternative B, pure user alternative) was calculated. This prediction combined the 
normalised weight and value judgements for the eight experimental attributes and their 
respective outcomes by feeding them into the simple linear additive MAUT model specified 
in equation 1 (see Chapter 1). It was assumed that someone whose attitude was inclined 
towards user considerations would give preference judgements which resulted in a high 
overall predicted value for the pure user alternative, whereas the preference judgements of 
someone who was more management-oriented should have resulted in a low predicted overall 
value for this alternative. Therefore, a median split was carried out on the MAUT prediction 
for the pure user alternative, in order to classify participants according to their attitude. The 
obtained median was high (66.32), indicating that participants generally attached high weight 
to user attributes4 . For participants with a value below the median, however, this tendency 
was less marked, and they will therefore be referred to as having a pro-management attitude. 
Participants with a value above the median will be referred to as having a pro-user attitude. 
                                                 
4 This was not surprising, given that in their training as programmers user considerations featured highly. 
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First decision  
Information search 
The examined process variables were the same as described in experiment 1. The 
effects of accountability and attitude on these variables and on the type of searched 
information were analysed and are summarised in Table 7.4. 
1. Depth of search 
Information search was generally exhaustive. The overall mean percentage of total 
number of information items searched was 115 %. This means that some information items 
must have been accessed at least twice. The overall mean percentage of different cells 
searched was 83%, on average 13.35 of the 16 different available items were accessed.  
It had been predicted that accountable participants would show a deeper information 
search, that is, search more information than non-accountable participants. To test this 
hypothesis, the 'accountability to users' and 'accountability to the management' conditions 
were pooled and compared to the 'no accountability' conditions. A two-factorial ANOVA, 
testing the effects of accountability and attitude, was performed on both the percentage of total 
number of items searched and the percentage of different cells searched. The expected 
accountability main effect was not significant for either of these measures, although the 
observed differences between conditions were in the predicted direction (total number of 
items searched: accountability: M = 123%, no accountability: M = 111%; different cells 
searched: accountability: M = 84%, no accountability: M = 82%). In both cases, there were 
significant main effects of attitude, however (total number of items searched: F(1,76) = 8.26, 
p = .005; different cells searched: F(1,76) = 8.12, p = .006). These effects will be discussed in 
more detail below, as part of the analyses of the effects of different types of accountability. 
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Table 7.4. Process measures for the first information search, as a function of type of 
accountability and attitude. 
  Accountability 
  No To Users To the Management 
  Pro User 
(n=24) 
Pro Man. 
(n=24) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
1. Depth of search  
(in %) 
      
 total # of items 101 122 108 107 90 167 
 different cells 77 88 88 82 68 95 
2. Searched user  
information (in %)  
      
 total # of items1 62 55 63 62 64 54 
 different cells2 60 53 58 58 60 51 
3. Variability of  
search  
      
across alternatives       
 total # of items 1.41 1.39 1.16 1.33 1.64 1.75 
 different cells 0.78 0.64 0.49 0.59 0.98 0.28 
across attributes       
 total # of items 1.29 1.29 1.52 1.10 1.37 1.23 
 different cells 0.69 0.39 0.62 0.55 0.84 0.20 
4. Compensatory  
processing 
0.50 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.37 0.83 
5. Pattern of search 
(Payne Index) 
-0.49 -0.22 -0.59 -0.19 -0.26 -0.22 
6. Concentration of  
search 
      
 total # of items 0.41 0.24 0.32 0.42 0.58 0.27 
 different cells 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.50 0.06 
1 For each participant, the number of user items searched was divided by the total number of items they had 
searched and transformed into a percentage.  
2 For each participant, the number of user information cells accessed was divided by the number of different cells 
they had searched and transformed into a percentage. 
 
In order to test the effects of type of accountability and attitude, 3 (type of 
accountability: no vs. to users vs. to the management) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-
management) ANOVAs were conducted. The analyses showed a significant main effect of 
participants’ attitude on the percentage of total number of information items searched (F(1,74) 
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= 7.66, p = .007). Participants with a pro-management attitude searched a higher percentage of 
information than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 130% vs. M = 101%). The reason 
for this initially unexpected result could be that, in contrast to participants with a pro-user 
attitude, who only focus on user attributes and therefore search relatively little information, 
participants with a pro-management attitude cannot afford to only focus on cost attributes. 
Instead, cost-benefit trade-offs have to be made, in order to identify the product that is 
reasonably good and not too expensive at the same time. This would mean that people with a 
pro-management attitude have to take more factors into account than people with a pro-user 
attitude and therefore should search more information. If this was the case, participants with a 
pro-management attitude should have also searched more different cells than participants with 
a pro-user attitude. This was indeed the case (M = 88% vs. M = 78%, F(1,74) = 7.37, p = 
.008). Contrary to the original predictions, there was no main effect of type of accountability 
on the percentage of total number of items searched, but a significant interaction between type 
of accountability and attitude was revealed (F(2,74) = 3.18, p = .047, see Figure 7.1). A 
simple main effects analysis showed that the accountability manipulation did not significantly 
affect participants with a pro-user attitude, but did have a significant effect on participants 
with a pro-management attitude (F(2,74) = 4.19, p = .019). The latter searched a higher 
percentage of information if they had been made accountable to the management of the 
company than if they had either not been made accountable at all (M = 167% vs. M = 122%, 
t(79) = 2.51, p = .014) or had been made accountable to the users of the program (M = 167% 
vs. M = 107%, t(79) = 2.61, p = .011). Also, the effect of attitude depended on the 
accountability condition participants were in (F(3,74) = 4.61, p = .005). The only significant 
difference was found in the 'accountability to management' condition, where participants with 
a pro-management attitude searched a higher percentage of information than participants with 
a pro-user attitude (M = 167% vs. M = 90%, t(79) = 3.34, p = .001).  
A significant interaction between type of accountability and attitude was also obtained 
for the percentage of different cells searched (F(2, 74) = 4.30, p = .017). A simple main 
effects analysis indicated that participants with a pro-user attitude were significantly affected 
by the accountability manipulation, whereas participants with a pro-management attitude were 
not (F(2,74) = 3.20, p = .047). Participants with a pro-user attitude searched a higher 
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percentage of different cells when they had been made accountable to users, compared to 
when they had been made accountable to the management (M = 88% vs. M = 68%, t(79) = 
2.50, p = .015). In addition, the effect of attitude was dependent on the accountability 
manipulation (F(3,74) = 6.03, p = .001). Participants in the 'no accountability' and 
'accountability to the management' conditions searched a higher percentage of different cells 
when they had a pro-management attitude than when they had a pro-user attitude (no 
accountability: M = 88% vs. M = 77%, t(79) = 2.37, p = .021; accountability to management: 
M = 89% vs. M = 68%, t(79) = 3.47, p = .001). There was no significant difference between 
participants with a pro-management and a pro-user attitude in the 'accountability to users' 
conditions. Again, the expected main effect of type of accountability on percentage of 
different cells searched was not significant. 
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Figure 7.1. Mean percentage of items searched during the first information search (based on 
the total number of items searched), as a function of type of accountability and 
attitude. 
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2. Searched user information  
The items searched were further classified as to whether they related to user 
information or whether they related to cost information. The proportion of information 
searched that was related to user attributes (user interface design and satisfaction with method 
support) and to cost attributes (hardware costs and training requirements), out of the total 
number of information items searched and out of the number of different cells searched, was 
calculated and transformed into a percentage. A balanced search of both types of information 
would have resulted in a 50:50 split. Only the results relating to user information are 
presented in Table 7.4, since the results for cost information represent the complimentary 
values to arrive at 100% and are therefore redundant.  
Overall, participants preferred user information over cost information, although this 
difference was less pronounced for the different cells searched than for the total number of 
items searched (M(user/total) = 60%, M(cost/total)=40%, M(user/different cells) = 56%, 
M(cost/different cells) = 44%). The fact that user information was preferred is consistent with 
the fact that, generally, participants' attitudes were more user-oriented. 
It had been expected that participants who had been made accountable to the users of 
the program would search a higher percentage of user information than participants who had 
not been made accountable or who had been made accountable to the management, resulting 
in a main effect of type of accountability. Two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of type 
of accountability and attitude were performed on the percentage of user information related to 
the total number of items searched as well as different cells searched. The only significant 
effects obtained were significant main effects of attitude on the percentage of searched user 
information for the total number of items searched (F(1,74) = 5.35, p = .024) and the 
percentage of searched user information for different cells searched (F(1,74) = 4.67, p = .034). 
As expected, participants with a pro-user attitude searched more user information than 
participants with a pro-management attitude (total number of items searched: M = 63% vs. M 
= 56%, different cells searched: M = 59% vs. M = 53%). There were neither significant main 
effects of type of accountability nor significant interactions between type of accountability and 
attitude on both measures, although the obtained pattern of results was consistent with 
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expectations. For the percentage of searched user information related to the total number of 
items searched as well as different cells searched, simple main effect analyses indeed 
indicated that the effect of attitude was dependent on the particular accountability condition 
(total number of items searched: F(3,74) = 3.04, p = .034, different cells searched: F(3,74) = 
3.54, p = .019). A significant and marginally significant difference, respectively, between 
participants with a pro-user and a pro-management attitude was only found for participants in 
the 'no accountability' and the 'accountability to the management' conditions. In these 
conditions, participants with a pro-user attitude searched a higher percentage of user 
information than participants with a pro-management attitude (total number of items searched: 
no accountability: M = 62% vs. M = 55%, t(79) = 2.37, p =.020, accountability to the 
management: M = 64% vs. M = 54%, t(79) = 1.84, p = .070; different cells searched: no 
accountability: M = 60% vs. M = 53%, t(79) = 2.63, p = .010, accountability to the 
management: M = 60% vs. M = 51%, t(79) = 1.92, p = .059). Also, as expected, the 
percentage of searched user information for participants with a pro-management attitude 
tended to be higher when they had been made accountable to the users of the program, 
compared to when they had not been made accountable (total number of items searched: M = 
62% vs. M = 55%, t(79) = 1.44, p = .155, different cells searched: M = 58% vs. M = 53%, 
t(79) = 1.44, p = .153) or had been made accountable to the management (total number of 
items searched: M = 62% vs. M = 54%, t(79) = 1.48, p = .143, different cells searched: 58% 
vs. 51%, t(79) = 1.54, p = .127). The mean percentage of searched user information (based on 
the total number of items searched) observed in the different conditions is shown in Figure 
7.2.  
3.  Variability of search 
The overall mean variability of search across alternatives and attributes, computed for 
the search of different cells, was 0.65 across alternatives and 0.54 across attributes. The fact 
that both values are greater than 0 indicates that participants did not search an equal number 
of attributes for each alternative and did not search an equal number of alternatives with 
respect to each attribute. Variability of search computed for the total number of items 
searched takes repeated searches of the same cells into account and therefore can shed more 
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light on the kind of information that received particular attention when information was 
searched more than once. The overall mean variability of search across alternatives computed 
for the total number of items searched was slightly higher than the overall mean variability of 
search across attributes (M = 1.43 vs. M = 1.30). This indicates that alternatives were attended 
to more unevenly than attributes, when the same information was searched more than once. 
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Figure 7.2. Mean percentage of searched user information (based on the total number of 
items searched), as a function of type of accountability and attitude.  
It had been predicted that accountable participants would show a lower variability of 
search for both alternatives and attributes than participants who had not been made 
accountable. This tendency was emergent in the data only for variability of search across 
alternatives for different cells searched (accountability: M = 0.56, no accountability: M = 
0.71), but did not reach standard significance levels. The variability of search across 
alternatives computed for the total number of items searched was, in fact, higher for 
accountable participants than non-accountable participants, but, again, not significantly so (M 
= 1.47 vs. M = 1.40). The variability of search across attributes, both for the total number of 
items searched and for different cells searched, was virtually the same for accountable and 
non-accountable participants (total number of items searched: M = 1.31 vs. M = 1.29, 
different cells searched: M = 0.54 vs. M = 0.54). The only significant effect in the analyses, a 
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main effect of attitude, was obtained for variability of search across attributes computed for 
different cells searched (F(1,76) = 10.01, p = .002)5. It will be discussed in more detail below. 
The ANOVAs testing the effects of type of accountability and attitude on variability of 
search across alternatives, computed for the total number of items searched as well as 
different cells searched, showed no significant effects. The same was true for variability of 
search across attributes computed for the total number of items searched. There was, however, 
a significant main effect of attitude on the variability of search across attributes for different 
cells searched (F(2,74) = 8.26, p = .005). Participants with a pro-user attitude showed a 
significantly higher variability of search across attributes (M = 0.70) than participants with a 
pro-management attitude (M = 0.38). A high variability of search across attributes is obtained 
if the number of cells (i.e., alternatives) inspected for each attribute is very different and is an 
indication of non-compensatory processing. The high variability of search across attributes for 
participants with a pro-user attitude therefore suggests that they were more likely to adopt a 
non-compensatory decision strategy, where they stopped to consider an alternative once they 
discovered that it did not meet certain criteria. Participants with a pro-management attitude, 
on the other hand, seem to have considered a larger number of alternatives before narrowing 
their options down, and, as a result, searched the information set more extensively (as 
supported by the results for depth of search).  
4.  Compensatory processing  
The overall mean Koele and Westenberg Index of Compensatory Processing (see 
Chapter 6) was 0.60, where a maximum extent of compensatory processing is indicated by a 
value of 1. This suggests that, overall, information processing was non-compensatory to some 
extent.  
It had been expected that accountable participants would process information in a 
more compensatory manner than participants who were not accountable. Although the 
                                                 
5 A weak tendency for an attitude main effect was observed for variability of search across alternatives, computed 
for different cells searched (F(1,76) = 2.74, p = .102, pro-user: M = 0.75, pro-management: M = 0.55) 
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observed means did suggest a higher degree of compensatory information processing for 
accountable participants compared to non-accountable participants (accountability: M = 0.64, 
no accountability: M = 0.57), this difference was not statistically reliable, as there was no 
significant main effect of accountability in the ANOVA conducted to test this hypothesis. 
There was a significant main effect of attitude, however (F(1,76) = 4.47, p = .038). 
Participants with a pro-management attitude processed information in a more compensatory 
manner than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 0.67 vs. M = 0.52). This result was not 
surprising, given that the index combines depth of search and variability of search across 
alternatives for different cells, and that participants with a pro-management attitude had been 
found to search more information and show a tendency towards a lower variability of search 
across alternatives for different cells than participants with a pro-user attitude. 
The analysis testing the effects of type of accountability and attitude on the Index of 
Compensatory Processing revealed the already mentioned significant main effect of attitude 
(F(1,74) = 4.49, p = .037), but no other significant effect.  
5.  Pattern of search (Payne Index)  
The mean Payne Index across all conditions was -0.34, suggesting that, overall, 
information search was attribute-wise rather than alternative-wise, that is, participants tended 
to search cells for the same attribute before moving on to the next one rather than searching 
different attributes for the same alternative before moving on to the next alternative. The 
difference to the expected value of 0 for a balanced search was highly significant (t(79) = 
6.25, p = .000). 
It had been expected that the pattern of search would be more attribute-wise for non-
accountable than for accountable participants. This is because non-accountable participants 
were expected to have a lower motivation to be accurate in their processing than accountable 
participants, and would therefore be more likely to resort to this cognitively easier strategy, 
which is commonly associated with non-compensatory processing (Russo & Dosher, 1993). 
Participants who were not accountable did indeed show a slightly stronger attribute-wise 
search than participants who were accountable (M = -0.36 vs. M = -0.33), but this difference 
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was not significant. There was a significant main effect of attitude on the pattern of search, 
however (F(1,76) = 5.43, p = .022). Participants with a pro-user attitude searched information 
in a more attribute-wise fashion than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = -0.47 
vs. M = -0.21). This further supports the conclusions drawn from the results obtained for 
variability of search across attributes and the Index of Compensatory Processing, which 
suggested that participants with a pro-user attitude processed information in a more non-
compensatory manner than participants with a pro-management attitude.  
Type of accountability did not affect the Payne Index significantly. In the ANOVA 
testing its effect, which also included the attitude factor, the main effect of attitude was only 
marginally significant (F(1,74) = 3.68, p = .059).  
6.  Concentration of search  
The fact that the overall amount of information searched was different for different 
alternatives (which had already been indicated by the results for variability of search across 
alternatives and the Index of Compensatory Processing) was further supported by the 
concentration of search measure. Mean concentration of search on the chosen alternative 
across all conditions was 0.35 for the total number of information items searched and 0.22 for 
different cells searched. The fact that these values are not 0 shows that the chosen alternative 
generally received more attention than the non-chosen alternatives. 
It had been predicted that non-accountable participants would concentrate their search 
more on the chosen alternative than accountable participants. Such a trend could neither be 
observed for the total number of items searched (no accountability: M = 0.33, accountability: 
M = 0.39) nor for different cells searched (no accountability: M = 0.22, accountability: M = 
0.21). Rather, the observed pattern of results suggests that when information was searched 
repeatedly, accountable participants were more biased towards their chosen alternative than 
non-accountable participants. However, in neither case was the main effect of accountability 
significant. There were significant main effects of attitude on both measures, however (total 
number of items searched: F(1,76) = 4.30, p = .041; different cells searched: F(1,76) = 7.36, p 
= .008), the nature of which will be discussed in more detail below.  
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The analyses testing the effects of type of accountability and attitude on the different 
concentration of search measures identified a significant main effect of attitude on 
concentration of search for different cells searched (F(1,74) = 8.47, p = .005). Consistent with 
the previously reported results, participants with a pro-management attitude concentrated their 
search less on the chosen alternative than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 0.15 vs. M 
= 0.29)6. In addition to the attitude main effect, a significant interaction between attitude and 
type of accountability was observed (F(2,74) = 4.34, p = .016). This is illustrated in Figure 
7.3. Simple main effects analyses indicated that the accountability manipulation only affected 
participants with a pro-user attitude. They showed a stronger concentration of search on the 
chosen alternative when they were accountable to the management than when they were 
accountable to the users of the program (M = 0.50 vs. M = 0.16, t(79) = 2.89, p = .005). Also, 
the effect of attitude was found to depend on the accountability condition participants 
belonged to (F(3,74) = 5.57, p = .002). A significant difference between participants with a 
pro-user and a pro-management attitude was obtained in the 'accountability to management' 
condition only. Participants with a pro-user attitude concentrated their information search 
more on the eventually chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude 
(M = 0.50 vs. M = 0.06, t(79) = 3.74, p = .000). This may be explained by the fact that the 
former were in a situation of high conflict, because their attitude was different from that of the 
group they had been made accountable to, and seem to have been reluctant to solve the 
conflict by adjusting to the latter's view. Participants with a pro-management attitude who had 
been made accountable to the users of the program, in contrast, who also experienced conflict 
between their own attitude and that of the group they had been made accountable to, did not 
show an equivalent effect (although their concentration of search was also higher than for 
participants with a pro-user attitude, who did not experience conflict). This suggests that they 
experienced the conflict between their own preferences and those of their audience less 
strongly.  
                                                 
6 A similar tendency was observed for concentration of search for the total number of items searched (pro-
management: M = 0.28 , pro-user: M = 0.42, but the effect was only marginally significant in this case (F(1,74) = 
3.16, p = .080). 
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Figure 7.3. Mean concentration of the first information search on the chosen alternative 
(based on the different cells searched), as a function of type of accountability and 
attitude.  
Summary of the results for the first information search 
The pattern of results for the first information search suggests that participants did 
react to the accountability manipulation, but only significantly so, if they had a pro-
management attitude. In this case, they searched more information when made accountable to 
the management and adapted their information search by searching less information when 
made accountable to the users of the program. The results obtained for the type of information 
searched are consistent with this interpretation; when made accountable to the users of the 
program, participants with a pro-management attitude tended to search relatively more user 
information, when made accountable to the management of the company they tended to search 
relatively less user information than under no accountability. In the 'no accountability' 
condition, information search followed participants' attitude; when participants had a pro-user 
attitude they searched less information than when they had a pro-management attitude. When 
participants with a pro-user attitude were made accountable to the users of the program, they 
tended to search more information, especially access a higher percentage of different cells 
than when they were not accountable. The additionally searched items were not primarily user 
Results 
 231 
items, however, as the percentage of searched user information did not differ significantly 
between the 'no accountability' and 'accountability to users' conditions.  
Variability of search was generally relatively high, indicating that participants tended 
to employ a non-compensatory decision strategy, also supported by the results for the Index of 
Compensatory Processing. Unlike expected, there were no significant differences between 
accountable and non-accountable participants in this respect. This suggests that task factors, 
for example, the complexity of the task, which was still relatively high with a choice set 
consisting of four alternatives differing on four attributes, overrode the effects of 
accountability. The only significant effect obtained was one of attitude on the variability of 
search across attributes for different cells. Participants with a pro-management attitude 
showed a significantly lower variability of search across attributes for different cells, 
indicating that they searched alternatives more equally and did not eliminate them from 
consideration as early as did participants with a pro-user attitude. This is consistent with the 
idea that participants with a pro-management attitude paid attention to both user and cost 
attributes; since alternatives had been constructed such that they were balanced in terms of 
their overall value, someone who was concerned with this overall value would find it hard to 
eliminate any of them from consideration.  
The same attitude effect was observed when analysing the extent of compensatory 
processing as indicated by Koele and Westenberg's Index of Compensatory Processing and the 
Payne Index. Again, participants with a pro-management attitude showed a more 
compensatory and less attribute-wise search than participants with a pro-user attitude, lending 
further support to the conclusions above. Unlike expected, these measures were not affected 
by the type of accountability. Again, the effect of task complexity seems to have overridden 
that of the accountability manipulations.  
Finally, the results obtained for the concentration of search measure did not show the 
predicted lower concentration of search on the chosen alternative for accountable compared to 
non-accountable participants, but revealed a (non-significant) tendency for the opposite effect 
for the total number of items searched, but not for the different cells searched. This suggests 
that when information was accessed repeatedly, accountable participants were more biased 
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towards their chosen alternative than non-accountable participants. However, this finding may 
also be interpreted as a stronger need to make sure that their preferred alternative was superior 
and as such would be consistent with the hypothesised stronger need for accuracy in these 
participants. A significant interaction between type of accountability and attitude furthermore 
suggested that only participants with a pro-user attitude were significantly affected by the type 
of audience they were accountable to. When they had been made accountable to the 
management, participants with a pro-user attitude showed a higher concentration of search on 
their chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude. Participants with a 
pro-management attitude, on the other hand, did not show the same effect when they had been 
made accountable to the users of the program. This suggests that the conflict between having a 
pro-user attitude and being accountable to the management was resolved differently than the 
conflict between having a pro-management attitude and being accountable to the users of the 
program. In the former case, participants seemed to have become defensive and not given in to 
the accountability pressure, whereas in the latter case participants seemed to have been happy 
to take into account the preferences of the audience they were accountable to. The results for 
information evaluation and integration are expected to shed more light on the validity of this 
assumption.  
Information evaluation and integration 
1.  Choices  
Participants' choices were classified in terms of whether they were user choices or 
management choices, depending on whether the chosen alternative fared well on user 
attributes or on cost attributes, and would therefore either be easy to justify to users or to the 
management of a company. Given that there was a clear preference for user attributes in the 
sample and the fact that the pure management alternative (i.e., the alternative with positive 
outcomes on the two cost attributes and negative outcomes on the two user attributes) was 
only chosen by one participant, it was decided to compare participants in terms of whether 
they had chosen the pure user alternative (positive outcomes on both user attributes and 
negative outcomes on both cost attributes) or any of the other alternatives. The latter will be 
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referred to as management alternatives and, apart from the pure management alternative, 
included the two compromise alternatives with one positive and one negative outcome on one 
user and one cost attribute, respectively. They maximised management values in terms of a 
cost-benefit trade-off. Table 7.5 presents the frequencies with which the user alternative and 
one of the management alternatives were chosen, as a function of participants' attitude and 
type of accountability.  
Table 7.5. Frequency of user and management choices at the first decision, as a function of 
type of accountability and attitude. 
No 
Accountability 
Accountability 
to Users 
Accountability 
to Management 
  
 
Attitude Pro User Pro Man. Pro User Pro Man. Pro User Pro Man. Σ 
User Alt. 17 8 8 4 3 2 42 
Man. Alt. 7 16 1 3 4 7 38 
Σ 24 24 9 7 7 9 80 
 
The user alternative was chosen by 52% of the participants (42/80), a management 
alternative was chosen by 48% of them (38/80). As expected, participants who had not been 
made accountable to any group chose according to their own attitude (χ2 (1) = 6.76, p = .009), 
participants with a user attitude chose the user alternative more often than a management 
alternative (17/24 = 78%) and participants with a management attitude chose a management 
alternative more often than the user alternative (16/24 = 67%). Participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program, however, chose the user alternative in the 
majority of cases (12/16 =75%), irrespective of their own attitude (χ2 (1) = 2.12, ns), whereas 
participants who had been made accountable to the management chose one of the 
management alternatives in the majority of cases (11/16= 69%), again, irrespective of their 
own attitude (χ2 (1) = 0.78, ns). Hence, a Chi-squared analysis testing the relationship 
between type of chosen alternative and type of accountability yielded a significant effect (χ2 
(2) = 6.15, p = .046). 
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2.  Attribute weights  
It had been predicted that the weight judgements of participants who had not been 
made accountable to any group would reflect their attitude, that is, participants with a pro-user 
attitude would place particular importance on user attributes and participants with a pro-
management attitude would place particular importance on cost attributes, whereas 
participants who had been made accountable to either the users of the program or the 
management of the company would adjust their weight judgements in such a way that they 
supported the position of the group they had been made accountable to (high user attribute 
weights when accountable to users and high cost attribute weights when accountable to the 
management), irrespective of participants' own attitude. In order to test this hypothesis, 
participants' weight judgements for the four attributes contained in the first and in the second 
information set were normalised so that they added up to 1, and the sum of user attribute 
weights and cost attribute weights at the first elicitation (before the first decision) and the 
second elicitation (after the first decision) as well as the difference between the second and 
first elicitation was calculated for each participant. Only the results for the user attribute 
weights are shown in Table 7.6, the results for cost attribute weights are the complimentary 
values to 1.  
The results are consistent with expectations in that participants who had been made 
accountable to the management assigned lower weights to user attributes from the first 
information set than they had done initially, whereas participants who had not been made 
accountable hardly changed their weight judgements. Unlike predicted, however, participants 
who had been made accountable to the users of the program did not increase their user 
attribute weights but decreased them, particularly participants with a pro-user attitude. The 
most likely explanation for this is a regression effect, as these participants had assigned a very 
high weight to user attributes initially. A two-factorial ANOVA, testing the observed change 
in user attribute weights from the first to the second elicitation for any effects of type of 
accountability and attitude, did not result in any significant effects.  
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Table 7.6. Mean sum of user attribute weights for information set 1 and 2 before and after 
the first decision, as a function of type of accountability and attitude. 
  Accountability 
  No To Users To the Management 
  Pro User 
(n=24) 
Pro Man. 
(n=24) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
sum of user attribute 
weights, set1 
      
after first decision .732 .642 .744 .743 .609 .622 
before first decision .749 .640 .793 .735 .678 .668 
difference -.018 .002 -.049 .008 -.068 -0.45 
sum of user attribute 
weights, set2 
      
after first decision .742 .629 .753 .694 .738 .655 
before first decision .747 .598 .730 .642 .726 .642 
difference -.005 .031 .024 .053 .012 .013 
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and 
the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
 
Interestingly, the results for the user attributes contained in the second information set, 
for which participants had also provided weight judgements twice at this point, but for which 
attribute outcomes had not been linked to certain alternatives yet, showed a different pattern. 
Participants who had been made accountable to the management did not decrease their user 
attribute weight judgements but increased them slightly. The same was true for participants in 
the 'no accountability' and 'accountability to users' condition, except for participants with a 
pro-user attitude who had not been made accountable, who showed no change. Accordingly, 
the ANOVA testing the effects of type of accountability and attitude on the change from the 
first to the second elicitation did not show any significant effects. This suggests that the 
importance differentiation process is employed to enhance particular alternatives with 
particular outcomes on particular attributes rather than attributes in general. 
The sums of normalised user attribute weights obtained after the first decision were 
also subjected to two-factorial ANOVAs, testing the effects of attitude and type of 
accountability. The only significant effect in the analysis performed on weights for user 
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attributes from the first information set was a main effect of type of accountability (F(2, 74) = 
6.37, p = .003). Post-hoc comparisons showed that, as expected, when participants were 
accountable to users, they assigned significantly higher weights to user attributes than when 
they were accountable to the management (M = 0.74 vs. M = 0.62, t(79) = 3.56, p = .001). 
Also, participants who were not accountable gave significantly higher user attribute weights 
than participants who were accountable to the management (M = 0.69 vs. M = 0.62, t(79) = 
2.43, p = .017). Although the interaction effect between type of accountability and attitude did 
not reach conventional significance levels (F(2,74) = 2.13, p = .126), simple main effects 
analyses showed that the effect of attitude depended on accountability condition (F(3,74) = 
3.15, p = .030). In line with expectations, a significant difference between participants with a 
pro-user attitude and participants with a pro-management attitude was only obtained in the 'no 
accountability' condition. Participants with a pro-user attitude assigned higher weights to user 
attribute than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 0.73 vs. M = 0.64, t(79) = 
3.07, p = .003). Also, participants with a pro-user attitude gave significantly higher user 
attribute weights when they were not accountable or accountable to users, compared to when 
they were accountable to the management (F(2,74) = 4.52, p = .014, no vs. management: M = 
0.73 vs. M = 0.61, t(79) = 2.82, p = .006; users vs. management: M = 0.74 vs. M = 0.61, t(79) 
= 2.65, p = .010). Participants with a pro-management attitude, accordingly, assigned 
significantly lower weights to user attributes when they were not accountable or accountable 
to the management than when they were accountable to the users of the program (F(2,74) = 
3.34, p = .041, no vs. users: M = 0.64 vs. M = 0.74, t(79) = 2.33, p = .023; management vs. 
users: M = 0.62 vs. M = 0.74, t(79) = 2.38, p = .020). The results are presented in Figure 7.4.  
When conducting the same analysis on the sum of user attribute weights for the user 
attributes contained in the second information set, as expected, the main effect of type of 
accountability was not significant. The attitude main effect was significant, however (F(1,74) 
= 10.18, p = .002), with participants giving higher user attribute weights when they had a pro-
user attitude than when they had a pro-management attitude (M = 0.74 vs. M = 0.65). This 
lends further support to the assumption that an importance differentiation process is employed 
to enhance the perceived value of certain alternatives rather than attributes in general.  
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Figure 7.4. Mean sum of user attribute weights (information set1) after the first decision, as 
a function of type of accountability and attitude. 
3.  Overall evaluation of alternatives  
Four types of dependent measures were analysed, (1) the difference between the 
suitability judgement for the chosen alternative and the average non-chosen alternative, (2) the 
difference between the MAUT prediction for the chosen alternative and the average non-
chosen alternative, based on participants' unidimensional value and weight judgements after 
the first decision, (3) the difference between the suitability judgement for the user alternative 
and the average management alternative, and (4) the difference between the MAUT prediction 
for the user alternative and the average management alternative, again based on participants' 
unidimensional value and weight judgements after the first decision. As in the previous 
experiment, the MAUT model applied to calculate the overall evaluation of alternatives based 
on the attributes of the first information search only took the unidimensional values and 
weights of searched information into account (see Equation 6.5). The results are presented in 
Table 7.7. 
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Table 7.7. Measures of the evaluative difference between alternatives before and after the 
first decision, as a function of type of accountability and attitude. 
  Accountability 
  No To Users To the Management 
  Pro User 
(n=24) 
Pro Man. 
(n=24) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
1. Rating chosen - 
average non-chosen 
alternative 
 
44.86 
 
32.22 
 
35.04 
 
41.19 
 
35.24 
 
30.44 
2. MAUT prediction  
chosen - average  
non-chosen alternative 
      
set 1 attributes       
after first decision 30.16 21.12 34.64 26.74 35.86 12.80 
before first decision 24.99 10.46 35.15 13.03 20.63 10.55 
difference 5.18 10.67 -0.51 13.71 15.23 2.24 
set 2 attributes       
after first decision 27.13 10.57 39.27 14.39 18.00 6.87 
before first decision 28.99 13.65 39.28 10.82 16.10 -2.45 
difference -1.86 -3.07 -0.01 3.56 1.90 9.32 
3. Rating user -  
average management 
alternative 
 
32.08 
 
15.28 
 
29.11 
 
25.95 
 
18.10 
 
2.30 
4. MAUT prediction  
user - average man. 
alternative 
      
set 1 attributes       
after first decision 33.22 13.49 35.67 21.05 36.00 9.51 
before first decision 28.75 6.44 31.80 12.45 23.83 8.49 
difference 4.47 7.05 3.87 8.59 12.17 1.02 
set 2 attributes       
after first decision 36.09 13.63 40.72 24.65 40.93 21.96 
before first decision 37.75 10.27 39.26 15.31 42.69 19.10 
difference -1.66 3.36 1.46 9.34 -1.77 2.87 
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and 
the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
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3a. Rating chosen - average non-chosen alternative  
It had been expected that participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision would show a smaller difference between the suitability judgement for their chosen 
alternative and their average non-chosen alternative than participants who had not been made 
accountable, because this was an overt judgement. The judgmental difference between the 
chosen alternative and the average non-chosen alternative was also expected to be smaller for 
participants who had not adopted the preference of their external audience. This was assumed 
to be more likely for participants who had experienced a conflict due to the fact that their own 
attitude did not coincide with that of the group they had been made accountable to, resulting 
in an interaction between type of accountability and attitude.  
In order to compare the 'no accountability' conditions against the conditions in which 
participants had been made accountable, a 2 (accountability: yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-
user vs. pro-management) ANOVA was conducted. Contrary to expectations, there was no 
significant main effect of accountability. There was, however, a significant main effect of 
attitude (F(1,76) = 4.96, p = .029) and a significant interaction between accountability and 
attitude (F(1,76) = 4.99, p = .028). The difference between the chosen alternative and the 
average non-chosen alternative was larger for participants with a pro-user attitude than for 
participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 40.97 vs. M = 33.39). However, this 
attitude main effect was qualified by the significant accountability-by-attitude interaction. The 
difference between accountability conditions was only significant for participants with a pro-
user attitude (F(1,76) = 5.91, p = .017), and the effect of attitude was only significant in the 
'no accountability' condition (F(2,76) = 6.22, p = .003). Within the group of participants with 
a pro-user attitude, those who were accountable, as expected, showed a smaller evaluative 
difference between the chosen alternative and the average non-chosen alternative than those 
who were not accountable (M = 35.13 vs. M = 44.86, t(79) = 2.43, p = .017), whereas there 
was no significant difference for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 35.15 vs. 
M = 32.22). Also, non-accountable participants with a pro-user attitude showed a significantly 
larger evaluative difference than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 44.86 vs. 
M = 32.22, t(79) = 3.53, p = .001), but there was no significant difference between the two 
groups when they were accountable (M = 35.13 vs. M = 35.15). This suggested that for the 
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overt measure of suitability judgements, accountability had the expected effect of diminishing 
rather than enhancing the judgmental difference between the chosen and the average non-
chosen alternative, but only for participants with a pro-user attitude.  
The hypothesis predicting an interaction between type of accountability and attitude 
was tested with an ANOVA including these two factors. The predicted significant interaction 
between type of accountability and attitude was found (F(2,74) = 3.55, p = .034). A simple 
main effects analysis indicated that the effect of attitude depended on the type of 
accountability (F(3,74) = 4.73, p = .005). Contrary to expectations, however, the only 
significant difference found was for participants in the 'no accountability' condition (t(79) = 
3.53, p = .001); non-accountable participants with a pro-user attitude showed a higher 
judgmental difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than non-
accountable participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 44.86 vs. M = 32.22, t(79) = 
3.55, p = .001). There was also a marginally significant effect of type of accountability for 
participants with a pro-user attitude (F(2,74) = 2.99, p = .056). As expected, the largest 
judgmental difference was observed in the 'no accountability' condition. It was significantly 
larger than the difference obtained in the 'accountability to users' condition (M = 44.86 vs. M 
= 35.04, t(79) = 2.04, p = .045), and marginally significantly larger than the difference 
obtained in the 'accountability to the management' condition (M = 44.86 vs. M = 35.24, t(79) 
= 1.82, p = .072). The observed differences between the suitability judgement for the chosen 
and the average non-chosen alternative are shown in Figure 7.5.  
3b. MAUT prediction chosen - average non-chosen alternative 
The differences between MAUT predictions for the chosen and the average non-
chosen alternative had been predicted to show differentiation and consolidation effects, given 
that they were covert measures. Accordingly, it was expected that for accountable participants 
the evaluative difference between their chosen alternative and average non-chosen alternative 
would be larger than for participants who had not been made accountable. The MAUT 
predicted evaluative difference was also expected to be larger for participants who 
experienced a conflict due to the fact that their own attitude did not coincide with that of the 
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group they had been made accountable to, resulting in an interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude.  
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Figure 7.5. Mean difference in overall suitability between the chosen and average non-
chosen alternative after the first decision, as a function of type of accountability 
and attitude. 
An ANOVA was carried out to test the effect of accountability (yes vs. no) and attitude 
(pro-user vs. pro-management) on the change in the difference between the MAUT prediction 
for the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative from the first to the second elicitation, 
based on the four attributes contained in the first information set. Contrary to expectations, it 
did not yield any significant effects. The same analysis for the change in the difference 
between MAUT predictions based on the four parallel attributes contained in the second 
information set, however, did produce a significant main effect of accountability (F(1,76) = 
4.28, p = .042). As expected, participants who had been made accountable showed a larger 
and positive evaluative change than participants who had not been made accountable (M = 
3.81 vs. M = -2.47). 
Similar analyses were performed on the differences between MAUT predictions for 
the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative obtained after the first decision. The 
ANOVA for the predictions based on the attributes in the first information set yielded a highly 
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significant main effect of attitude (F(1,76) = 13.84, p = .006). Participants with a pro-user 
attitude showed a significantly larger difference between the MAUT prediction for their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude 
(M = 32.17 vs. M = 20.23). There was no significant interaction between accountability and 
attitude. The same was true for the analysis of the MAUT predictions based on the attributes 
in the second information set. The only significant effect obtained was a main effect of 
attitude (F(1,76) = 14.10, p = .000). Again, participants with a pro-user attitude showed a 
larger evaluative difference than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 28.27 vs. 
M = 10.41).  
In order to test the predictions regarding the effects of a conflict between the attitude 
of the group participants had been made accountable to and their own attitude, two-factorial 
ANOVAs testing the effects of type of accountability and attitude on the change in the MAUT 
predicted difference between the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative from the first 
to the second elicitation were conducted. For the MAUT predictions based on the attributes 
from the first information set, a marginally significant interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude was indeed obtained (F(2,74) = 2.80, p = .068). Simple main effect 
analyses suggested that for participants who had been made accountable to the users of the 
program, those with a pro-user attitude, as expected, tended to show a smaller (and, in fact, 
slightly negative) increase in the evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-
chosen alternative, compared to participants with a pro-management attitude who would 
experience a stronger conflict and showed a large positive increase (M = -0.51 vs. M = 13.71, 
t(79) = 1.68, p = .096). Also, in line with predictions, for participants who had been made 
accountable to the management, the opposite tended to be true (although not significantly so); 
participants with a pro-user attitude tended to show a larger evaluative difference between 
their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management 
attitude (M = 15.23 vs. M = 2.24, see Figure 7.6).  
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Figure 7.6. Mean change in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen 
and average non-chosen alternative (based on the attributes from information set 
1) from before to after the first decision, as a function of type of accountability 
and attitude. 
The ANOVA for the MAUT predictions based on the attributes from the second 
information set yielded no significant effects. However, there was a weak tendency for a main 
effect of type of accountability (F(2,74) = 2.33, p = .105). In line with expectations, 
participants in the 'no accountability' condition showed the weakest differentiation (indeed a 
slight decrease in the difference between the MAUT prediction for their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative, M = -2.47). Participants in the 'accountability to the management' 
condition showed the strongest differentiation (M = 6.07).  
An ANOVA performed on the difference between the MAUT prediction for the 
chosen and the average non-chosen alternative after the first decision, based on the attributes 
from the first information set, only indicated a significant main effect of attitude (F(1,74) = 
12.42, p = .010). As before, the predicted evaluative difference was larger for participants 
with a pro-user attitude than for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 32.17 vs. 
M = 20.23). The same analysis for the MAUT prediction based on the attributes contained in 
the second information set also only showed a significant main effect of attitude (F(1,76) = 
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10.74, p = .002). For participants with a pro-user attribute, the difference between the MAUT 
prediction for the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative was larger than for 
participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 28.27 vs. M = 10.41). The main effect of 
type of accountability failed to reach standard significance levels (F(2,74) = 1.89, p = .159), 
but post-hoc contrasts suggested that the difference in MAUT predictions between the chosen 
and the average non-chosen alternative tended to be larger when participants had been made 
accountable to the users of the program than when they had been made accountable to the 
management of the company (M = 28.39 vs. M = 19.34, p = .057).  
3c. Rating user - average management alternative  
A large difference between the rating for the user and the average management 
alternative may be expected if individuals have clear user preferences and are not concerned 
with any benefits of alternatives regarding cost attributes. It had therefore been predicted that 
the judgmental difference between the user alternative and the average management 
alternative would be larger for participants with a pro-user attitude than with a pro-
management attitude, and larger for participants who had been made accountable to the users 
of the program than for participants who had been made accountable to the management of 
the company, assuming that, on the whole, participants would adjust to the preferences of 
their audience. The difference had also been expected to be particularly small for participants 
with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the management, and 
particularly large for participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to 
the users of the program, resulting in an interaction between type of accountability and 
attitude. This was because, in these cases, there was no conflict between participants' own 
preferences and those of the group they had been made accountable and both own preferences 
and choice would pull the ratings in the same direction. Participants who experienced a value 
conflict, on the other hand, were expected to succumb to the pressure created by the 
conflicting preferences of the group they had been made accountable to, and, for this overt 
measure of differentiation, demonstrate some adjustment to the preferences of their audience. 
In order to test these hypotheses, a 3 (type of accountability: no vs. to users vs. to the 
management) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) ANOVA was conducted. It 
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revealed a marginally significant main effect of attitude (F(1,74) = 3.40, p = .069). As 
expected, for participants with a pro-user attitude, the observed judgmental difference 
between the user and the management alternative tended to be larger than for participants with 
a pro-management attitude (M = 28.97 vs. M = 14.23). There was also a weak tendency for a 
main effect of type of accountability (F(2,74) = 2.21, p = .117). Again, as expected, for 
participants who had been made accountable to the management, the difference tended to be 
smaller than both for participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program 
(M = 10.20 vs. M = 27.53, t(79) = 1.93, p = .058) and for non-accountable participants (M = 
10.20 vs. M = 23.68, t(79) = 1.84, p = .070). The expected interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude was not significant. However, as expected, participants who had 
been made accountable to the management showed a smaller judgemental difference between 
the user and average management alternative when they had a pro-management attitude than 
when they had a pro-user attitude (M = 18.10 vs. M = 2.30), whereas for participants who had 
been made accountable to the users of the program there was hardly any difference between 
those with a pro-user and those with a pro-management attitude (M = 29.11 vs. M = 25.95). 
The latter suggests that participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program adjusted to the preferences of their audience easily. 
The mean differences between suitability ratings for the user and average management 
alternative after the first decision, which were observed in the different conditions, are shown 
in Figure 7.7. 
3d. MAUT prediction user - average management alternative  
Like for the actual suitability judgements, it had been expected that the evaluative 
difference between MAUT predictions for the user and the average management alternative 
would be larger for participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program 
than for participants who had been made accountable to the management of the company, 
with the 'no accountability' condition in-between, and larger for participants with a pro-user 
attitude compared to a pro-management attitude. In departure from the predictions for the 
suitability judgements, however, the difference had been expected to be particularly large for 
participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the management and 
particularly small for participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made 
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accountable to the users of the program, indicating bolstering of a conflicting choice rather 
than adjustment to audience preferences.  
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Figure 7.7. Mean difference in overall suitability between the user and average management 
alternative after the first decision, as a function of type of accountability and 
attitude. 
These predictions were tested by ANOVAs including the 'type of accountability' factor 
and the 'attitude' factor. For the change in the difference between the MAUT prediction for the 
user and the average management alternative from before the first to after the first decision, 
based on the attributes from the first information set, no significant effects were obtained. The 
observed pattern of results was consistent with an interaction between type of accountability 
and attitude, although not in the expected direction; whereas for participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program, those with a pro-management attitude showed a 
larger (and not smaller) increase in the difference between the MAUT prediction for the user 
and average management alternative than those with a pro-user attitude (M = 8.59 vs. M = 
3.87), the opposite was true for participants who had been made accountable to the 
management (M = 1.02 vs. M = 12.17). A large individual variability in responses prevented 
these differences from becoming significant, however.  
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The analysis of change in the difference between the MAUT prediction for the user 
and the average management alternative, calculated for the parallel attributes from the second 
information set, only revealed a marginally significant main effect of attitude (F(1,74) = 3.31, 
p = .073). Unlike expected, participants with a pro-management attitude tended to show an 
increase in the evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative 
from before the first to after the first decision, whereas participants with a pro-user attitude 
showed a slight decrease (M = 4.30 vs. M = -0.98).  
The ANOVA that was performed on the MAUT predicted difference between the user 
and average management alternative after the first decision, based on the attributes contained 
in the first information set, only yielded the expected main effect of attitude, which was highly 
significant (F(1,74) = 20.29, p = .000). As predicted, participants with a pro-user attitude 
showed a larger evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative 
than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 34.26 vs. M = 13.91). The expected 
interaction between type of accountability and attitude was not significant. Although 
participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the management, as 
expected, showed a much larger difference between the MAUT prediction for the user and 
average management alternative (M = 36.00 vs. M = 9.51), a large individual variability in 
judgements again meant that this difference was not significant.  
The analysis for the MAUT predictions based on the attributes from the second 
information set revealed a marginally significant main effect of type of accountability (F(2,74) 
= 2.41, p = .097). Post-hoc comparisons indicated a marginally significant difference between 
the 'no accountability' and the 'accountability to users' condition. For participants who had 
been made accountable to the users of the program the predicted difference tended to be larger 
than for participants who had not been made accountable (M = 33.69 vs. M = 24.86, t(79) = 
1.87, p = .065). Unexpectedly, though, the mean predicted difference obtained in the 
'accountability to users' condition was not significantly larger than the mean predicted 
difference obtained in the 'accountability to the management' condition (M = 33.69 vs. M = 
30.26). In addition, there was again a highly significant main effect of attitude (F(1,74) = 
26.91, p = .000). For participants with a pro-user attitude, the predicted difference was larger 
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than for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 37.98 vs. M = 17.43). The 
interaction between type of accountability and attitude was not significant. 
Summary of the results for information evaluation and integration at the first 
decision 
The results relating to information evaluation and integration at the first decision, 
although they did not always exactly match the predictions, were largely consistent with them. 
Overt measures, such as participants' choices, weight judgements and suitability ratings for the 
user compared to the average management alternative, indicated some adjustment to the 
inferred values of the audience participants had been made accountable to. As expected, 
participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program were more likely to 
choose the user alternative and participants who had been made accountable to the 
management were more likely to choose one of the management alternatives, no matter what 
their own attitude was, while the choices of participants in the 'no accountability' condition 
depended on their attitude; they were more likely to choose the user alternative if their attitude 
was user-oriented and more likely to choose one of the management alternatives if their 
attitude was more management-oriented.  
Likewise, the weight judgements for user attributes by participants who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program were significantly higher than those by participants 
who had been made accountable to the management, irrespective of participants' own attitude. 
The weight judgements by participants who had not been made accountable, on the other 
hand, corresponded with their attitude. Interestingly, this effect was only observed for the 
attributes contained in the first information set and not for those in the second, for which 
attribute outcomes had not yet been linked to certain alternatives at the time the judgements 
were made. Weight judgements for the attributes contained in the second information set only 
showed an effect of attitude; participants with a pro-user attitude assigned larger weights to 
user attributes than participants with a pro-management attitude. Whereas the adjustment 
effect was highly significant in participants' weight judgements after the first decision, the 
change in weight judgements, calculated as the difference between the weights obtained at the 
second elicitation (after the first decision) and the weights obtained at the first elicitation 
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(before any experimental manipulations), although showing the predicted trend, was not. It 
may therefore be better to speak of importance adjustment rather than differentiation in this 
case. These findings also suggest that the problem of which dependent variable one chooses to 
inspect is not a trivial one.  
The overall differentiation between user and management alternatives, as captured in 
participants' suitability ratings for the user compared to the average management alternative, 
only showed a weak tendency for adjustment to the audience participants had been made 
accountable to, but, as expected, the observed judgmental difference between the user and 
average management alternative was smaller for participants who had been made accountable 
to the management than for participants who had either been made accountable to the users of 
the program or participants who had not been made accountable. If there was a conflict 
between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the group they had been made 
accountable to, adjustment seemed to have been stronger for participants with a pro-
management attitude who had been made accountable to the users of the program than the 
opposite combination.  
The difference between MAUT predictions for the user compared to the average 
management alternative, as a covert measure of differentiation, had been expected to show 
bolstering of participants' own preferences rather than adjustment to audience preferences 
when they experienced a conflict between their own preferences and those of the audience. 
However, this tendency was not consistently evident, neither in the change of the evaluative 
difference from before the first to after the first decision, nor in the evaluative difference 
obtained after the first decision. Rather, the observed change in the difference between the 
MAUT prediction for the user and the average management alternative from the first to the 
second elicitation (based on the attributes from the first information set), although not 
significantly so, again suggested that participants with a pro-management attitude who had 
been made accountable to the users of the program adjusted to the preferences of their 
audience, whereas participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the 
management bolstered their own preference, as both showed a relatively large increase in the 
evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative. The same 
measure, but based on the parallel attributes from information set 2, showed a marginally 
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significant main effect of attitude such that participants with a pro-management (and not a 
pro-user!) attitude showed the larger increase in the evaluative difference between the user 
and average management alternative, mainly because participants with a pro-management 
attitude who had been made accountable to the users of the program showed a particularly 
large increase. This seems to support the assumption that they easily gave in to user pressures.  
The analyses performed on the differences between MAUT predictions for the user 
and the average management alternative after the first decision mainly yielded the expected 
effects of participants' own attitude; participants with a pro-user attitude showed a larger 
evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative than participants 
with a pro-management attitude, both for the attributes of the first and of the second 
information set. The analysis carried out on the parallel attributes also indicated the expected, 
marginally significant tendency for participants who had been made accountable to the users 
of the program to show a larger evaluative difference between the user and average 
management alternative than participants who had not been made accountable. In order for 
such an effect to be obtained, participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program must have shown an adjustment to the preferences of 
their audience. 
The most notable tendency emerging from the analyses testing the actual and predicted 
evaluative differences between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative was a main 
effect of attitude. Especially the analyses investigating the predicted evaluative differences 
between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative after the first decision showed this 
effect to be the strongest and often the only significant one. Generally, the obtained evaluative 
differences were larger for participants with a pro-user attitude than for participants with a 
pro-management attitude. This finding may be explained by another effect that has already 
been discussed earlier, namely that participants with a pro-user attitude seemed to have only 
paid attention to user attributes, whereas participants with a pro-management attitude were 
concerned with both user and cost attributes. This meant that participants with a pro-user 
attitude who chose the user alternative rated the overall value of this alternative as distinctly 
higher than the overall value of the management alternatives, resulting in a large evaluative 
difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, whereas for participants 
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with a pro-management attitude the difference was smaller, because they considered an 
alternative with advantages on both user attributes as still relatively good. Indeed, there was 
no significant difference in the suitability rating of the user alternative by participants with a 
pro-user attitude and a pro-management attitude (M = 80.25 vs. M = 74.13, t(78) = 1.36, p = 
.176), whereas there was a significant difference in their rating of the pure management 
alternative (M = 37.50 vs. M = 48.00, t(78) = 2.35, p = .021). The high median obtained for 
the attitude measure, indicating that even participants with a pro-management attitude highly 
valued the user alternative, also supports this assumption. 
This effect has important implications for the interpretation of the evaluative 
difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative observed in the various 
conditions. A large difference after the first decision does not necessarily only signal a strong 
differentiation between the chosen and the non-chosen alternatives, but also that participants 
clearly preferred the user alternative to the management alternatives. A small difference, on 
the other hand, may mean that participants valued user and cost aspects and therefore the user 
and the management compromise alternatives equally. The same applies to those dependent 
measures that analysed the change in the evaluative difference between the chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative from before to after the first decision; an increase may signal 
that preferences have shifted from a management to the user alternative, whereas a decrease 
may signal that preferences have shifted from the user to one of the management alternatives. 
Ideally, one would have included the type of chosen alternative as another factor in the 
analysis, but this was not possible, due to the fact that the sample size was too small and that 
when participants did not experience any value conflict, they rarely chose an alternative not in 
accordance with their own attitude.  
The analyses performed on the difference between the suitability rating for the chosen 
and average non-chosen alternative, apart from an attitude main effect, yielded an interaction 
between accountability and attitude, such that accountable participants showed a smaller 
evaluative difference between the chosen alternative and the average non-chosen alternative 
than non-accountable participants, but only if they had a pro-user attitude. For participants 
with a pro-management attitude, no significant difference was observed. Accountability had 
been expected to reduce the evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-chosen 
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alternative, given that this was an overt measure of differentiation. The reason why this effect 
was not obtained for participants with a pro-management attitude was that, when they had 
been made accountable to the users of the program, they showed an enlarged evaluative 
difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, thereby increasing the 
mean for the accountability condition and making it not significantly different from the mean 
observed for the 'no accountability' condition. Participants with a pro-user attitude, on the 
other hand, did show a significantly smaller evaluative difference between the chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative when they had been made accountable, even when they had 
been made accountable to an audience with compatible preferences. 
The interaction effect remained significant when the effects of the particular types of 
accountability rather than accountability per se were analysed. It was caused, however, not by 
different response patterns in the 'accountability to users' and accountability to the 
management' conditions, but by the fact that in the 'no accountability' condition, participants 
with a pro-user attitude showed a higher judgmental difference between their chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative than those with a pro-management attitude. When participants 
had been made accountable to either the users of the program or the management of the 
company, no significant differences between participants with different attitudes emerged. 
This suggests that, rather than resisting the preferences of the audience and defending their 
deviant choice, participants showed some adjustment to these preferences, as already evident 
in choices and weight judgements. 
The analyses of the MAUT predicted difference between the chosen and the average 
non-chosen alternative, however, as expected, told a slightly different story. The change in the 
MAUT predicted difference between the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative, 
based on the attributes from the first information set, showed a marginally significant 
interaction between type of accountability and attitude. Among participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program, those with a pro-management attitude tended to 
increase the evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
more strongly than those with a pro-user attitude, whereas the opposite tended to be true for 
participants who had been made accountable to the management. This suggests bolstering of 
the chosen alternative, whenever a value conflict existed. A closer inspection of the means 
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observed in these conditions, depending on whether participants solved the value conflict in 
favour of the audience preferences and chose an alternative consistent with them, or in favour 
of their own attitude, that is, chose an alternative inconsistent with audience preferences, 
supports this assumption. Participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program showed a larger evaluative difference between their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative if they had chosen according to their own attitude 
rather than according to audience preferences (M = 22.89, n = 3 vs. M = 6.83, n = 4). The 
same was true for participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the 
management of the company (M = 17.77, n = 3 vs. M = 13.33, n = 4). Given the small ns, it 
is not surprising that in the ANOVA performed to analyse these differences, the expected 
interaction between type of accountability (to users vs. to management) and type of chosen 
alternative (user vs. management) was not significant (F (1,10) = 1.15, p = .308). The trends 
in the data seem to be rather clear, however. 
Supporting this assumption is the fact that a similar pattern was observed for the 
differences between MAUT predictions for the chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
after the first decision, based on the attributes from the first information set. Although the 
interaction between type of accountability and attitude was not significant, simple main effect 
analyses suggested that when participants had been made accountable to the management of 
the company, the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen and the average 
non-chosen alternative was larger when participants had a pro-user attitude than when they 
had a pro-management attitude. There was no difference, however, when participants had 
been made accountable to the users. An inspection of the means in the value conflict 
conditions again suggested that the obtained difference was larger when participants had 
chosen an alternative that was inconsistent with the preferences of the group they had been 
made accountable to than when they had chosen an alternative that was consistent with these 
preferences (accountability to users: M = 39.97 vs. M = 16.81, accountability to the 
management: M = 43.05 vs. M = 30.47). This time the expected interaction between type of 
accountability and type of chosen alternative approached significance (F (1,10) = 4.11, p = 
.070). 
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Also, as expected, MAUT predictions based on the parallel attributes, which had not 
been linked to alternatives yet, did not show these effects, neither the change in the evaluative 
difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative from before the first to 
after the first decision, nor the difference obtained after the first decision. In both cases, 
analyses of the value conflict conditions only showed an effect of the type of chosen 
alternative (change: F (1,10) = 3.63, p = .086, after first decision: F (1,10) = 37.27, p = .000). 
For participants who had chosen the user alternative, a larger evaluative difference was 
obtained than for participants who had chosen a management alternative (change: M = 12.05 
vs. M = -6.58, after the first decision: M = 43.55 vs. M = -11.16). The ANOVAs performed 
on the whole sample, accordingly, did not yield any significant effects, apart from the above 
mentioned attitude main effects. 
Finally, the comparison of the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative for accountable and non-accountable participants 
did not yield any consistent results. The change in the difference between the MAUT 
prediction for the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative from before the first to after 
the first decision, based on the four attributes contained in the first information set, did not 
show the expected larger increase for accountable compared to non-accountable participants, 
but the change in the predictions based on the four parallel attributes contained in the second 
information set, which had not been expected to show the effect, did. Whereas participants 
who had been made accountable showed an overall increase in the evaluative difference 
between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, participants who had not been made 
accountable showed a decrease. 
The analyses performed on the differences between MAUT predictions for the chosen 
and the average non-chosen alternative obtained after the first decision only yielded 
significant main effects of attitude, both for predictions based on the attributes from the first 
and the second information set. Again, participants with a pro-user attitude showed a 
significantly larger difference between the MAUT predictions for their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude. 
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Final decision 
Information search 
The same measures as for the first information search were analysed. Table 7.8 shows 
the results obtained in each condition. In addition, given the redundancy of the information 
items contained in the second information set, the final information search also allowed to test 
the extent to which information search was biased to support the chosen alternative, as 
captured by the Biased Search Index outlined in Chapter 6. The index takes into account both 
the expected value of searched information and its importance, by comparing the mean 
product of unidimensional values and their corresponding weights for the information items 
searched for a particular alternative to the mean product that would be expected if information 
search was completely balanced. For an unbiased information search, a value of 1 is expected. 
A value > 1 indicates that information search was biased to support the searched alternative 
and a value < 1 indicates that it was biased to devalue the searched alternative. An overall 
measure of confirmation bias for the chosen alternative compared to the non-chosen 
alternatives can be computed by dividing the BSI for the chosen alternative by the average 
BSI for the non-chosen alternatives. A value > 1 is expected if there is a bias to support the 
chosen over the average non-chosen alternative, a value < 1 if there is a bias to support the 
average non-chosen alternative over the chosen alternative. 
1.  Depth of search  
Overall, the final information search was less exhaustive than the first information 
search, both in terms of the percentage of total number of items searched and the percentage 
of different cells searched (total number of items searched: 101% vs. 115%, t(79) = 2.84, p = 
.006, two-sided, different cells searched: 76% vs. 83%, t(79) = 3.57, p = .001, two-sided). 
This may have been expected, given that participants had already established a preference for 
one of the alternatives when they made their first decision, and given the fact that the 
information contained in the second search set was largely redundant with the information 
contained in the first set. 
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It had been predicted that accountable participants would search more information than 
participants who had not been made accountable. In order to compare the control group to the 
experimental groups, two-factorial ANOVAS testing the effects of accountability (yes vs. no) 
and attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) were conducted. In line with expectations, there 
was a marginally significant main effect of accountability on the percentage of total number of 
items searched as well as different cells searched (total number of items searched: F(1,76) = 
3.76, p = .056, different cells searched: F(1,76) = 3.70, p = .058). Accountable participants 
tended to search a higher percentage of information than non-accountable participants (total 
number of items searched: M = 106% vs. M = 81%, different cells searched: M = 78% vs. M 
= 67%). In both cases, there was also a significant main effect of attitude (total number of 
items searched: F(1,76) = 4.19, p = .044, different cells searched: F(1,76) = 6.61, p = .012). 
Like during the first information search, participants with a pro-management attitude searched 
a higher percentage of information than participants with a pro-user attitude (total number of 
items searched: M = 110% vs. M = 92%, different cells searched: M = 82% vs. M = 70%).  
The control group was also compared to the experimental groups in ANOVAs which, apart 
from the attitude factor, either included the 'time of accountability' factor or the 'type of 
accountability' factor. It had been expected that participants who had been made accountable 
before the final information search would search a higher percentage of information than 
participants who had been made accountable before the first search, resulting in a significant 
main effect of time of accountability. The analyses only showed a weak tendency for such an 
effect (total number of items searched: M = 108% vs. M = 103%, F(2,74) = 2.07, p = .134, 
different cells searched: M = 80% vs. M = 76%, F(2,74) = 2.15, p = .124). The main effects of 
attitude were significant again, however (total number of items searched: (F(1,74) = 4.18, p = 
.044), different cells searched: (F(1,74) = 7.81, p = .007). Also, for the percentage of total 
number of items searched, the main effect of time of accountability was qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction between time of accountability and attitude (F(2,74) = 2.97, 
p = .057). Simple main effect analyses indicated that the main effect of time of accountability 
was only significant for participants with a pro-user attitude (F(2,74) = 4.12, p = .020), and 
that the effect of attitude depended on time of accountability (F(3,74) = 3.05, p = .034). 
Participants with a pro-user attitude searched a significantly higher percentage of information 
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when they had been made accountable before the final decision than when they had not been 
made accountable (M = 114% vs. M = 62%, t(79) = 2.75, p = .008). There was also a 
marginally significant difference between the 'accountability before the final decision' and the 
'accountability before the first decision' conditions (M = 114% vs. M = 85%, t(79) = 1.88, p = 
.064). Furthermore, when participants had either not been made accountable or when they had 
been made accountable before the first decision, those with a pro-management attitude 
searched a higher percentage of information than those with a pro-user attitude (no 
accountability: M = 101% vs. M = 62%, t(79) = 1.77, p = .080, accountability before the first 
decision: M = 121% vs. M = 85%, t(79) = 2.33, p = .022).  
Based on the results for the first information search, it was also expected that 
participants who had been made accountable to the management would search a higher 
percentage of information than participants who had either been made accountable to the users 
of the program or not been made accountable. The expected main effect of type of 
accountability was marginally significant for the percentage of total number of items searched 
(F(2,74) = 2.57, p = .084), and was significant for the percentage of different cells searched 
(F(2,74) = 3.17, p = .048). Post-hoc simple contrasts indicated that non-accountable 
participants searched a lower percentage of different cells than participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program (total number of items searched: 81% vs. 112%, 
p = .028, different cells searched: 67% vs. 82%, p = .020). No other comparison was 
significant. Again, the attitude main effects were significant (total number of items searched: 
F(1,74) = 4.21, p = .044, different cells searched: F(1,74) = 8.19, p = .005). 
Three-factorial ANOVAs were conducted in order to test the joint effects of time of 
accountability (before the first decision vs. before the final decision), type of accountability 
(to users of the program vs. to the management of the company) and attitude (pro-user vs. pro-
management) on the percentage of searched information. The control group was not included 
in these analyses, since it was not part of a full factorial design of these factors. The ANOVA 
performed on the percentage of total number of items searched did not yield the expected 
main effect of time of accountability, but did show a significant interaction between time of 
accountability and attitude (F(1,56) = 4.16, p = .046). 
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Table 7.8. Process measures for the final information search, as a function of time of accountability, type of accountability and attitude. 
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
          1. Depth of search  
(in %)           
 total # of items 62 101 96 117 71 124 120 117 108 88 
 different cells 58 77 74 84 57 88 83 88 75 74 
          2. Searched user  
information (in %)           
 total # of items 64 55 65 63 73 62 61 58 65 59 
 different cells 63 51 60 61 69 55 52 52 62 54 
          3. Variability of  
search           
across alternatives           
 total # of items 1.33 1.58 1.39 0.91 1.44 1.02 1.12 1.57 1.61 1.54 
 different cells 1.17 0.79 0.70 0.41 1.06 0.55 0.59 0.69 0.66 1.06 
across attributes           
 total # of items 0.96 1.14 1.59 1.35 1.22 1.78 1.94 1.08 1.25 0.99 
 different cells 0.80 0.66 0.80 0.66 0.80 0.41 0.31 0.19 0.59 0.53 
4. Compensatory 
processing 
0.28 0.52 0.52 0.68 0.30 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.56 0.37 
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Table 7.8.  cont. 
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
5. Pattern of search 
(Payne Index) 
-0.46 -0.12 -0.42 -0.56 -0.23 -0.35 -0.54 -0.32 -0.66 -0.38 
          6. Concentration of 
search           
 total # of items 0.78 0.36 0.48 0.16 0.68 0.16 0.35 0.10 0.48 0.35 
 different cells 0.62 0.29 0.34 0.13 0.68 0.17 0.31 0.15 0.33 0.30 
7. Confirmation bias 
(BSI) 
          
chosen  
alternative 
1.14 1.04 1.17 1.19 1.14 1.14 1.37 0.87 1.50 1.09 
average non-chosen 
alternative 
0.89 1.00 1.10 1.07 1.13 1.00 1.01 1.09 0.99 1.08 
chosen alt./ average 
non-chosen alt. 
1.55 1.05 1.30 1.23 1.36 1.21 0.82 0.82 1.61 1.06 
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A simple main effects analysis showed that participants with a pro-management attitude 
searched a higher percentage of information items than participants with a pro-user attitude 
when they had been made accountable before the first decision (M = 121% vs. M = 83 %, 
F(1,56) = 4.79, p = .033), but not when they had been made accountable before the final 
decision (M = 102% vs. M = 114%, see Figure 7.8). The same interaction between time of 
accountability and attitude was obtained for the percentage of different cells searched, 
although it was only marginally significant in this case (F(1,56) = 2.93, p = .092). 
Nevertheless, there was a highly significant difference in the percentage of different cells 
searched between participants with different attitudes when they had been made accountable 
before the first decision only (F(1,56) = 7.46, p = .008). Participants with a pro-management 
attitude searched a higher percentage of different cells than participants with a pro-user 
attitude (M = 86% vs. M = 67%); this difference was not significant for participants who had 
only been made accountable before the final decision (M = 81% vs. M = 79%). In addition to 
the interaction between time of accountability and attitude, there was a significant main effect 
of attitude for the percentage of different cells searched (F(1,56) = 4.69, p = .035). 
Participants with a pro-management attitude searched a higher percentage of different cells 
than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 84% vs. M = 73%).  
2.  Searched user information  
The overall percentage of searched user information was 62% when related to the total 
number of items searched. This was higher than for the first information search (60%), the 
difference was marginally significant (t(79) = 1.97, p = .052, two-sided). The overall 
percentage of searched user information related to different cells searched was also higher 
than the value obtained for the first search, but not significantly so (M = 58% vs. M = 56%).  
It had been expected that only participants who had been made accountable before the 
first decision would adjust the type of the information they searched to the group they had 
been made accountable to, that is, would search relatively more or less user information, 
depending on whether they had been made accountable to the users of the program or to the 
management of the company. Participants who had only been made accountable before the 
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final decision, on the other hand, would search information according to their own attitude, 
resulting in a significant interaction between time of accountability and type of accountability 
and time of accountability and attitude.  
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Figure 7.8. Mean percentage of items searched during the final information search (based on 
the total number of items searched), as a function of time of accountability and 
attitude.  
Three-factorial ANOVAs performed to test these hypotheses revealed a marginally 
significant main effect of time of accountability on the percentage of searched user 
information calculated for the total number of items searched (F(1,56) = 3.28, p = .076), and a 
significant main effect of time of accountability on the percentage of searched user 
information calculated for different cells searched (F(1,56) = 4.03, p = .049). They also 
showed marginally significant main effects of attitude for both measures (total number of 
items searched: F(1,56) = 3.89, p = .053, different cells searched: F(1,56) = 3.66, p = .061). 
Participants who had been made accountable before the first decision tended to search a 
higher percentage of user information than participants who had been made accountable 
before the final decision (total number of items searched: M = 66% vs. M = 61%, different 
cells searched: M = 61% vs. M = 55%). Also, in line with expectations, participants with a 
pro-user attitude tended to search a higher percentage of user information than participants 
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with a pro-management attitude (total number of items searched: M = 66% vs. M = 60%, 
different cells searched: M = 61% vs. M = 55%). In addition, for the percentage of user 
information calculated for different cells searched, a marginally significant interaction 
between type of accountability and attitude was obtained (F(1,56) = 3.92, p = .053). A simple 
main effects analysis showed that the effect of type of accountability was only significant for 
participants with a pro-user attitude (F(1,56) = 5.48, p = .023), and that the effect of 
participants' attitude was only significant when they had been made accountable to the 
management of the company (F(1,56) = 7.58, p = .008). Participants with a pro-user attitude 
searched more user information when they had been made accountable to the management of 
the company than when they had been accountable to the users of the program (M = 66% vs. 
M = 57%), whereas there was no significant difference when participants had a pro-
management attitude (M = 55% vs. M = 56%). Also, when participants had been made 
accountable to the management of the company, those with a pro-user attitude searched more 
user information than those with a pro-management attitude (M = 66% vs. M = 55%), 
whereas participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the 
users of the program searched as much user information as participants with a pro-user 
attitude (M = 56% vs. M = 57%, see Figure 7.9). At first, these results seem to be at odds with 
the predictions, but may be explained if one assumes that participants with a pro-user attitude 
who thought they had to justify their decision to the management were under pressure, 
especially if they chose not to adjust to the opinion of the group they were made accountable 
to and preferred the user alternative instead. It may then be expected that they particularly 
concentrated on the positive attributes of this alternative, in order to be able to defend their 
choice. Participants who had been classified as having a pro-management attitude but were 
accountable to the users, on the other hand, seemed to have been much more willing to adjust 
their preference to that of the group they were accountable to. This is not surprising, given that 
attitudes were inclined towards user considerations anyway. 
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Figure 7.9. Mean percentage of user information searched during the final information 
search (based on different cells searched), as a function of type of accountability 
and attitude. 
The percentage of searched user information calculated for the total number of items 
searched as well as different cells searched did not differ significantly between accountable 
and non-accountable participants, as the main effect of accountability in the 2 (accountability: 
yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) ANOVAs performed on these 
measures was not significant. For both measures, there was a significant main effect of 
attitude, however (total number of items searched: F(1,76) = 5.48, p = .022, different cells 
searched: F(1,76) = 6.13, p = .015). As expected, participants with a pro-user attitude 
searched a higher percentage of user information than participants with a pro-management 
attitude (total number of items searched: M = 66% vs. M = 59%, different cells searched: M = 
61% vs. M = 55%).  
Unexpectedly, the percentage of searched user information calculated for the total 
number of items searched as well as different cells searched did not vary as a function of type 
of accountability. The attitude main effect was significant again for both measures, however 
(F(1,74) = 6.49, p = .013, different cells searched: F(1,74) = 7.26, p = .009).  
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There was neither a significant main effect of time of accountability on the percentage 
of searched user information related to the total number of items searched nor on the 
percentage of searched user information related to different cells searched. Again, only the 
attitude main effects were significant (total number of items searched: F(1,74) = 6.38, p = 
.014, different cells searched: F(1,74) = 6.85, p = .011).  
3.  Variability of search  
The overall mean variability of search across alternatives calculated for the total 
number of items searched was slightly lower than for the first information search (M = 1.35 
vs. M = 1.43), but not significantly so. The opposite trend was observed for variability of 
search across alternatives calculated for different cells searched (M = 0.76 vs. M = 0.65, t(79) 
= 1.76, p = .081, two-sided). The latter supports the assumption that participants' information 
search concentrated on only a subset of the available alternatives. The overall mean variability 
of search across attributes was slightly larger for the final than for the first information search 
(M = 1.34 vs. M = 1.30 for total number of items searched and M = 0.57 vs. M = 0.54 for 
different cells searched), but not significantly so. The fact that the observed variability of 
search was larger when calculated for the total number of items searched than for different 
cells searched (across alternatives: M = 1.35 vs. M = 0.76, t(79) = 7.22, p = .000, across 
attributes: M = 1.34 vs. M = 0.57, t(79) = 7.68, p = .000) indicates that when participants 
searched information repeatedly, they tended to do this less evenly. Variability of search of 
different cells was significantly larger across alternatives than it was across attributes (M = 
0.76 vs. M = 0.57, t(79) = 2.31, p = .041). The same difference was not significant where the 
total number of items was concerned, however (M = 1.35 vs. M = 1.34). The former effect 
again lends support to the assumption that participants did not search information for all 
alternatives; however, the alternatives they did consider, they tended to search a similar 
number of attributes for. 
It had been expected that the variability of search across alternatives and attributes 
would be lower for accountable than for non-accountable participants. The observed 
variability of search across alternatives was indeed lower for accountable than for non-
accountable participants (total number of items searched: M = 1.33 vs. M = 1.45, different 
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cells searched: M = 0.71 vs. M = 0.98), but in the ANOVAs performed to test this hypothesis 
the main effect of accountability was not significant. The variability of search across attributes 
showed the predicted trend when it was calculated for different cells searched (M = 0.53 vs. M 
= 0.73), but not when it was calculated for the total number of items searched (M = 1.41 vs. 
M = 1.05). In neither case were significant main effects of accountability obtained, however. 
There were also no significant attitude main effects or significant interactions between 
accountability and attitude observed in any of the analyses. 
Furthermore, it had been expected that participants who had been made accountable 
before the decision would show a lower variability of search across alternatives and attributes 
than participants who had been made accountable before the first decision, resulting in 
significant main effects of time of accountability. Two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects 
of time of accountability (no vs. before the first decision vs. before the final decision) and 
attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) were carried out to test these predictions. There was 
indeed a marginally significant effect of time of accountability on the variability of search 
across attributes calculated for different cells searched (F(2,74) = 2.56, p = .084), but not for 
any of the other measures. Post-hoc simple contrasts suggested that, as predicted, participants 
who had been made accountable before the final decision tended to show a lower variability of 
search across attributes than both non-accountable participants (M = 0.41 vs. M = 0.73, p = 
.056) and participants who had been made accountable before the first decision (M = 0.41 vs. 
M = 0.66, p = .068). For variability of search across alternatives calculated for different cells 
searched, a weak tendency for an interaction between time of accountability and attitude was 
observed (F(2,74) = 2.34, p = .103). Simple main effects analyses suggested that the effect of 
time of accountability tended to be limited to participants with a pro-user attitude (F(2,74) = 
2.03, p = .138). When they had been made accountable before the final decision, they showed 
a significantly lower variability of search across alternatives calculated for different cells 
searched than when they had not been made accountable (M = 0.62 vs. M = 1.17, t(79) = 2.00, 
p = .049). The difference to participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision was in the predicted direction, but not significant (M = 0.62 vs. M = 0.86). The 'type 
of accountability' main effect did not reach standard significance levels in the ANOVAs 
performed on any of the variability of search measures.  
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Three-factorial ANOVAs performed on measures of variability of search across 
alternatives and attributes only yielded significant effects when variability of search was 
related to different cells searched but not when it was related to the total number of items 
searched. For variability of search across alternatives, there was a significant interaction 
between time of accountability and attitude (F(1,56) = 4.40, p = .040). A simple main effects 
analysis revealed that the attitude effect only approached significance when participants had 
been made accountable before the first decision (F(1,56) = 3.30, p = .074). In this case, 
participants with a pro-management attitude showed a lower variability of search across 
alternatives than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 0.48 vs. M = 0.88), for participants 
who had been made accountable before the final decision this pattern was reversed (M = 0.87 
vs. M = 0.62), but not significantly so. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 7.10.  
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Figure 7.10. Mean variability of search across alternatives (based on different cells searched) 
during the final information search, as a function of time of accountability and 
attitude. 
The ANOVA carried out on the variability of search across attributes calculated for 
different cells searched yielded a significant main effect of time of accountability (F(1,56) = 
4.15, p = .046). As expected, participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision showed a lower variability of search across attributes than participants who had been 
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made accountable before the first decision (M = 0.41 vs. M = 0.66). This effect was qualified, 
however, by a marginally significant interaction between time of accountability and type of 
accountability (F(1,56) = 2.93, p = .092). A simple main effects analysis indicated that time of 
accountability only had a significant effect on participants who had been made accountable to 
the users of the program (F(1,56) = 7.03, p = .010). Participants who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program before the first decision showed a higher variability of 
search across attributes than participants who had been made accountable only before the final 
decision (M = 0.73 vs. M = 0.25). For participants who had been made accountable to the 
management, this difference was not significant (M = 0.60 vs. M = 0.56, see Figure 7.11).  
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Figure 7.11. Mean variability of search across attributes (based on different cells searched) 
during the final information search, as a function of time of accountability and 
type of accountability. 
4.  Compensatory processing  
Overall, information processing was significantly less compensatory than during the 
first search (0.52 vs. 0.60, t(79) = 2.27, p = .026, two-sided), which is consistent with a 
strategy of mainly searching information for the alternative one already has a preference for. 
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Although the predicted main effect of accountability on the extent of compensatory 
processing failed to reach standard significance levels (F(1,76) = 2.34, p = .131), it was in the 
expected direction. Accountable participants tended to process information in a more 
compensatory manner than non-accountable participants (M = 0.55 vs. M = 0.40). The main 
effect of attitude also showed a weak tendency to be significant (F(1,74) = 2.43, p = .123). 
Participants with a pro-user attitude tended to process information in a more compensatory 
manner than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 0.46 vs. M = 0.57). This is 
opposite to what was found for the first search. 
It had also been expected that participants who had been made accountable before the 
final decision would show a stronger tendency for compensatory processing than participants 
who had already been made accountable before the first decision, resulting in a significant 
main effect of time of accountability. This effect was not found. There was, however, a 
marginally significant interaction between time of accountability and attitude (F(2,74) = 2.38, 
p = .099). Simple main effects analyses suggested that the effect of time of accountability only 
tended to be significant for participants with a pro-user attitude (F(2,74) = 2.40, p = .097). 
Their information processing was significantly more compensatory when they had been made 
accountable before the final decision than when they had not been made accountable (M = 
0.60 vs. M = 0.28, t(79) = 2.11, p = .039). It also tended to be more compensatory when they 
had been made accountable before the final decision than when they had been made 
accountable before the first decision (M = 0.60 vs. M = 0.48), but not significantly so. In 
addition, the analyses revealed that the effect of attitude tended to depend on the 'time of 
accountability' condition (F(3,74) = 2.20, p = .095). The only significant difference between 
participants with a pro-user attitude and participants with a pro-management attitude was 
obtained when they had been made accountable before the first decision. In this case, 
participants with a pro-management attitude showed a more compensatory information search 
than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 0.68 vs. M = 0.42, t(79) = 2.03, p = .046).  
The ANOVA testing the effects of type of accountability and attitude showed a weak 
tendency for a main effect of type of accountability (F(2, 74) = 2.20, p = .118). Post-hoc 
contrasts showed that participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program 
tended to have a more strongly compensatory information processing than participants who 
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had not been made accountable (M = 0.61 vs. M = 0.40, p = .161). The attitude main effect 
only showed a weak tendency to be significant (F(1,74) = 2.53, p = .116). 
The results of the three-factorial ANOVAs testing the effect of time of accountability, 
type of accountability and attitude on the experimental groups only yielded the following 
results. Consistent with the results for depth of search and variability of search across 
alternatives, a significant interaction between time of accountability and attitude was found 
(F(1,56) = 4.34, p = .042). As before, simple main effects analyses suggested that participants' 
attitude only had a significant effect if they had been made accountable before the first rather 
than the final decision (F(1,56) = 4.48, p = .039). In this case, participants with a pro-
management attitude processed information in a more compensatory manner than participants 
with a pro-user attitude (M = 0.68 vs. M = 0.42). For participants who had been made 
accountable before the final decision the pattern was reversed (M = 0.50 vs. M = 0.60), the 
difference was not significant, however. Figure 7.12 shows the extent of compensatory 
information processing, as a function of time of accountability and attitude.  
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Figure 7.12. Mean Index of Compensatory Processing, as a function of time of accountability 
and attitude (a value of 1 indicates a maximum extent of compensatory 
processing). 
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5.  Pattern of search (Payne Index) 
The overall pattern of search was attribute-wise, as indicated by the negative value 
obtained (M = -0.41), but not significantly different to that of the first search (M = -0.34). 
This suggests that, overall, information processing tended to be non-compensatory. 
It had been predicted that non-accountable participants would show a more attribute-
wise search than accountable participants. The main effect of accountability in the 2 
(accountability: yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro management) ANOVA employed 
to test this hypothesis was not significant, however. If anything, the observed means suggested 
the opposite; information search tended to be more attribute-wise for accountable than non-
accountable participants (M = -0.43 vs. M = -0.29). The attitude main effect was not 
significant, nor was the interaction between accountability and attitude.  
Another difference that had been predicted was that participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision would show a more attribute-wise search than 
participants who had been made accountable before the final decision. This was not the case; 
in the ANOVA employed to test this hypothesis, the main effect of time of accountability was 
not significant, nor was the main effect of attitude or the interaction between these factors. 
The same was true for the analysis testing the effect of type of accountability. 
Finally, no significant effects were obtained in the analysis testing the effects of time 
of accountability, type of accountability and attitude on the experimental conditions only. 
6.  Concentration of search  
The preliminary conclusion that participants mainly searched information for the 
alternative they already had a preference for was also supported by the results for 
concentration of search on the chosen alternative. Concentration of search on the chosen 
alternative was higher during the final information search than during the first search, both for 
the total number of items searched and for different cells searched (M = 0.39 vs. M = 0.35 for 
total number of items searched, M = 0.33 vs. M = 0.22 for different cells searched). This 
Results 
 271 
difference was only significant for the concentration of search for different cells searched, 
however (t(79) = 2.94, p = .004). 
It had been predicted that accountable participants would concentrate their search less 
on the chosen alternative than participants who had not been made accountable. There was 
indeed a significant main effect of accountability for concentration of search on the chosen 
alternative calculated for the total number of items searched (F(1,76) = 4.66, p = .034). As 
expected, accountable participants focused their search less on the chosen alternative than 
non-accountable participants (M = 0.35 vs. M = 0.57). There was also a highly significant 
main effect of attitude (F(1,76) = 11.56, p = .001). Participants with a pro-user attitude 
concentrated their information search more on the chosen alternative than participants with a 
pro-management alternative (M = 0.55 vs. M = 0.23). The results for concentration of search 
of different cells were less clear-cut. The main effect of accountability only showed a weak 
tendency to be significant (F(1,76) = 2.25, p = .138). As before, accountable participants 
tended to concentrate their information search less on the chosen alternative than non-
accountable participants (M = 0.30 vs. M = 0.45). The only significant effect was the attitude 
main effect (F(1,76) = 6.79, p = .011), which, again, suggested that participants with a pro-
user attitude had a higher concentration of search on the chosen alternative than participants 
with a pro-management attitude (M = 0.45 vs. M = 0.21). 
Time of accountability had a marginally significant effect on concentration of search 
for the total number of items searched (F(2,74) = 2.43, p = .095). Post-hoc simple contrasts 
indicated that participants who had been not been made accountable concentrated their search 
more on the chosen alternative than participants who had been made accountable before the 
final decision (M = 0.57 vs. M = 0.32, p = .034), and tended to concentrate their search more 
on the chosen alternative than participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision (M = 0.57 vs. M = 0.37, p = .080, see Figure 7.13). Again, the main effect of attitude 
was significant (F(1,74) = 14.48, p = .000). For concentration of search for different cells 
searched, only the main effect of attitude was significant (F(1,74) = 8.31, p = .005). 
Participants with a pro-user attitude concentrated their search more on the chosen alternative 
than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 0.45 vs. M = 0.21).  
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Figure 7.13. Mean concentration of the final information search on the chosen alternative 
(based on the total number of items searched), as a function of time of 
accountability and attitude. 
Type of accountability was found to have a significant main effect on the concentration 
of search calculated for the total number of items searched (F(2,74) = 3.40, p = .039). Post-
hoc simple contrasts showed that participants in the 'no accountability' condition showed a 
significantly higher concentration of search on the chosen alternative than participants in the 
'accountability to users' conditions (M = 0.57 vs. M = 0.28, p = .012). Again, the main effect 
of attitude was highly significant (F(1,74) = 15.06, p = .000). There was no significant main 
effect of type of accountability on the concentration of search for different cells searched; only 
the attitude main effect was highly significant (F(1,74) = 8.67, p = .004). 
Three-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of time of accountability, type of 
accountability, and attitude on the concentration of search calculated for the total number of 
items searched as well as different cells searched, only yielded significant attitude main effects 
(F(1,56) = 10.55, p = .002 for total number of items searched, F(1,56) = 7.08, p = .010 for 
different cells searched). Participants with a pro-user attitude concentrated their search more 
on the chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 0.49 vs. M = 
0.19 for total number of items searched, M = 0.41 vs. M = 0.19 for different cells searched). 
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7.  Biased search  
It had been predicted that, after a first decision had been made, information search 
would be biased to bolster the previously chosen alternative, that is, participants would search 
information which they could expect to support their chosen alternative and devalue their non-
chosen alternatives, resulting in a BSI that was significantly greater than 1 for the chosen 
alternative, significantly smaller than 1 for the average non-chosen alternative and 
significantly greater than 1 for the ratio of the chosen alternative to the average non-chosen 
alternative. This tendency was expected to be stronger for accountable than for non-
accountable participants, being evident in a significant main effect of accountability. In 
addition, information search was expected to be particularly biased if participants had been 
made accountable before the final rather than the first decision, and if they experienced a 
value conflict because their own preferences opposed those of the group they had been made 
accountable to, resulting in significant interactions between time of accountability and attitude 
and type of accountability and attitude. 
The overall mean BSI observed for the chosen alternative (M = 1.17) indicated that 
there was a bias in the sample to search more supporting than non-supporting information for 
the chosen alternative. The difference to a balanced value of 1 was highly significant (t(79) = 
3.32, p = .001). The same was true for the ratio of the BSI for the chosen to the BSI for the 
average non-chosen alternative (M = 1.26, t(79) = 3.28, p = .002), suggesting that information 
search was biased to support the chosen over the average non-chosen alternative. The 
observed mean BSI for the non-chosen alternative (M = 1.03) was not significantly different 
from 1, however. 
Two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of accountability (yes vs. no) and attitude 
(pro-user vs. pro-management) were performed on all dependent measures to test whether the 
bias in information search was stronger for accountable than for non-accountable participants. 
Contrary to expectations, no significant main effects of accountability were obtained. 
Accountable participants tended to show a larger BSI for the chosen alternative than non-
accountable participants (M = 1.19 vs. M = 1.09), but the observed difference was not 
significant. For the average non-chosen alternative, a tendency in the opposite direction was 
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observed, although this was not significant either; accountable participants did not bias their 
information search against the average non-chosen alternative, whereas non-accountable 
participants tended to do so (M = 1.06 vs. M = 0.95). This may be seen to suggest that the 
expectation of having to justify their choice induced participants to pay more attention to 
information that contained possible counter-arguments. As a result, the ratio of the BSI for the 
chosen alternative to the BSI for the average non-chosen alternative hardly differed between 
conditions (accountability: M = 1.25, no accountability: M = 1.30). The ANOVA performed 
on this dependent measure yielded the only significant effect, a main effect of attitude 
(F(1,76) = 4.67, p = .034). Participants with a pro-user attitude showed a stronger bias to 
support their chosen over their average non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-
management attitude (M = 1.45 vs. M = 1.07).  
In order to test whether the observed bias in information search was stronger for 
participants who had been made accountable before the final rather than the first decision, two 
factorial ANOVAs including the factors of time of accountability and attitude were conducted. 
The analysis performed on the BSI for the chosen alternative did not yield the expected main 
effect of time of accountability, but showed a marginally significant main effect of attitude 
(F(1,74) = 3.17, p = .079). Participants with a pro-user attitude tended to show a stronger bias 
to support their chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 1.26 
vs. M = 1.07). This effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between time 
of accountability and attitude (F(2,74) = 2.34, p = .104). Simple main effect analyses 
indicated that the strength of the attitude effect depended on when participants had been made 
accountable (F(3,74) = 2.95, p = .038). Participants with a pro-user attitude only showed a 
stronger bias to support their chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management 
attitude when they had been made accountable before the final decision (M = 1.43 vs. M = 
0.98, t(79) = 2.94, p = .004). The analysis performed on the BSI for the average non-chosen 
alternative did not yield any significant effects, that for the ratio of the BSI for the chosen to 
the BSI for the average non-chosen alternative only yielded the already known main effect of 
attitude (F(1,74) = 5.81, p =.018). 
The predictions concerning the effects of a value conflict on the degree of bias in 
participants' information search were tested with three-factorial ANOVAs including the 
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factors of time of accountability, type of accountability and attitude. These only included the 
experimental groups. The analysis performed on the BSI for the chosen alternative indicated a 
marginally significant main effect of attitude (F(1, 56) = 3.43, p = .069) and a marginally 
significant interaction between time of accountability and attitude (F(1, 56) = 3.72, p = .059). 
Participants with a pro-user attitude tended to bias their information search more strongly 
towards the chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 1.30 vs. 
M = 1.07). However, this effect was only significant when they had been made accountable 
before the final decision (M = 1.43 vs. M = 0.98, F(1, 56) = 7.21, p = .010). There was no 
significant difference between participants with a pro-user and a pro-management attitude 
when they had been made accountable before the first decision (M = 1.16 vs. M = 1.17). This 
relationship is depicted in Figure 7.14.  
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Figure 7.14. Mean BSI for the chosen alternative, as a function of time of accountability and 
attitude. 
Similar results were obtained for the ratio of the BSI for the chosen alternative to the 
BSI for the average non-chosen alternative. The main effect of attitude was again marginally 
significant (F(1,56) = 3.86, p = .055, pro-user attitude: M = 1.43, pro-management attitude: M 
= 1.08). The interaction between time of accountability and attitude was not significant 
(F(1,56) = 1.81, p = .183), but simple main effects analyses indicated that, as already 
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suggested by the BSI for the chosen alternative, participants with a pro-user attitude biased 
their information search more strongly to support their chosen over their average non-chosen 
alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude when they had been made 
accountable before the final, but not when they had been made accountable before the first 
decision (accountability before the final decision: M = 1.53 vs. M = 0.94, F(1,56) = 5.52, p = 
.022, accountability before the first decision: M = 1.33 vs. M = 1.22). Although the triple 
interaction between time of accountability, type of accountability and attitude was not 
significant, an inspection of the observed means showed that participants with a pro-user 
attitude who had been made accountable to the management before the final decision 
exhibited a particularly strong bias to support their chosen over their average non-chosen 
alternative, suggesting that they experienced their value conflict as particularly strong (see 
Figure 7.15). No significant effects were obtained in the ANOVA analysing the BSI for the 
average non-chosen alternative.  
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Figure 7.15. Mean ratio of the BSI for the chosen alternative to the BSI for the average non-
chosen alternative. 
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Summary of the results for the final information search 
The results for the final information search were consistent with predictions derived 
from the PMA, in that they suggested that accountability pressures tended to result in a 
deeper, less variable and more compensatory information search that was less strongly 
concentrated on the chosen alternative compared to no accountability. The difference between 
accountability before the final and the first decision was also significant in some cases, but 
tended to be smaller overall. Also, the final information search measures pointed to some of 
the predicted interactions between the experimental factors. As expected, a conflict between 
participants' own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable 
to resulted in information processing that was geared towards protecting the chosen alternative 
if participants had not adjusted their choice to that assumed to be preferred by their audience. 
This was only true for participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to 
the management, however, because the general bias towards user considerations in the sample 
meant that participants with a pro-management attitude felt it easy to give in to user pressures. 
Because participants who had been made accountable before the first decision had partly 
adjusted to audience preferences already when making their first decision, as expected, this 
effect tended to be stronger for participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision.  
Overall, depth of the final information search was lower than that of the first. This was 
to be expected, given that participants had already developed a preference hierarchy, and that 
the information to be searched was largely redundant with that of the first information set and 
therefore should not have presented any surprises to the participants. As predicted, 
accountable participants searched more information than non-accountable participants. 
However, the hypothesis that participants who had been made accountable immediately prior 
to the final information search would search more information than participants who had 
already been made accountable before the first information search could only be confirmed for 
participants with a pro-user attitude. This was because, although participants with a pro-
management attitude searched more information than participants with a pro-user attitude 
overall, and did so when they had either not been made accountable or when they had been 
made accountable before the first decision, they failed to do so when they had been made 
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accountable before the final decision, particularly when they had been made accountable to 
the management. This was true both for the total number of items searched and different cells 
searched. As a consequence of this effect, only the 'accountability to users' conditions showed 
a deeper information search than the 'no accountability' conditions. At this point, there is no 
readily apparent reason why participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made 
accountable to the management before the final decision searched comparatively little 
information. The analysis of participants' choices later on may shed some light on this. The 
significant main effect of attitude on depth of search is yet another indicator for the fact that 
participants with a pro-management attitude were concerned with both user and cost 
attributes, whereas participants with a pro-user attitude were primarily interested in user 
attributes. 
The percentage of searched user information observed in the various conditions was 
consistent with a results pattern that would be expected if participants with a pro-user attitude 
who had been made accountable to the management were reluctant to adjust to these 
accountability pressures, whereas participants with a pro-management attitude who had been 
made accountable to the users were willing to. This had already been suggested by analyses 
investigating information evaluation processes after the previous decision and so receives 
further support. Participants with a pro-user attitude searched a higher percentage of user 
information when they had been made accountable to the management than when they had 
been made accountable to the users of the program, presumably because they had mostly 
chosen the user alternative before and needed to defend it against objections from a 
management-friendly audience. Participants with a pro-management attitude who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program, on the other hand, searched as much (and not 
less) user information as participants with a pro-user attitude, suggesting that they adjusted to 
the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable to. It had also been expected 
that participants who had been made accountable before the final decision would be unwilling 
to adjust to the preferences of their audience if these conflicted with their own, but that this 
would not be the case if participants had already been made accountable before the first 
decision. However, this effect could not be observed in the percentage of user information 
searched. 
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On the whole, the observed variability of search, as expected, tended to be lower for 
accountable than for non-accountable participants, but not significantly so. For variability of 
search across attributes, calculated for the total number of items searched, an opposite trend 
could be observed, suggesting that accountable participants, when they searched information 
repeatedly, tended to do so for some attributes but not for others to a larger extent than non-
accountable participants, possibly to remind themselves of the advantages of the alternative 
they favoured. Variability of search across alternatives calculated for different cells searched 
was generally larger than variability of search across attributes. This indicates that participants 
only searched a subset of the available alternatives, but tended to search an equal number of 
attributes per alternative. The expected main effect of time of accountability on variability of 
search measures was only found for variability of search across attributes for different cells 
searched. As expected, it tended to be lower when participants had been made accountable 
before the final decision than when they had either not been made accountable or had been 
made accountable before the first decision. Variability of search across alternatives calculated 
for different cells searched was affected by time of accountability only when participants had 
a pro-user attitude. This was consistent with the results obtained for depth of search. For 
participants with a pro-user attitude, variability of search across alternatives was indeed lower 
when they had been made accountable before the final decision than when they had not been 
made accountable, whereas for participants with a pro-management attitude there was no 
significant difference, and they tended to show the lowest variability of search when they had 
already been made accountable before the first decision. The fact that participants' attitude 
moderated the effects of time of accountability was further supported by a significant 
interaction between these factors when the data for the experimental groups only were 
inspected. Significant effects were only obtained for variability of search measures related to 
the number of different cells searched. Where variability of search across alternatives was 
concerned, participants with a pro-user attitude showed a significantly larger variability of 
search than participants with a pro-management attitude when they had been made 
accountable before the first decision. For accountability before the final decision, the reverse 
tended to be true, but not significantly so. This is yet another indicator for a tendency 
described earlier, namely that participants with a pro-management attitude did not show their 
usual relatively balanced search of all alternatives when they had been made accountable 
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before the final decision, especially when they had been made accountable to the 
management. This meant that for variability of search across attributes, participants who had 
been made accountable to the management of the company did not show the expected smaller 
variability of search when they had been made accountable before the final compared to the 
first decision, whereas participants who had been made accountable to the users did.  
The analyses performed on the Koele and Westenberg Index of Compensatory 
Processing, which combines measures of depth of search and variability of search across 
alternatives for different cells searched, not surprisingly, confirmed what had separately been 
found for these two measures. The information search of participants with a pro-management 
attitude was more compensatory than that of participants with a pro-user attitude when they 
had been made accountable before the first decision, whereas the opposite tended to be the 
case when they had been made accountable before the final decision. Also, participants with a 
pro-user attitude processed information in a more compensatory manner when they had been 
made accountable before the final decision than when they had not been made accountable. As 
expected, information processing tended to be more compensatory for accountable than non-
accountable participants, but the observed difference was not significant. Overall, processing 
was also less compensatory than during the first information search. This effect was also 
evident in the observed pattern of search, which was generally attribute-wise and indicated a 
non-compensatory information search. The latter was, however, the only conclusion that could 
be drawn from the findings obtained regarding the pattern of search. The persistent failure to 
obtain any significant effects for this measure indicates problems with its sensitivity.  
The findings for the extent of compensatory information processing were largely 
supported by those for the concentration of search measures. Concentration of search on the 
chosen alternative, as expected, was significantly lower for accountable than non-accountable 
participants when the total number of items searched was inspected, and tended to be lower 
for the number of different cells searched, suggesting that it was particularly repeated searches 
of information that focused on the chosen alternative. In most analyses, there was also a 
significant main effect of attitude, which indicated that participants with a pro-user attitude 
concentrated their information search more strongly on the chosen alternative than participants 
with a pro-management alternative. The analyses performed on the concentration of search 
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measure for the total number of items searched furthermore suggested that participants who 
had not been made accountable concentrated their information significantly more strongly on 
the chosen alternative than participants who had been made accountable immediately prior to 
this search, and marginally more strongly than participants who had already been made 
accountable before the first decision. Participants in the 'no accountability' conditions also 
showed a stronger concentration of search on the chosen alternative for the total number of 
items searched than participants in the 'accountability to users' conditions. In departure from 
the findings for depth and variability of search, the analyses carried out on the experimental 
groups only did not show any significant interactions, but only resulted in significant attitude 
main effects. In line with expectations, however, the highest concentration of search on the 
chosen alternative was observed for participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made 
accountable to the management before the first decision. They had experienced a value 
conflict, because they had not generally adjusted their choices to the preferences of their 
audience previously. This  induced a need to concentrate on their preferred alternative, and as 
they did not experience an immediate pressure to prepare for a justification, they had the 
freedom to do so. 
Finally, the analyses performed on the Biased Search Index (BSI), as a measure for 
confirmation bias, revealed that there was indeed a bias in the sample to search more 
supporting than non-supporting information for the chosen alternative, and to search 
information in such a way that the chosen alternative was supported over the average non-
chosen alternative. Accountable participants, however, did not do so significantly more 
strongly than non-accountable participants. The analysis performed on the BSI for the average 
non-chosen alternative even suggested that accountable participants tended to search more 
information that supported the non-chosen alternatives than did participants who had not been 
made accountable. This may be seen as supporting the assumption that accountability raises 
interest in possible counter-arguments, and therefore increases attention to competing choices. 
The analyses performed on the BSI for the chosen alternative also revealed that participants 
with a pro-user attitude showed a stronger bias to support their chosen alternative than 
participants with a pro-management attitude, but only when they had been made accountable 
before the final decision. This was also found when the ratio of the BSI for the chosen 
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alternative to the BSI for the average non-chosen alternative was analysed. In this case, the 
effect was only significant, however, when the control group was not included in the analysis. 
When it was included, only the attitude main effect was significant. The nature of the 
observed interactions between time of accountability and attitude is consistent with other 
results that suggested that participants' information search was particularly non-balanced and 
biased towards the chosen alternative when they experienced a value conflict because they had 
been made accountable to a group whose preferences clashed with their own and they had not 
been willing to adjust to the preferences of their audience. This was particularly the case for 
participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the management 
before the final decision. Hence, not surprisingly, the strongest bias to support the chosen over 
the average non-chosen alternative was observed in this condition. 
Information evaluation and integration 
1.  Choices  
It was expected that participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision would be more likely to choose the user alternative if they had been made 
accountable to the users of the program, and more likely to choose a management alternative 
if they had been made accountable to the management of the company. Participants who had 
been made accountable only before the final decision, however (that is, after they had already 
made a commitment to one of the alternatives), were expected not to adjust their choice to the 
preference of the group they had been made accountable to but choose according to their own 
attitude instead. Participants who had not been made accountable were expected to show the 
same tendency. Table 7.9 shows the frequencies of user and management choices, as a 
function of time of accountability, type of accountability and attitude.  
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Table 7.9. Frequency of user and management choices at the final decision. 
 No 
Accountability 
Accountability before 
the First Decision 
Accountability before 
the Final Decision 
 
  To Users To Man. To Users To Man.  
Attitude Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
 
Σ 
User Alt. 6 5 8 6 3 4 7 3 6 4 52 
Man. Alt 2 3 1 1 4 5 1 5 2 4 28 
Σ 8 8 9 7 7 9 8 8 8 8 80 
 
A Chi-squared analysis performed on the choices of participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision revealed the expected effect; participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program chose the user alternative more often than a 
management alternative (14/16= 88%), whereas participants who had been made accountable 
to the management chose a management alternative more often than the user alternative (9/16 
= 56%, χ2 (1) = 6.79, p = .009). Participants who had only been made accountable before the 
final decision, on the other hand, did not adjust their choices to the group they were made 
accountable to (χ2 (1) = 0.00, p = 1.000). As expected, their choices were a function of their 
own attitude instead. Participants with a pro-user attitude chose the user alternative in the 
majority of cases (13/16 = 81%), participants with a pro-management attitude, on the other 
hand, chose a management alternative more often than the user alternative (9/16 = 56%, χ2 (1) 
= 4.80, p = .028). In the 'no-accountability' condition, however, although expected, this effect 
was not observed. Both participants with a pro-user and a pro-management attitude chose the 
user alternative more often than the management alternative (6/8 = 75% and 5/8 = 63%, 
respectively). The reason for this was that, surprisingly, three non-accountable participants 
who had been classified as having a pro-management attitude changed their initial decision 
from a management alternative to the user alternative. This had a considerable impact, given 
the small number of participants in this condition. Otherwise, changes of the initial decision 
were generally rare (10/80 = 12.5%) and exclusively in the direction of a change from a 
management alternative to the user alternative, again indicating the generally strong 
preference for user over cost attributes in the sample (see Table 7.10). 
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Table 7.10. Frequency of change of the initial decision.  
 No 
Accountability 
Accountability before 
the First Decision 
Accountability before 
the Final Decision 
 
  To Users To Man. To Users To Man.  
Attitude Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
Pro 
User 
Pro 
Man. 
 
Σ 
No Change 7 5 9 5 7 7 8 7 7 8 70 
To User Alt 1 3 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 10 
To Man. Alt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Σ 8 8 9 7 7 9 8 8 8 8 80 
 
2.  Attribute weights  
Similar to the choice results, it was expected that participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision would indicate adjustment of their attribute weights to 
the group they had been made accountable to, that is, participants who had been made 
accountable to the users would report higher user attribute weights than participants who had 
been made accountable to the management of the company. Participants who had been made 
accountable only before the final decision, on the other hand, would not show this adjustment, 
but instead report weights which corresponded with their attitude, resulting in an interaction 
between time of accountability and type of accountability and time of accountability and 
attitude. The mean sum of user attribute weights observed before and after making the final 
decision as well as their change from the second to the third elicitation is shown in Table 7.11. 
Three-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of time of accountability (before the first 
decision vs. before the final decision), type of accountability (to users of the program vs. to 
the management of the company) and attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) were conducted 
to test the above hypotheses. The control group was not included in the analyses.  
The ANOVA performed on the mean sum of normalised weights for user attributes 
contained in the first information set after the final decision revealed a significant main effect 
of attitude (F(1,56) = 4.28, p = .043). For participants with a pro-user attitude, a higher sum of 
user attribute weights was obtained than for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 
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0.71 vs. M = 0.64). The analysis also revealed the expected interaction between time of 
accountability and type of accountability (F(1,56) = 9.09, p = .004). A simple main effects 
analysis showed that when participants had been made accountable before the first decision, 
the mean sum of user attribute weights was significantly higher in the 'accountability to users' 
condition than in the 'accountability to the management' condition (M = 0.72 vs. M = 0.62, 
F(1,56) = 8.37, p = .005). For participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision, this difference was not significant (M = 0.69 vs. M = 0.65, see Figure 7.16). This 
was in line with predictions. Also, when participants had been made accountable to the users 
of the program, their sum of user attribute weights was significantly higher when this had 
happened before the first decision than when it had happened before the final decision (M = 
0.72 vs. M = 0.65, F(1,56) = 4.24, p = .044). When participants had been made accountable to 
the management of the company, however, the opposite was true, the sum of user attribute 
weights was higher when participants had only just been made accountable to the management 
than when they had already been made accountable before the first decision (M = 0.62 vs. M 
= 0.69, F(1,56) = 4.87, p = .032). This makes sense, if one bears in mind that many of those 
participants had initially chosen the user alternative (9/16 = 56%). Subsequent accountability 
to the management created a strong pressure to either adjust to the preferences of the group 
they had been made accountable to or bolster their decision. All participants seem to have 
chosen a bolstering strategy, by selecting the user alternative again and stressing the 
importance of user attributes on which their chosen alternative fared particularly well.  
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Figure 7.16. Mean sum of user attribute weights after the final decision (information set 1), as 
a function of time of accountability and type of accountability. 
Unexpectedly, the ANOVA performed on the sum of weights for the parallel user 
attributes contained in the second information set only yielded a significant main effect of 
attitude (F(1,55) = 5.38, p = .024). Again, for participants with a pro-user attitude the sum of 
user attribute weights was higher than for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 
0.72 vs. M = 0.64). For the sum of weights based on the user attributes contained in both 
information sets, the time of accountability by type of accountability interaction remained 
significant, however (F(1,55) = 4.64, p = .036). Post-hoc analyses showed a similar pattern as 
before; for participants who had been made accountable before the first decision the observed 
mean sum of user attribute weights tended to be higher when they had been made accountable 
to the users of the program than the management of the company (M = 0.71 vs. M = 0.64, 
F(1,55) = 3.51, p = .066), whereas this difference was not significant when participants had 
only been made accountable before the final decision (M = 0.66 vs. M = 0.70). 
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Table 7.11. Mean sum of user attribute weights after the first and final decision, as a function of time of accountability, type of accountability 
and attitude. 
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
sum of user attribute 
weights 
          
set 1 attributes           
after final decision .775 .631 .733 .705 .630 .606 .670 .625 .748 .642 
after first decision .788 .668 .744 .743 .609 .622 .664 .639 .743 .620 
difference -0.013 -0.037 -0.111 -0.038 -0.021 -0.160 0.006 -0.140 0.005 0.022 
set 2 attributes           
after final decision .757 .643 .744 .663 .696 .652 .694 .647 .760 .637 
after first decision .713 .628 .753 .694 .738 .655 .735 .629 .778 .630 
difference 0.044 0.015 -0.009 -0.031 -0.042 -0.002 -0.041 0.019 -0.018 0.014* 
set 1 + 2 attributes           
after final decision .763 .637 .739 .673 .652 .631 .680 .635 .754 .643 
after first decision .750 .654 .748 .712 .661 .637 .696 .631 .757 .625 
difference 0.013 -0.017 -0.008 -0.038 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016 0.004 -0.003 0.017* 
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
 * Because of missing values for the third elicitation, the data for one participant had to be excluded from the analysis, resulting in inconsistent difference values. 
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The analyses performed on the change in the sum of user attribute weights from after 
the first to after the final decision did not yield any significant effects, neither for the attributes 
from the first information set nor for those from the second information set or both combined. 
The differences obtained were mainly negative, indicating regression rather than 
differentiation and consolidation effects. 
3.  Overall evaluation of alternatives  
The dependent variables were the same as previously analysed, except that the 
differences between MAUT predictions were calculated subtracting the predictions obtained 
after the first decision from those obtained after the final decision. The results are presented in 
Table 7.12 and Table 7.13. 
3a. Rating chosen - average non-chosen alternative 
It had been predicted that, for participants who had been made accountable in any way, 
the change in the judgmental difference between their chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative from the first to the final decision as well as the difference observed after the final 
decision would be smaller than for participants who had not been made accountable. In order 
to compare the experimental conditions to the 'no accountability' conditions, 2 (accountability: 
yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) ANOVAs were performed. For the 
change in the judgmental difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, 
the expected main effect of accountability was not found, but a marginally significant 
interaction between accountability and attitude was obtained (F(1,76) = 3.12, p = .082). 
Simple main effects analyses indicated that when participants had not been made accountable, 
those with a pro-management attitude increased the judgmental difference between their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative, whereas participants with a pro-user attitude 
decreased it (M = 6.46 vs. M = -6.25, t(79)= 1.79, p = .077). When participants had been 
made accountable, on the other hand, there was a decrease in both groups (M = -1.08 vs. M = 
-2.34). In the analysis of the judgmental difference between the chosen and average non-
chosen alternative after the final decision, the expected main effect of accountability  
  
289 
Table 7.12. Measures of the evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative after the first and final decision.  
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
1. rating chosen - 
average non-chosen 
alternative 
          
after final decision 41.25 40.63 35.00 36.67 31.19 28.96 34.58 29.17 51.79 29.58 
after first decision 47.50 34.17 35.04 41.19 35.24 30.44 43.83 27.92 43.25 34.58 
difference -6.25 6.46 -0.04 -4.52 -4.05 -1.48 -9.25 1.25 8.54 -5.00 
2. MAUT prediction 
chosen - average non-
chosen alternative 
          
set 1 attributes           
after final decision 32.21 12.54 23.53 33.73 33.89 8.88 21.06 24.47 31.98 22.12 
after first decision 34.21 16.28 34.64 26.74 35.86 12.80 27.76 25.52 28.52 21.57 
difference -2.00 -3.74 -11.11 6.99 -1.95 -3.91 -6.71 -1.05 3.46 0.55 
set 2 attributes           
after final decision 35.32 30.09 38.61 25.82 23.44 21.94 28.09 21.54 40.60 10.37 
after first decision 17.96 7.76 39.27 14.39 18.00 6.87 33.67 9.89 29.76 14.06 
difference 17.36 22.33 -0.66 11.43 11.02* 15.07 -5.58 11.65 10.84 -2.34* 
set 1 + 2 attributes           
after final decision 31.88 18.75 31.35 27.90 31.39 15.20 23.50 23.02 35.13 14.44 
after first decision 31.28 16.30 40.85 22.54 24.42 9.98 32.73 18.61 28.81 22.06 
difference 0.61 2.45 -9.50 5.36 9.65* 5.22 -9.23 4.41 6.32 -7.69* 
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
 *Because of missing values for the third elicitation, the data for one participant had to be excluded from the analysis, resulting in inconsistent difference values. 
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Table 7.13. Measures of the evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative after the first and final decision.  
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
3. rating user - average 
management 
alternative 
          
after final decision 37.92 24.79 30.56 36.67 27.38 20.07 29.58 10.83 39.29 22.92 
after first decision 32.50 19.17 29.11 25.95 18.10 2.30 33.83 7.92 29.92 18.75 
difference 5.42 5.63 1.44 10.71 9.29 17.78 -4.25 2.92 9.38 4.17 
4. MAUT prediction 
user - average man. 
Alternative 
          
set 1 attributes           
after final decision 41.66 7.98 26.16 26.59 29.29 12.12 23.23 5.18 37.84 23.78 
after first decision 38.03 11.38 35.67 21.05 36.00 9.51 30.17 7.70 31.46 21.38 
difference 3.63 -3.40 -9.50 5.54 -5.09* 2.61 -6.94 -2.52 6.39 2.39 
set 2 attributes           
after final decision 47.87 23.39 40.67 30.48 63.88 31.66 31.43 18.70 49.91 19.78 
after first decision 32.72 14.70 40.72 24.65 40.92 21.96 37.59 14.32 37.97 11.87 
difference 15.15 8.68 -0.05 5.83 24.72* 9.70 -6.15 4.38 11.94 9.58* 
set 1 + 2 attributes           
after final decision 42.51 13.22 33.84 26.23 42.65 21.08 26.37 10.38 42.95 20.18 
after first decision 38.85 17.06 41.98 25.57 34.80 18.37 35.78 15.99 35.69 21.56 
difference 3.66 -3.84 -8.14 0.66 -4.29* 2.71 -9.41 -5.62 7.26 -1.38* 
Note: Discrepancies between the differences between the values obtained at the first and second elicitation and the given difference values are due to rounding errors. 
 * Because of missing values for the third elicitation, the data for one participant had to be excluded from the analysis, resulting in inconsistent difference values.  
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was marginally significant (F(1,76) = 2.99, p = .088). In line with predictions, participants who 
had been made accountable tended to show a smaller judgmental difference between their chosen 
and their average non-chosen alternative than participants who had been made accountable (M = 
34.56 vs. M = 40.94). This lends further support to the conclusion drawn from previous results, 
namely that accountability seems to diminish the overt judgmental difference between the chosen 
and the average non-chosen alternative.  
It was furthermore expected that participants who experienced conflict because their own 
preferences contradicted those of the group they had been made accountable to, would show a 
smaller judgmental difference between their chosen and their average non-chosen alternative 
than participants who did not experience this conflict. This was assumed to be more likely when 
participants had been made accountable before the final rather than the first decision, resulting in 
significant interactions between type of accountability and attitude and time of accountability and 
attitude. In order to test this hypothesis, 2 (time of accountability: before the first decision vs. 
before the final decision) by 2 (type of accountability: to users vs. to the management) by 2 
(attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) factorial ANOVAs were conducted. The control group 
was not included in the analyses.  
The analysis performed on the change in the judgmental difference between the chosen 
and average non-chosen alternative from the first to the final decision revealed a significant 
interaction between all three experimental variables (F(1,56) = 4.84, p = .032). Simple main 
effects analyses indicated that the interaction between time of accountability and type of 
accountability was only significant for participants with a pro-user attitude (F(1,56) = 4.76, p = 
.033), and that the interaction between type of accountability and attitude was only significant for 
participants who had been made accountable before the final decision (F(1,56) = 5.84, p = .019). 
When participants had a pro-user attitude, they showed a larger decrease in the judgmental 
difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative when they had been made 
accountable to the management rather than the users before the first decision (M = -4.05 vs. M = 
-0.04), but when they had been made accountable before the final decision, they showed an 
increase in the judgmental difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
when they had been made accountable to the management, and a decrease when they had been 
made accountable to the users (M = 8.54 vs. M = -9.25). Participants with a pro-management 
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attitude tended to show the opposite pattern, but not significantly so; they showed a larger 
decrease in the judgmental difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
when they had been made accountable to the users rather than the management before the first 
decision (M = -4.52 vs. M = -1.48), but when they had been made accountable before the final 
decision, they showed an increase in the judgmental difference between their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative when they had been made accountable to the users, and a decrease when 
they had been made accountable to the management (M = 1.25 vs. M = -5.00). 
Also, when participants had been made accountable before the final decision, those with a 
pro-management attitude slightly increased the judgmental difference between their chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative when they had been made accountable to the users of the 
program, whereas those with a pro-user attitude decreased it (M = 1.25 vs. M = -9.25). For 
participants who had been made accountable to the management, the opposite was observed; 
those with a pro-user attitude increased the judgmental difference between their chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative, whereas those with a pro-management attitude decreased it (M = 
8.54 vs. M = -5.00). When participants had been made accountable before the first decision, on 
the other hand, those with a pro-management attitude decreased the judgmental difference 
between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative more than those with a pro-user attitude 
when they had been made accountable to the users of the program (M = -4.52 vs. M = -0.04), but 
when participants had been made accountable to the management of the company, those with a 
pro-management attitude decreased the judgmental difference between their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative less than those with a pro-user attitude (M = -1.48 vs. M = -4.05). The 
latter interaction was not significant, though. These relationships are depicted in Figure 7.17. 
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Figure 7.17. Mean change of the difference in overall suitability between the chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative from the first to the final decision. 
This pattern of results suggests an interesting regularity; a conflict between participants' 
own preferences and the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable to resulted 
in decreased consolidation when participants had already been made accountable before the first 
decision, but resulted in an increased consolidation when they had only been made accountable 
before the final decision. This is consistent with the assumption that participants who had been 
made accountable before the first decision had adjusted to the preferences of their audience, and 
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therefore did not need to increase the evaluative difference between their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative any further, whereas participants who had only been made accountable 
before the final decision had not, and therefore needed to further increase the evaluative 
difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative.  
The analysis performed on the judgmental difference between the chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative obtained after the final decision yielded a significant main effect of 
attitude (F(1,56) = 5.65, p = .021), a significant interaction between time of accountability and 
attitude (F(1,56) = 5.21, p = .026) and a significant interaction between time of accountability 
and type of accountability (F(1,56) = 6.04, p = .017). The expected interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude was only marginally significant (F(1,56) = 3.05, p = .086). For 
participants with a pro-user attitude the judgmental difference between the chosen alternative and 
the average non-chosen alternative was higher than for participants with a pro-management 
attitude (M = 38.26 vs. M = 30.85). This effect was qualified, however, by the significant 
interaction between time of accountability and attitude and the marginally significant interaction 
between type of accountability and attitude. Simple main effect analyses indicated that if 
participants had been made accountable before the final decision, those with a pro-user attitude 
showed a larger judgmental difference between their chosen and their average non-chosen 
alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 43.19 vs. M = 29.38, F(1,56) 
= 10.95, p = .002). This difference was not significant if they had been made accountable before 
the first decision (M = 33.33 vs. M = 32.33). Also, participants with a pro-user attitude showed a 
significantly larger judgmental difference between their chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative when they had been made accountable before the final, compared to the first decision 
(M = 43.19 vs. M = 33.33, F(1,56) = 5.80, p = .019). For participants with a pro-management 
attitude, this was not the case (M = 29.38 vs. M = 32.33).  
The simple main effects analyses employed to explore the interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude indicated that when participants had been made accountable to the 
management of the company, those with a pro-user attitude showed a significant larger difference 
between the suitability judgement for their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than those 
with a management attitude (M = 42.18 vs. M = 29.25, F(1,56) = 8.50, p = .005). There was no 
significant difference between participants with a pro-user attitude and with a pro-management 
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attitude when participants had been made accountable to the users of the program (M = 34.80 vs. 
M = 32.67). 
Finally, simple main effect analyses suggested that participants who had been made 
accountable to the management showed a significantly larger judgmental difference between the 
their chosen and average non-chosen alternative if this had happened before the final rather than 
the first decision (M = 40.69 vs. M = 29.94, F(1,56) = 6.41, p = .014), whereas there was no 
significant difference when they had been made accountable to the users of the program (M = 
31.88 vs. M = 35.73). Also, if participants had been made accountable before the final decision, 
those accountable to the users of the program showed a smaller judgmental difference than those 
accountable to the management (M = 31.88 vs. M = 40.69, F(1,56) = 4.46, p = .039). The 
opposite tended to be true if accountability had been introduced before the first decision, but not 
significantly so (M = 35.73 vs. M = 29.94). 
This pattern of results seems to suggest that participants showed a larger, not smaller, 
judgmental difference between their chosen and their average non-chosen alternative after the 
final decision as a result of conflict between their own preferences and the preferences of the 
group they had been made accountable to. Also, this seems to only have been the case when the 
conflict was between having a pro-user attitude and having been made accountable to the 
management. Participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the 
management showed a significantly higher difference between the suitability judgement for their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude who 
had been made accountable to the users of the program (M = 42.18 vs. M = 32.67, t(28) = 1.79, p 
=.043, one-sided). Having a pro-management attitude when being faced with accountability to 
the users of the program does not seem to have created any strong conflict.  
 
3b. MAUT prediction chosen - average non-chosen alternative  
Because it was a covert measure, it had been expected that participants who had been 
made accountable would increase the difference between the MAUT prediction of the overall 
evaluation of their chosen and average non-chosen alternative more strongly than participants 
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who had not been made accountable. It had also been predicted that this difference would be 
significantly larger for accountable than non-accountable participants after the final decision. The 
2 (accountability: yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) ANOVAs employed 
to test these hypotheses did not reveal any significant effects for the change in MAUT 
predictions based on the attributes contained in the first information set. A main effect of 
accountability was found in the analysis of the change in the MAUT predicted evaluative 
difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative based on the attributes from 
the second information set (F(1,74) = 6.61, p = .012). However, contrary to expectations, 
participants who had been made accountable showed a smaller increase in the evaluative 
difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants who had 
not been made accountable (M = 6.37 vs. M = 19.84). No other effects were significant. Finally, 
the analysis performed on the change in the difference in MAUT predictions between the chosen 
and average non-chosen alternative combining the evaluation of attribute outcomes and weights 
from both information sets did not reveal any significant effects.  
The analysis performed on the MAUT predicted difference between the chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative after the final decision only revealed a significant main effect of 
attitude when the prediction was based on the attributes from the first information set (F(1,75) = 
6.86, p = .011). Again, participants with a pro-user attitude showed a larger difference between 
the MAUT prediction for their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants with 
a pro-management attitude (M = 28.13 vs. M = 19.73). Although the interaction between 
accountability and attitude failed to reach standard significance levels (F(1,75) = 2.15, p = .147), 
simple main effects analyses indicated that the effect of attitude depended on the accountability 
condition (F(2,75) = 3.44, p = .037). The difference between participants with a pro-user and a 
pro-management attitude was only significant in the 'no accountability' conditions (M = 32.21 vs. 
M = 12.54, t(79) = 2.29, p = .025), but not in conditions where participants had been made 
accountable (M = 27.08 vs. M = 21.53). No significant effects were obtained in the analysis of 
the predictions based on the attributes from the second information set. There was again a weak 
tendency for participants with a pro-user attitude to show a larger difference between the MAUT 
prediction for their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-
management attitude (M = 33.85 vs. M = 22.15), but it was not significant (F(1,74) = 2.13, p = 
.149). For the prediction based on the combined attributes from both information sets only the 
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already known main effect of attitude was found (F(1,73) = 6.82, p = .011). The difference 
between the MAUT prediction for the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative was again 
larger for participants with a pro-user attitude than for participants with a pro-management 
attitude (M = 30.61 vs. M = 19.68). 
Three-factorial ANOVAs including the 'type of accountability' factor, the 'time of 
accountability' factor' and the 'attitude' factor were employed to test the hypothesis that 
participants who experienced a conflict, because their own preferences contradicted those of the 
group they had been made accountable to, would show a larger evaluative difference between 
their chosen and their average non-chosen alternative than participants who did not experience 
this conflict, and that this effect would be stronger for participants made accountable before the 
final rather than the first decision, resulting in significant interactions between type of 
accountability and attitude and time of accountability and attitude.  
The analysis performed on the change in the difference between the MAUT predictions 
for the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative, based on the attributes contained in the 
first information set, showed indeed a marginally significant interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude (F(1,55) = 3.18, p = .080). Simple main effects analyses indicated that 
the effect of attitude was only significant when participants had been made accountable to the 
users of the program (F(1,55) = 4.49, p = .039). In this case, participants with a pro-user attitude 
decreased the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-
chosen alternative, whereas participants with a pro-management attitude increased it (M = -8.91 
vs. M = 2.97). When participants had been made accountable to the management, the opposite 
tendency could be observed, but was not significant (M = 0.76 vs. M = -1.68).  
The ANOVA carried out on the change in the evaluative difference predicted from the 
evaluation of parallel attributes from the second information set also showed a marginally 
significant interaction between type of accountability and attitude (F(1,54) = 3.97, p = .051). 
Simple main effects analyses suggested that the effect of type of accountability was only 
significant for participants with a pro-user attitude (F(1,54) = 4.22, p = .045). In this case, 
participants who had been made accountable to the management of the company showed an 
increase in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-
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chosen alternative, whereas participants who had been made accountable to the users of the 
program showed a decrease (M = 10.93 vs. M = -3.12). Participants with a pro-management 
attitude, on the other hand, showed an increase both when they had been made accountable to the 
management and to the users (M = 7.45 vs. M = 11.54). Also, the effect of attitude was only 
significant, when participants had been made accountable to the users of the program (F(1,54) = 
4.81, p = .033). In the 'accountability to users' conditions, participants with a pro-management 
attitude increased the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between their chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative, whereas participants with a pro-user attitude decreased it (M = 11.54 vs. 
M = -3.12). For participants who had been made accountable to the management, an increase 
was observed in both conditions (M = 6.36 vs. M = 10.93). 
Not surprisingly, given that the analyses performed on the predictions for the attributes 
from the first and second information set separately had already shown interaction effects 
between type of accountability and attitude, this effect was also significant in the analysis of the 
predictions based on the attributes contained in both information sets (F (1,53) = 9.44, p = .003). 
As before, the effect of type of accountability was only significant for participants with a pro-user 
attitude (F(1,53) = 9.96, p = .003), and the effect of attitude was only significant when 
participants had been made accountable to the users of the program (F(1,53) = 7.48, p = .008). 
When participants had a pro-user attitude, those who had been made accountable to the 
management of the company showed an increase in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference 
between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative, whereas participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program showed a decrease (M = 7.60 vs. M = -9.36). The 
opposite pattern was observed when participants had a pro-management attitude; they showed a 
decrease, when they had been made accountable to the management and an increase when they 
had been made accountable to the users, although this effect was not significant (M = 0.43 vs. M 
= 4.85). Also, when participants had been made accountable to the users of the program, those 
with a pro-management attitude increased the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between 
their chosen and average non-chosen alternative, whereas participants with a pro-user attitude 
decreased it (M = 4.85 vs. M = -9.37). For participants who had been made accountable to the 
management, on the other hand, the effect was reversed, but not significant (M = 0.43 vs. M = 
7.60). 
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The analyses performed on the MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative obtained after the final decision yielded the following 
results. The ANOVA carried out on the predictions based on the attributes from the first 
information set yet again yielded a significant interaction between type of accountability and 
attitude (F(1,55) = 8.77, p = .005). Simple main effects analyses indicated that the effect of 
attitude was only significant when participants had been made accountable to the management of 
the company (F(1,55) = 8.87, p = .004). In this case, participants with a pro-user attitude showed 
a larger difference between the MAUT prediction for their chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 32.80 vs. M = 15.11). When 
participants had been made accountable to the users of the program, a reverse set of means could 
be observed (M = 22.36 vs. M = 28.79), although the difference between them was not 
significant. Also, the effect of type of accountability was only significant for participants with a 
pro-management attitude (F(1,55) = 5.65, p = .021). When participants had a pro-management 
attitude, those who had been made accountable to the users of the program showed a larger 
MAUT predicted evaluative difference than participants who had been made accountable to the 
management of the company (M = 28.79 vs. M = 15.11), whereas this effect was reversed when 
participants had a pro-user attitude, although only marginally significantly so (M = 22.36 vs. M = 
32.80, F(1,55) = 3.31, p = .074). Although the three-way interaction between time of 
accountability, type of accountability and attitude failed to reach standard significance levels 
(F(1,54) = 1.80, p = .186), simple main effects analyses indicated that the interaction between 
type of accountability and attitude was only significant for participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision (F(1,55) = 8.97, p = .004). Also, the interaction between 
time of accountability and type of accountability was marginally significant for participants with 
a pro-management attitude (F(1,55) = 3.87, p = .054), but not for participants with a pro-user 
attitude. These relationships are shown in Figure 7.18. 
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Figure 7.18. Mean MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-
chosen alternative after the final decision (based on the attributes from information 
set 1). 
The ANOVA performed on the difference between the MAUT predictions for the chosen 
and the average non-chosen alternative based on the attributes contained in the second 
information set somewhat unexpectedly only yielded a significant main effect of attitude (F(1,54) 
= 4.23, p = .044). For participants with a pro-user attitude the obtained difference was larger than 
for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 33.47 vs. M = 20.10).  
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Finally, the predictions based on the combined attributes from both information sets 
showed a significant main effect of attitude (F(1,53) = 5.60, p = .022) as well as a marginally 
significant interaction between type of accountability and attitude (F(1,53) = 3.65, p = .061). For 
participants with a pro-user attitude the obtained difference was larger than for participants with 
a pro-management attitude (M = 30.27 vs. M = 19.91). Simple main effects analyses suggested, 
however, that the effect of attitude was significant when participants had been made accountable 
to the management of the company (M = 33.69 vs. M = 14.87, F(1, 53) = 8.56, p = .005), but not 
when they had been made accountable to the users of the program (M = 27.66 vs. M = 25.30). 
Also, there was a marginally significant effect of type of accountability for participants with a 
pro-management attitude only (F(1,53) = 3.16, p = .081). In this case, participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program tended to show a larger difference between the 
MAUT predictions for their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than participants who 
had been made accountable to the management (M = 25.30 vs. M = 14.87). For participants with 
a pro-user attitude, the difference was not significant (M = 27.66 vs. M = 33.69). 
3c. Rating user - average management alternative  
Because the judgmental difference between the user alternative and the average 
management alternative can be expected to be large if the individual has user preferences and/or 
has chosen a user alternative, it had been predicted to be larger for participants with a pro-user 
attitude than with a pro-management attitude, and larger for participants who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program than for participants who had been made accountable to 
the management of the company. Also, the difference had been expected to be particularly small 
for participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the 
management, and particularly large for participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program. Participants experiencing a value conflict between their 
own preferences and those of the audience they had been made accountable to, however, given 
that this was an overt measure of differentiation, were expected to signal some adjustment to 
audience preferences and show a medium large difference. This adjustment was also expected to 
be greater when participants had been made accountable before the first than before the final 
decision, resulting in interactions between type of accountability and attitude, time of 
accountability and attitude, and time of accountability and type of accountability. 
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In order to test these predictions, 2 (time of accountability: before the first decision vs. 
before the final decision) by 2 (type of accountability: to users vs. to the management) by 2 
(attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) factorial ANOVAs were conducted on the change in the 
observed judgmental difference between the user and average management alternative from the 
first to the final decision as well as the difference obtained after the final decision. The control 
group was not included in the analysis. The analysis on the change in the judgmental difference 
between the user and the average management alternative from the first to the final decision did 
not yield any significant effects. As expected, participants who had been made accountable to the 
users of the program showed a weak tendency for a larger increase than participants who had 
been made accountable to the management (M = 9.11 vs. M = 3.72, F(1,56) = 2.43, p = .125). 
Also, participants who had been made accountable before the first decision showed a weak 
tendency for a larger increase than participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision (M = 9.78 vs. M = 3.05, F(1,56) = 2.00, p = .163). 
The analysis performed on the judgmental difference between the user and average 
management alternative observed after the final decision revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of attitude (F(1,56) = 2.80, p = .100), a marginally significant interaction between time of 
accountability and type of accountability (F(1,56) = 3.66, p = .061) and a weak tendency for an 
interaction between time of accountability and attitude (F(1,56) = 2.44, p = .124). As expected, 
participants with a pro-user attitude tended to show a larger difference than participants with a 
pro-management attitude (M = 31.80 vs. M = 22.10). Simple main effect analyses also suggested 
that participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program tended to show a 
larger difference when they had been made accountable before the first compared to the final 
decision (M = 33.23 vs. M = 20.21, F(1,56) = 3.05, p = .086). The opposite tended to be true 
when participants were accountable to the management (M = 23.27 vs. M = 31.10), but not 
significantly so. Finally, for participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision the judgmental difference between the user alternative and the average management 
alternative was significantly larger when they had a pro-user attitude than when they had a pro-
management attitude (M = 34.44 vs. M = 16.88, F(1,56) = 5.28, p = .025). This was not the case 
when participants had been made accountable before the first decision (M = 29.17 vs. M = 
27.33). Figure 7.19 shows the mean judgmental difference between the user and average 
management alternative in the various conditions. 
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This pattern of results is another indicator of the tendency of participants not to adjust to 
the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable to when they had already 
committed themselves to another alternative previously, and when they experienced a conflict 
between a pro-user attitude and having been made accountable to the management. The fact that 
the judgmental difference between the user and average management alternative was 
significantly larger for participants who had been made accountable to the users before the first 
rather than the final decision, indicates that when participants were made accountable to the users 
before the final decision, those with a pro-management attitude must have rated alternatives 
according to their attitude and thereby pulled the obtained mean judgmental difference down. 
This is supported by the significantly smaller judgmental difference for participants with a pro-
management attitude compared to a pro-user attitude, which was only observed when they had 
been made accountable before the final, but not when they had been made accountable before the 
first decision. Also, the fact that the obtained judgmental difference between the user and average 
management alternative was relatively high whenever participants had been made accountable to 
the management (no matter whether before the first or before the final decision), signals that 
participants with a pro-user attitude must have been generally reluctant to adjust to the 
preferences of their audience.  
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b) Accountability before the final decision
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Figure 7.19. Mean difference in overall suitability between the user and average management 
alternative after the final decision.  
3d. MAUT prediction user - average management alternative  
The hypotheses concerning the MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the user 
alternative and the average management alternative had been the following; as for the actually 
observed judgmental difference between the user and average management alternative, the 
MAUT differences had been expected to be larger for participants who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program than for participants who had been made accountable to 
the management of the company, and larger for participants with a pro-user attitude than with a 
pro-management attitude. However, in departure from the predictions for the difference in actual 
ratings, the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the user and average management 
alternative had been expected to be particularly large for participants with a pro-user attitude 
who had been made accountable to the management, and particularly small for participants with 
a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the users of the program, 
especially when they had been made accountable before the final decision, resulting in 
interactions between type of accountability and attitude time of accountability and attitude, and 
time of accountability and type of accountability. 
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Again, three-way ANOVAs including the factors of time of accountability, type of 
accountability and attitude, performed on the data for the experimental groups only, were carried 
out to test these hypotheses. The analysis of the change in the MAUT predicted evaluative 
difference between the user and average management alternative, based on the attributes from the 
first information set, did not yield any significant effects. There was only a weak tendency for 
participants with a pro-management attitude to show a larger increase in the MAUT predicted 
evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative than for participants 
with a pro-user attitude (M = 1.92 vs. M = -3.89, F(1,55) = 2.06, p = .157). This suggests that, 
overall, their preferences had changed towards user preferences. 
The ANOVA performed on the change in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference 
between the user and average management alternative based on the attributes from the second 
information set yielded the expected main effect of type of accountability (F(1,54) = 6.62, p = 
.013) and a marginally significant interaction between type of accountability and attitude 
(F(1,54) = 2.81, p =.100). Participants who had been made accountable to the management of the 
company showed a larger increase in the evaluative difference between the user and average 
management alternative than participants who had been made accountable to the users of the 
program (M = 13.27 vs. M = 0.82). Simple main effects analyses indicated that this was true only 
when participants had a pro-user attitude (M = 17.42 vs. M = -2.92, F(1,54) = 8.97, p = .004). 
When participants had a pro-management attitude, there was no significant difference (M = 5.06 
vs. M = 9.65). This is consistent with the hypothesis that participants with a pro-user attitude 
who had been made accountable to the management did not adjust to the preferences of their 
audience, but felt a need to bolster their own preference. 
The MAUT predictions based on the combined attributes from both information sets 
showed the same trends that had been observed for the separate attribute sets. The ANOVA 
carried out on the change in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the user and 
average management alternative from the first to the final decision again yielded a significant 
main effect of type of accountability (F(1,53) = 5.34, p = .025) and a weak tendency for an 
interaction between type of accountability and attitude (F(1,53) = 2.21, p = .143). As had been 
observed for the MAUT predictions based on the second attribute set, participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program showed a smaller increase in the evaluative 
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difference between the user and average management alternative (a decrease, in fact) than 
participants who had been made accountable to the management of the company (M = -5.90 vs. 
M = 3.22). Simple main effects analyses, however, indicated that this was true only when 
participants had a pro-user attitude (M = -8.78 vs. M = 5.70, F(1,54) = 6.96, p = .011). When 
participants had a pro-management attitude, the same trend was evident, but not significant (M = 
-2.48 vs. M = 0.66). 
The MAUT predicted differences between the user and average management alternative 
obtained after the final decision showed the following effects. The analysis performed on the 
predictions based on the attributes from the first information set yielded a significant main effect 
of attitude (F(1,55) = 7.00, p = .011) and the expected interaction between time of accountability 
and type of accountability (F(1,55) = 5.82, p = .019). The mean MAUT predicted evaluative 
differences between the user alternative and the average management alternative obtained after 
the final decision are displayed in Figure 7.20. As expected, for participants with a pro-user 
attitude, the obtained difference was significantly larger than for participants with a pro-
management attitude (M = 23.60 vs. M = 11.91). Simple main effects analyses also indicated 
that when participants had been made accountable before the final decision, the obtained 
difference was smaller, if they had been made accountable to the users of the program than to the 
management of the company (M = 14.21 vs. M = 30.81, F(1,55) = 6.67, p = .012), whereas when 
participants had been made accountable before the first decision, the observed values were 
reversed (M = 26.35 vs. M = 18.99), albeit not significantly so. Also, participants who had been 
made accountable to the management of the company tended to show a smaller MAUT predicted 
evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative, if they had been 
made accountable before the first, compared to the final decision (M = 18.99 vs. M = 30.81, 
F(1,55) = 3.56, p = .065). For participants who had been made accountable to the users of the 
program, this tendency was reversed, but not significant (M = 26.35 vs. M = 14.21). Although 
the triple interaction between time of accountability, type of accountability, and attitude did not 
reach standard significance levels (F(1,55) = 1.37, p = .247), simple main effects analyses 
indicated that the observed interaction between time of accountability and type of accountability 
was only significant for participants with a pro-management attitude (F(1,55) = 6.56, p = .013).  
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This pattern of results suggests that participants who had been made accountable before 
the final decision did not adjust their unidimensional value and weight judgements to the 
preferences of the group they had been made accountable to but gave judgements according to 
their attitude, especially when they experienced a conflict between the two. Accordingly, when 
participants had been made accountable at the final decision, the obtained evaluative difference 
between the user and average management alternative was smaller when participants had been 
made accountable to the users and larger when they had been made accountable to the 
management, because for participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made 
accountable to the users the obtained difference was particularly small and for participants with a 
pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the management the obtained difference was 
particularly large.  
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Figure 7.20. Mean MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the user and average 
management alternative after the final decision (based on the attributes from 
information set 1). 
A similar pattern of results was obtained in the analysis of the MAUT predicted 
evaluative difference between the user and average management alternative based on the 
attributes from the second information set, except that some of the other main effects were also 
significant (see Figure 7.21). There was a significant main effect of time of accountability 
(F(1,54) = 4.30, p = .043), a marginally significant main effect of type of accountability (F(1,54) 
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= 3.78, p = .057) and a highly significant main effect of attitude (F(1,54) = 14.21, p = .000). The 
obtained evaluative difference was significantly larger for participants who had been made 
accountable before the first decision than for participants who had been made accountable before 
the final decision (M = 40.25 vs. M = 30.28) and for participants with a pro-user attitude 
compared to a pro-management attitude (M = 45.16 vs. M = 25.37). It also tended to be larger 
for participants who had been made accountable to the management of the company, compared 
to the users of the program (M = 40.20 vs. M = 30.64). The interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude was marginally significant (F(1,54) = 3.04, p = .087). Simple main 
effects analyses showed that when participants were accountable to the management, a larger 
evaluative difference was obtained if they had a pro-user attitude than if they had a pro-
management attitude (M = 55.90 vs. M = 26.47, F(1,54) = 14.62, p = .000). When participants 
were accountable to the users of the program, the obtained differences showed the same trend, 
but were not significantly different from each other (M = 36.32 vs. M = 24.20). Also, for 
participants with a pro-user attitude the obtained difference between the MAUT predictions for 
the user and the average management alternative was significantly larger when they had been 
made accountable to the management of the company than when they had been made 
accountable to the users of the program (M = 55.90 vs. M = 36.32, F(1,54) = 6.76, p = .012). For 
participants with a pro-management attitude the obtained difference was not significant (M = 
26.47 vs. M = 24.20).  
Finally, the analysis performed on the MAUT predicted difference between the user and 
average management alternative after the final decision, based on the attributes of both 
information set 1 and 2, yielded a marginally significant main effect of type of accountability 
(F(1,53) = 2.80, p = .100) and a highly significant main effect of attitude (F(1,53) = 14.33, p = 
.000). Participants who had been made accountable to the management of the company tended to 
display a larger MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the user and average 
management alternative than participants who had been made accountable to the users of the 
program (M = 30.62 vs. M = 24.44). Also, the obtained difference was larger for participants 
with a pro-user attitude than for participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 35.75 vs. M = 
19.28). 
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Figure 7.21. Mean MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the user and average 
management alternative after the final decision (based on the attributes from 
information set 2). 
None of the interactions reached standard significance levels, but a number of significant 
simple main effects were obtained. When participants had been made accountable before the 
final decision, those who had been made accountable to the management of the company showed 
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a larger difference between their MAUT prediction for the user alternative and the average 
management alternative than those who had been made accountable to the users of the program 
(M = 32.32 vs. M = 18.37, F(1,53) = 4.52, p = .038). When participants had been made 
accountable before the first decision, on the other hand, this difference was not significant (M = 
28.78 vs. M = 30.51). Also, when participants had been made accountable to the users of the 
program, the obtained difference in MAUT predictions between the user alternative and the 
average management alternative tended to be larger when they had been made accountable before 
the first compared to the final decision (M = 30.51 vs. M = 18.37, F(1,53) = 3.63, p = .062) and 
when they had a pro-user attitude compared to a pro-management attitude (M = 30.32 vs. M = 
17.77, F(1,53) = 3.72, p = .059). For participants who had been made accountable to the 
management, time of accountability did not significantly affect the obtained difference in MAUT 
predictions between the user alternative and the average management alternative (accountability 
before first decision: M = 28.78, accountability before final decision: M = 32.32). There was, 
however, a highly significant difference between participants with a pro-user attitude and a pro-
management attitude (F(1,53) = 11.42, p =.001); participants with a pro-user attitude who had 
been made accountable to the management showed a significantly larger difference in MAUT 
predictions between the user and the average management alternative than participants with a 
pro-management attitude (M = 42.84 vs. M = 20.69). Finally, for participants with a pro-user 
attitude, this difference tended to be larger when they had been made accountable to the 
management of the company compared to the users of the program (M = 42.84 vs. M = 30.32, 
F(1,53) = 3.86, p = .055), whereas there was no significant difference for participants with a pro-
management attitude (M = 20.69 vs. M = 17.77).  
Summary of the results for information evaluation and integration at the final 
decision 
Overall, the results relating to information evaluation and integration processes at the 
final decision largely confirmed the predictions that had been made at the outset, in that 
accountability after a commitment had already been made seemed to result in reluctance to adjust 
to the preferences of the group participants were made accountable to if there was a conflict 
between their own attitude and the preferences of their audience. Results also suggested that 
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conflict was experienced as particularly strong if participants had a pro-user attitude and were 
made accountable to the management. 
As expected, participants' choices indicated adjustment to the preferences of the group 
they had been made accountable to when they had already been made accountable before the 
first, but not when they had been made accountable before the final decision. The choices of 
participants who had been made accountable only after they had already made a commitment to 
one of the alternatives were in accordance with their own attitude, that is, showed a preference 
for the user alternative when participants had a pro-user attitude, and a preference for 
management alternatives when participants had a pro-management attitude. Participants who had 
already been made accountable before the first decision, however, chose according to the 
preferences of their external audience; they chose the user alternative more often when they had 
been made accountable to the users of the program, and a management alternative more often 
when they had been made accountable to the management of the company, irrespective of their 
own attitude. Surprisingly, in their final choice participants showed an overall preference for the 
user alternative when they had not been made accountable at any point, even if their own attitude 
was management-oriented. This was because three participants had changed their initial choice 
from a management alternative to the user alternative, demonstrating the overall bias towards 
user considerations in the sample. Otherwise, changes of the preferred alternative were relatively 
rare and did not vary as a function of experimental condition. 
Participants' ratings of attribute importance confirmed the effect evident in their choices, 
but only where the attributes from the first information set were concerned. In this case, when 
participants had been made accountable before the first decision, the mean sum of user attribute 
weights was significantly higher in the 'accountability to users' condition than in the 
'accountability to the management' condition, whereas there was no significant difference for 
participants who had been made accountable before the final decision. Indeed, the sum of user 
attribute weights was also significantly higher when participants had been made accountable to 
the management immediately prior to the final decision rather than already before the first 
decision. This effect may be explained by participants' choices. A majority of participants who 
had been made accountable to the management before the final decision had chosen the user 
alternative before and kept this choice, which made it necessary for them to stress the importance 
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of attributes on which their chosen alternative fared particularly well. Surprisingly, the weight 
judgements for attributes contained in information set 2 did not show the same effect as those for 
attributes contained in information set 1. The only significant effect observed was a main effect 
of attitude; as expected, participants with a pro-user attitude assigned higher user attribute 
weights than participants with a pro-management attitude. The fact that also no significant effects 
were obtained for the changes in weight judgements from the first to the final decision, signals 
that regression effects seem to have been stronger than any importance differentiation and 
consolidation effects as such. Supporting this assumption is the fact that the grand means were 
all negative (set 1: M = -.008, set 2: M = -.006, set 1+2: M = -.005).  
The actually observed and MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the user 
alternative and average management alternative also showed some evidence for a reluctance to 
adjust to audience preferences for participants who had been made accountable only before the 
final rather than already before the first decision when their own attitude was incompatible with 
the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable to. In addition, it emerged that a 
conflict between a pro-user attitude and accountability to the management induced a particularly 
strong need to bolster the own preference. Although these effects were not significant in the 
change of the actually observed judgmental difference between the user and average management 
alternative from the first to the final decision, they were observed in the judgmental differences 
between the user and average management alternative obtained after the final decision and the 
MAUT predicted differences observed after the final decision. These evaluative differences 
between the user and average management alternative were larger when participants had been 
made accountable before the first rather than the final decision in the 'accountability to users' 
conditions and larger when participants had been made accountable before the final rather than 
the first decision in the 'accountability to the management' conditions. This is consistent with a 
failure to adjust to audience preferences and bolstering of own preferences when being made 
accountable before the final decision. Also, significantly smaller evaluative differences between 
the user and average management alternative were observed for participants with a pro-
management attitude when they had been made accountable to the management rather than the 
users, whereas for participants with a pro-user attitude there was no significant difference. This 
signals that participants with a pro-user attitude must have been reluctant to adjust to the 
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preferences of a management audience, whereas participants with a pro-management attitude 
were happy to adjust to the preferences of a user audience.  
The obtained changes in the MAUT predicted differences between the user and average 
management alternative from the first to the final decision only revealed significant effects of a 
value conflict between a pro-user attitude and accountability to the management when 
predictions were based on the attributes contained in the second information set and both 
information sets combined. This finding was somewhat unexpected, as participants' attribute 
weights as an important sub-component of these predictions had only shown significant effects 
for the attributes from the first information set. The fact that time of accountability did not 
significantly interact with other factors where the changes in the MAUT predicted differences 
between the user and average management alternative from the first to the final decision were 
concerned suggests that the measure of change is not sensitive enough to uncover such effects.  
The evaluative differences between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, both 
those actually observed and those predicted by an additive linear MAUT model, also suggested 
that a conflict between participants' own preferences and those of the group they had been made 
accountable to resulted in an enlarged difference, compared to conditions that did not experience 
conflict, particularly when they had been made accountable before the final rather than the first 
decision, and particularly when the conflict was between a pro-user attitude and having been 
made accountable to the management. The nature of the triple interaction between time of 
accountability, type of accountability and attitude observed in the change of the judgmental 
difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative from the first to the final 
decision indicated that a conflict between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the 
audience they had been made accountable to resulted in an increased consolidation when 
participants had been made accountable before the final decision, but in a decreased 
consolidation when they had already been made accountable before the first decision. This 
supported the prediction that participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision would adjust to the preferences of the group they had been made accountable to and 
therefore would not need to show an increased difference between the chosen and average non-
chosen alternative, whereas participants who had only been made accountable before the final 
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decision would want to defend their own choice and therefore needed to increase the evaluative 
difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative.  
In the judgmental difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
observed after the final decision, the effect of conflict was also evident. In addition, the fact that 
when they had been made accountable to the users of the program, participants with a pro-
management attitude did not show a larger judgmental difference between the chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative than participants with a pro-user attitude, but participants with a 
pro-user attitude did show a larger difference than participants with a pro-management attitude 
when they had been made accountable to the management of the company, suggests that only a 
pro-user attitude in combination with being accountable to the management created a strong 
conflict, the opposite, however, did not. It is important to note that participants' choices cannot 
explain the observed results, because in both conflict conditions (pro-user attitude/accountable to 
management and pro-management attitude/accountable to users), the same overall choice 
distribution was observed; 9 out of 15 participants chose the user alternative. 
The evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, when 
predicted by a MAUT model rather than actually observed, nevertheless showed similar effects 
of conflict. These were only significant, however, for the changes of this evaluative difference 
from the first to the final decision, and when predictions were based on the first set of attributes 
or both attribute sets combined rather than the second. Again, a conflict between a pro-user 
attitude and accountability to the management resulted in significantly larger evaluative 
differences than no conflict, whereas the conflict between a pro-management attitude and 
accountability to the users, although showing the same tendency when the predictions were based 
on the first attribute set, did not do significantly so. Although the triple interaction between the 
experimental factors was not significant, simple main effects analyses suggested that these 
effects were only significant for participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision. This may be seen as an indicator for continued bolstering of the chosen alternative, 
even when accountability pressures were not salient anymore. The only significant effect 
observed in the analysis of the predictions based on the attributes from information set 2 was an 
attitude main effect; participants with a pro-user attitude generally showed a larger MAUT 
predicted evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative than 
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participants with a pro-management attitude. This failure to observe any other effects can be 
explained by the absence of such effects in the weight judgements that participants had provided 
for the attributes of information set 2.  
As expected, a presence of accountability pressures meant that, compared to no 
accountability, the overt judgmental difference between the chosen and the average non-chosen 
alternative was decreased. Where the change of this difference from the first to the final decision 
was concerned, a marginally significant interaction between accountability and attitude suggested 
that when participants had not been made accountable, those with a pro-management attitude 
increased the judgmental difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, 
whereas those with a pro-user attitude decreased it. 
Overall, there was little evidence for the hypothesis that because of the covert nature of 
the MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative, accountable participants would show larger such differences than non-accountable 
participants. The only significant effect of accountability vs. no accountability was observed for 
the change in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-
chosen alternative from the first to the final decision, based on the attributes from the second 
information set. This was, however, opposite to what was expected; for accountable participants, 
the increase in the evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
was smaller than for participants who had not been made accountable. 
The MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative at the final decision, based on the attributes from the first information set, revealed a 
tendency for an interaction between accountability and attitude, such that when participants had 
not been made accountable, those with a pro-user attitude showed a larger difference than those 
with a pro-management attitude. Although showing the same tendency, this difference was not 
significant, when participants had been made accountable. 
Justifications 
The justifications provided by participants were content-analysed. The unit of analysis 
was an argument, defined as the smallest unit that provided some meaning in the experimental 
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context. Two independent judges sorted the arguments with respect to the categories listed 
below. Inter-judge correlations were moderate to high (r = .72. to r = .95, mean: r = .89). 
Differences in categorisation were resolved by discussion. The results are presented in Table 
7.14. The following dependent variables were analysed. 
• Total number of arguments 
This number included four subtypes of arguments: (1) direct arguments which were directly 
related to information presented during the experiment, (2) elaborations, that is, arguments in 
which participants had elaborated on information presented during the experiment, and which 
could not be directly inferred from this information, (3) false reproductions of information, 
where participants' arguments contained incorrect information, and (4) arguments that 
mentioned evaluation criteria more generally, without referring to specific alternatives. 
• Complexity of argumentation 
The complexity of argumentation was measured by the ratio of the number of two-sided 
arguments to the sum of one-sided and two-sided arguments. Two-sided arguments were 
defined as arguments which mentioned two alternatives, comparing them in some way, 
whereas one-sided arguments were arguments that only mentioned one alternative. The 
complexity index ranged between 0 and 1, where 0 indicated that only one-sided arguments 
had been presented and the complexity of argumentation was low, and 1 indicated that only 
two-sided arguments had been presented and the complexity of argumentation was high. It 
was expected that participants who had only been made accountable after they had already 
made a decision, that is, participants who had been made accountable before the final 
decision, would show a higher complexity of argumentation than participants who had 
already been made accountable before the first decision.  
• Type of arguments 
Arguments were distinguished in terms of whether they were related to user attributes or cost 
attributes. 
• Consonant vs. dissonant arguments 
Consonant arguments were arguments which mentioned a positive aspect of the chosen 
alternative or a negative aspect of a non-chosen alternative, whereas dissonant arguments 
were arguments which mentioned a positive aspect of a non-chosen alternative or a negative 
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aspect of the chosen alternative. Percentages were calculated relative to the total number of 
arguments excluding global evaluation criteria.  
1.  Number of arguments  
It had been expected that the total number of arguments presented in the justifications 
would be higher for accountable than for non-accountable participants. This hypothesis was 
tested with a 2 (accountability: yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) 
ANOVA, which was performed on the total number of arguments. Although accountable 
participants mentioned more arguments on average than non-accountable participants (M = 7.98 
vs. M = 7.06), the main effect of accountability was not significant nor were any of the other 
effects. ANOVAs performed on the percentages of direct arguments, elaborations, false 
reproductions and criteria only yielded a significant main effect of attitude on the percentage of 
direct arguments (F(1,75) = 5.17, p = .026). Participants with a pro-management attitude 
presented a higher percentage of direct arguments than participants with a user attitude (M = 64% 
vs. M = 52%). This attitude main effect was only marginally significant for the percentage of 
elaborations observed (F(1,75) = 2.74, p = .102). In this case, participants with a pro-
management attitude presented a lower percentage of elaborations than participants with a pro-
user attitude (M = 23% vs. M = 29%)
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Table 7.14. Mean number of arguments presented (percentages in brackets). 
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
          1. Number of 
arguments           
direct 2.75 (43) 5.38 (76) 2.67 (39) 3.71 (63) 3.57 (57) 5.22 (57) 5.00 (65) 3.71 (74) 5.75 (57) 3.88 (51) 
elaboration 2.38 (37) 1.38 (16) 2.56 (29) 2.57 (30) 2.43 (29) 2.44 (25) 1.38 (14) 0.71 (10) 3.25 (36) 3.50 (34) 
false reproduction 0.38 (06) 0.13 (02) 0.44 (05) 0.29 (07) 0.43 (06) 0.22 (03) 0.13 (01) 0.57 (09) 0.25 (04) 0.00 (00) 
criterion 1.25 (14) 0.50 (06) 2.56 (27) 0.00 (00) 0.86 (08) 1.00 (15) 2.00 (19) 0.29 (07) 0.50 (03) 1.25 (14) 
total  6.75 (100) 7.38 (100) 8.22 (100) 6.57 (100) 7.29 (100) 8.89 (100) 8.50 (100) 5.29 (100) 9.75 (100) 8.63 (100) 
2. Complexity 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.07 
          3. Type of argument  
          
user-related 4.25 (63) 4.69 (63) 4.56 (62) 4.57 (75) 4.21 (56) 4.39 (51) 5.75 (71) 3.00 (58) 4.88 (50) 4.69 (58) 
cost-related 2.50 (37) 2.69 (37) 3.67 (38) 2.00 (25) 3.07 (44) 4.50 (49) 2.75 (29) 2.29 (42) 4.88 (50) 3.94 (42) 
 
  320 
Table 7.14. cont. 
  No 
Accountability 
Accountability before the 
First Decision 
Accountability before the 
Final Decision 
   To Users To Management To Users To Management 
  Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
Pro User 
(n=9) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=7) 
Pro Man. 
(n=9) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=7) 
Pro User 
(n=8) 
Pro Man. 
(n=8) 
4a. Consonant 
arguments  
          
positive aspects 
of the chosen alt. 
5.13 (94) 6.25 (93) 4.33 (76) 6.00 (94) 5.86 (91) 5.44 (69) 4.75 (76) 4.71 (94) 6.25 (87) 6.38 (87) 
negative aspects 
of the non-chosen alt. 
0.25 (04) 0.00 (00) 0.33 (06) 0.29 (03) 0.00 (00) 0.89 (11) 1.00 (14) 0.00 (00) 0.75 (03) 0.25 (06) 
total 5.38 (98) 6.25 (93) 4.67 (82) 6.29 (97) 5.86 (91) 6.33 (80) 5.75 (90) 4.71 (94) 7.00 (90) 6.63 (93) 
4b. Dissonant 
arguments 
          
negative aspects 
of the chosen alt. 
0.13 (02) 0.63 (07) 0.67 (12) 0.29 (03) 0.57 (09) 1.00 (13) 0.50 (07) 0.29 (06) 1.25 (07) 0.75 (07) 
positive aspects 
of the non-chosen alt. 
0.00 (00) 0.00 (00) 0.33 (06) 0.00 (00) 0.00 (00) 0.56 (07) 0.25 (03) 0.00 (00) 1.00 (03) 0.00 (00) 
total 0.13 (02) 0.63 (07) 1.00 (18) 0.29 (03) 0.57 (09) 1.56 (20) 0.75 (10) 0.29 (06) 2.25 (10) 0.75 (07) 
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Three-factorial ANOVAs tested the effects of time of accountability (before the first 
vs. before the final decision), type of accountability (to users vs. to the management) and 
attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) on the dependent measures for the experimental 
groups only. The analyses performed on the total number of arguments and the percentage of 
direct arguments did not yield any effects. For the percentage of elaborations a significant 
interaction between time of accountability and type of accountability was obtained (F(1,55) = 
4.16, p = .046). Simple main effects analyses indicated that the effect of type of accountability 
was only significant for participants who had been made accountable before the final decision 
(F(1,55) = 6.63, p = .013). When this was the case, participants who had been made 
accountable to the management showed a significantly higher percentage of elaborations than 
participants who had been made accountable to the users (M = 35% vs. M = 12%). For 
participants who had been made accountable before the first decision, there was no significant 
difference (M = 27% vs. M = 29%). Further analyses showed that the type of elaborations that 
showed this pattern were positive elaborations of the chosen alternative (time of 
accountability x type of accountability: F(1,55) = 4.38, p = .041), particularly the user 
alternative (time of accountability x type of accountability: F(1,55) = 3.58, p = .058). When 
participants had been made accountable before the final decision, those who had been made 
accountable to the management mentioned a significantly higher percentage of positive 
elaborations of the user alternative than participants who had been made accountable to the 
users (M = 15% vs. M = 4%), whereas there was no difference when participants had been 
made accountable before the first decision (M = 11% vs. M = 15%, F(1,55) = 4.15, p = .046). 
Given that participants who had been made accountable to the management before the final 
decision often chose a user alternative with bad outcomes on cost attributes, they particularly 
needed to convince the audience of the benefits of this alternative and seemed to have done so 
by elaborating on the information provided. 
The analysis carried out on the percentage of false reproductions resulted in a 
marginally significant effect between type of accountability and attitude (F(1,55) = 3.08, p = 
.085). Simple main effects analyses suggested that there was a tendency for participants with a 
pro-management attitude to reproduce a higher percentage of information incorrectly when 
they had been made accountable to the users than when they had been made accountable to the 
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management (M = 8% vs. M = 1%, F(1,55) = 3.08, p = .085). There was no significant 
difference when participants had a pro-user attitude (M = 3% vs. M = 5%). Further analyses 
indicated that the falsely reproduced information tended to support the chosen alternative 
(type of accountability x attitude: F(1,55) = 3.95, p = .052), in particular the user alternative 
(type of accountability x attitude: F(1,55) = 4.88, p = .031). When participants had a pro-
management attitude, they tended to mention relatively more information that falsely 
supported the user alternative when they had been made accountable to the users than when 
they had been made accountable to the management (M = 3% vs. M = 0%, F(1,55) = 3.66, p = 
.061), whereas the opposite, however, non-significant, pattern was observed when participants 
had a pro-user attitude (M = 1% vs. M = 3%). This seems to suggest that an attitude that was 
incompatible with the preferences of the audience participants had been made accountable to, 
especially a pro-management attitude, induced a tendency to report incorrect information that 
supported the audience preference, possibly in an attempt to make a good impression on the 
audience. 
The interaction between type of accountability and attitude was also significant in the 
ANOVA testing the effects of the experimental variables on the percentage of arguments that 
consisted of global evaluation criteria rather than arguments referring to specific alternatives 
(F(1,55) = 6.76, p = .012). Participants with a pro-user attitude mentioned a higher percentage 
of global criteria when they had been made accountable to the users of the program than when 
they had been made accountable to the management of the company (M = 23% vs. M = 6%, 
F(1,55) = 5.08, p = .028). The opposite tended to be true when participants had a pro-
management attitude, but the difference failed to reach significance (M = 3% vs. M = 15%). 
Also, when participants had been made accountable to the users of the program, those with a 
pro-user attitude mentioned a significantly higher percentage of criteria than those with a pro-
management attitude (M = 23% vs. M = 3%, F(1,55) = 6.16, p = .016), whereas this 
difference was reversed when participants had been made accountable to the management of 
the company (M = 6% vs. M = 15%), although not significantly so. Further analyses 
suggested that this pattern of results was obtained particularly when the importance of user 
attributes was stressed (type of accountability x attitude: F(1,55) = 3.11, p = .083). When 
participants had a pro-user attitude, those who had been made accountable to the users 
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mentioned a higher percentage of arguments stressing the importance of user criteria than 
those who had been made accountable to the management (M = 9% vs. M = 2%, F(1,55) = 
3.06, p = .086) and than participants with a pro-management attitude (M = 9% vs. M = 2%, 
F(1,55) = 3.06, p = .086). This indicates an attempt of participants to refer to evaluation 
criteria that they perceived as important in the situation, could expect their audience to agree 
with, and on which their chosen alternative tended to excel. This was particularly the case for 
user criteria and a choice of the user alternative.  
2.  Complexity of argumentation  
The overall complexity of argumentation was very low, indicated by a grand mean of 
0.06, where 0 indicates minimal complexity. It had been expected that non-accountable 
participants would show a lower complexity of argumentation than participants who had been 
made accountable at some point. The data, analysed with a two-factorial ANOVA including 
the factors of accountability and attitude, only revealed a weak tendency for this to be the case 
(M = 0.00 vs. M = 0.08, main effect of accountability: F(1,75) = 2.60, p = .111). It should be 
noted that among participants who had not been made accountable, not a single one presented 
any two-sided arguments that compared alternatives, providing strong support for the 
assumption of a low complexity of argumentation in this condition. 
A three-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of time of accountability, type of 
accountability and attitude on the complexity of argumentation observed in the experimental 
conditions revealed a marginally significant triple interaction between these factors (F(1,55) = 
3.09, p = .085). Simple main effects suggested that a significant interaction between type of 
accountability and attitude was obtained in the 'accountability before the first decision' 
conditions only (F(1,55) = 5.34, p = .025). When participants had been made accountable 
before the first decision, the complexity of argumentation was significantly lower when 
participants had been made accountable to an audience with preferences incompatible with 
their own attitude (M = 0.00 for both conditions) than when they had been made accountable 
to an audience with compatible preferences (M = 0.16 for both pro-user/to users and pro-
management/to management). When participants had been made accountable before the final 
decision, no significant differences between conditions were observed (pro-user/to users: M = 
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0.05, pro-user/to management: M = 0.09, pro-management/to users: M = 0.06, pro-
management/to management: M = 0.07). These relationships are illustrated in Figure 7.22. 
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Figure 7.22. Mean complexity of argumentation (1 = maximum complexity). 
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3.  Type of argument 
Overall, participants provided a higher percentage of user arguments than cost 
arguments (M = 62% vs. M = 38%, t(78) = 5.36, p = .000). An analysis was only performed 
on the percentage of user arguments presented, as the percentage of cost arguments was the 
complimentary value to 100. As expected, a three-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of time 
of accountability, type of accountability and attitude on the percentage of user arguments 
revealed a marginally significant main effect of type of accountability (F(1,55) = 3.56, p = 
.064). In line with predictions, participants who had been made accountable to the users of the 
program mentioned a higher percentage of user arguments than participants who had been 
made accountable to the management of the company (M = 66% vs. M = 56%), thereby 
signalling attention and adjustment to the norms of the group they had been made accountable 
to.  
4a.  Consonant arguments  
Overall, the percentage of consonant arguments that participants presented was much 
higher than that of dissonant arguments (M = 92% vs. M = 8%, t(76) = 27.96, p = .000). 
Within consonant arguments, participants showed a clear preference for mentioning positive 
aspects of the chosen alternative compared to mentioning negative aspects of the non-chosen 
alternatives (M = 88% vs. M = 5%, t(76) = 24.49, p =.000). Although, as expected, non-
accountable participants tended to mention a higher percentage of positive aspects of the 
chosen alternative (M = 93% vs. M = 86%), negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives 
(M = 5% vs. M = 2%) and consonant arguments overall (M = 96% vs. M = 92%) than 
accountable participants, none of the observed differences were significant. 
A three-factorial ANOVA carried out on the percentage of positive aspects of the 
chosen alternative that was mentioned by participants in the experimental groups yielded a 
marginally significant interaction between type of accountability and attitude (F(1,53) = 3.46, 
p = .069). Simple main effects analyses suggested that the effect of type of accountability only 
tended to be significant, when participants had a pro-management attitude (F(1,55) = 2.67, p = 
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.108). In this case, participants mentioned a higher percentage of positive aspects of the 
chosen alternative when they had been made accountable to the users of the program than 
when they had been made accountable to the management of the company (M = 94% vs. M = 
81%). When participants had a pro-user attitude, the opposite tended to be true; they 
mentioned a higher percentage of positive aspects of the chosen alternative when they had 
been made accountable to the management of the company than when they had been made 
accountable to the users of the program (M = 89% vs. M = 81%, see Figure 7.23) . This 
suggests that participants felt a particular need to support their chosen alternative when they 
had been made accountable to a group with preferences that were different from their own. 
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Figure 7.23. Mean percentage of arguments mentioning positive aspects of the chosen 
alternative, as a function of type of accountability and attitude.  
The analysis performed on the percentage of negative aspects of the non-chosen 
alternatives identified in participants' justifications also revealed a significant interaction 
between type of accountability and attitude (F(1,53) = 5.67, p = .021) and a marginally 
significant interaction between time of accountability and attitude F(1,55) = 3.03, p = .088). 
Simple main effects analyses indicated that, whereas when participants had been made 
accountable to the users of the program, those with a pro-user attitude tended to mention a 
higher percentage of negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than those with pro-
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management attitude (M = 9% vs. M = 2%, F(1,53) = 2.82, p = .099), the opposite tended to 
be the case when participants had been made accountable to the management of the company 
(M = 1% vs. M = 8%, F(1,53) = 2.85, p = .097). Also, for participants with a pro-user 
attitude, those who had been made accountable to the users of the program tended to mention 
a higher percentage of negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than those who had 
been made accountable to the management of the company (M = 9% vs. M = 1%, F(1,53) = 
3.06, p = .086). The difference for participants with a pro-management attitude showed the 
reverse trend (M = 2% vs. M = 8%, see Figure 7.24), but was not significant. Unlike the 
results obtained for the percentage of positive aspects of the non-chosen alternative, these 
findings suggest that participants tended to mention relatively fewer negative aspects of the 
non-chosen alternatives when they expected to justify their choice to an audience with 
incompatible preferences. This may be explained by the fact that participants showed some 
tendency to strategically adjust to the preferences of the audience they had been made 
accountable to. When a conflict between participants' own attitude and the preferences of their 
audience existed, they may have felt that they could not express their real preference, but 
would have been nevertheless reluctant to say something negative about it.  
The simple main effects analyses performed to explore the marginally significant 
interaction between time of accountability and attitude did not allow very clear conclusions 
but suggested that there was a weak tendency for participants with a pro-user attitude to 
mention a higher percentage of negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives when they had 
been made accountable before the final rather than the first decision (M = 8 vs. M = 2, 
F(1,53) = 2.56, p = .116). This is consistent with a reluctance of participants with a pro-user 
attitude in particular to adjust to audience preferences after they had already made a 
commitment to a different alternative.  
Finally, the analysis on the percentage of both types of consonant arguments combined 
did not reveal any significant effects.  
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Figure 7.24. Mean percentage of arguments mentioning negative aspects of the non-chosen 
alternatives, as a function of type of accountability and attitude.  
4b.  Dissonant arguments  
As already mentioned, the occurrence of dissonant arguments was generally rare, but 
when they were mentioned, participants tended to do so relatively more often in the form of 
negative aspects of the chosen alternative than positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives 
(M = 6% vs. M = 1%, t(76) = 3.98, p = .000). As expected, non-accountable participants 
tended to mention a lower percentage of negative aspects of the chosen alternative (M = 4% 
vs. M = 7%), positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives (M = 0% vs. M = 2%) and 
dissonant arguments overall than accountable participants (M = 4% vs. M = 9%), but neither 
of these differences was significant, as the accountability main effects in the two-factorial 
ANOVAs including the factors of accountability and attitude that were performed on these 
measures were not significant. Also, neither of the three-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects 
of time of accountability, type of accountability and attitude on these measures yielded any 
significant effects. 
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Summary of the justification results 
Overall, participants' written justifications strongly focused on the advantages of the 
chosen alternative and exhibited a very low complexity, almost exclusively mentioning one-
sided arguments and not comparing alternatives in any way. In line with predictions, non-
accountable participants showed this tendency more strongly, and mentioned consonant 
arguments (positive aspects of the chosen alternative and negative aspects of the non-chosen 
alternatives) relatively more often and dissonant arguments (negative aspects of the chosen 
alternative and positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives) relatively less often than 
accountable participants, but for none of these dependent measures the observed difference 
was significant. Non-accountable participants also tended to mention fewer arguments overall 
than accountable participants, but, again, not significantly so. 
The analyses performed on the experimental conditions only, however, revealed some 
interesting and partly predicted significant effects. The relative frequency of user and cost 
arguments observed in the written justifications indicated that participants attended to the 
preferences of the group they had been made accountable to. A marginally significant main 
effect of type of accountability showed, as expected, that participants who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program referred to user arguments relatively more often than 
participants who had been made accountable to the management in their justifications.  
When participants had been made accountable before the final decision, the 
justifications of those participants who had been made accountable to the management 
included a significantly higher percentage of elaborations, that is, arguments that were not 
directly based on information provided by the experimenter, than those of participants who 
had been made accountable to the users. These elaborations particularly supported the user 
alternative and therefore suggest that, because they chose a user alternative in the majority of 
cases (10/16), participants who had been made accountable to the management before the 
final decision needed to bolster their choice with elaborations. 
Another effect that emerged was that of participants with a pro-management attitude to 
reproduce a higher percentage of information incorrectly when they had been made 
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accountable to the users, compared to when they had been made accountable to the 
management. The fact that this information tended to support the user alternative may suggest 
that participants in this condition wanted to make a good impression on their audience when 
they perceived a conflict between their own attitude and that of their audience. It may also be 
the case that they really did not remember the advantages of their adopted choice correctly, 
however, in this case, participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to 
the management also should have falsely remembered the advantages of the management 
alternative. This effect was not observed, however. 
Whereas a conflict between a pro-management attitude and having been made 
accountable to the users of the program resulted in more false reproductions, the absence of 
this conflict, because participants had a pro-user attitude, seemed to induce a tendency to 
mention a higher percentage of global evaluation criteria. As expected, these were primarily 
arguments that supported the importance of user concerns. An equivalent effect was not found 
for participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the 
management. This may be explained by the fact that for them both user and cost attributes 
were important, and they tended to choose compromise alternatives that did not have clear 
advantages on one or the other. 
The analyses testing the effects of the experimental variables on the different types of 
consonant and dissonant arguments only yielded significant effects for consonant arguments. 
These suggested that a bolstering of the chosen alternative in the form of mentioning a high 
percentage of positive aspects of the chosen alternative, not surprisingly, particularly occurred 
when participants perceived a conflict between their own attitude and the preferences of the 
audience they had been made accountable to. However, where the percentage of negative 
aspects of the non-chosen alternatives was concerned, a different pattern emerged. This 
percentage was higher when participants did not experience a value conflict. A possible 
explanation for these findings is that participants who did perceive a value conflict, showed 
some tendency to adjust their choice to that they expected to be preferred by the audience they 
had been made accountable to, especially when they had a pro-management attitude, and 
especially when they had been made accountable before the first decision. Although they 
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showed this adjustment, it may be assumed that they would have been reluctant to say 
something negative about their real preference, resulting in the observed effect.  
Finally, the significant triple interaction between the experimental variables obtained 
in the ANOVA performed on the complexity of the argumentation suggested that the tendency 
to bolster one’s own choice particularly strongly when a value conflict was perceived, was 
evident especially when participants had been made accountable before the first rather than 
the final decision. In this case, the complexity of argumentation was significantly lower when 
participants had been made accountable to an audience with preferences incompatible with 
their own attitude than when they had been made accountable to an audience with compatible 
preferences. When participants had been made accountable before the final decision, on the 
other hand, no significant differences between conditions emerged. This may be regarded as 
somewhat surprising, as the conflict should have been experienced more strongly if 
participants had already committed themselves to a different alternative when they were made 
accountable. On the other hand, accountability before the final decision was more salient to 
participants, and this finding is therefore in line with the expected increased depth and 
complexity of information processing induced by accountability. 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
1.  Difficulty of the decision  
It was expected that participants who had been made accountable would find the 
decisions they had made more difficult than participants who had not been made accountable. 
A two-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of accountability (yes vs. no) and attitude (pro-
user vs. pro-management) revealed the expected significant main effect of accountability 
(F(1,76) = 4.71, p = .033). Participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision indeed found this decision significantly more difficult than non-accountable 
participants (M = 3.94 vs. M = 3.33). There was also a significant main effect of attitude 
(F(1,76) = 6.86, p = .011). Participants with a pro-management attitude found the decision 
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more difficult than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 3.95 vs. M = 3.20). The 
interaction between accountability and attitude was not significant.  
Although accountable participants also rated the final decision as more difficult than 
non-accountable participants (M = 4.09 vs. M = 3.75), a two-factorial ANOVA testing the 
effects of accountability (yes vs. no) and attitude (pro-user vs. pro- management) on the rated 
difficulty of the final decision did not yield the expected main effect of accountability nor any 
other significant effect. A 2 (time of accountability: before the first decision vs. before the 
final decision) by  2 (type of accountability: to users vs. to the management) by  2 (attitude: 
pro-user vs. pro-management) ANOVA conducted on the experimental groups only revealed a 
significant attitude main effect. Participants with a pro-management attitude found the final 
decision more difficult than participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 4.53 vs. M = 3.66). No 
other effects were significant.  
A repeated-measurements ANOVA with time of rating (after the first vs. after the final 
decision) as a within-subjects factor and experimental condition and attitude as between-
subjects factors revealed a significant 'time of rating' effect (F(1,70) = 6.41, p = .014). The 
final decision was rated as more difficult than the first decision (M = 4.02 vs. M = 3.58). The 
only other significant effect was an attitude main effect (F(1,70) = 7.12, p = .009). Again, 
participants with a pro-management attitude generally found the decisions more difficult than 
participants with a pro-user attitude (M = 4.15 vs. M = 3.45). 
2.  Confidence in the decision  
It had been expected that being made accountable for their decision would reduce 
participants' confidence in their decision as, for example, found by Tetlock and Kim (1987) 
and McKenna and Myers (1997). However, two-factorial ANOVAs testing the effects of 
accountability (yes vs. no) and attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) on reported confidence 
showed neither any significant effects for the first decision nor for the final decision. There 
were also no significant effects when the data for participants in the experimental conditions 
only were analysed.  
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With respect to a change of confidence from the first to the final decision, it had been 
expected that participants would report a higher confidence after the final decision than after 
the first decision, replicating research that has shown that people become increasingly 
confident in their decision the more information they can base it on (e.g., Oskamp, 1965). A 
repeated-measurements ANOVA with time of rating (after the first vs. after the final decision) 
as a within-subjects factor and experimental condition and attitude as between-subjects factors 
revealed a marginally significant 'time of rating' effect (F(1,70) = 2.70, p = .105) which, 
however, if anything, suggested the opposite. Confidence ratings after the first decision were 
higher than confidence ratings after the final decision (M = 5.24 vs. M = 5.01). 
3.  Need to make a good decision  
Responses to this question had been expected to vary as a function of whether 
participants were made accountable or not and the time at which they were made accountable. 
It was assumed that accountable participants would report a greater need to make a good 
decision, both at the first and at the final decision, than non-accountable participants, and that 
participants who had been made accountable before the final decision would report a greater 
need to make a good final decision than participants who had already been made accountable 
before the first decision. These assumptions were not supported, however. At the first 
decision, accountable participants reported a slightly higher need to make a good decision 
than non-accountable participants (M = 6.09 vs. M = 5.94), but the main effect of 
accountability in the 2 (accountability: yes vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-
management) ANOVA was not significant, nor were any other effects. The same was true for 
need to make a good decision reported at the final decision (M = 6.08 vs. M = 5.88). Again, 
there were no other significant effects. Also, a three-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of 
time of accountability, type of accountability and attitude on the ratings provided by 
participants in the experimental groups after the final decision did not yield any significant 
effects. 
A repeated-measurements ANOVA with time of rating (after the first vs. after the final 
decision) as a within-subjects factor and experimental condition and attitude as between-
subjects factors, showed that there was also no significant change in ratings from the first to 
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the final decision (M = 6.00 vs. M = 6.04), as the main effect of time of rating was not 
significant. Generally, the obtained mean values were quite high (means around 6 on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 7), suggesting that participants had possibly interpreted the question as one 
of asking about how seriously they had taken the experiment and had given high ratings in 
order to make a good impression on the experimenter. 
4.  Expectation of having to justify the final decision  
The assumption that accountable participants would expect more strongly to be asked 
to justify their final decision than participants who had not been made accountable was not 
supported, since no significant main effect of accountability was found in the ANOVA 
employed to test this hypothesis. On the contrary, accountable participants reported a slightly 
lower expectation than non-accountable participants, although this difference was not 
significant (M = 2.91 vs. M = 3.00). No other significant effects were found. A three-factorial 
ANOVA testing the effects of time of accountability, type of accountability, and attitude on 
the ratings of participants in the experimental groups only also did not show any significant 
effects. The mean values around 3 indicate that participants’ expectations of having to justify 
their decision were only moderate. This throws some doubt on whether participants in the 
accountability conditions took the manipulation seriously, but could have also been caused by 
the format of the justification, which was different from what accountable participants had 
been told before.  
5.  Need to be able to justify the first and the final decision  
It had been assumed that participants would report a particularly strong need to justify 
their decision immediately after being made accountable, resulting in a significant difference 
in ratings of this need between accountable and non-accountable participants for the first 
decision and between participants who had been made accountable before the first decision 
compared to participants who had only been made accountable before the final decision for 
the final decision. These hypotheses were not confirmed.  
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There was no significant difference in the reported need to be able to justify the first 
decision for accountable and non-accountable participants, as the main effect of accountability 
in the ANOVA carried out to test this hypothesis was not significant. The main effect of 
attitude and the interaction between accountability and attitude were also not significant. A 
three-factorial ANOVA performed on the experimental groups only, however, revealed a 
significant three-way interaction between time of accountability, type of accountability, and 
attitude (F(1,56) = 4.51, p = .038). A simple main effects analysis indicated that the 
interaction between time of accountability and attitude was only significant in conditions 
where participants had been asked to justify their decision to the management rather than the 
users (F(1,56) = 4.07, p = .049). Participants who had been made accountable to the 
management of the company before the first decision reported a higher need to justify this 
decision when they had a pro-management attitude compared to a pro-user attitude (M = 5.33 
vs. M = 4.29). For participants who were only made accountable to the management at a later 
time, this pattern was reversed (M = 4.63 vs. M = 5.38). This relationship is illustrated in 
Figure 7.25.  
Assuming that participants were willing and able to report their perceived need to 
justify their first decision accurately, this suggests that accountability to the management for 
participants with a pro-management attitude created a particular pressure to perform well. 
Participants who had not been made accountable yet at the time, on the other hand, seem to 
have felt more under pressure when their own attitude was user-oriented than when it was 
management-oriented.  
Accountable and non-accountable participants did also not differ in their reported need 
to justify the final decision, since the accountability main effect in the 2 (accountability: yes 
vs. no) by 2 (attitude: pro-user vs. pro-management) ANOVA conducted on this measure did 
not show a significant accountability main effect, nor any other significant effects. This was 
also true for the three-factorial ANOVA which tested the effects of time of accountability, 
type of accountability and attitude on the ratings of the experimental groups only.  
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Figure 7.25. Mean need to be able to justify the first decision (1=not at all, 7=extremely).  
A repeated-measurements ANOVA with type of decision (first vs. final decision) as a 
within-subjects factor and experimental condition and attitude as between-subjects factors 
revealed a significant 'type of decision' effect (F(1,70) = 19.43, p = .000). Generally, 
participants reported a stronger need to justify the final decision than the first decision (M = 
5.66 vs. M = 5.05). No other effects were significant. 
Results  
 337 
6.  Usefulness of additional information  
It was expected that, generally, participants would find the additional information 
useful, despite its redundancy, and accountable participants more so than non-accountable 
participants. The latter was not the case. The two-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of 
accountability (yes vs. no) and attitude (pro-user vs. pro-management) on rated usefulness did 
not yield the expected significant main effect of accountability, nor any other significant 
effect. The information was considered to be highly useful, however, indicated by an overall 
mean value of 5.40, on a scale ranging from 1 ‘not at all useful’ to 7 ‘very useful’.  
A three-factorial ANOVA testing the effects of time of accountability, type of 
accountability and attitude on the usefulness ratings of participants in the experimental groups 
revealed a marginally significant interaction between time of accountability and type of 
accountability (F(1,56) = 3.78, p = .057). A simple main effects analysis showed that type of 
accountability only significantly affected participants who had been made accountable before 
the first decision (F(1,56) = 4.03, p = .049). Participants who had been made accountable 
before the first decision found the additional information more useful when they had been 
made accountable to the users of the program than when they had been made accountable to 
the management of the company (M = 5.94 vs. M = 5.06), whereas the opposite tended to be 
the case when participants had been made accountable before the final decision (M = 5.19 vs. 
M = 5.50), although not significantly so.  
Summary of the results for the post-experimental questionnaire 
Participants' responses to the post-experimental questionnaire did not consistently 
show the expected effects, particularly not where the reported need to be able to justify the 
first and final decision was concerned. It had been expected that accountable participants 
would report a greater need to justify their first and final decision, respectively, and that the 
reported need to be able to justify a decision would be particularly strong if participants had 
been made accountable immediately prior to that decision. None of these hypotheses were 
confirmed. Instead, it was found that participants who had been made accountable to the 
management of the company before the first decision reported a stronger need to justify this 
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decision when they had a pro-management rather than a pro-user attitude, whereas for 
participants who had not been made accountable to the management yet, a stronger reported 
need to justify the first decision was observed when they had a pro-user rather than a pro-
management attitude. This may be seen as an indicator for the fact that for participants with a 
pro-management attitude, accountability to the management at the first decision created a 
particular pressure to perform well. For participants with a pro-user attitude who had been 
made accountable to the users, this effect was not observed. A repeated-measurements 
ANOVA found that, generally, participants indicated a stronger need to justify the final than 
the first decision, which is not surprising, given that the final decision was announced as such 
and therefore must have appeared as particularly important.  
Accountability also did not significantly affect the reported need to make a good first 
or final decision, although the observed means were higher for accountable than non-
accountable participants and therefore in the predicted direction. There was no difference 
between the first and final decision with respect to the reported need to make a good decision; 
the generally high values that were observed suggest that participants may have interpreted 
these questions as testing their motivation to comply with experimental instructions and 
responded in the affirmative, in order to make a good impression. 
Participants generally only reported a moderate expectation of having to justify the 
final decision, which did not vary significantly as a function of accountability. This may mean 
that the accountability manipulation was not convincing enough, but could also have been 
caused by the format of the justification; originally, accountable participants had expected to 
justify their choice to other people in a face-to-face discussion, but then found themselves 
asked to provide a written justification.  
As predicted, accountable participants found the first decision more difficult than non-
accountable participants. The same trend was observed for the final decision, but failed to 
reach statistical significance. Generally, the final decision was perceived as more difficult than 
the first, which is consistent with the result reported earlier that participants perceived a 
stronger need to be able to justify it than they did for the first decision. The observed ratings 
of difficulty also revealed significant main effects of attitude. Participants with a pro-
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management attitude perceived both the first and the final decision as more difficult than 
participants with a pro-user attitude. This supports the conclusion suggested by the 
information search results in particular, namely, that participants with a pro-management 
attitude took both user and cost attributes into account when making their decision. This put a 
higher strain on their information processing capacities compared to participants with a pro-
user attitude, and therefore made decisions indeed more difficult for them.  
Unexpectedly, there was neither a significant reduction of confidence in the first nor in 
the final decision as a result of accountability. Confidence was also not increased after the 
final decision, as had been predicted originally. If anything, an opposite trend could be 
observed; participants tended to be less confident after the final than the first decision.  
Finally, the redundant information that was presented to participants in the second 
information set was perceived as highly useful overall. The perceived usefulness did not vary 
as a function of accountability as such, but analyses revealed a significant interaction between 
time of accountability and type of accountability in the experimental groups. Participants who 
had been made accountable before the first decision rated the additional information as more 
useful when they had been made accountable to the users of the program than when they had 
been made accountable to the management of the company, whereas a reverse (but not 
significant) trend was observed for participants who had only been made accountable before 
the final decision. Possibly, participants who been made accountable to the management 
before the first decision and had felt under pressure to justify their decision, especially if they 
had not adjusted to the preferences of their audience, may have particularly hoped to find 
more information that supported their choice. This was, however, not possible, because of the 
redundancy of this information with the information provided in the first set, and these 
participants may have therefore been particularly disappointed. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
The present study had been designed to test the norm-enforcement aspect of 
accountability, as predicted by the PMA presented in Chapter 5. According to the PMA, 
external accountability to others who are able to evaluate the individual, because his or her 
performance is identifiable, and whose standards of evaluation have been made explicit to or 
can be easily guessed by the individual, will make directional goals salient and bias the 
decision process towards the alternative that is likely to be preferred by the individual's 
evaluators. However, this is only predicted to be the case if the decision maker has not already 
committed him- or herself to a different alternative, that is, accountability is pre- rather than 
post-decisional. When the individual is made accountable after having made a decision 
already, he or she is expected to evaluate and integrate information in such a way that the 
previously chosen alternative comes out best. Participants' own preferences are assumed to be 
another important moderator of the tendency to either adjust or not adjust to audience 
preferences. If they match those of the group the individual has been made accountable to, 
adjustment to audience preferences is assumed to be more likely compared to when this is not 
the case.  
At the same time as biasing the decision process, the responsibility cues inherent in 
external accountability demands, namely personal causality in bringing about and control over 
the decision and its consequences, are predicted to make accuracy goals salient. These are 
expected to enhance depth of information search and complexity of information integration. 
External accountability to representatives of different interest groups was therefore predicted 
to make the decision process both more complex and more biased. 
These hypotheses were tested in a decision context in which participants had to choose 
which of four CASE programming tools to buy for a company and were made accountable 
either to the future users of the program (the programmers of the company) or to the 
management of the company. This happened either before or after an initial decision was 
made. Participants in a control group were not made accountable at any time. The 
accountability manipulation was implicit, in that participants were told that the final decision 
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about which CASE tool to acquire would be made by a committee, consisting of themselves 
and two other people, a representative of the users and a representative of the management. 
Participants were lead to believe that, after having made a decision on their own, they would 
meet these representatives and have to jointly agree on a decision after a group discussion. 
Accountability to the users of the program was created by implying that it would be 
particularly important to convince the user representative, as the users would have to work 
with the tool in the future, accountability to the management was created by implying that it 
would be particularly important to convince the management representative, as the 
management would have to pay for it. In this way the values of the audience participants were 
made accountable to were made salient, and it was expected that participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program before they made a decision would bias their 
decision process towards an alternative that maximised user values, whereas participants who 
had been made accountable to the management of the company would bias their decision 
process towards an alternative that maximised cost values.  
However, the findings suggested that participants who had been made accountable to 
the management of the company before they made a decision attempted to maximise both user 
and cost values, which meant that the results did not usually exactly match the original 
predictions, but nevertheless provided evidence for the type of processes predicted by the 
PMA. Another tendency that affected results was the strong user orientation in the sample. 
This may not seem surprising, given that the participants were all Computer Science students, 
who were particularly familiar with the user aspects of computer software. This meant, 
however, that the adjustment to a user audience for participants who had been classified as 
having a pro-management attitude was easier than the opposite adjustment.  
Information search before the first decision 
Because of the two effects mentioned above, an increased depth of information search, 
assumed to be induced as a result of accountability compared to no accountability, could only 
be observed when participants had a pro-management attitude and had been made accountable 
to the management. When this was the case, participants indeed exhibited a tendency to adapt 
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their information search to audience preferences by searching less information when made 
accountable to the users of the program, and more information when made accountable to the 
management of the company. This adjustment tendency was also evident in the type of 
information that was searched; when participants with a pro-management attitude were made 
accountable to the users of the program, they tended to search relatively more user 
information, when they were made accountable to the management of the company, they 
tended to search relatively less user information than under no accountability. As expected, 
information search in the 'no accountability' condition followed participants' attitude. Because 
participants with a pro-management attitude had to search both user and cost attributes in 
order to identify the alternative that offered the best compromise overall, they searched more 
information than participants with a pro-user attitude when accountability pressures were 
absent. Also in line with predictions, participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made 
accountable to the users of the program, tended to search more information, particularly a 
higher percentage of different cells, than when they were not accountable. Unexpectedly, 
however, the additional information that was searched was not primarily user information, as 
the percentage of searched user information did not differ significantly between the 'no 
accountability' and 'accountability to users' conditions. Participants with a pro-user attitude 
who had been made accountable to the management searched particularly little information. 
This points to the validity of an assumption mentioned earlier, namely that for these 
participants adjustment to a management audience was very difficult. Indeed, the overall 
pattern of results observed for this condition strongly suggests that an adjustment to the 
management audience either did not happen or only happened reluctantly. 
The observed concentration of the first information search on the chosen alternative, 
for example, was another indicator of the fact that the conflict between having a pro-user 
attitude and being accountable to the management was resolved by defending user 
preferences, whereas the conflict between having a pro-management attitude and being 
accountable to the users of the program was resolved by adjusting to user preferences. 
Participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the management 
showed a higher concentration of search on their chosen alternative than participants with a 
pro-management attitude. For participants with a pro-management attitude who had been 
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made accountable to the users of the program, however, the equivalent tendency was not 
significant.  
Contrary to predictions, accountable participants did not only fail to show a 
significantly lower concentration of their information search on the chosen alternative than 
non-accountable participants, but even exhibited the opposite, albeit non-significant, 
tendency. Particularly when concentration of search on the chosen alternative was calculated 
for the total number of items searched, the observed mean was higher for accountable than for 
non-accountable participants. The fact that this effect was not observed when the 
concentration of search measure was based on the different cells searched suggests that 
accountable participants had a stronger need to make sure that their intended choice was 
superior when they searched information repeatedly, and as such is consistent with more 
salient accuracy goals for these participants. 
The high variability of search as well as the low Index of Compensatory Processing 
and attribute-wise search pattern indicated that, overall, information search was non-
compensatory. It had been predicted that the extent of non-compensatory information 
processing would be higher for non-accountable than accountable participants, but, although 
the observed means mostly showed the expected tendencies, none of the observed differences 
were significant. A possible explanation for this can be the strong influence of task factors, in 
particular the relatively high complexity of the task, which may have overshadowed any 
accountability effects. The only significant effect was a main effect of attitude on the 
variability of search across attributes for different cells. Participants with a pro-management 
attitude showed a significantly lower variability of search across attributes for different cells 
than participants with a pro-user attitude. This implies that they searched alternatives more 
equally and did not eliminate them from consideration as early as participants with a pro-user 
attitude did. This may be interpreted as supporting the assumption that participants with a pro-
management attitude paid attention to both user and cost attributes. The alternatives on offer 
had been constructed in such a way that they were similar in terms of their overall value and, 
therefore, someone who was interested in maximising overall value, as participants with a 
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pro-management attitude were, would have found it hard to eliminate any of them from 
consideration early.  
Information evaluation and integration at the first decision 
The measures of information evaluation and integration at the first decision lent further 
support to the above conclusions. Also, another interesting regularity emerged, namely that 
overt measures of adjustment, such as choices, weight judgements and suitability ratings of 
alternatives indicated adjustment to the preferences of the group participants had been made 
accountable to, whereas covert measures, such as MAUT predicted evaluative differences 
between alternatives demonstrated the defensive tendencies of participants' whose own 
attitude conflicted with that of their audience. 
Hence, participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program chose 
the user alternative more often than a management alternative, whereas the opposite was true 
for participants who had been made accountable to the management. Also, in line with 
predictions, attitude only significantly affected participants' choice when they were not 
accountable; as expected, participants with a pro-user attitude were more likely to choose the 
user alternative and participants with a pro-management attitude were more likely to choose a 
management alternative. The fact that the pure management alternative was only chosen once 
by the latter again supports the conclusion that participants with a pro-management attitude 
were attracted to alternatives that fared well on both user and cost attributes. 
Participants' weight judgements reflected their choices. Participants who had been 
made accountable to the users of the program assigned relatively higher weights to the user 
attributes of the first information set than participants who had been made accountable to the 
management, no matter what their own attitude was. The weight judgements of participants in 
the 'no accountability' condition, on the other hand, were affected by their attitude and, hence, 
relatively higher for user attributes when participants were user-oriented than when they were 
management-oriented. As expected, these effects were only observed for the user attributes 
contained in the first information set, for which participants knew how outcomes were linked 
to the different alternatives. This suggests that the weight judgements for user attributes 
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contained in information set 1 were strategically adjusted, in order to support the chosen 
alternative. The weight judgements for the user attributes of the second information set, on the 
other hand, only showed the expected main effect of attitude. 
Despite the clear adjustment effects that were observed in participants' weight 
judgements, the change of these judgements from the first elicitation (which had happened 
before any experimental manipulation) to the second elicitation after the first decision, 
although showing the predicted trends, did not reveal any significant effects, suggesting that 
effects were not strong enough to be able to speak of importance differentiation on an 
individual basis. An inspection of the mean sum of user attribute weights obtained before the 
first decision suggested that the reason for the failure to obtain significant differentiation 
effects may have been the fact that user attribute weights were quite high generally, so that 
regression effects may have cancelled out any differentiation attempts, especially for 
participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program and therefore would 
have had to increase their user attribute weights even more.  
Measures of overall attractiveness differentiation between alternatives had included the 
difference between suitability ratings for the user and the average management alternative, in 
order to assess the effect of having been made accountable to different interest groups, and the 
difference between suitability ratings for the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, in 
order to test differentiation to protect the chosen alternative more generally. Given that both 
measures were overt measures, in that participants openly expressed their preferences in these 
ratings, it was expected that participants who had been made accountable would decrease the 
evaluative difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative and the user and 
average management alternative, respectively, in order to signal that they were willing to take 
differing audience view points into account, especially if they experienced a conflict between 
their own attitude and the preferences of the group they had been made accountable to. 
Indeed, the observed evaluative difference between the user and average management 
alternative was smaller for participants who had been made accountable to the management 
than for participants who had either been made accountable to the users of the program or 
participants who had not been made accountable, suggesting some adjustment effect. This 
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tendency was not statistically significant, however. There was, however, a significant effect of 
attitude, which, as expected, indicated that the evaluative difference between the user and 
average management alternative was larger for participants with a pro-user attitude than for 
participants with a pro-management attitude. A conflict between participants' own attitude and 
the preferences of the group they had been made accountable to tended to result in a more 
ready adjustment to audience preferences when participants with a pro-management attitude 
had been made accountable to the users of the program than when participants with a pro-user 
attitude had been made accountable to the management of the program, but again, this effect 
was not strong enough to be significant.  
The analyses performed on the difference between suitability ratings for the chosen vs. 
average non-chosen alternative indicated that the expected decrease of this difference for 
accountable participants only happened when they had a pro-user attitude. For participants 
with a pro-management attitude no significant difference between accountable and non-
accountable participants was observed. The reason for this pattern of results was that 
participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the users 
showed an unexpectedly large evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-
chosen alternative, which pulled the mean in the accountability conditions upwards and made 
it not significantly different from that observed in the 'no accountability' condition. A 
significant interaction between time of accountability and attitude was obtained when the 
control group was included in the analysis. Indeed, it was the tendency of non-accountable 
participants with a pro-user attitude to show a larger judgemental difference between their 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative than those with a pro-management attitude which 
caused the interaction effect to become significant. The influence of participants' attitude on 
this measure can yet again be explained by the fact that for participants with a pro-
management attitude, because of their attention to both user and cost attributes, the overall 
value of the different alternatives they had to choose between was more similar and, therefore, 
irrespective of their choice, the difference between the chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative would be expected to be smaller. When participants had been made accountable to 
either the users of the program or the management of the company, no significant differences 
between participants with different attitudes emerged. This may be seen as yet another 
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indication of the fact that participants showed some adjustment to the preferences of their 
audience and the effect of their own attitude lost its strength.  
Contrary to the actually observed evaluative differences between alternatives, the 
predictions of these differences from participants' unidimensional value and weight 
judgements, given their more covert nature, had been expected to show evidence of a 
tendency to defend own preferences rather than adjust to audience preferences when 
participants experienced a conflict between their own preferences and those of their audience. 
This was the case for the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between the user and the 
average management alternative as well as the MAUT predicted evaluative difference 
between the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative, but, again, usually only when this 
conflict was one between a pro-user attitude and having been made accountable to the 
management. Also, the conflict effect tended to be stronger when the change in MAUT 
predicted evaluative differences from before the first to after the first decision rather than 
differences obtained after the first decision were analysed.  
Interestingly, and in contrast to the results obtained for weight judgements, the MAUT 
predicted evaluative differences between alternatives showed some effects of the experimental 
manipulations not only when the predictions were based on the attributes from the first 
information set, but also when they were based on the parallel attributes from information set 
2, although these effects were quite weak and did not usually reach standard significance 
levels. This may be interpreted as supporting a conclusion that the attempt to make the 
information contained in the second information set largely redundant to that in the first was 
successful. Only then would participants have rated attribute outcomes similarly and similar 
predictions would have been obtained. An important difference to the effects for MAUT 
predictions based on the attributes from the first information set, however, was that, apart 
from significant attitude effects, they suggested adjustment to the preferences of the audience 
participants had been made accountable to rather than conflict effects. This makes sense, 
given that a conflict is likely to be experienced only when a choice is involved, but 
participants had not known parallel attribute outcomes for their choice at this point.  
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Most likely as a result of the differential tendency to adjust to audience preferences by 
participants with a pro-management and pro-user attitude, respectively, accountable 
participants did not consistently show an enlarged MAUT predicted difference between the 
chosen and the average non-chosen alternative compared to participants who had not been 
made accountable. The only time this effect was found was for the change in the MAUT 
predicted difference between the chosen and the average non-chosen alternative from before 
the first to after the first decision, based on the attributes from the second information set. As 
expected, accountable participants showed a larger increase in this difference than non-
accountable participants, who, in fact, showed a decrease, suggesting that regression effects 
were at work.  
An assumption that unfortunately could not be tested adequately, due to the 
insufficient sample size and asymmetrical choice distributions, was that the way in which a 
conflict between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been 
made accountable was resolved, that is, either by adjustment to audience preferences or 
resistance and bolstering of own preferences, would affect the observed evaluative difference 
between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative. Some tentative analyses, which have 
to be viewed with caution, given that they were based on very small ns, nevertheless 
suggested that, as expected, when participants decided to resolve the conflict by making a 
choice according to their own preferences rather than those of the audience they had been 
made accountable to, the evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-chosen 
alternative was larger than when they decided to go along with audience preferences. 
Information search before the final decision 
The defensiveness-inducing effects of resisting audience preferences were supported 
by the analyses of decision processes observed at the final decision. It had been predicted that 
participants who had only been made accountable before the final decision would not show 
adjustment to the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable to, especially if 
they perceived a conflict between their own preferences and those of the audience they had 
been made accountable to. This was observed in participants' information search before the 
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final decision as well as their information evaluation, but, as before, only for participants with 
a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the management. 
The defensiveness of these participants' information search, for example, was indicated 
by the type of information they searched. Participants with a pro-user attitude searched a 
higher percentage of user information when they had been made accountable to the 
management than when they had been made accountable to the users of the program, most 
likely because the majority of them had chosen a user alternative before and needed to defend 
it. Participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the users 
of the program, on the other hand, searched the same relative amount of user information as 
participants with a pro-user attitude, suggesting that they adjusted to the preferences of the 
audience they had been made accountable to.  
Furthermore, analyses of the Biased Search Index (BSI) data suggested that the 
tendency to search more supporting than non-supporting information for the chosen 
alternative and to search information in such a way that the chosen alternative was supported 
over the average non-chosen alternative, was stronger for participants with a pro-user attitude 
than for participants with a pro-management attitude, but only when they had been made 
accountable before the final decision. This again indicates that the value conflict between a 
pro-user attitude and having been made accountable to the management was experienced as 
more severe than the opposite combination, and was particularly strong after a previous 
commitment. 
Unlike expected, accountable participants did not show a significantly stronger bias to 
search information that supported the chosen alternative over the non-chosen alternatives than 
participants who had not been made accountable. The analysis performed on the BSI for the 
average non-chosen alternative even indicated that, compared to non-accountable participants, 
accountable participants tended to search more information that supported than did not 
support the non-chosen alternatives. This confirms previously reported findings, for example, 
by Canon (1964), which suggested that an expectation of having to convince someone else of 
one's choice results in more attention to dissonant information. It seems reasonable to assume 
that accountable participants in this study expected to be presented with counter-arguments in 
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their discussion with the other committee members, particularly when they had chosen to 
resist the choice that they thought would be favoured by the group they had been made 
accountable to. They seem to have dealt with this pressure by searching information that could 
feed into possible counter-arguments, but also made sure that they had more good arguments 
supporting their own choice. 
In addition to any biasing effects, the PMA had also predicted that participants who 
had been made accountable before the final decision would show a deeper and more complex 
information processing than participants who had already been made accountable before the 
first decision or had not been made accountable at all, resulting in significant effects of time 
of accountability on the information search measures. Accordingly, accountable participants 
were predicted to show deeper and more complex information processing than non-
accountable participants. 
The results obtained for the final information search measures largely supported these 
predictions. As expected, the information search of accountable participants was deeper, more 
compensatory and less strongly concentrated on the chosen alternative than that of non-
accountable participants. Most of the variability of search measures showed a trend that was 
consistent with these findings, namely, variability of search was lower in the 'accountability' 
than in the 'no accountability' conditions. An exception was variability of search across 
attributes, based on the total number of items searched, which tended to be higher for 
accountable than non-accountable participants. This suggested that accountable participants, 
when they searched information repeatedly, tended to do so for some alternatives on some 
attributes to a larger extent than non-accountable participants, possibly to remind themselves 
of the advantages of the alternative they favoured. When variability of search across attributes 
was based on different cells searched, however, it indeed tended to be lower when participants 
had been made accountable before the final decision than when they had either not been made 
accountable or had been made accountable before the first decision. This shows that 
participants who had been made accountable before the final decision searched a more equal 
number of alternatives for each attribute and suggests that they did not eliminate alternatives 
from consideration at an early stage. The observed variability of search across alternatives was 
generally larger than variability of search across attributes when both were based on the 
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different cells searched. This is consistent with a tendency to only search a subset of the 
available alternatives, but searching a relatively equal number of attributes per considered 
alternative. Given that participants had eliminated alternatives during their previous choice 
process already, a strategy that focused on the previously preferred alternative and its closest 
competitor would make sense.  
The expected difference between accountability before the final and accountability 
before the first decision was significant for some measures, such as concentration of search, 
but tended to be smaller overall and was sometimes dependent on participants' attitude. For 
example, a significantly deeper information search for participants who had been made 
accountable before the final compared to the first decision was only observed for participants 
with a pro-user attitude. This was caused by the particularly low amount of information that 
was searched by participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable 
to the management before the final decision. As a result, the only conditions that showed a 
significantly deeper information search than the 'no accountability' conditions were the 
'accountability to users' conditions. These findings were mirrored in those observed for 
variability of search across alternatives and complexity of processing. When participants had a 
pro-user attitude, the observed variability of search was lower and complexity of processing 
higher when they had been made accountable before the final decision than when they had 
been made accountable before the first decision, whereas for participants with a pro-
management attitude a reverse, but non-significant, tendency was observed. The latter 
supports the conclusion that participants with a pro-management attitude did not show their 
usual relatively balanced search of all alternatives when they had been made accountable 
before the final decision, especially when they had been made accountable to the 
management. One can only speculate as to why this effect occurred; it may be that because 
their own preferences did not clash with those of the audience they had been made 
accountable to, participants felt little need to check upon their previous choice. 
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Final information evaluation and integration 
Participants' final choices were consistent with the adjustment effects predicted by the 
PMA. When participants had been made accountable only after they had already made a 
commitment to one of the alternatives, no adjustment was observed and their choices matched 
their attitude, that is, showed a preference for the user alternative when participants had a pro-
user attitude and a preference for management alternatives when participants had a pro-
management attitude. When participants had already been made accountable before the first 
decision, on the other hand, their choices matched the preferences of their external audiences, 
that is, expressed a preference for the user alternative when they had been made accountable 
to the users of the program and a preference for the management alternative when they had 
been made accountable to the management of the company. Somewhat unexpectedly, when 
participants had not been made accountable, they were more likely to choose the user 
alternative, even if their own attitude was management-oriented. This was, because some 
participants changed their initial choice from a management to a user choice, and shows yet 
again that a user perspective was very strong within the sample. 
Participants' weight judgements showed similar effects, but only for the attributes 
contained in the first information set. As predicted, when participants had been made 
accountable before the first decision, the mean sum of user attribute weights elicited after the 
final decision was significantly larger when they had been made accountable to the users of 
the program than when they had been made accountable to the management of the company, 
but when they had been made accountable before the final decision, the observed mean sum of 
user attribute weights did not differ significantly in the two conditions. Moreover, when 
participants had been made accountable to the management before the final decision, the sum 
of user attribute weight was larger than when they had been made accountable before the first 
decision. This is likely to have been the result of participants' initial and final choices, which 
had been choices of the user alternative in the majority of cases, and which were supported by 
stressing the importance of user attributes. The only significant effect observed for the weight 
judgements based on the parallel attributes from information set 2 was one of attitude; as 
expected, participants with a pro-user attitude assigned higher user attribute weights than 
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participants with a pro-management attitude. The presence of an effect for the attributes from 
the first information set but absence of the same effect for the attributes from the second 
information set, suggests that participants consolidated their choice through their weight 
judgements for the attributes from information set 1, but did not show differentiation for the 
new attributes. A possible explanation for this could be the fact that weights for the attributes 
from the first information set were always elicited first and that, by the time weights for the 
parallel attributes were elicited, a sufficient bolstering of participants' choice had already 
occurred. A similar argument has been made by Götz-Marchand, Götz, and Irle (1974), who 
found empirical support for it in a study where the opportunity to reduce dissonance by 
negatively evaluating an intelligence test in which participants had allegedly performed badly, 
was used more often when it was the first dependent measure compared to when it appeared in 
fifth position in the post-test (see Chapter 4). The fact that no significant effects were obtained 
either for the changes in weight judgements from the second elicitation after the first decision 
to the third elicitation after the final decision signals that regression effects may have 
counteracted any importance differentiation and consolidation effects. 
A reluctance to adjust to audience preferences when having been made accountable 
after a commitment to a different alternative was also evident in the actually observed and 
MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the user alternative and average management 
alternative, and chosen and average non-chosen alternative, respectively. Furthermore, the 
observed pattern of results lent again support to the special significance of the conflict 
between a pro-user attitude and accountability to the management in inducing a particularly 
strong need to uphold and defend own preferences. It is important to stress that in all instances 
where this was observed, participants' particular choices could not provide the sole 
explanation for the effect, because in both conflict conditions (pro-user attitude/accountable to 
management and pro-management attitude/ accountable to users) the same overall choice 
distribution was observed; 9 out of 15 participants chose the user alternative. 
Actually observed and MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the user and 
average management alternative were larger when participants had been made accountable to 
the users before the first rather than the final decision, and larger when they had been made 
accountable to the management before the final rather than the first decision. This is 
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consistent with a failure to adjust to audience preferences and bolstering of own preferences 
when being made accountable before the final decision. In addition, the fact that participants 
with a pro-user attitude did not show significantly smaller evaluative differences between the 
user and average management alternative when they had been made accountable to the 
management rather than the users, whereas participants with a pro-management attitude did, 
suggests that participants with a pro-user attitude must have been more unwilling to adjust to 
the preferences of a management audience. 
This time, significant effects of a value conflict between a pro-user attitude and 
accountability to the management were also obtained when changes in the MAUT predicted 
differences between the user and average management alternative from the first to the final 
decision were analysed. Unexpectedly, however, this was only the case for predictions based 
on the attributes contained in the second information set and both information sets combined. 
This was particularly surprising, given that attribute weights, as important components of 
these predictions, had only revealed significant effects when the attributes had been contained 
in information set 1. Another peculiarity of the changes in MAUT predicted differences 
between the user and average management alternative from the first to the final decision was 
that time of accountability never significantly interacted with the other factors, suggesting that 
such effects were not strong enough and/or the measure not sensitive enough to pick them up. 
Evaluative differences between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, both 
those actually observed and those predicted by an additive linear MAUT model, were found to 
be increased when participants experienced a conflict between their own attitude and the 
preferences of the audience they had been made accountable to, particularly when 
accountability had been introduced before the final rather than the first decision, and when the 
conflict was between a pro-user attitude and having been made accountable to the 
management. The triple interaction between all three experimental variables observed in the 
change of the judgmental difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
from the first to the final decision is particularly interesting, because it suggests that a conflict 
between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been made 
accountable to resulted in an increased consolidation when they had been made accountable 
before the final decision, but in a decreased consolidation when they had already been made 
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accountable before the first decision. This seems to speak against the validity of Svenson's 
(1992, 1996) hypothesis that individuals will show consolidation even if their choice is not 
under threat, but seems to support previous findings, for example, by Boiney, Kennedy and 
Nye (1997), which suggest that participants only bias their information evaluation when this is 
necessary to arrive at the desired conclusion. Participants with a value conflict between a pro-
user attitude and accountability to the management who had already been made accountable 
before the first decision presumably had already achieved the desired degree of differentiation 
and therefore did not need to increase the evaluative difference between their chosen and 
average non-chosen alternative even further.  
However, MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the chosen and average 
non-chosen alternative after the final decision, based on the attributes from the first 
information set, provided some support for Svenson’s theory. A conflict between a pro-user 
attitude and accountability to the management resulted in a significantly larger evaluative 
difference than no conflict, whereas the conflict between a pro-management attitude and 
accountability to the users, although showing the same tendency, did not do so significantly. 
Although the triple interaction between the experimental factors was not significant, simple 
main effects analyses suggested that the above was only true for participants who had been 
made accountable before the first decision. When participants had been made accountable 
before the final decision, although the same trends were evident, the observed differences 
were not significant. This points to continued bolstering of the chosen alternative under 
conflict, even when accountability pressures were not immediately salient anymore. 
What could be the reason for these seemingly contradictory results? When participants 
rated the suitability of the different alternatives, they may have been reluctant to openly show 
consolidation by rating the overall value of their preferred alternative higher and/or the overall 
value of their non-chosen alternatives lower than before unless they felt a strong pressure to 
do so. This may have happened, because they were able to remember their previous 
judgements and did not want to appear inconsistent. When participants gave unidimensional 
value and weight judgements, on the other hand, the process of consolidation was much less 
obvious and previous judgements more difficult to remember, so participants may therefore 
have engaged in it more readily. The fact that when MAUT predictions were based on the 
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attributes from the first information set, the consolidation effect was stronger for participants 
who had been made accountable before the first compared to the final decision may be seen to 
suggest that accountability before the final decision interfered with consolidation attempts, 
because it forced participants to reconsider their choice. 
Both actually observed and MAUT predicted evaluative differences between the 
chosen and average non-chosen alternative showed significant effects of a value conflict 
between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been made 
accountable to when their change from the first to the final decision was analysed. However, 
when the differences after the final decision, were inspected, significant conflict effects for 
MAUT predicted differences were only obtained when predictions were based on the first set 
of attributes or both attribute sets combined rather than based on the second attribute set. The 
failure to observe any conflict effects for predictions based on the attributes from information 
set 2 may be explained by the absence of such effects in the weight judgements that 
participants had given and hence be regarded as a consequence of the particular order in which 
weight judgements were elicited.  
As expected, accountability compared to no accountability resulted in a decreased 
judgmental difference between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative after the final 
decision. When inspecting the change of this difference from the first to the final decision, 
however, this effect was not significant. The MAUT predicted evaluative differences between 
the chosen and average non-chosen alternative also mostly failed to show the larger means 
that had been predicted for accountable participants. The only significant effect of 
accountability vs. no accountability was observed for the change in MAUT predicted 
evaluative differences between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative from the first to 
the final decision, based on the attributes from the second information set. The direction of 
this effect was opposite, however, to what had been expected; accountable participants 
showed a smaller increase in the MAUT predicted evaluative difference between their chosen 
and average non-chosen alternative than participants who had not been made accountable.  
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Justifications  
Overall, participants' written justifications were found to focus almost exclusively on 
the advantages of the chosen alternative and to exhibit a very low complexity, that is, a very 
low ratio of two-sided arguments (arguments that compared alternatives in some way) to the 
total number of one- and two-sided arguments. This is consistent with previous findings, for 
example, by Crozier (1989, 1990), Ranyard (1991) and Huber and Seiser (2001), which 
showed that justification texts typically only refer to the chosen alternative, which is described 
very positively. The results of the present data analyses furthermore suggested that a conflict 
between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been made 
accountable to resulted in a particularly low complexity of argumentation, but only when 
participants had been made accountable before the first rather than the final decision. This 
supports the previously reported tendency evident in participants' information evaluation, 
namely that consolidation was stronger for participants who had been made accountable 
before the first compared to the final decision. The increased depth and complexity of 
information processing induced by accountability immediately prior to the final decision 
seems to have carried over to the justifications. 
The effect of conflict was also evident in the relative number of arguments mentioning 
positive aspects of the chosen alternative, which was larger when participants experienced a 
conflict between their own preferences and those of the audience they had been made 
accountable to than when they did not. However, at the same time, the other type of consonant 
arguments, namely negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives, was mentioned relatively 
less often when participants experienced a value conflict than when they did not. The reason 
underlying this finding can only be speculated about. It may be that participants in the conflict 
conditions who had adjusted their choices to the preferences of the audience they had been 
made accountable to, particularly avoided mentioning negative aspects of their secretly 
preferred alternative. Dissonant arguments, that is, arguments that mentioned negative aspects 
of the chosen alternative or positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives did not reveal any 
significant differences between conditions. 
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Again, results suggested that the conflict between having a pro-user attitude and 
having been made accountable to the management had a special role in inducing defensive 
effects, especially when it occurred under post-decisional accountability. Participants who had 
been made accountable to the management before the final decision elaborated relatively more 
often on the information that had been presented during the experiment than participants who 
had been made accountable to the users. Given that these participants had chosen the user 
alternative in the majority of cases and the elaborations they presented tended to support the 
user alternative, they seem to have bolstered their choice by means of elaborations. 
Participants with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the 
users, on the other hand, gave incorrect information relatively more often than participants 
with a pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the management. The 
false information they gave did not support the management alternative but the user 
alternative. This signals adjustment to the preferences of their audience and possibly the wish 
to make a good impression. In order to achieve this goal, they may have exaggerated the 
advantages of the user alternative. Participants with the opposite value conflict did not show 
an equivalent tendency.  
Whereas a conflict between a pro-management attitude and having been made 
accountable to the users of the program resulted in more false reproductions, the absence of 
this conflict, because participants had a pro-user attitude, seemed to have induced a different 
strategy, namely a strategy to mention more global evaluation criteria which did not refer to 
any alternatives in particular, but stressed the importance of user concerns. Participants with a 
pro-management attitude who had been made accountable to the management, did not show a 
comparable tendency, which may be explained by the fact that they did not exclusively favour 
cost concerns over user concerns, and tended to choose compromise alternatives that did not 
have clear advantages on one or the other.  
The PMA had predicted that external accountability to different interest groups would 
make external norms salient. This should have also found expression in participants’ 
justifications. Indeed, participants justifications showed that they were sensitive to these 
norms, as participants who had been made accountable to the users of the program mentioned 
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relatively more user and fewer cost arguments than participants who had been made 
accountable to the management of the company and vice versa. 
It had also been expected that participants who had not been made accountable at any 
time would exhibit a lower complexity of argumentation, and mention consonant arguments 
(positive aspects of the chosen alternative and negative aspects of the non-chosen alternatives) 
relatively more often and dissonant arguments (negative aspects of the chosen alternative and 
positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives) relatively less often than accountable 
participants. Although the observed means pointed in the predicted directions, none of the 
observed differences were significant. This was also true for the total number of arguments 
presented, which, as expected, was slightly higher for accountable than for non-accountable 
participants.  
Conclusions 
The results of the present study, notwithstanding certain peculiarities resulting from 
sample characteristics and the particular decision scenario used, supported the predictions of 
the PMA. External accountability to different interest groups resulted in both complex and 
biased information processing, no matter whether it was pre-decisional or post-decisional. The 
fact that when accountability was introduced, information processing remained relatively 
more extensive and complex, even if participants had already made a choice, suggests that 
Tetlock's (1985, 1991, 1992) hypothesis that accountability will result in a more thorough 
information processing only when decision makers have been made accountable before their 
decision to an audience with unknown views is not quite correct. Also, in line with the 
predictions derived from the PMA, only pre-decisional accountability induced any significant 
tendencies to adjust to the preferences of the audience participants had been made accountable 
to. Post-decisional accountability resulted in defensive reactions, where individuals tried to 
bolster their initial choice, both by the type of information they searched and the way in which 
they evaluated and integrated information.  
Participants' own preferences appeared as an important moderator of the effects of 
external accountability on decision processes in this study. A conflict between individuals' 
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own preferences and those of the audience they were made accountable to typically resulted in 
defensive information processing that supported participants' own preferences, particularly 
when accountability was post-decisional. It must be noted, however, that the effect of 
participants' own preferences may have been overestimated in this study, because 
unidimensional value and weights judgements were elicited first and therefore may have had 
an effect similar to a commitment for participants, who may have been concerned to appear 
consistent afterwards. Further studies need to address this point. Another reason for why the 
effects of participants' own preferences were particularly pronounced may have been that the 
consequences of not adjusting to audience preferences but insisting on one's own opinion 
were, of course, negligible in this artificial laboratory situation. The present results, however, 
imply that when decisions require adjustment to a particular norm, as it is, for example, the 
case when individuals act as agents for a principal who expects them to make decisions that 
match his or her own preferences, they should only be delegated to individuals with similar 
preferences.  
An effect that was not consistently observed, especially where the degree of bias in 
information evaluation and integration was concerned, was a difference between accountable 
and non-accountable participants' information processing. Although the direction of observed 
effects usually matched predictions, they were often not significant. One possible reason for 
the failure to obtain significant differences is that the accountability pressures created in the 
present experiment lacked ecological validity and therefore were not strong enough. However, 
the fact that comparisons between experimental groups usually revealed significant effects 
seems to speak against this assumption. Instead, task factors seem to have sometimes 
overshadowed any effects of accountability. For example, the biasing effect of a previous 
commitment on information search processes was observed in the 'accountability' as well as 
'no accountability' conditions. Both accountable and non-accountable participants searched 
more information for the chosen alternative that supported rather than did not support it, and 
searched information in such a way that the chosen alternative was supported over the non-
chosen alternatives. However, accountable participants also tended to search more information 
for the non-chosen alternatives that supported rather than did not support these alternatives, 
whereas non-accountable participants did not show this tendency. This result is consistent 
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with previous findings which suggest that the expectation of having to convince someone of 
one's choice increases attention to dissonant information.  
Finally, the present study provided some support for Svenson's (1992, 1996) Diff Con 
theory, in that participants gave unidimensional value and weights judgements which 
differentiated the chosen alternative from the non-chosen alternatives, particularly when there 
was a conflict between participants' own preferences and those of the group they had been 
made accountable to. However, regression effects counteracted these effects and meant that 
there was not usually a significant increase in the evaluative differences between the chosen 
and average non-chosen alternative, unless a value conflict existed. There was also evidence 
to support Svenson's assumption of ongoing consolidation after a decision has been made. 
This tendency was, however, only clearly visible when the measure was a covert one, 
otherwise there was a suggestion that consolidation only occurred when it was necessary, for 
example, because participants were under pressure. Hence, like in the previous study, a 
dissociation between overt and covert measures of differentiation and consolidation was 
observed. However, this dissociation did not occur when participants experienced a value 
conflict. In this case, both overt and covert measures showed an enlarged evaluative difference 
between the chosen and average non-chosen alternative, supporting the assumption that 
differentiation and consolidation is particularly strong when individuals are under pressure. 
The following, final chapter will summarise the main findings from both studies and 
discuss their implications for theories of the effects of accountability on decision processes in 
particular and motivation more generally. 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The work presented here investigated the effects of accountability on information 
search, evaluation and integration in multi-attribute decision making, integrating classical 
social psychological with decision-analytical approaches. Accountability is a social context 
variable that affects decision processes, like other context variables, such as decision 
complexity or time pressure. Here it was conceptualised as a motivating agent, that is, as a 
variable that introduces particular goals into decision makers' information processing. The 
exact nature of these goals was argued to depend on the particular type of accountability that 
is created. Contrary to common conceptions of accountability as a unidimensional variable 
which always produces the same effects on decision processes, a closer inspection of the 
accountability concept resulted in the conclusion that accountability has two core 
components; it introduces in the individual a feeling of personal responsibility for potentially 
negative consequences of his or her behaviour, and it creates evaluation apprehension. 
Personal responsibility is suggested to the individual by implications of personal causality, 
that is, personal agency in bringing about certain consequences, and by implications of the 
individual having control over the consequences of his or her behaviour. Evaluation 
apprehension, on the other hand, is induced by the implied presence of others and the 
assumption that these others can identify the individual's performance. While personal 
responsibility cues make internal standards and norms of behaviour salient, evaluation cues 
enhance the salience of the norms and standards of the external audience. It was furthermore 
argued that not all types of accountability contain both components to the same extent. 
Internal accountability, for example, that is, a need to be able to justify one's behaviour to 
oneself (Simonson, 1989), suggests personal responsibility to the individual but does not 
create any significant evaluation apprehension, due to the absence of an external audience. 
External accountability, on the other hand, implies both personal responsibility and evaluation 
by an external audience. 
A new process model of accountability (PMA, see Chapter 5) was introduced, which 
linked the antecedents of accountability, personal responsibility and evaluation apprehension, 
to particular goals with particular cognitive consequences. The model's main premise is that 
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accountability can make the decision process both more complex and more biased and 
therefore has not the exclusively beneficial effects that it is commonly afforded. Ample 
evidence from the research literature was presented which supported this claim. The PMA 
proposes that the increased depth of information search and complexity of information 
integration that can be observed when individuals are made accountable, is the result of strong 
accuracy goals, which have been enhanced by the personal responsibility cues inherent in 
accountability manipulations. The stronger degree of defensiveness and bias in individuals' 
information evaluation and integration when they have been made accountable, on the other 
hand, is assumed to be the consequence of directional goals, which are enhanced by the 
evaluation cues inherent in accountability manipulations. Directional goals, as suggested by 
their name, are goals that steer the decision process into a particular direction, for example, 
towards supporting an alternative that is assumed to be favoured by the external audience 
individuals are accountable to. A directional goal may also be introduced by a previous 
commitment to an alternative (in this case the decision process is biased towards the 
previously chosen alternative) or by the individuals' knowledge that the outcome of their 
decision rather than the process by which they arrived at it will be evaluated1. Hence, the 
different goals that are made salient by personal responsibility and evaluation apprehension, 
respectively, set into motion different cognitive mechanisms that operate at different stages of 
the decision process. Accuracy goals enhance depth of information search and complexity of 
information integration, whereas directional goals introduce a bias into the decision maker's 
information evaluation and integration (see also Baumeister and Newman, 19942). It is 
important to note that both tendencies can be compatible when no normatively correct answer 
to a decision problem exists, as an increased depth of processing may be used to bias the 
decision process towards a particular outcome and construct justifications for one's 
conclusions (Kunda, 1990). If a normatively correct answer to a decision problem exists and 
                                                 
1 The distinction between accuracy and directional goals was originally proposed by Kunda (1990) and can be 
found in a similar form in Baumeister and Newman's (1994) model of self-regulated inference and decision 
processes. Baumeister and Newman (1994) distinguish between the mindset of an intuitive scientist, with a need 
to arrive at an optimal conclusion, and the mindset of an intuitive lawyer, with a need to arrive at a particular 
conclusion.  
2 Intuitive scientists are assumed to try to achieve their goal primarily by intensifying their information search, 
intuitive lawyers, on the other hand, are assumed to try to achieve their goal primarily by biasing their 
information evaluation and integration. 
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accuracy and directional goals conflict, accountability effects will ultimately depend on which 
goal is stronger. The question of whether or not accountability makes decision processes more 
normative as such was not one that this work attempted to answer, but we will nevertheless 
return to it later. 
The PMA predicts that the personal responsibility cues inherent in internal 
accountability manipulations will induce a deeper information search and more complex 
information integration compared to no accountability, while any biasing effects on 
information evaluation and integration processes will be minimal, because of the absence of 
any evaluation cues. This will, however, only be true as long as internal accountability is 
introduced before a decision is made. When individuals are made internally accountable after 
they have already made a decision, although they will still show a deeper information search 
and more complex information integration compared to non-accountable individuals, they 
will bias their information evaluation and integration towards supporting the previously 
chosen alternative. External accountability, on the other hand, will make information 
processing both more extensive and integratively complex and more biased compared to no 
accountability, no matter whether it is pre-decisional or post-decisional. The direction of bias 
induced by post-decisional external accountability, however, is likely to differ from that of 
pre-decisional external accountability. It is predicted to support the previously chosen 
alternative, whereas any pre-decisional bias is directed at supporting the alternative that is 
likely to be favoured by the audience the individual has been made accountable to. In the 
absence of any salient external norms that can guide the decision maker's information 
processing, the alternative that appears most defensible, for example, because it has the best 
outcome on the most important attribute, or because it seems to be a good compromise, is 
likely to be chosen. 
Two empirical studies were conducted to test the above predictions. The first 
compared internal and external accountability, which was introduced either before or after an 
initial decision had been made, in order to test whether it would be particularly pre-decisional 
internal accountability that resulted in an extensive but relatively unbiased decision process. 
No norms were made explicit in this study. The second study focused on the impact of pre- 
and post-decisional external accountability to different interest groups, in order to investigate 
how different external norms would pull the decision process into different directions. In both 
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studies, participants were asked to search information and make an initial decision before they 
were given the opportunity to search further information and had to make a final decision. 
The information offered the second time was largely redundant with that participants were 
able to search before their first decision, in order to be able to test to what extent information 
search would be biased to support a previously chosen alternative. Also, unidimensional value 
and weight judgements were elicited from participants at several points during the 
experiment, in order to test predictions derived from Svenson's (1992, 1996) differentiation 
and consolidation theory, particularly attractiveness differentiation and importance 
differentiation. Both are assumed to be employed in order to increase the overall evaluative 
difference between the chosen alternative and the non-chosen alternatives. Attractiveness 
differentiation refers to a change in the evaluation of attribute outcomes, such that outcomes 
of the chosen alternative are evaluated more positively and/or outcomes of the non-chosen 
alternatives more negatively than before. Importance differentiation means that the 
importance of attributes on which the chosen alternative fares well is enhanced and/or the 
importance of attributes on which the chosen alternative fares badly is decreased. These 
processes were expected to be more pronounced, when participants were accountable than 
when they were not accountable. 
The effects of accountability on directional bias in information evaluation and 
integration 
Overall, the results supported the predictions of the PMA, particularly in terms of the 
special role that norms play for directing decision processes. This was suggested by the fact 
that in the first study, where no particular norms were made salient before participants first 
made a decision and participants were therefore left to guess the preferences of the audience 
they had been made accountable to, the effects of a biased information evaluation and 
integration were rather weak and only marginally significant, whereas in the second study, 
where the norms of the audience participants were made accountable to were made more 
explicit, clear biasing effects were observed. This suggests that when individuals are made 
accountable, impression management concerns become salient and, in order to protect their 
social image, individuals adapt their expressed preferences to those of the audience they have 
been made accountable to. These effects were strong enough to find significant expression in 
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choices and attribute weights and to a lesser extent in suitability ratings of alternatives. Only 
when participants had not been made accountable, did their choices and attribute importance 
ratings follow their own attitude. Otherwise, when participants were made accountable to an 
audience that they expected to have certain preferences, they chose alternatives more often 
that had positive rather than negative outcomes on attributes participants expected to be 
considered important by the audience they had been made accountable to, and judged the 
relative importance of these attributes higher than the importance of attributes that were not 
expected to be considered important. As predicted, this was only true, however, when 
participants had been made accountable before they made an initial decision. If accountability 
was only introduced after participants had already committed themselves to an alternative, 
participants did not adjust their choice to the preferences of their audience (unless these 
preferences coincided with their own, obviously) and assigned attribute weights that were 
consistent with their previous choice. 
Although participants were found to rate relative attribute importance in such a way 
that their chosen alternative was supported, the change in these ratings from before the first to 
after the first decision and after the first to after the final decision was not usually significant, 
because of relatively strong regression effects, which counteracted differentiation and 
consolidation effects, particularly in those conditions, in which attribute weights had been 
extreme. Hence, importance differentiation in the strict sense of the word was not observed.  
The effects of attractiveness differentiation were tested by feeding participants' 
unidimensional value and weight judgements into a linear additive MAUT (multiattribute 
utility theory) model, which predicted the overall evaluation of alternatives. The reason for 
why attractiveness differentiation was not analysed independently of importance 
differentiation is that it is really only effective when it is performed on attributes that are 
considered important. The obtained results suggested that individuals indeed rate the 
outcomes of alternatives in such a way that their chosen alternative is supported, creating a 
large evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-chosen alternative. 
However, the effects of the experimental variables on the change of these ratings over time 
were relatively weak and only significant when individuals perceived a conflict between their 
own preferences and those of the audience they had been made accountable to. 
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Individuals' own preferences as a moderator of directional effects 
The results of the empirical work carried out to investigate the PMA consistently 
demonstrated the importance of participants' own preferences as a moderator of accountability 
effects. Any biasing tendencies observed in information evaluation and integration processes 
were particularly strong when a conflict between participants' own preferences and those of 
the audience they had been made accountable to existed, especially if participants had already 
committed themselves to an alternative before they were made accountable and therefore 
were under particular pressure. In some cases, as mentioned above, defensive bolstering was 
only observed under such circumstances. There are, however, two reasons why the work 
presented here may have overestimated the impact of participants' own attitude. The first is a 
purely methodological reason. The fact that unidimensional values and weights were elicited 
at the beginning of the experiment may have made participants' own preferences particularly 
salient to them, and they may have wanted to avoid appearing fickle to the experimenter. The 
second reason lies in the relative artificiality of the laboratory context participants were 
exposed to. Participants were only role-playing, had no prior relationship to their audience 
and could be relatively certain that a failure to adopt the preferences of the audience they had 
been made accountable to would not result in any severe negative consequences that may 
otherwise be expected in real-life situations. However, there is some evidence that conflict 
effects similar to those obtained in the present research can also be observed in the field. 
Kroon, van Kreveld and Rabbie (1991), for example, in a study on the effects of 
accountability conducted at two departments of the Dutch Riot Police Academy, found that 
incongruence between an anti-violence norm introduced by superiors and the norm already 
existing within the institution resulted in reactance. 
Internal vs. external accountability 
The effects of pre-decisional internal accountability had been predicted to differ from 
those of pre-decisional external accountability such that the bias evident in information 
evaluation and integration would be weaker for participants who had been made internally 
accountable than for participants who had been made externally accountable. This prediction 
could not be confirmed, however. If anything, there was a suggestion that participants under 
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external accountability kept the evaluative difference between their chosen and average non-
chosen alternative particularly small. This may partly be explained by the fact that no 
particular norms had been made salient and, yet again, underlines the significance of norms 
for directing the decision process. Under normative ambiguity, participants seem to have 
engaged in a 'sitting on the fence strategy' that would allow them to change their mind without 
losing face, should it be necessary, and signal recognition of the fact that others may have 
different preferences. When decision makers were made accountable only after they had 
already made an initial decision, the results, as predicted, suggested that the information 
processing of both internally and externally accountable participants became biased to support 
the previously chosen alternative, but this tendency was stronger for participants under 
internal than external accountability. This was evident in a number of information search as 
well as information evaluation measures. For example, participants who had been made 
internally accountable before the final decision displayed the least compensatory information 
search and a search that was most strongly concentrated on the chosen alternative. Also, their 
information search was most strongly biased to search dissonant rather than consonant 
information for the competing alternative. Interestingly, it was participants who had been 
made internally accountable before the first decision who showed the least biased information 
processing when they made their final decision. They also displayed the smallest degree of 
differentiation between their chosen and average non-chosen as well as directly competing 
alternative. Whereas for participants who had been made internally accountable before the 
first decision accuracy goals still seemed to be strongly salient and a motivation to support 
their previously chosen alternative relatively low, those who had been made internally 
accountable before the final decision, because of the immediacy of this manipulation, seem to 
have had a stronger motivation to protect their initial choice, and at the same time lacked the 
motivation to prepare for a public defence induced by external accountability, which gave 
them the freedom to show the strongest bias in their information processing.  
How much more bias does accountability induce compared to no accountability? 
A question which the present work also attempted to answer is how much more biased 
decision processes are under accountability compared to no accountability. Overall, the 
observed differences between the decision processes of accountable and non-accountable 
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participants were weaker where the extent of bias in information evaluation and integration 
was concerned than where depth of information search and complexity of its integration was 
concerned, and not always significant. This could have partly been the result of accountable 
participants' tendency not to openly show any differentiation and consolidation processes that 
were not in accordance with the preferences of the audience they had been made accountable 
to, which would have meant that any difference between accountable and non-accountable 
decision makers would become smaller. Evidence which supports this assumption will be 
discussed in more detail below. However, it may also be the case that a certain degree of bias 
is normal in choice processes. Indeed, there are theories which argue that decisions are 
generally made in such a way that they can be defended easily; hence, accountability should 
not change the choice process dramatically (Tversky, 1972; Slovic, 1975; Slovic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1988; Shafir, 1993; Shafir, Simonson & Tversky, 1993). For example, Shafir 
(1993) demonstrated that if individuals are asked to select an alternative, their choice is based 
on very positive aspects of the alternative, whereas if they are asked to reject an alternative, 
that is, identify the alternative they would not choose, their rejection is based on very negative 
aspects of the alternative. This results in the paradox effect that an alternative which has very 
positive as well as very negative aspects, can both be selected first and rejected first. 
Preference reversals involving choice and judgement, that is, changes of preference depending 
on whether individuals have to choose between alternatives or have to rate them in some way, 
also have been explained with a need to be able to defend choices more than judgements. 
Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1988) concluded that 'much of the deliberation prior to 
choice consists of finding a concise, coherent set of reasons that justify the selection of one 
option over the others' (p. 159).  
When is a bias really a bias? 
Even if one concludes that accountability has certain effects on information evaluation 
and integration that are over and above any such effects observed in 'normal', non-accountable 
choice, the question remains whether one should regard them as biases at all. Many authors, 
including Lerner and Tetlock (1999), have questioned this terminology. If, like Tetlock (1985, 
1991, 1992) proposes, the individual acts like a politician, whose primary goal is to maintain 
good relationships with his or her constituency, any costs of a bias may be off-set by the 
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benefits of getting along well with people (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Similar arguments have 
been made with regard to other biases. For example, the compromise effect, that is, the 
tendency to choose an alternative more often when it becomes a compromise or middle option 
in a choice set, is rational, if one assumes that the individual attempts to keep blame at a 
minimal level. Likewise, the fundamental attribution error, that is, the tendency to attribute 
behaviour to actor rather than situational characteristics, may be an expression of social 
control, that is, the attempt to hold others strictly accountable for their conduct even if there 
have been situational constraints on their behaviour (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). This line of 
argumentation follows a recent shift towards a pragmatic perspective in social psychology, in 
the course of which many social psychological phenomena have been re-interpreted in terms 
of the social utility they have for the individual. 
The instrumental nature of directional bias 
Apart from one exception, the results did not provide consistent evidence for 
Svenson's (1992, 1996) assumption that the extent of differentiation and consolidation is 
independent of the evaluative difference that has been achieved between alternatives already, 
but rather supported Boiney, Kennedy and Nye's (1997) conclusion that motivated reasoning 
is instrumental, and that the decision maker biases judgements more or less as needed to 
support the desired conclusion. This was, for example, indicated by the fact that a conflict 
between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been made 
accountable to resulted in an increased consolidation (evident in an increased difference 
between participants suitability ratings for their chosen and average non-chosen alternative 
from the first to the final decision) when they had been made accountable before the final 
decision, but in a decreased consolidation when they had already been made accountable 
before the first decision. 
However, when MAUT predicted rather than actually observed evaluative differences 
between the chosen and average non-chosen alternatives after the final decision were 
analysed, there was some suggestion that when these predictions were based on 
unidimensional value and weight judgements for the attributes contained in the first 
information search, a conflict between participants' own attitude and the preferences of the 
audience they had been made accountable to resulted in a significantly enlarged evaluative 
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difference, particularly for participants who had been made accountable before the first 
decision. This indicated continued bolstering of the chosen alternative under conflict, even 
when accountability pressures were not immediately salient anymore. 
Methodological boundary conditions of directional bias 
This dissociation of results highlighted an important methodological implication that 
was suggested both by findings from the first and the second study, namely that whether 
significant differentiation and consolidation effects defending the own choice can be observed 
or not, depends on whether an overt or a covert measure of differentiation and consolidation is 
employed. Overt measures, which involve relatively direct comparisons of the quality of the 
preferred option compared to others, such as actual suitability ratings of alternatives, make it 
obvious to others when decision makers have biased their information evaluation in order to 
defend their preferred alternative. Covert measures, on the other hand, such as MAUT 
predictions, which are calculated from a multitude of single components, hide such processes 
to a stronger extent. Impression management concerns mean that decision makers do not want 
to be seen biasing their decision processes too openly, a suggestion that has also been made 
by authors such as Kunda (1990), Baumeister and Newman (1994) and Hsee (1995, 1996). 
Hence, it is relatively unlikely that biasing effects will be observed in overt measures3. On the 
contrary, if a danger to be exposed as a non-objective information processor exists, decision 
makers may keep the evaluative difference between their preferred alternative and other 
alternatives small, especially if they are made accountable. Study 1 suggested that this 
tendency to 'sit on the fence' is of particular concern to decision makers when there is 
normative ambiguity and they cannot be sure about what reaction to expect from their 
audience. Study 2 suggested that this tendency is also stronger when decision makers 
anticipate dissent because their choice does not match the preferences of the audience they 
have been made accountable to. This hypothesis may help to explain the failure of previous 
studies to find significant differentiation and consolidation effects as a consequence of 
accountability, and provide a way forward of locating such effects in the future. 
                                                 
3 Huber and Seiser (2001) indeed did not find any significant difference between accountable and non-
accountable participants' suitability ratings for the chosen alternative and for the non-chosen alternatives. 
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It must also be noted that the fact that in the present studies numerical ratings were 
elicited rather than ratings on a visual analogue scale, which have been typically employed in 
previous differentiation and consolidation studies, made it less likely that differentiation and 
consolidation effects were obtained, because participants were better able to remember their 
previous judgements, and, for consistency reasons, may have provided these rather than 
ratings of alternatives, attributes and attribute outcomes as they were perceived at the time of 
elicitation. 
Finally, there was some indirect evidence that the order of dependent measures may 
have influenced results. For example, in the second study, weights for attributes contained in 
the first information set were always elicited before weights for attributes contained in the 
second information set, and it was only for the former that significant differentiation effects 
were observed. It may be that individuals take the first opportunity to achieve differentiation 
and consolidation and then do not enhance the evaluative advantage of their chosen 
alternative any further. This would again confirm the hypothesis that individuals only bias 
their decision processes as much as is needed, and not more. Support for a similar suggestion 
in the context of dissonance reduction was provided by Götz-Marchand, Götz, and Irle 
(1974), who found that the opportunity to reduce dissonance by negatively evaluating an 
intelligence test in which participants had allegedly performed badly, was preferred when it 
was the first dependent measure compared to when it was the fifth dependent measure in the 
post-test. 
Another possibility may be that particular ways of achieving differentiation and 
consolidation, for example, importance differentiation, are preferred over others. Dissonance 
theory would suggest that such preferences, apart from the extent to which they can hide bias, 
should depend on the resistance to change of various cognitions. Such effects need to be 
investigated more systematically.  
The effects of accountability on information search  
Apart from a biasing effect of salient norms or previous commitments on information 
evaluation and integration, the PMA had predicted that accountability, irrespective of its type 
or the time when it was introduced, would make information search more extensive and 
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information integration more complex, compared to conditions where accountability was 
absent. Overall, this tended to be the case, both in the first and in the second study, and was 
evident in a higher depth of search, lower variability of search, higher Index of Compensatory 
Processing and lower concentration of search on the chosen alternative under accountability, 
compared no accountability. These findings are consistent with previous research, for 
example, by Huber and Seiser (2001), who found that participants who had been made 
accountable before they made a decision searched more information, both overall and 
repeatedly, compared to participants who had not been made accountable.  
The fact that information processing remained at a deeper level, even when 
participants were only made accountable after they had already made a decision, contradicts 
Tetlock's (1985, 1991, 1992) hypothesis that the integrative complexity of individuals' 
information processing is only high when individuals are made accountable to an audience 
with unknown views before they make a decision, but supports the assumption of the PMA 
that accountability generally increases depth of processing. The difference between 
accountability before a first and before a final decision (rather than between accountability 
and no accountability) was less pronounced, but still approached significance in some cases. 
The particular type of accountability participants experienced also affected 
information search processes, by increasing the attention to particular attributes. For example, 
participants who had been made accountable to a particular interest group concentrated their 
information search on those attributes that they expected to be considered important by the 
group they had been made accountable to. However, as predicted, this was generally only the 
case if they had been made accountable before the first decision. Participants who had been 
made accountable before the final decision mainly searched information that was relevant to 
their previous choice, and therefore did not show a significant adjustment to the preferences 
of their audience when these conflicted with their own. Also, as expected, when participants 
had been made accountable to an audience with unknown views, their information search 
showed little evidence of being focused on particular attributes.  
There was also some effect of type of accountability on the extent of bias displayed in 
participants' final information search. As expected, externally accountable participants 
showed a significant tendency to search more information that they expected to support rather 
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than contradict their chosen alternative, and they did significantly more so than internally 
accountable participants. They also showed a significantly stronger bias to support the chosen 
over the competing alternative than participants in the 'internal accountability' conditions. 
Furthermore, participants who experienced a value conflict between their own preferences 
and those of the audience they had been made accountable to tended to exhibit a stronger bias 
to support their chosen alternative and to support their chosen over their average non-chosen 
alternative than did participants without such a conflict. 
The effects of task variables on information search  
At the same time as being affected by the experimental variables of time and type of 
accountability, the influence of task variables, such as the complexity of the task, the task of 
having to judge all alternatives, or a previous commitment was strongly evident in 
participants' information search. The relatively high informational complexity of both 
decision tasks meant that non-compensatory processing was common, where decision makers 
did not trade off attributes, but seemed to have eliminated alternatives from their 
consideration, if they did not meet certain criteria. In study 1, this effect was counteracted by 
pre-decisional instructions to rate all alternatives, in addition to making a choice. This meant 
that participants engaged in a generally very extensive information search. After they had 
made a decision, participants generally did not search information for all alternatives 
anymore, but concentrated their search on a sub-set of alternatives. In study 1, where a 
stalemate between alternatives was suggested, this sub-set typically included the chosen 
alternative and the other stalemate alternative as its closest competitor. Information search 
after a previous commitment was also found to be generally biased to support the chosen over 
the average non-chosen alternative. In the second study, there was also a significant general 
tendency to search more supporting than non-supporting information for the chosen 
alternative. These findings illustrate the effects of context variables other than accountability, 
which sometimes overshadowed accountability effects.  
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The effects of accountability on justifications  
Participants' written justifications of their choices showed some evidence of the higher 
complexity in information processing induced by accountability, although the effects 
observed here were not usually strong enough to be significant. Overall, the complexity of 
argumentation (i.e., the relative frequency of comparison of alternatives) was very low and 
justifications almost exclusively referred to the advantages of the chosen alternative. 
However, the justifications of accountable participants tended to be more complex and 
mentioned consonant arguments relatively less often and dissonant arguments relatively more 
often than those of accountable participants. Accountable participants also tended to mention 
more arguments overall than non-accountable participants. At the same time, the justifications 
of accountable participants were clearly directed toward the preferences of the audience they 
had been made accountable to, evident in the different relative percentage of arguments 
focusing on attributes that would have been perceived as relevant by the audience participants 
had been made accountable to. This supports Kunda's (1990) assumption that extensive 
information processing may facilitate the construction of justifications for desired 
conclusions. 
The justifications of externally accountable participants were found to contain 
relatively fewer arguments referring to negative aspects of the chosen, but relatively more 
arguments referring to positive aspects of the non-chosen alternatives than those of internally 
accountable participants. This may be regarded as yet another indicator of the heightened 
impression management concerns under external accountability; externally accountable 
participants avoided letting their own choice appear vulnerable, but showed that they were 
aware of the advantages of other alternatives preferred by their external audience.  
A tendency to bolster the chosen alternative by mentioning a large number of positive 
aspects of the chosen alternative was particularly pronounced, when participants perceived a 
conflict between their own attitude and the preferences of the audience they had been made 
accountable to. However, the relative number of arguments mentioning negative aspects of 
the non-chosen alternatives was smaller when a value conflict existed, presumably because 
some individuals had chosen to give in to audience pressures and did not want to mention 
negative aspects of their truly preferred alternative. A value conflict furthermore resulted in a 
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relatively larger percentage of falsely reproduced information, probably indicating a strategic 
rather than a real failure to remember information correctly. Finally, a value conflict resulted 
in a lower complexity of argumentation compared to the absence of such a conflict when 
participants had been made accountable before the first, but not when they had been made 
accountable before the final decision. Therefore, the higher complexity of processing induced 
by a more recent anticipation of having to justify one's choice to someone with a different 
opinion seems to have carried over to the justifications. A strategy of participants whose 
attitude coincided with that of their audience, on the other hand, seems to have been to 
mention general evaluation criteria they could expect their audience to share. They were 
found to do so relatively more often than participants who experienced a value conflict. Huber 
and Seiser (2001) had found a significant difference between accountable and non-
accountable participants in this respect. This finding was not confirmed by the present results, 
however. 
Does accountability improve decision processes? 
The decision problems used in the empirical investigations here did not have an 
obvious normatively correct solution (in fact, alternatives were even constructed in such a 
way that their overall utility predicted by a MAUT model would be very similar if attributes 
were weighted equally), hence the obtained findings cannot speak to the question of whether 
accountability results in better decisions. The present findings only imply that decision 
processes change when participants are made accountable. If a normatively correct answer 
exists, previous research has shown that accountability only increases decision accuracy if 
participants know or can anticipate this answer, or if the increased depth of processing 
induced by accountability makes it more likely that the normative answer is identified 
(Simonson & Nye, 1992). Hence, when participants have been trained in using certain 
normative decision rules, for example, to ignore sunk costs, the sunk cost effect is attenuated 
by accountability, and so is the primacy effect, due to a more extensive information 
processing, but choice-matching preference reversals, for example, are not. The more 
extensive information processing induced by accountability can backfire, however. Under 
accountability, the dilution effect, that is, the tendency to inappropriately take into account 
non-diagnostic information which dilutes the extremity of predictions (Nisbett, Zukier, & 
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Lemley, 1981; Zukier, 1982), is enhanced (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989, Tetlock, Lerner, & 
Boettger, 1996). 
It may be argued that the existence of an obviously correct solution which, if not 
known, can be identified through an increased information processing effort, is relatively 
uncommon in decision making under certainty, and, therefore, the likelihood that 
accountability can result in an improvement of the accuracy of such decisions is not very 
high. 
Qualitative vs. quantitative motivated reasoning 
One of the ongoing controversies in the motivated reasoning literature is whether 
motivational goals change the nature of information processing, that is, have a qualitative 
effect, or only change the intensity of information processing, that is, have a quantitative 
effect. A supporter of the former view is, for example, Kunda (1990, 1999) with her 
distinction between accuracy and directional goals, which are assumed to be met by different 
cognitive operations, a view this thesis also has subscribed to. Ditto and his co-workers (Ditto 
& Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch and Lockhart, 1998), on the other 
hand, are supporters of the latter view, and suggest that the reason why individuals accept 
preference-consistent information more readily than preference-inconsistent information is 
that preference-consistent information is less likely to initiate effortful cognitive analysis than 
preference-inconsistent information. While there is evidence to support this hypothesis, the 
present results seem to quite clearly point to two distinct effects of accountability, an increase 
in depth of information search and complexity of information integration and an increase of 
directional bias in information evaluation and integration. Analysis of the extent of bias in the 
final information search furthermore did not suggest that preference-consistent information 
was processed to a lesser extent. In study 1, externally accountable participants searched more 
information that supported their chosen alternative over their average non-chosen alternative 
than internally accountable participants. In study 2, participants who experienced a value 
conflict between their own preferences and those of the audience they had been made 
accountable to also showed this tendency. Ditto et al. (1998) concede that any factor that 
increases either the incentive for accurate judgements or the penalty for inaccurate ones, and 
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accountability is one such factor, should promote effortful processing of information people 
want to believe and this seems to have been observed here.  
The present findings also underline the validity of Kruglanski's (1996) contention that, 
in order to be able to predict motivated reasoning effects accurately, it is important to both 
identify the type of goal, that is, the desired end state, and its strength or magnitude. Whereas 
the former exerts an influence on the direction of cognitive activity, the latter affects the 
extent of cognitive activity. Because goal magnitude quantifies the effects of a goal type, 
according to Kruglanski, it is impossible to predict specific motivational effects on cognition 
from magnitude alone. Likewise, because of the principle of equifinality, which suggests that 
a goal can be reached in different ways, the identification of the goal alone is also insufficient 
for arriving at correct predictions about particular cognitive effects. Only a careful analysis of 
the psychological situation the individual is confronted with allows to predict which special 
means he or she is likely to choose to reach a particular goal, and the vigour with which it will 
be employed. In the present work, the analysis of the antecedents of different types of 
accountability and the normative context appeared vital for correctly predicting specific 
accountability effects. 
Accountability effects in natural environments 
The fact that significant adjustment to audience norms could be observed, despite the 
fact that accountability was manipulated in a laboratory context, implies that similar effects 
should occur when audience pressures are real. The social psychological persuasion and 
conformity literature would furthermore suggest that audience variables, such as the 
audience's reward and punitive power and likeability should influence participants' 
willingness to adjust to audience preferences. Studies by Cvetkovich (1978), Gordon and 
Stuecher (1992) and Haccoun and Klimoski (1975), for example, have provided some support 
for these assumptions.  
An important difference that a real-world context, such as an organisational 
environment, may present, however, is familiarity with the task. The participants in the 
present studies were students, and as such were not particularly experienced with the kind of 
decision problems they were presented with. Experts may not be as susceptible to the effects 
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of social pressure, because they have confidence in their own judgement and are used to 
following certain procedures. However, research carried out by Janis on the groupthink 
phenomenon (Janis, 1982) has illustrated how even for extremely consequential decisions, 
such as the US government's decision to invade Cuba in 1961, social pressures overrode 
expertise and resulted in highly defensive, dysfunctional information processing. Also, the 
controversy about whether experts are less susceptible to effects of motivated reasoning more 
generally, and decision biases in particular, is an on-going one. While Smith and Kida (1991), 
for example, have shown that professional auditors are less prone to biases, the medical 
decision making literature suggests that medical experts are as much, if not more, liable to 
certain decision biases as lay people (e.g., Heller, Saltzstein, & Caspe, 1992).  
Does accountability change preferences permanently? 
Another question that arises is, whether the effects that accountability has on the way 
in which information is processed, result in a permanent change of individuals' preferences. 
Given that accountability increases the individual's focus on salient norms, its effect may be 
expected to be more similar to normative influence, which typically only results in a 
temporary change of opinion, compared to informational influence, which changes attitudes 
more permanently (e.g., Deutsch & Gerrard, 1955). Simonson and Nye (1992) found some 
support for conformity processes as a result of pre-decisional external accountability. In one 
of their studies, participants who were simply instructed to process information thoroughly 
did not exhibit the sunk cost effect to a lesser extent than a control group who had not been 
made accountable. Participants who had been made accountable, on the other hand, showed a 
reduction in this bias. This implies that it was not the increased depth of processing of 
information but an adjustment to what accountable participants considered a normative 
response that reduced this bias. Also, in another study by Irwin and Davies (1995), responses 
to socially significant decision problems after a group choice returned to their original 
individual level, suggesting that adjustment to the values of the group was only short-lived. 
One way to investigate such effects more systematically is to employ an audience cancellation 
method, where participants first expect to have to justify their decision to some external 
audience, but then, after they have made a decision, are told that they will not have to do so 
after all. If their response is different from that of participants who are not given the audience 
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cancellation instruction, this would suggest that any observed preference shift is only 
strategic. Pennington and Schlenker's (1999) study, which employed such a paradigm, seemed 
to imply that external accountability does not only produce normative but also informational 
influence. Participants in an audience cancellation condition still showed some conformity to 
the norms of the audience they had been made accountable to, even when they made their 
decision only after having learned that the expected meeting with their audience had been 
cancelled, although to a lesser extent. In this case, it could not be ruled out, however, that 
participants may have believed that a meeting between them and their audience would take 
place at a later time. 
Implications for the use of accountability as a means of control in organisations  
Considerations like the ones just discussed have important implications for the use of 
accountability as a norm-enforcement mechanism in applied contexts. If pre-decisional 
external accountability induces only temporary adjustments to salient norms, it is only useful 
if the accountability pressure exerted by principals who delegate decisions to their agents can 
be maintained salient over a certain time span. This constant monitoring of agents' behaviour 
is costly, however, and somewhat undermines the goal of reducing workload by delegating 
decisions in the first place. Also, the larger the organisation, the more difficult it becomes to 
ensure accountability of subordinates to organisational leaders, and rules and regulations 
typically replace direct supervision, which are easier to ignore (Jos & Tompkins, 1994). At 
the same time, subordinates may not even be aware of whom they are accountable to and for 
what.  
Furthermore, some of the results presented here have suggested that if there is a 
conflict between the decision maker's own preferences and those of the audience he or she is 
accountable to, information processing may become defensive, with the aim of supporting the 
decision maker's own preference, particularly if accountability was only introduced after a 
decision had already been made. The extent of the perceived discrepancy between preferences 
should moderate this effect, however. If it is only slight to medium, the rewards and/or 
punishments associated with adjustment and a failure to adjust, respectively, may be strong 
enough to induce conformity. Indeed, there was some evidence for the truth of this 
assumption in the present data. In the second study, participants with a pro-management 
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attitude who had been made accountable to the future users of a program, the purchase of 
which they were asked to make a decision on, adjusted to the preferences of their audience 
more readily than participants with a pro-user attitude who had been made accountable to the 
management. 
One way to avoid reactance effects may be to delegate decisions only to agents who 
share the principal's values. This suggests that when organisations select personnel, such 
considerations should play a role. Alternatively, the goal of organisational culture should be 
to encourage employees to internalise the value system of the organisation, so that they can be 
trusted to make decisions in accordance with that system. The fact that in the present studies 
pre-decisional internal accountability overall seemed to have the fewest negative effects and 
kept information processing relatively balanced, even after an initial decision had been made, 
supports the potential benefits of such an approach. However, it is important to stress that it 
was only pre-decisional internal accountability that had such an effect. Post-decisional 
internal accountability induced information processing that was strongly biased, even more so 
than when accountability was external. 
Another condition that seemed to have had relatively beneficial effects was normative 
ambiguity, at least in the sense that decision makers were unable to demonstrate adjustment to 
certain norms and therefore engaged in a 'sitting on the fence strategy'. However, normative 
ambiguity can arise in two different ways. Firstly, the individual may genuinely not be able to 
anticipate the preferences of the audience he or she is accountable to, because there are no 
cues as to what these preferences are and/or these preferences are not very pronounced. 
Secondly, and this situation seems to be much more common, the individual can anticipate the 
preferences of the audience he or she is accountable to, but is equally accountable to more 
than one person or interest group whose views conflict with each other. This is, for example, 
the case, when companies are both accountable to their clients and shareholders, or when drug 
regulation agencies are accountable to both the pharmaceutical industry and patients who take 
the drugs that are admitted to or removed from the market. Tetlock and Boettger's (1994) 
investigation of a scenario similar to the latter situation suggested that, when made 
accountable to multiple audiences with conflicting views, individuals often attempt to cope by 
buck-passing, that is, trying to transfer responsibility for the decision to others, and by 
procrastinating, that is, delaying the decision. Hence, the kind of normative ambiguity that is 
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most common may result in dysfunctional behaviour. It must be mentioned at this point, 
however, that there are some studies which have suggested that accountability to an audience 
with conflicting views may enhance complexity of processing (e.g., Carnevale & Mack, 
reported in Carnevale, 1985), and may induce more constructive negotiation strategies (Pruitt 
& Carnevale, 1982). However, it looks like such results may only be obtained if compromises 
are possible. As to the first type of normative ambiguity, further research is necessary to 
systematically investigate the conditions under which individuals attempt to guess the 
preferences of their audience, which type of cues they base their guess on, and which type of 
cues will promote success or failure at guessing correctly. Biases such as the false consensus 
effect, that is, the tendency to assume that others share one's own opinions (Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977), suggest that individuals may display an egocentric bias in their guesses and 
often guess incorrectly. 
The work presented here has clearly demonstrated that accountability is not 
universally beneficial, due to its potential to focus individuals' attention on salient norms and 
induce information processing that is directed to favour a conclusion compatible with these 
norms. Whereas this norm enforcement aspect of accountability is vital for social control and 
maintaining social order, it can also be dysfunctional. Moreover, a conflict between 
individuals' preferences and the norms of the audience they have been made accountable to 
seems to result in particularly defensive information processing. Conditions in which external 
norms are completely absent are rare and such effects, therefore, are difficult to avoid. 
Humans as social animals are invariably subject to social influence and this influence is also 
evident in decision processes. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Information set 1, experiment 1. 
 
 A B C D 
Diploma thesis 
grade B A- A B+ 
Educational stay 
in a foreign 
country 
none 
3 months 
placement in the 
USA 
studied in 
England for one 
year 
6 weeks in 
England on a 
school exchange 
Number of 
placements in 
the area of Org. 
Psych.  
3, in different 
fields none 1 
2, in similar 
fields 
Job as a student 
research 
assistant 
for one year, 
when writing 
thesis 
demonstrator in 
a lab class for 
one term 
none 
for several 
years, since 
intermediate 
exams 
Activities as a 
student member 
of a professional 
organisation  
helping to create 
a data base for 
placements 
member of  
BDP, active as a 
student rep and 
in EFPSA 
member of BDP no activities 
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Appendix 2. Information set 2, experiment 1. 
 
 
A B C D 
Computing 
skills 
good knowledge of 
1 word processing 
package and SPSS 
medium knowledge 
of 1 word 
processing package 
and SPSS 
fair knowledge of 1 
word processing 
package and SPSS 
very good knowledge of 
2 word processing 
packages, SPSS, and a 
programming language, 
experience with data 
bases 
Knowledge of 
foreign 
languages 
English: fair 
no French 
English: very good 
French: good 
English: excellent 
French: very good 
English: good 
French: fair 
Activities as a 
student rep on 
university 
committees 
two years on 
Departmental Board 
AstA member for 
several years 
substitute on 
Faculty Board for 
one term 
no 
Relevance of 
thesis topic to 
Org. Psych. 
thesis in 
Organisational 
Psychology, in 
research area of 
future supervisor 
thesis in an area 
unrelated to 
Organisational 
Psychology 
thesis in Clinical 
Psychology with 
possible 
applications  
in Org. Psych. 
thesis in 
Organisational 
Psychology, not in 
research area of 
future supervisor 
Reference from 
thesis supervisor fair very good extremely good good 
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Appendix 3. Mean values (M) and standard deviations (SD) for ratings of similarity between 
attribute pairs in experiment 2 (ratings for parallel attributes appear in bold 
typeface). 
Similarity between M SD 
user interface design & satisfaction with user interface design         4.82 0.55 
user interface design & satisfaction with method support           2.72 1.15 
user interface design & method support                 2.54 1.17 
user interface design & training requirements            3.30 1.36 
user interface design & training costs           2.92 1.39 
user interface design & hardware costs          2.37 1.12 
user interface design & hardware requirements        3.00 1.18 
satisfaction with user interface design & satisfaction with method support   2.84 1.20 
satisfaction with user interface design & method support 2.74 1.28 
satisfaction with user interface design & training requirements            2.84 1.30 
satisfaction with user interface design & training costs           2.98 1.35 
satisfaction with user interface design & hardware costs          2.27 1.21 
satisfaction with user interface design & hardware requirements        2.56 1.17 
satisfaction with method support & method support               4.70 0.79 
satisfaction with method support & training requirements          2.80 1.02 
satisfaction with method support & training costs         2.52 1.23 
satisfaction with method support & hardware costs        1.85 1.02 
satisfaction with method support & hardware requirements      2.02 0.94 
method support & training requirements            2.86 1.17 
method support & training costs           2.79 1.17 
method support & hardware costs          2.06 1.09 
method support & hardware requirements        2.37 1.18 
training requirements & training costs           4.35 1.09 
training requirements & hardware costs          1.37 0.70 
training requirements & hardware requirements        1.54 0.98 
training costs & hardware costs        1.64 1.11 
training costs & hardware requirements      1.56 0.81 
hardware costs & hardware requirements      4.76 0.60 
Note: Similarity ratings were given on a scale from 1 (very dissimilar) to 5 (very similar). 
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Appendix 4. Information set 1, experiment 2. 
 
 A B C D 
Satisfaction with 
Method Support 
judgement of 
testers: 
6 
judgement of 
testers: 
7 
judgement of 
testers: 
3 
judgement of 
testers: 
4 
Training 
Requirements 
new training 
concept needed, 
25 days for 
development, 
5-day course 
new training 
concept needed, 
20 days for 
development, 
5-day course 
adaptation of 
vendor’s concept, 
2 days for 
development, 
5-day course 
adaptation of 
vendor’s concept, 
4 days for 
development, 
5-day course 
Hardware  
Costs ca. 200.000 DM ca. 340.000 DM ca. 230.000 DM ca. 300.000 DM 
User Interface 
Design  
medium-suited to 
requirements, medium 
orientation, flexible 
user guidance, no 
context-sensitive help 
well-suited to 
requirements, medium 
orientation, flexible 
user guidance, 
context-sensitive help 
medium-suited to 
requirements, good 
orientation, inflexible 
user guidance, 
context-sensitive help 
well-suited to 
requirements, good 
orientation, flexible 
user guidance, 
context-sensitive help 
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Appendix 5. Information set 2, experiment 2. 
 
 A B C D 
Hardware 
Requirements 
8 MB RAM, 20 MB 
on hard disk, 486/33 
MHz processor,  
laser printer, 
16’’ monitor 
16 MB RAM, 150 
MB on hard disk, 
Pentium/90 MHz 
processor, postscript 
laser printer, 19’’ 
monitor 
12 MB RAM, 50 MB 
on hard disk, 486/66 
MHz processor, 
laser printer, 
16’’ monitor 
16 MB RAM, 120 
MB on hard disk, 
486/100 MHz 
processor, 
laser printer, 
19’’ monitor 
Satisfaction with 
User Interface 
Design 
judgement of 
testers: 
2 
judgement of 
testers: 
5 
judgement of 
testers: 
3 
judgement of 
testers: 
6 
Method Support 
entity-relationship and 
data flow modelling, 
modelling of 
organisational 
procedures has to be 
configured manually 
entity-relationship 
modelling, data flow 
modelling 
and modelling of 
organisational 
procedures 
entity-relationship and 
data flow modelling, 
no modelling of 
organisational 
procedures 
entity-relationship 
modelling and 
modelling of 
organisational 
procedures, no data 
flow modelling 
Training Costs ca. 50.000 DM ca. 45.000 DM ca. 7.000 DM ca. 9.000 DM 
 
 
